ABSTRACT. The essay aims to sum up distinctions and relations between motives, purposes, and reasons, to ground a socio-cultural account of action. The method is selective critique of recent analyses and arguments.

Motives are causal, but reasons are not. The construal of motives and purposes should be broader than usual. Purpose is that for the sake of which something is done, motive correlating to it as attitude to object; actions may count as intrinsic goods when done for their own sake; lastly, all actions are motivated. If a purpose is unreasoned and arbitrary, it doesn't count as a reason, reasons being justificatory.

Davidson's breaching the distinction between reasons and causes can only be extenuated, not justified. That line holds by virtue of the way philosophy of culture, not philosophy of nature, makes sense of reasons in terms of approbative emulation. There is both a basis for dualism in the differentiation of culture from the world and one for monism in their mergence. Philosophy of action and ethics effectively suggest this joint divergence/mergence.

PREFACE

The charge of having been derived from animism has been made against philosophical dualism. There seems to be partial truth in the charge, but the distant ancestry itself more nearly reflects credit, not discredit, upon all concerned—including those philosophies of action and ethical
theories having dualistic aspects. The partiality of the
truth can be sustained in that animism is ambiguous as be­
tween dualism and monism, between divergence and mergence
regarding nature and spirit. Very primitive rootings in
animism of the world descriptive and culturative functions
give rise on the one hand to spirit worship with its diver­
gence and on the other to nature worship (pluralistic before
becoming monistic) with its merger of descriptive and cul­
turative elements. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
gives three definitions of "animism", the first two being
compatible with merger; and the third with divergence:
1. a doctrine that the soul is the vital principle of or­
ganic development. 2. attribution of conscious life to na­
ture or natural objects. 3. belief in the existence of
spirits separable from bodies."[1]

Animism's ambiguity undergoes transformation but is
nonetheless passed on down through philosophy. Jaspers
pointed out the first major change in the Axial Age when
religion and philosophy became part of history and enabled
man to reach for individual self-understanding.[2] "Peren­
nial philosophy" was carried on in various well-founded
strategies for authorizing and integrating ways of life and
thought, differing from traditional religions mainly in its
greater trust in human rationality and in closer relations
to the histories of science and politics. On the theologi­
cal side of such views, the ambiguity of animism still
showed itself through joint assertions of Divine immanence
and transcendence.

The contemporary philosophical scene more nearly re­
fects the second major shift in the legacy. Secularization
progressively obscured and tended to abrogate the founda­
tional insight to a Divine grounding for nature and values.
A once well-founded strategy becomes more simply just a
placement strategy for locating man within nature and his
authorized norms. (Placing man in nature alone is science's
job.) The placement strategist takes both nature and norms
as givens, his affinity to his naive animist ancestor lying
in his continuing needs to describe and to culturate, the
two needs merging and diverging.

Philosophies of mind and action, along with ethical
theories, more sharply display joint divergence and mergence
than does epistemology for example, its norms staying more
in the background. The main body of this discussion common
sensically instantiates the animistic legacy regarding mo­
tives, purposes, and reasons. Divergence will be seen in
the non-identity of reasons and causes; mergence in motiva­
tional causation of actions, motives co-implicating purposes
(both taken in a broad sense), and in purposes as calling
for reasoned justification. The orders of fact and justifi­
cation are distinguishable, but not separable; as are the
sciences and humanities.
Culturation through approbative emulation is a key factor. Philosophy of culture becomes as basic for action theory and ethics as philosophy of nature is for epistemology. Divergence with mergence is to be commended over against its alternative, reductive naturalism that submerges culturation within world description. After the main discussion, I shall deal briefly with the question as to how far today's ethical theories also instantiate the animist's ambiguity and in what respects mythic traces can be dredged up even from apparently submergent positions.

The heart of the matter will be a sociocultural account of action through examining differences and relations among motives, purposes, and reasons. Some conceptual idealization will be required, but mostly in the dismissal of misleading uses. First, insofar as occurrent and dispositional motives count as causal, they fall within world-description, but insofar as they incidentally evoke questions of justification, they pertain to the culturative realm. Secondly, both motives and purposes should be taken in a broader sense, "that-for-the-sake-of-which" covering things done for their own sake, their agents having pro-attitudes toward doing so. (Ewing creatively expanded ideal utilitarianism beyond consequentialism, such expansion constituting mergence.)[3] Thirdly, reasons are not strictly the same as purposes, though certainly alluding to them, but are principles of choice "taking one consideration with another." Fourthly, it can be argued against Davidson's interesting submergent position that a reason is not a cause. Lastly, the philosophy of culture is more hospitable to philosophy of action than is the philosophy of nature or of science, because approbative emulation furnishes the best key to understanding the sense of reasons for action.

