ABSTRACT. This paper evaluates three recent attacks on what Harry Frankfurt has called the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), i.e., the principle that if a person could not have done otherwise he is not morally responsible for what he has done. One critic of PAP argues that, if a person was drawn irresistibly to a drug yet was "altogether delighted with his condition", he might well be morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise. A second critic describes circumstances in which, if the agent had failed to perform a certain action, physical forces would have taken effect and caused him to perform that action. Such a person, he argues, may be morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. I argue that both of the preceding counterexamples fail. The third argument against PAP shows, I maintain, that PAP is not acceptable as it stands; appropriately supplemented, however, it will continue to serve its traditional role in the compatibilist-incompatibilist debate.

The standard argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility employs the following two premisses:

(1) A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise;

(2) A person could have done otherwise only if determinism is false.

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While premiss (2) has often been challenged, premiss (1) has been accepted as true almost universally. However, in 1969 Harry Frankfurt argued that premiss (1), which he called the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), is in fact false. Since then, a number of philosophers have taken up the issues raised by Frankfurt and, although some have argued that a principle (or principles) alternative to PAP can be constructed to take its place in the incompatibilist argument, they have been nearly unanimous in rejecting PAP itself. David Blumenfeld and Peter Van Inwagen, for example, have argued for alternative principles but have agreed with Frankfurt on the unacceptability of PAP. John Hunter while not addressing PAP explicitly has argued that considerations of freedom as such are entirely irrelevant to assessments of moral responsibility. The latest voice to be added to the chorus of PAP detractors is that of Mark Bernstein.

In an earlier paper I argued that neither Frankfurt in his 1969 paper, nor Hunter, had succeeded in falsifying PAP. This paper will take up three other attempts to undermine this philosophically important principle: Part I will consider Blumenfeld's attempt to reinforce Frankfurt's original argument against PAP; Part II will take up Mark Bernstein's argument; and Part III will address a 1971 argument of Frankfurt's that I previously overlooked.

I

Blumenfeld offers the following counterexample to PAP:

Suppose that the presence of a certain atmospheric reaction always causes Smith to decide to attack the person nearest to him and to actually do so. Suppose also that he always flushes a deep red when he considers and decides against performing an act of violence and that under certain circumstances the atmospheric reaction is triggered by the appearance of just this shade of red. Now imagine that on a day on which circumstances are favorable to the triggering of the reaction, Smith considers whether or not to strike a person with whom he is conversing, decides in favor of it, and forthwith does it.

Blumenfeld, then, is suggesting that, while Smith is morally responsible for striking his companion, he could not have done otherwise for, even if initially he had decided not to strike, the flushing and the subsequent atmospheric reaction would have ensured that he strike. I shall argue that, although it is true that Smith is morally responsible for what he did, it is a mistake to say that, when he struck his companion, he could not have done otherwise.
Suppose Smith strikes his companion at time $t_n$. The question in assessing his moral responsibility for this action must be whether it is true that he could not have avoided striking his victim at $t_n$—not whether it is true that he could not have avoided doing it eventually, at some time or other. This can be made clear by considering whether Jones is morally responsible for taking a breath at $t_n$ (suppose his taking a breath at that moment has disastrous consequences). The question in determining his moral responsibility is whether he could have done otherwise at $t_n$. He was bound to take a breath eventually, but that is irrelevant here; the question is whether he could have refrained from taking one at $t_n$. Now could Smith have refrained from striking his companion at $t_n$? Let us recall the scenario. Smith makes a decision to strike at a time somewhat earlier than the actual striking, let us say at $t_n-r$. This decision is acted on at $t_n$. However, if at $t_n-r$ he had decided not to strike, he would have flushed, the atmospheric reaction would have taken place resulting in a decision to strike the person nearest him, and the unfortunate fellow would have received his lumps anyway. When? Presumably somewhat later than if the flushing and the atmospheric reaction had not been necessary, let us say at $t_n+r$. Thus we can say that while Smith is indeed morally responsible for abusing his companion (at $t_n$), he could have done otherwise (at $t_n$). But suppose we assume (somewhat artificially but nonetheless legitimately) that, if at $t_n-r$ Smith had decided not to strike, then the flushing, etc., would have precipitated a striking, not at $t_n+r$, but at $t_n$ the same time as the actual striking. Can we now say that Smith could not have done otherwise at $t_n$? No, we cannot—for although at $t_n-r$ Smith decided to strike, he could have changed his mind any time from $t_n-r$ until $t_n$ (the time of the actual striking). Suppose he had changed his mind at $t_n$; the flushing etc., would have brought on a striking in any case—but necessarily at some time later than $t_n$. Thus again, although we may grant that Smith is morally responsible for striking his companion (at $t_n$), he could have done otherwise (at $t_n$).