I. MOTIVES AS CAUSAL

Motives may be understood as embraced by two domains, the factual and the justificatory. But they are most often considered in the order of fact. Consider: there may be bad motives as well as bad reasons, yet while we may often sensibly say of a bad reason that it is no reason at all, we do not say of a bad motive that it is no motive. The facticity of "motives" predominates here, while "reason" clearly inhabits the justificatory domain of meaning. Divergency is quite marked at this point.

Yet some classifications partly blur the difference. Consider A.R. White. He marks off causal and teleological explanations from each other by limiting causes of actions to antecedent events, while at the same time grouping both "motive explanations" and those in terms of "reason or purpose" as teleological.[4] One can question such equating of "reason" and "purpose", since, though careless speech often takes "reason" for "purpose", a reason typically carries
justificatory force, and not all purposes justify. Whenever a reason is given for an action, the agent's purpose or goal is certainly implicated. Yet a given purpose might not have any justifying reason, since the choices by agents of ends-in-view can be quite arbitrary. Despite his opinion, and however different they are from each other, Aristotelian and Rylean causal readings of dispositional motive are both convincing. White's reluctance to take any motive-explanation as causal seems based upon the claim that motives are intentional, but thirst is surely causal.

White's analysis of the relation between motive explanations and those we call "purpose explanations" has its merits, yet these two sorts should not be lumped together. A fully stated motive mentions the purpose, but not the desire. In no way is the point a trivial one. Though "purpose" is not synonymous with "motive," knowing the one allows an inference to the other, a move from the "that-for-the-sake-of-which" to the agent's "pro-attitude" towards it.[5] Assume that an agent's purpose is such-and-such. It is his very possession of that particular purpose and not its "such-and-such" content that implies the pro-attitude toward it.

Expanding White's position then leaves us with three distinct sorts of explanations: antecedent event explanations, motive explanations and purposive or teleological explanations. Contrary to White's practice, the first two are here naturally enough classed together as causal, but not the third, stemming as it does from the intentional content of explicit motive explanations. None of those justify an action, although motives and the purposes to which they relate call for assessment. When the question of justifiability becomes raised, philosophy of culture appears as a much more congenial frame of reference than does philosophy of nature.

Another critical change is mandated by White's use of the term "desire."[6] Nowell-Smith's neologism "pro-attitude" has its decided advantage of greater generality, and Davidson's use of the term is so far quite reasonable. Approving is not ever to be boiled down to wanting. We are only confused into imagining so since wantings may be approved out of prudence or beneficence, no other principle forbidding. "Pro-attitudes" consequently work well as explanation-factors either in dispositional or occurrent motive-explanations. Upon this broad reading, those factors may be rightly claimed as causal. We are then safe with motives construed as causes, and that provides a first basis for the merger which will also be found in the way purposes not only correlate with motives but in addition closely relate to issues of rational justification. Nonetheless, divergency holds between causes and reasons.
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II. WIDER SENSES FOR PURPOSE AND MOTIVE

Repeating my support for A.R. White's contextual correlation of a "that-for-the-sake-of-which" with its pro-attitudinal motive, and remarking merely that such a correlation can never be an identity, I would hold that A.C. Ewing correctly classifies any action in which something is done for its own sake as purposive. He stretches out the earlier formulations of ideal utilitarianism, by assuming that "intrinsic goods" may include acts as well as consequences.[7] That seems fair enough. We regard actions in which something may be done for its own sake as contextually implying "pro-attitudes." Not all purposes in doing X are "further purposes" than doing X; surely not all motives are ulterior. Except when knowingly yielding to temptation, we do regard our own purposes as "intrinsic goods."

Ewing's enlargement here given to purpose covers all actions "done-for-their-own-sake," just because the agents wanted to, as well as those done out of virtue, this being its own reward. If this raises doubts, one could simply speak of "purposes-plus" or of "that's-for-the-sake-of-which," which would comprehend not only "doing-X-for-the-sake-of-Y" but "doing-X-for-the-sake-of-doing-X." That completes our observations on the legitimate broadening of purpose and the co-implicated broadening of motive.

From the other side, motive ought not to be restricted consequentially either. I doubt that "motive" should be limited even to the sense given by White, and certainly not to any more confining sense. Let us assume a question to be asked, "What is the motive for Tom's doing X?" Asking seems strange whenever the answer would be apparent, but this does not have to be a logical oddness. Let us consider the raising of the question why Tom plays golf when Tom manifestly enjoys golfing. It may happen that the questioner, conceivably not trusting first impressions, or being extraordinarily suspicious, searches for something else behind the action. On the other hand he may simply be attempting to analyze the obvious in a manner most confusing to his listener. Possibly that is why White confines "motive" to cases where X is done out of the desire for Y, and X and Y are never the same. R.S. Peters[8] and William Alston[9] go even further in boxing in the sense of motive. Where a standard purpose attaches to the action, as in sending Christmas cards, they take it as puzzling or invidious to ask for the motive. Still it seems highly questionable to postulate that all motives must be ulterior ones. That would follow as an unattractive implication of rigid consequentialism.

For a better view, one should turn to Nowell-Smith, who writes: "In ordinary life to ask what someone's motive in doing something was is usually to imply that the motive was a disreputable one; but this must not blind us to the fact
that everything which a man chooses to do is susceptible of a motive-explanation. A motiveless action, or 'acte gratuit' is logically impossible."[10] Instinctive, purely impulsive, behavior might be called "motiveless." But if actions are restricted to those that are chosen, all this being componental to Stephan Korner's recent analysis as well, then deliberate action as opposed to mere behavior, that has no motive becomes impossible.[11] For the most responsible use of the term "action", this would be the best reading.

In brief, the question, "What is Tom's motive in playing golf?" does not at all strike us as strangely as does "Is two and two really four?" The special peculiarity of the former question lies in asking for what should seem plain to an observer, in L'il Abner's words, "as any fool can plainly see." Let us assume that Tom's motive in playing golf is his very own personal pleasure in playing golf, or that behind his sending Christmas cards is a wish to conform socially. "What is his motive?" still makes some sense even if the asker isn't just turning down the obvious answer. Therefore by and large I prefer the broader construal of "motive." Any doubt, whether White's, Peter's, or Alston's, fails to threaten the natural use of "motive" where all actions are genuinely motivated.

To sum it up, the correlative notions of "motive" and "purpose" clearly go past White's somewhat limited usage, and much past the more confining senses of Peter's and Alston's. But the roomier construal does apparently accomplish the task of salvaging whatever is sound in all of the other accounts. Therefore, it deserves endorsement.

III. PURPOSES NOT IDENTICAL WITH REASONS

A prime error, though no doubt an initially plausible one, lies in taking purposes as such to be reasons. That the statement of reasons typically alludes to purposes, and that as a result imprecise talk sometimes equates the two, does not settle the matter. The phrase "purposive explanation" should be preferred over against A.R. White's portmanteau "reason or purpose explanation" since an action can be purposive without being reasonable, even without being so taken by its agent. Though reasoning about the relations of means to end surely ties up with purposiveness, reason engages both thought as to what wants really count and moral reflection upon such choices.

In some contexts, "purpose" fits and "reason" does not do nearly so well. "John's purpose in cutting his grandmother's throat was to steal her necklace for the purchase of heroin." It seems counterintuitive somehow that "reason" be substituted for "purpose." Naturalists would seem uncomfortably committed to this substitution. Yet perhaps John
himself would not presume to claim his purpose as a reason. If he claimed a "bad" reason as a reason, one might rather want to say "John thinks he has a reason for acting," suggesting that he wrongly takes a consideration as a reason which is not one.

Someone could object that what is "not really a reason" that is, a purpose, is still "his (the agent's) reason," intending to bolster a neutral instrumental sense of "reason" as the proper one. That this might be said seems much less important than how we would go about saying it, ironically and stressing "his", and of far less consequence than our shying away from saying "the reason John murdered, etc.", since this would suggest a co-sponsorship in a public forum of the act's legitimacy. All of these considerations incline me to believe that the neutral sense of "reason" battens upon a prior justificatory sense.

Anyone could have any number of short-term purposes without being willing to claim them as reasons or justifications. People do things at times without justifying them at all, though still having their purposive ends-in-view. It can be added that all explanations in terms of "pro-attitudes," that is, "motive explanations" are causal, and that occurrent or dispositional pro-attitudes can enter such explanations. For causes, among other things, we look for agents' set attitudes and actualized decisions, felt inclinations and the like. Purposive accounts need not always be whole rationales, though possibly implying them when ends-in-view claim respectability or even mere permissability.

Another hopeful line may be taken in distinguishing the class of purposes from that of reasons. One could act purposively, using instrumental reason, without having initiated a rational comparison of one's ends. An agent impulsively setting a course, even when choosing workable means, cannot always be said to have acted upon a reason. Even calculative reason falls short of being reasonable when an actor does not weigh his real wants, when he proceeds with too much haste. Both modes together stand as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions of rational action. The agent's goal falls subject to evaluation just whenever reasonableness is claimed for it. One might like to allow reasons, in the plural and before decision, to be either "moral or immoral."[12] But a decisive reason for (or against) action must have issued from relevant considerations, including moral ones. A "bad reason" only possesses rationality in connecting the bad goal with its means. Subject to reprobation, unlike a poor reason (which might have been a good reason, the situation having been different), it need not really be taken as a true reason by those asserting its badness.

Similar accounts of explanation comes from many thinkers working in different areas. In the field of philosophy
of history, William Dray, and in that of philosophy of mind, those men whom Bernstein, like Passmore, calls "new teleologists"[13] urge the importance of a "rationale."[14] This involves both purposive explanation, implying causal explanation though not identical with it, and at least, the suggestion of a proximate if not ultimate justification. For Dray, a rationale hangs upon an agent's ends and principles, which need not be those of the historian. Two features of most rationales are incompleteness and also the kind of causal association that ushers in unwelcome "covering-law" readings from positivists interested in submerging actions in events. Yet a rationale points up those non-causal aspects proper to normative concerns, those aspects which ought not to be neglected.