In short, all that Blumenfeld’s counterexample shows is that Smith is morally responsible for a certain act (striking his companion) even though he was bound to perform that act sooner or later. But, as has been shown, that does not threaten any plausible interpretation of PAP. For an effective counterexample to PAP one must come up with a case where the agent is clearly morally responsible for a certain act even though he is clearly unable to do otherwise at the time of the act.

Is there any way to modify Blumenfeld’s counterexample to make it effective? Let us turn to the philosopher’s last resort: the evil genius. Suppose that this maleficent spirit not only wants Smith to pummel his unfortunate companion, but he wants it done at $t_n$. He performs his calculations and foresees that it will indeed be done at the
desired time; suppose that, if he had foreseen that left to his own devices Smith would renege (or in any case not strike at \( t_n \)), the evil genius could have and would have taken steps to ensure that Smith was bound to strike at \( t_n \), that he could not have done otherwise, yet is morally responsible for the striking that took place at \( t_n \).

But is it really quite clear even now? What grounds do we have for saying that Smith could not have done otherwise at \( t_n \)? He was not in fact coerced or compelled in any way, he was in full possession of his faculties, etc. The only ground is this: that, if the evil one had foreseen that Smith would not strike at \( t_n \), he would have intervened to ensure that Smith do so. Furthermore, the hypothetical intervention need not have been coercive or power-removing in any obvious sense; it might, for example, have taken the form of a slight intensification of Smith's aggressive urge. If we suppose the hypothetical means coercive, it is not their coercive character that "binds" Smith for no coercion is ever actualized; it is simply that the means, whatever their character, would have been actualized to ensure the striking at \( t_n \) if the genius had foreseen their necessity. The grounds, then, for saying that Smith could not have done otherwise at \( t_n \) are simply that there were antecedent conditions relative to which it was certain that Smith would strike at \( t_n \)-conditions, it might be claimed, that in some sense guaranteed the striking at \( t_n \). But guaranteed in what sense?

There are two scenarios to consider. To begin with, suppose that the actions in this counterexample are determined. We can then say that, with the evil genius' foresight and willingness to interfere, Smith's striking was guaranteed in the sense that there were antecedent conditions causally sufficient for the striking; but if the actions are determined we have that kind of guarantee without the evil genius and, of course, it is notoriously problematic whether that kind of guarantee entitles us to say that Smith could not have done otherwise. Besides, even if his actions being determined did entitle us to say that Smith could not have done otherwise, it would certainly not be clear that we should reject PAP rather than the claim that Smith is morally responsible. Indeed, those who accept the incompatibility of determinism and freedom seem to be unanimous in rejecting moral responsibility rather than PAP.