In fairness to naturalists, we had better take the "covering law" approach in its most favorable sense while viewing causal accounts of action in a neo-Humean light. With that as our beginning we could next side with Aristotle rather than with White, grouping both motive-explanations and antecedent-event explanations together as causal. This would be somewhat provocative, since motive explanations, unlike other ground-level causal explanations, also entail non-causal teleological explanations. However, this still would not compel us to take reasons as causes, in view of the properly justificatory role of rationales.

IV. REASONS ARE NOT CAUSES

A causal explanation for a happening stands as the enquirer's reason for the happening. Let us allow provisionally for the sake of argument that an action is a sort of happening. Furthermore, in unusual cases such as amnesia, the enquirer could even be the agent himself retrospecting about an action. Donald Davidson suggests admirably clear causal explanations for actions in terms of attitudes and beliefs. However, one cannot quite get from here to there, there being the Davidsonian position. Two barriers would seem to fully stand in the way of our taking reasons straightforwardly as causes, as does Davidson. An agent's reason for an action, also to be made available to some community or other, is not the enquirer's fuller "reason why" for a happening. A reason could be either a scientist's or an actor's. The other barrier can be said to be this: A causal explanation, rational enough presumably in its own terms, and alluding to the causes, itself no more constitutes a cause than a "Save-the-whale" speech would be a whale.

There being contrary views deriving from rather different premises at issue here, a preliminary excursus free of Davidsonian references should be helpful in laying some different groundwork. It will be followed by a tentative hypothesis explaining Davidson's taking the position he does
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take.

Dispositions, states of affairs, or events cause actions, but a reason counts neither as a habit, a state of affairs, nor as an event. An action could be caused by an agent's reasoning about his choice in the light of normative principles, but a case of reasoning would not be a reason. Reasons are the sorts of things we act without or upon. Unlike causes, they appear as sound or unsound principles. Although the cause of John's action may well be his acceptance of a principle, his acceptance cannot itself be the principle.

We should now address Hume's claim that "reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions". At best such reason mediates, coordinates and carries out first-person aims, as by raising two questions, "What do I really want?" and "How do I get what I want?" Both those prudential questions as "principles of rationality," fall under "principles of reasonableness" (the principles of morality), claims David Richards. For an action said to be reasonable, its defender purports to have taken "one consideration with another," where the considerations explicitly or implicitly include moral ones. Though naturalists seek to ground their ethic on a Hume-like basis, the gap between prudential calculation and ethical principles cannot so readily be eliminated.

Misreading Hume must be guarded against. One can not say on such grounds as those that Hume takes reasons (rather than passions) as causes. Reconstrual, and unfortunate reconstrual alone, projects that view upon him. An action finds its cause rather in its agent's taking a consideration to be a reason, more precisely, to be a decisive reason. A reason as a reason is not an event nor even the disposition to take some consideration as decisive. In all consistency with what they maintain elsewhere, naturalists should properly limit their discussion of causes just to events and dispositions.

One promising angle we might work with is linguistic, since ordinary ways of talking occasionally make it difficult to tell reasons from causes. Stephen Toulmin wrote: "As we say . . . the line separating reasons from causes becomes very thin at certain points. It may seem innocent enough—when speaking colloquially—to describe the reasons justifying a conceptual change as 'explaining' why the scientists concerned changed their mind, or alternatively to refer to the activity of a research term in collecting new evidence as 'justifying' the explanatory procedures in support of which their research was undertaken. Yet such colloquial expressions are potentially misleading and, for philosophical purposes, we shall have to choose our words more carefully."

One could add more to those remarks. There are a number of butter-slides onto which one may inadvert-
ently slip. For most everyday purposes, ordinary speech does well enough, but loose ways of speaking can not be taken as justifying the claim that reasons are causes.

The dictionary introduces us to some of those treacherous butter-slides. Lexicographically-impressed thinkers may be drawn by more than one quaint usage into claiming synonymy between reason and cause, since older senses of cause associated with rather telic, pre-Galilean notions survive in everyday speech. When a contemporary philosopher says that a reason is a cause, we suspect he does not consciously intend any such outmoded sense, yet the synonymy claim may very well follow from such older ways of talking as these: "Our cause is just." "Show reasonable cause." "There is cause for rejoicing." Strictly speaking, the term "reason" could be substituted in the third case, as it could be for the whole phrase "reasonable cause" in the second case. But in the first sentence, "cause" bears the sense of purpose, and "purpose" fits only sometimes as equivalent to "reason". This does not hold true of the term "cause". A purpose may be taken as contextually implying, yet not entailing, the justifying principle for its choice. This follows since a reason is a favorably assessed purpose, and sometimes mentioned purposes suggest their own legitimacy. A "purpose explanation" may, but does not have to, contextually imply a "reason explanation." "Reason" weighs in as a graver term than "purpose". A purpose always simply belongs to someone but a reason as such primarily justifies, as well as being, for instance, "John's reason." Only reasonable purposes can be publicly acknowledged as reasons, unreasonable ones receiving public demotion while still keeping their status as purposes. That helps explain the concealment of disreputable actions and hypocrisy generally.

One short formula touches our chief problem with the butterslide. "The reason for his doing X was Y." This tempts us now to mix reason and cause only because Y does double duty. It nails down the reason for the agent's action and implies his motivation, namely his disposition to act in line with reason Y. "The reason" has its ambiguity since it may be either our reason (causal explanation) in comprehending the agent's action or it can be his own justification. If the last, the sentence really deserves clarification, "His reason for doing X was Y," in the spirit of our earlier analysis.

Reasons, unlike causes, are reasons for anyone's believing that, believing in, doing something, or assuming a policy of doing something. As such, reasons are ways of thinking which fix some claim upon a thinking agent that some policy or other is preferable. The stating of reasons may be so elliptical as to encourage us to think that reasons are "operative" in the styles of events or locomotives. "The cause" given might be either a particular condition or a general covering law, but such an item only makes up part
of a whole causal explanation. Conversely, a supposed fact may be treated as a reason though it is just one element in a fully stated reason.[17] Other parts of a justification are the principle of choice appealed to, together with either the purpose or the fittingness of a kind of action. Problems with such talk occur to the philosopher more often than to the man of common sense. Ordinary understanding takes place with the help of many tacit assumptions shared in the context of his speech.

In contrast, take the three sentences given by Keith Donnellan, which he holds to carry the same meaning. (1) "The boring conversation caused me to leave early." (2) "I left early because the conversation was so boring." (3) "My reason for leaving early was that the conversation was so boring."[18] These only partially overlap in their meaning. The first offers a causal explanation, while through the persuasive force of "boring" contextually implying a justification. The second falls into ambiguity with its "because" which could be either causal or justificatory or both. The third is a justification ("My reason") alluding to a supposed fact and elliptical in leaving out the principle justifying the action. Lastly, the third sentence, like any reason-explanation for an action, does imply a motive explanation. This implication remains over and beyond the negative persuasive force of the term "boring."

A helpful distinction can be drawn with an historical illustration. Mr. Baldwin could well have properly confessed desertion of duty toward Mr. Liddy if he had left the Howard Johnson during a very boring Democratic conversation. Then he couldn't mention boredom as a justification, given that his assigned job was to listen and take careful notes of any talk. Donnellan's third example gives the reason and implies its motive. If a reason justifies, it cannot be simply a function of individual psychology or preference. The pass that must not be sold is the preferability of the way of thinking called upon by the agent in his justifying reason. That his way of thinking comes to be preferred by him gives us the motive explanation, but the reason explanation lies in its being worthy of being preferred. Ethical naturalists often give up this distinction, unbeknownst to themselves or not, thus collapsing the line between reasons and causes.

David A.J. Richards made various sound points about moral psychology. Still, I wonder whether his identification of "good reason" with "a generally sufficient reason" holds good.[19] It would be far sounder to take "good reason" and "conclusive reason" as equivalent. Instead of "generally sufficient reason" one might bring in a term like that used by W.D. Ross, and refer to a "prima facie reason". One should allow that prima facie duties do count as such prima facie reasons. Richards discusses "self-regarding reasons." The question should be raised as to which sub-
One clear answer to that quest for delimitation may be submitted: They can only be such *prima facie* reasons if soundly calculated as to both the real wants of the agent and also the appropriate available means of action. This would put aside those reasons which are poor or bad, even though in tune with the agent's self-regarding interests. "Self-regarding reasons" make no such broad moral claim as do "good reasons", and are frequently overridden, most clearly by real duties.

On the other hand if nothing forbids, any soundly calculated self-regarding reason would then be vested as a good or conclusive reason for acting. Well-reasoned self-regarding reasons would have to be good reasons everything being considered, that is, if they do not clash with overriding duties. This lets us fix a boundary line between egoistic prudentialism and utilitarianism, whether the latter is hedonistic or ideal. The farthest outpost of prudentialism lies on the border of utilitarianism. The label "minimal reason" should characterize the least worthy of reasons on the face of it. Such would be our permissible wants, nothing forbidding them. Richards might conceivably choose to class those with his "generally sufficient reasons."

Other things being equal, most of the time the fulfilling of our wants comes as fairly reasonable. Again, our wants cause us to act. Those two commonplaces may be responsible for leading the naturalist to submerge reasons among causes, ignoring the "other-things-being-equal" qualifier as trifling. The attraction of ethical naturalisms follows from the way their proponents slip in the "everything being considered" clause as an unnoticed assumption, in their attempt to achieve a seamless world of fact. That saving clause was written in invisible ink. Emphasizing the generally unnoticed circumstance that among the things to be considered are the relevant moral principles contributes to a sound philosophy of action, implying that the line between reasons and causes does hold, however thin it may become. In other words, however attenuated the divergence, it must be still asserted against reductionism.