Will the counterexample be effective if we suppose that the actions in it are not determined? I think not, for it would be problematic in two respects. To begin with, the infallibility of the evil genius' foresight would be questionable; and secondly, the claim that Smith is both morally responsible and unable to do otherwise would be at least as problematic as it is under the supposition that Smith's actions are determined. Let us consider this last point.
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Two alternatives to an action being completely determined have been proposed: one is that it is wholly or partially without a cause of any kind—"simple indeterminism" as Richard Taylor calls it; the other is that it is wholly or partially the product of "agent causality"—to use the terminology of Roderick Chisholm and Richard Taylor. Under the first alternative (simple indeterminism) the claim that Smith is morally responsible would be highly suspect. Under the second alternative (agent causality) we are faced with an account whose intelligibility many have questioned because they question the coherence of the concept of agent causality; and, furthermore, under the second alternative, if the defenders of agent causality are right and the concept is coherent, then it is at least doubtful that there is no sense in which Smith could have done otherwise—even with the evil genius looking over his shoulder. Thus, regardless of which metaphysics of human action we select, we cannot construct an unproblematic scenario in which we clearly have moral responsibility coupled with the inability to do otherwise.

In short, then, not even an evil genius can tighten up the kind of counterexample that Blumenfeld proposes so as to make it an effective tool against PAP.

II

Bernstein attacks PAP indirectly. He is concerned to examine three principles that Van Inwagen has proposed as replacements for PAP, three principles, that is, that will do PAP's work in the traditional compatibilist-incompatibilist debate. Berstein argues that all three are false and claims that their collective falsity entails PAP's falsity thereby undercutting the traditional compatibilist-incompatibilist controversy. I shall argue that, appropriately supplemented, Van Inwagen's first two principles are true; his third principle is false, but its falsity does not entail the falsity of PAP.

Van Inwagen's first replacement principle, the principle of possible action (PPA), concerns unperformed acts:

A person is morally responsible for failing to perform a given act only if he could have performed it.

Bernstein offers the following counterexample:

Jones is naturally a somewhat self-centered person but wishes to become an enormous egoist. He believes that by becoming such a person, he will have more time for his favorite pastime, watching baseball games. Pursuant to his aim, he intentionally and deliberately tries to do everything...
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possible to become such an egoist. (We might im­
agine him, for example, reading novels of altru­
ism, where the altruist dies of a painful di­
sease.) Jones' wish is fulfilled; he succeeds in
becoming an enormous egoist. Imagine now that he
sees a young child, Mary, being hit by a car.
Mary is bleeding profusely and is, quite obvious­
ly, in severe pain. But years of Jones' egoistic­
al training have steeled Jones against such a con­
dition, he simply cannot help her; his present
psychological condition makes it impossible for
him to be concerned about her and to remove her
from the street. So he does not perform the act
of helping Mary.12

It is evident, says Bernstein, that, although Jones could
not have helped Mary, he is morally responsible for his
failure to act.

Now despite the implausibility of the situation de­
scribed, this counterexample will serve to refute PPA as it
stands. The point is that one may be morally responsible
for a failure to do 'x' even though it was impossible at the
time to do 'x'--provided that one is morally responsible for
the inability to act: culpable inability will not serve to
excuse (at least not completely). PPA, then, must be sup­
plemented as follows:

S-PPA A person is morally responsible for failing
to perform a given act only if he could have
performed it or is morally responsible for
the fact that he could not.

PAP, of course, must be supplemented in precisely the same
way:

S-PAP A person is morally responsible for what he
has done only if he could have done otherwise
or is morally responsible for the fact that
he could not.

Thus the drunken driver who strikes and kills a pedestrian
may be morally responsible for killing the pedestrian even
though he lacked the motor reflexes necessary to stop on
time.13

This supplement to PAP and his relative, PPA will not
distress the incompatibilist; he will recognize that one is
morally responsible for an inability only if it is in some
way the result of a previous act, or failure to act, 'x',
that one is morally responsible for. And one will be moral­
ly responsible for 'x' only if (1) one could have done oth­
wise, or (2) one is morally responsible for one's inabil­
ity to do so--and so on until one reaches an act, or failure
to act, that is a causal ancestor of the original act and of
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which it is true to say "He could have done otherwise". Thus, if one is to be morally responsible for a given act or failure to act, there must have been alternative possibilities of action somewhere along the line. (And, of course, the incompatibilist argues that if determinism is true there never are such alternative possibilities.