To allow the thinness of the line, as should be admitted, sets the stage for a apologia for Davidson, whose most recent writings do soften in some measure the position taken in "Actions, Reasons, and Causes."[20]

One might speculate as to why someone might become drawn to the position that a "reason is a rational cause."[21] The following suggestion seems the least implausible to me. First and foremost, rational scientists manifestly reason out causal explanations. Therefore, causal explanations are rational. Furthermore, Davidson himself
gives causal explanations in his account of actions follow­
ing both from desires (and other pro-attitudes) and beliefs. But a causal explanation is not a cause, though of course an agent's acceptance of a causal explanation, joined together with his various attitudes, could well lead to some action, but that fact would be wholly incidental to the status of the explanation.

A reason emerges from reasoning, more or less effec­
tively done, and the less reasoned it is, the more likely to call forth the charge "not a reason at all". A reason stands as a dialectical element in the order of meaning, not as a psychological moment or regularity in the factual or­der. Admittedly, reasons become expressed in the order of fact, while factual entertainments of reasons, but surely not reasons as principles, do have their causal efficacy. There then lies the crucial "thin line between reasons and causes", as Stephen Toulmin maintained. Beyond this one should add that the thin line succeeds in setting firm bounds between meaning and fact. Davidson apparently at­
tempted to homogenize issues across that line in a manner to be hopefully reminiscent of common sense, in his own vigor­ous search for worldly seamlessness, in effect for the sub­mergence of culturation in world description.

A few remarks can be made in summation of the matter so far. Motives, but not purposes, are causal. A motivating pro-attitude, whether as a disposition or as its occur­rent instance attaches itself in a desiderative or approbative way to a "that for the sake of which", now interpreted in a widened purposive sense. This extended sense lies in being either standardly consequential or that done "for-its-own­sake," whether in satisfying a minimal reason (a permissible want) or some normative rule. On the other hand, falling in the order of meaning, "reason" serves in justification, in sharp contrast to "motives". Once common sensical discourse becomes sorted out and put in order and culturative priori­ties receive their proper acknowledgement, we arrive at a balanced divergence/mergence between world-description and culturation. Its instantiation remains in direct continuity with all those things we sensibly can say about motives, purposes, and reasons.

V. ACTION AND PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE

Accounts of action, especially insofar as they intro­duce discussions of ethics, may best be understood within the domain of culture. We have found that culturation it­self turns upon approbations and disapprobations of forms of life expressed in various actions, discursive and otherwise. Furthermore, since idealisms tend to convey the impact of normative culture upon the recipient subject, and realisms that of the objective world, the philosophy of culture em­bracing actions and reasons emphatically has an idealist
tinge. Philosophies of science and of nature look for something more external, and so constrict "actions" within their preferred causal frames, at some cost to the distinctive features displayed in philosophies of mind, action, and ethics. However surprisingly, those features are most effectively handled within the transmogrified legacy coming down ultimately from animism through the Greco-European philosophical mainstream.

The normative quality of a reason arises from approbation within the social realm. Thus ethics cannot develop simply from the first-person perspective, but the cultivation subserving ethics must unfold from a cross-ruffing between initial wantings and socially encouraged pro-attitudes towards ways of life. Rational criticism and selection must play their part here, de facto culture not always receiving endorsement. "Cultural lag" may be perceived as such, as "customs more honored in the breach than in the observance." Rational culturation, not blind indoctrination, characterizes even the standard internalizing of norms and a fortiori the philosophic tradition.

The centrality of action and its normative implications are spelled out by Alan Gewirth. I infer that these normative implications attach also to reason, even to the prescinded instrumental sense of rationality: "It has not hitherto been noted that action has a normative structure, in that the agent's factual statement that he performs purposive actions entails . . . evaluative judgments on his part about the goodness of his purposes and the necessary goodness of his having freedom and basic well-being."[22] (Certain broader implications from the passage are here omitted as not germane to the point.) Open purposive action, performed in the "light of day" and not surreptitiously, must typically be regarded as laying a claim to its emulatibility and reasonableness, whether minimally as something wanted when nothing forbids its being done, or maximally as conforming to a social good. Implicit would be the notion that instrumental rationality only gains its legitimacy through the "goodness of (the agent's) purposes", a view congruent with that sustained in the body of this paper.