Van Inwagen's two other principles, designed to help his first principle do the incompatibilist work of PAP, concern the consequences of actions (or failures to act), viz. events and states of affairs. In order to avoid the controversial question of whether events and states of affairs are particulars or universals, Van Inwagen states and defend the following two principles:

PPP-1 A person is morally responsible for a certain event [or state of affairs] (particular) only if he could have prevented it. 14

PPP-2 A person is morally responsible for a certain event or state of affairs (universal) only if he could have prevented it. 15

Thus the principles differ only in that the first treats the relevant consequence of the act as a particular and the second treats it as a universal. Van Inwagen uses the following criterion for individuating events: 'x' is the same event as 'y' if, and only if, 'x' and 'y' have the same causes. (Though he does not say so explicitly, presumably he would use a similar criterion to individuate states of affairs.)

Van Inwagen considers a counterexample that might be offered against either of his two last principles, PPP-1 and PPP-2:

Gunnar shoots and kills Ridley (intentionally), thereby bringing about Ridley's death, a certain event. But there is some factor, f, which (1) played no causal role in Ridley's death, and (2) would have caused Ridley's death if Gunnar had not shot him . . ., and (3) is such that Gunnar could not have prevented it from causing Ridley's death except by killing (or by deciding to kill) Ridley himself. So it would seem that Gunnar is responsible for Ridley's death, though he could not have prevented Ridley's death. 16

Van Inwagen has no difficulty showing (and Bernstein agrees) that the counterexample is ineffective against PPP-1: Gunnar is indeed morally responsible for Ridley's death (particular), but it is not the case that he could not have prevented Ridley's death (particular). He could not have prevented Ridley's death (universal) for if he had not shot Ridley factor 'f' would have been activated, etc.; but he
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could have prevented Ridley's death (particular) for, if he had refrained from shooting Ridley, this particular dying-of-Ridley would not have occurred (remember Van Inwagen's criterion for individuating events: that they have different causes). Accordingly, PPP-I is unaffected by this counterexample.

Bernstein goes on to offer an alternative counterexample to PPP-I in which the agent, Jones, has voluntarily "cultivated a flair for violence so that it forms an integral part of his character". This character trait is such that in a certain situation Jones is unable to prevent himself from murdering Gifford. Bernstein then argues that, although Jones in that situation was unable to prevent Gifford's death, he is nonetheless morally responsible for it. Again, despite the implausibility of the situation described, this counterexample like the one Bernstein offers against PPA does serve to point up the necessity of a supplement:

S-PPP

A person is morally responsible for a certain event (or state of affairs) only if (1) he could have prevented it or (2) he is morally responsible for the fact that he could not.

Like the addition to PPA this supplement will leave the incompatibilist unfazed.

While Bernstein agrees with Van Inwagen that the Gunnar-Ridley counterexample is ineffective against PPP-I, he argues, contra Van Inwagen, that it is fatal to PPP-2. I agree with Bernstein on this (though I would argue it on different grounds); however, an elaboration of the lengthy argument involved is unnecessary since the falsity of PPP-2 in no way affects S-PAP (or the original unsupplemented PAP for that matter).