Ethics calls on the idea of desirability carrying the strong normative force missing in plain desiring but weakly available even to desiring, should reason show no principle forbids. Specific ways of life are the sources from which its principles are drawn. Man always starts from a concrete action when claiming cases of fulfillments or violations. "In the beginning was the deed." In fact, we could not be pure "divergentists" or dualists, given the objectiver geist or embodiment of meaning to which both Goethe and Dilthey pointed, though the distinction between normative and the facticity in which it is embedded must be sharply drawn. The interplay develops between the impulses of human needs
and the discipline exerted by social approbation and disap­probation, the latter being internalized ideally at least in rational ways. Permissible desires, taken as minimal rea­sons for acting, of course are as plentiful as blackberries. That plenitude confers whatever initial plausibility hedon­istic utilitarianisms may boast of.

Action and reason get their proper illumination and so does the relation between causes and reasons. But culture cannot be philosophized about with any success as a brute arbitrary fact. That approach would lead to historicism in the bad sense. The proper approach proceeds by way of pro­gressively reasoned culture, man's propulsion on that path given by the authority of norms tested against one another and the facts of experience. Necessarily, there had to be a starting place, something like Burke's notion of a "just prejudice" having a "latent wisdom."[23] Subsequently there grows a pressing need for harmonizing all the multiple forms of life and bringing them into our world. Myth, well-found­ed strategies, and finally placement strategies coordinate man's position within both his norms and his worldly experi­ence, even though the latest stage abandons any search for their ultimate grounding.

VI. PRESENT-DAY INSTANTIATIONS

At the beginning I suggested that both divergence and mergence must be affirmed as between the normative (cultura­tive) and the world-descriptive realms. Divergence becomes dominant to the degree that the distinctive authority of culture is emphasized, mergence in the respects that ways of life are played out in the world and that culture is mediat­ed through the natural order. The aspects of divergence and mergence lead to steerings back and forth between two criti­cized features of non-naturalisms, the disconnection in du­alisms and the confusion in double-aspect monisms. The cen­trality of science in modernity inevitably has made the sub­mergence of culturation a powerfully tempting option. None­theless, mythic echoes remain largely undisturbed, left over elements from well-founded strategies originating between the Axial Age and recently matured naturalisms. Faint myth­ic echoes are now to be traced within a few selected contem­porary placement strategies, having to do with philosophy of mind and ethics. Even when submergent naturalisms are ex­amined, similar results frequently obtain, despite their greater latency or camouflage.

For a direct approach to divergency, we can consider the non-naturalistic way in which forms of life convey and present themselves authoritatively to their recipients. The philosophic tradition dating from the telic Platonic Forms encourages such rational acknowledgements. Rational "self­evident" intuitions of principle, as with Locke, gave way to Scottish "moral sense" approaches, combining the de jure
intuitionism of rationalists with the particularity of empiricist observation. Both intuitional and moral sense theories have appeared in twentieth century expressions, as has the Kantian divergency between the theoretical and the practical.

An originally negative paring back of Kantian divergentist thought was set forth in the early stages of ethical non-cognitivism. Progressive correction of that view began with Charles Stevenson in America, and with R.M. Hare in Great Britain, then culminated in the moderate non-cognitivism of the "good reasons" school. A number of citations have been made here to this group; Stuart Hampshire now should be added, not least for his divergentist reading of common sense language as against Ryle's submergent Concept of Mind. Good reasons well preserve the distinctiveness of culturative authority. H.D. Aiken blends Harvard naturalism with "good reasons" themes, thereby keeping himself barely clear of attempting reductive submergence.

Another Harvard philosopher not too distant from naturalism is Morton White. His book title: What Is and What Ought to Be Done, exemplifies a mild divergence between descriptive and culturative symbolic functions, somewhat better than did his earlier phrase "Science and Sentiment." White abstains from falling into a reductive naturalism which would define the latter function in terms of the former, yet he retains his Deweyan suspicion of dualisms. As a consequence, he represents the merging of the functions in his limited "corporatism," the view that a relevant set of factual and normative beliefs must be tested all at once. His favorable though nominalistic attitude toward "moral sentiments" shows him to be a contemporary heir of Scottish moralists.

Richard Bernstein's Praxis and Action correctly highlights the way conceptual analysis distinguishes action and its closely related concepts from those of the natural order. Yet suspecting that divergency threatens to become dichotomous, Bernstein joins with the two waves of criticism against such "new teleologists". He represents Donald Davidson's submergentist approach, making reasons a sub-species of causes, as a first-wave protest against hard-and-fast conceptual a priorism. The second wave, developing its "displacement hypothesis" admits our current distinctions between the "manifest and scientific images" hold now but need not do so in the face of imminent conceptual change. Incidentally Bernstein associates both Korner's opposition to transcendental deductions and his "category reconstructionism" with this second wave. Now Korner presents categorial frameworks as gearing in with scientific history, in the long run with world-description. But since he makes Kantian divergentist room for ethical questions, his terms being those of "perspectivism", I doubt that Korner would be an appropriate recruit for that movement. Metaphilosophi-
cally, Korner more clearly resembles a moderate non-cognitivist than an eschatologist of the "scientific image." Taking Bernstein's second wave as a whole, I would remark that the unavoidable prospect of conceptual change can not credibly be counted upon to suppress the hitherto constant function of culturation. That culturation has been symbolically conveyed in prodigiously many ways only reinforces the point that the passing on of authorizable forms of life can no more be eliminated than can the transmission of worldly information.