Let us concede that Gunnar is morally responsible for Ridley's death at time $t_1$. It may further be conceded that there is nothing that Gunnar could have done to prevent Ridley's dying at $t_1$. It may further be conceded that there is nothing that Gunnar could have done to prevent Ridley's dying at $t_1$ (universal): if he hadn't shot him, factor 'f' would have insured Ridley's dying (universal) at $t_1$. Accordingly PPP-2 is false. But how does that affect PAP? PAP says that one is morally responsible for something one did only if one could have done otherwise. What is it that Gunnar did? He shot Ridley—an act for which he is indeed morally responsible but one which he could have refrained from performing. PAP is not impugned. Thus, although there was in fact nothing Gunnar could have done to effectively prevent Ridley's death at $t_1$, he could not have refrained from shooting Ridley himself. And since Gunnar presumably foresaw that Ridley would, or would probably, die as a result of the shooting, Gunnar is morally responsible for Rid-
Thus, Bernstein has failed in his indirect attack on PAP. He set out to show that the three principles proposed by Van Inwagen as replacements for PAP were all false and claimed that their falsity entailed PAP's falsity. The third, PPP-2, is indeed false, but its falsity does not call PAP into question. On the other hand the first and second principles are basically sound: it is true that they must be supplemented (in precisely the same way that PAP must be supplemented), but the modification leaves the compatibilist-incompatibilist dispute basically unaltered.

III

Approximately one year after his first attempted refutation of PAP Frankfurt set out another quite different argument that purported to establish the same conclusion. In that argument he asks us to consider the case of an addict who is drawn irresistibly to a drug but who is "altogether delighted with his condition". This is an addict who in taking his drug is doing what he wants to do, is doing it because he wants to do it and is quite pleased to have just those wants. He cannot do otherwise; however, even if he could do otherwise, he would not do so. Even if magically he could remove his addiction, he would not do so:

He is a willing addict who would not have things any other way. If the grip of his addiction should somehow weaken, he would do whatever he could to reinstate it; if his desire for the drug should begin to fade, he would take steps to renew its intensity.

Frankfurt then suggests that, although the addict cannot do otherwise, he is nonetheless morally responsible for taking the drug.

In this alleged counterexample to PAP the ground offered for saying that the agent could not have done otherwise is entirely different from the ground offered for the same claim in Frankfurt's original argument. In that argument as in Blumenfeld's the appeal was to the fact that certain conditions antecedent to the agent's action in some sense guaranteed that he would act in a certain way, but the agent was not coerced, nor was he compelled to act as he did; in this counterexample, however, the ground for saying that the agent could not have done otherwise is that he was subject to an overwhelming inner compulsion.

But does that permit us to say that he could not have not otherwise? I submit that the claim that it does is problematic. There is, of course, no doubt that compulsions, addictions, phobias, etc., render certain actions
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extremely **difficult** to perform. But do they render them **impossible** to perform? That is what is required to be able to say that the addict could not have done otherwise. Can we not say that, if there is some conceivable incentive that would have induced the addict to forego the drug, then it was not **impossible** for him to do so—though it may have been excruciatingly difficult? (And, incidentally, in some cases the difficulty of doing otherwise is sufficient to excuse—impossibility is not required. Whether it is sufficient will depend upon the gravity of the offence in question.)

I shall not press this point, primarily because I am prepared to grant that it may be true that in extreme, very rare cases, compulsions, addictions and phobias do render certain actions impossible—though I do not know how the question could be definitively settled one way or the other.

Let us, then, for the sake of argument, grant this doubtful assumption. Will the counterexample work? Again there are two scenarios to consider. In the first the addict, at least to some extent, is at fault for his condition; that is, he is in some measure morally responsible for his psychological inability to refrain from taking the drug (presumably the more common situation); that is, his addiction is the result of previous voluntary choices, ones of which it is true to say "He knew or should have known the probable consequences, he could have done otherwise, etc."

This case (like several cases described by Bernstein) simply serves to indicate the necessity of supplementing PAP. This has already been done by introducing S-PAP:

**S-PAP**

A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise or if he is morally responsible for the fact that he could not.

The second scenario is the more interesting. In this case the agent is not responsible for his addiction; he cannot refrain from taking the drug and this through no fault of his own. At the same time, not only has he become reconciled to his condition, but at this point he is "altogether delighted with it"; he wouldn't change it even if he could. It might well seem that this fellow is morally responsible and that his case refutes not only PAP, but S-PAP as well.

However, a closer examination belies this. To see this clearly one must recall and fix firmly in mind the (problematic) supposition we began with and that is essential to Frankfurt's case: for this addict to refrain from taking the drug when the opportunity presents itself is not only extremely difficult but impossible. We must suppose that it is just as impossible for him to refrain from taking the drug as it would be impossible for him to take it if his hands were bound or if the drug were not available.

Now, what exactly is this person morally responsible
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for? What Frankfurt needs to be able to say is that he is morally responsible for taking the drug. But, I submit that he is not. What is apt to mislead us into thinking he is, is the fact that he is contemptible. (We may suppose that taking the drug is a grievous wrong: perhaps the man's family suffers greatly as a result.) The kind of person who would delight in such a condition is worthy of our disapprobation; he is a base character. Notice that though ex hypothesi he is not morally responsible for having become an addict, he may be morally responsible for being the kind of person who would not change his addiction even if he could.

But, is he morally responsible for taking the drug? I suggest that he is not—for he could not have done otherwise, it was quite impossible and this through no fault of his own.

Let me buttress my position with a couple of comparisons. Consider the case of the feuding neighbors, Jones and Smith. Smith's huge willow tree is not only sucking moisture and nutrition from Jones' lawn, but its roots are invading Jones' treasured rose garden. One day, shortly after a particularly acrimonious exchange about the offending tree, Jones learns to his delight that the ubiquitous willow roots have actually penetrated Smith's basement wall and are doing serious damage; the tree must be axed. Jones is rapturous; if he could have done so and done so with impunity, certainly he would himself have directed the roots toward the (originally) tiny crack in the wall. Now Jones' thrill at his neighbor's misfortune is worthy of our disapproval; in fact if Smith had been more congenial earlier, and if Jones hadn't treasured his roses so, one might even say that Jones' attitude is despicable. But what we cannot say is that Jones is morally responsible for the roots' penetration of Smith's foundation: after all Jones had nothing to do with the destructive action of the roots.

Of course not, you may say, but this case is different from the case of the willing addict for he did have something to do with taking the drug. He did indeed. However, the point this example makes is that one may be contemptible because of one's attitude toward a certain state of affairs (one's neighbor's misfortune or one's addiction) even though one is not morally responsible for that state of affairs.

Consider now a second supporting analogy. Suppose that the uncontrollable willow roots get hold of Smith as he is inspecting his damaged wall and within minutes he is in danger of strangulation. Quick work with an ax could save him; however, Jones is the only person within earshot and he is physically unable to respond since he is a paraplegic. (He is unable even to call for help since hollering at Smith has reduced his voice to a whisper.) We may further suppose that Jones wants Smith dead and he wouldn't lift a finger to help even if he could. Now, Jones may be detestable, but he is not morally responsible for failing to help Smith: after
all he couldn't help him, it was impossible. Likewise Frankfurt's willing addict may be detestable (because of his attitude toward his addiction), but he is not morally responsible for taking the drug: after all he couldn't refrain, it was impossible. I submit that the case of the paraplegic neighbor is not relevantly different from that of the willing addict.

Notice the following further similarity between the two cases. Suppose that Jones could have called for help, but that unknown to him there was no one else within earshot and that the unfortunate Smith was too far gone anyway. Jones couldn't have saved Smith so he is not morally responsible for failing to do so; however, he could have tried and didn't, so he is morally responsible for that. Likewise, if we suppose that it was impossible for the willing addict to actually refrain from taking the drug on this occasion, but that he did not realize the utter futility of any attempt to refrain; and, if we further suppose that he could have tried to refrain; then we must say that, while he is not morally responsible for taking the drug, he is morally responsible for not having tried to refrain from taking it. Or, more plausibly, he might well be morally responsible for not having tried to cure his addiction (perhaps by visiting a doctor) even if we suppose that any such attempt was, unknown to him, completely hopeless.