William Frankena who recently typologized present-day ethics with reference to two notions, the "moral point of view" and the "ethics of right reason," himself embodies both perspectives, blended with a renewed interest in "moral sense."[29] He instantiates a balanced divergence/mergence view, as C.I. Lewis did in his older and more Kantian style. Many of the theories listed by Frankena happen to carry the special approbative and culturative force highlighted by divergence.

Yet Richard Brandt, whose rule utilitarianism was classified by Frankena as an ethics of right reason, seems more prone than others to naturalist submergence. He criticizes three types of theory contrasting to his own; "ideal observer"; Hare's prescriptivism (currently veering toward a more explicit utilitarianism); and Rawls' contractarianism.[30] Notice should be paid to the way that all three placement strategies are more divergentist than his. First, the "ideal observer" theory clearly reflects secular adaptation of key themes from well-founded strategies through a surrogate Deity. Secondly, Rawls like Locke gives us a secularized myth of origins, his notion of the self in an original position "behind a veil of ignorance" denying what is meant by personhood in its particularity.[31] Such a person would be partially like a disembodied angelic intellect. Thirdly, Hare's prescriptivism suggests divergence between cognitive and directive discourse, even though he is now more nearly a utilitarian.

In the final analysis, Brandt's naturalism does not completely dispose of mythic remnants any more than such clearly divergentist placement strategies, whatever the appearances are to the contrary. His normative notion of a "fully rational agent" surely has something packed into it, not too unlike the case of the "ideal observer," but more latently so. For one to be fully rational, his desires and aversions must be made rational by "cognitive psychotherapy" that must be vivid and relevant.[32] Either the psychotherapist resembles the ideal observer as a God surrogate, or the standards of relevance making for appropriate desires and aversions reflect something like Platonic forms or Divine intellect. This is not too distant from J.S. Mill's own imperfect submergence where the wise man must distinguish between qualities of pleasure. Such devices load the
One last illustration of a submergent view will point back through Kant toward the divergent/mergent balance commended in the body of the paper. This allusion draws on one element in Alvin Goldman's philosophy of action, his effort to accommodate two accounts of the causes of acts. "I have been arguing that want-and-belief causation of acts is compatible with agent-causation of acts, but I also believe that agent-causation is explicable in terms of want-and-belief causation."[33] Although Goldman's first clause on compatibility could be read as suggesting mergence, the second decidedly implies submergence. An alternative reading of the force of those causalities, only one literal and the other disguisedly mythic, reminds us of the divergence in Kant between phenomenal and noumenal egos. Kant's dualism, more subtle than those of Plato and Descartes, still resembles them in its derivation from myth, combining as it does both world-description and culturation. Soul, mind, and noumenal ego are all functions of a turn inward to the proximate center of meaning and of the initiation through thought of action. Here occur the recipience of experience and of forms of life; here lies the growing edge of the future and the target for culture.

By contrast the phenomenal ego is not the self as hailed and invoked, but the self as known, retrospectively the "has-been" self and prospectively the self predicted upon its (and others') "has-been" characteristics. Phenomenality moves along in the rear-view mirror, while noumenality moves along with the "now" of advancing awareness and choice. There lies the basis of divergence, with its mergence grounded in the very oneness of the self under both description and normative coordination.

The balance demanded of theories of mind, action and ethics calls for descriptive explanation with motives both occurrent and dispositional and for evaluation and commendation befitting the dignity of ongoing uncompleted selves. Without divergence the normative force of reasons has to be lost; without any mergence dichotomization splits our culture into scientific and romantic nihilisms. With submergence on the other hand comes the illusion that culture may be constituted from science. Consequently, animistic ambiguity has its key place in serious philosophy, however multi-form its transformations may have been throughout history. Something akin to the "manifest image" is bound to outlive any and all efforts at its displacement.
FOOTNOTES


7. Ewing, op. cit., 76f.


11. Stephan Korner, Experience and Conduct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 81. Social scientists can admit purposeless behavior; Sorokin while writing against Parsons' exclusively teleological account of action mentioned "fundamental actions" as provoked reactions that can go against the policies of the agent, as well as "normative actions" that reflected internalized ideal patterns. But relatively mindless reactions can be distinguished from actions, even injudiciously chosen ones done for short-term consequences against the agent's longer-range policies.

12. Ibid., 106.


17. Kurt Baier suggests that a supposed fact does not as such co-


20. Donald Davidson, *Actions and Events* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980). His introduction and the sequence of essays which qualify and amplify his earlier position are welcome, but perhaps those changes could have gone even further as concessions to "new teleologists" and "good reasons" people.

21. Ibid., 233.


28. Ibid., n. 73, p. 283.