Thus, in comparing the willing addict to the second episode in the case of the feuding neighbors, we find there are no relevant differences. In each case the agent is an object of disapprobation, perhaps even contempt, because of his attitude. And that is what is apt to mislead, for it is a small step from disapproval of an attitude to censure of an action. Yet, in each case, though the agent is base, even contemptible, there is no action (or failure to act) of which one can say "Clearly he could not have done otherwise yet he is morally responsible for what he did". What is particularly likely to mislead in the case of the willing addict is the fact that we are apt to suppose that, as in the case of most addicts, refraining was excruciatingly difficult but not impossible. That, however, Frankfurt cannot grant and we must fix this (problematic) impossibility firmly in mind if the example is to be assessed accurately. The feuding neighbors analogy aids the cause of accurate assessment by delineating a similar situation wherein the impossibility of alternative action is perfectly clear.

To summarize, I have argued that Blumenfeld's attempt to reinforce Frankfurt's original argument against PAP fails; that Frankfurt's second attempt to undermine PAP also fails; and that Bernstein's argument merely reveals the necessity of supplementing PAP. The supplemented version, however, preserves the spirit of the original and will serve the same function as PAP did in the traditional compatibilist-incompatibilist debate.
FOOTNOTES


6. Van Inwagen, while he accepts Frankfurt's argument against PAP, does not add to it; he is principally concerned to defend three principles that bundled together will, he thinks, provide the incompatibilist with a tool that is every bit as effective as PAP (albeit more unwieldy).

7. Blumenfeld, p. 341. Although Blumenfeld accepts Frankfurt's argument, he believes his own counterexample is an improvement on Frankfurt's since his unlike Frankfurt's does not have to assume that human actions and decisions are determined and, accordingly, the claim that the agent is morally responsible will be less contentious. However, it might be argued that as he states it his counterexample also assumes that decisions are completely determined: the atmospheric reaction in question "always causes Smith to decide to attack the person nearest him and to actually do so". However, Blumenfeld could skirt this problem by having the atmospheric reaction cause an involuntary striking.


9. The proponents of agent causality argue that man sometimes acts as a prime mover, as the first cause in a causal series that constitutes an action such as intentionally raising one's arm. On this account such actions do not have antecedent sufficient conditions yet neither are they uncaused. cf. Roderick Chisholm, "Human Freedom and the Self" in Reason and Responsibility, ed. by Joel Feinberg (Dickenson Publishing Co., 1971), second ed., 359-66.

10. Bernstein, though he thinks PAP is ultimately untenable, also rejects Blumenfeld's counterexample though on different grounds. He argues that it is meaningless to speak of something like an atmospheric reaction causing a decision to strike—for it would remove the agent's status as agent. The "decision" would be merely something that happened to him and not a decision at all. But that is not necessarily true; the atmospheric reaction might conceivably have brought on the desire to
strike by causing a slight intensification of Smith's annoyance with his companion, just as the fact that his companion was a redhead (and he had always had an unconscious dislike of redheads) might have had a similar effect. Besides, even if it did not bring on what could properly be called a decision to strike, it might nonetheless have brought on the striking—and that seems to be the crucial point.

11. Van Inwagen, p. 204. It is at least prima facie odd that PAP should be false and PPA true. Van Inwagen offers no explanation of why this should be so. I will argue that as they stand they are both unacceptable, but that appropriately supplemented they are both true.

12. Bernstein, p. 3.

13. I pointed this out in some detail in "Freedom Requirement," 302-04. The clue, of course, is taken from Aristotle who showed us that culpable ignorance will not serve to excuse.


17. Bernstein, p. 5.

18. Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," The Journal of Philosophy LXVIII, 1 (January 14, 1971), 18-20. The argument against PAP in this paper is incidental to Frankfurt's principal concern, which is the concept of freedom of the will and its relation to the concept of person.


20. For a discussion of this point see my "Freedom Requirement," 298-99. I owe the recognition to this point in John Hunter; see Hunter, "Acting Freely," 239.