ABSTRACT. As part of an attempt to give a "liber­
tarian" account of some aspects of human agency, the author articulates and defends a modified in­
terpretation of "internalism" which makes coherent the notion of a genuinely, self-determined choice amongst fundamental conceptions of practical rea­son. That such choices are "nomologically irredu­cible" is evidenced by the fact that although (contextually) unavoidable, they are nonetheless under-determined with respect to any combination of the agent's (specific) desires and circumstanc­es. Alternatively, to the extent that orthodox "externalism" subordinates reason to the field of externally determined "passions," it is rejected, in conclusion, as yielding a naive and excessively reductive analysis of human agency.

I

Perhaps the most familiar debate bedeviling theorists of action concerns the central question as to whether or not all explanatory reasons for action must be given a causal account. At the very core of this disagreement lies the bearing of action of wants, desires, pro-attitudes, and like conations. Determinists have generally defended two theses, firstly, that any full specification of an agent's reasons for action must include some reference to the pro-attitudes of the agent, and secondly, that those same pro-attitudes stand in a causal relation to those actions into whose ex­planation they enter.1 Libertarian opponents of these two theses have responded by either insisting that beliefs, in themselves, can motivate action, or more commonly, by arguing that pro-attitudes and actions are logically, and there­fore non-causally, related.2

Copyright 1983 Philosophy Research Archives
INTERNALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION

In the sequel I shall not try to resolve this dispute. Although I wish to sustain a libertarian position, I shall none the less adopt both of the determinist's basic premises. My reasons for believing that explanatory reasons for action are not complete unless they include some reference to a "background of desire or purpose" will come out clearly enough as we proceed. Whilst I cannot hope to show that desires, as such, are a kind of cause, my strategy is to cede this point to the determinists, and yet assert that certain categories of desire are so related (depending upon their origin) as to preclude their subsumption under covering laws. This suggests that my aims are not "reconciliationist" as between the competing demands of freedom and determinism. Rather, I want to show, despite the predominately deterministic nature of my premises, that any rich conception of human agency depends upon what Davidson would undoubtedly term "the nomological irreducibility of the psychological."

To indicate why a causal analysis of desire need not compromise the autonomy of that agency for which desire provides explanatory reasons, I shall begin by distinguishing two varieties of desire or want—generic and specific. I do not mean to deny here that all wants are particular, and shall define a generic want merely as one that has as its object purely formal criteria of practical rationality, the commitment to which cannot, in itself, result in action because of their abstractness. Specific wants, by contrast, do normally result in action, given relevant opportunities for realizing their objects, and an adequate knowledge of certain action-guiding facts. All things considered, such wants yield action-tendencies of such diverse generality as maximizing one's own utilities, telling the truth for its own sake, jumping in front of the subway train, etc., as well as their negations.

The characterization of all such disparate wants, indifferently, as specific depends on their straightforward ability to generate further wants, and (ceteris paribus) related actions, given the existence, only, of certain empirical beliefs about the manner in which wants of that order may be gratified, and without the introduction of further evaluative considerations into the deliberation process. For example, although the want to maximize one's own utility and the want to cheat at cards differ with reference to the generality of their objects, they are nevertheless specific, in my sense, for all of that, because both wants (unlike their generic counterparts) equally well satisfy the criteria of concreteness just articulated. Thus, X's want to maximize his own utilities is specific to the extent that, under appropriate circumstances, it occasions X's want to cheat at cards, etc., just as X's want to cheat at cards is specific, insofar as it results in X's want to go out for the evening (in view of the "pickings" elsewhere). The two situations are similar as regards an equally stark contrast
with wants, conceived generically, and in despite of the fact that virtually all specific wants include other specific wants within their scope (as implied by our example).

I have suggested that generic wants are abstract in the sense of having formal criteria as their object, rather than a specific action or type of action, and mean to highlight in this connection such desires as the want to act consistently and the want to subsume one's actions under a relevant, universalizable reason or (practical) principle. Notice that these generic wants are perfectly coherent in their own right and contrast nicely with an indifferent attitude towards the hypothetical reversals of role and "golden rule"-type thinking required by a consistent application, to practical reason, of a universalizability criterion.

What is really significant about generic wants, however, is that they cannot stand on their own, and require something more than mere appeal to "the facts" to give them pointiness, and a bearing on action, namely, a reference to related, distinctively practical beliefs. Knowing that I want to act consistently, or by reference to a universalizable principle, in itself, tells me nothing about what I actually should do (as critics, including Hegel, of Kant's "categorical imperative" have pointed out), and contextually implies the existence of an ultimate, evaluative belief about what it is rational to do which "informs" the generic desire in the process of setting in motion the causal chain of specific desire to act in accordance with the same belief. It needs to be noted here that such beliefs do not stand in a means/end relation to their concomitant generic desires, but provide the content which makes the objects of those desires practically meaningful qua purely formal constraints.

As an example of this, consider that an ethical egoist who specifically wants to maximize his own utilities, as a joint result of his generic wanting to act rationally and his belief that it is rational for anyone always so to act, does not hold his belief as a means for realizing the end of rationality; rather, acting egoistically is, for him, the concrete manifestation of abstract rationality, and the specific want to do so is thus "internal" (in a formal sense shortly to be articulated) with respect to the egoistically informed, generic wanting to act rationally.

If we turn things around, however, and view the specific want to act egoistically as the sole determinant of action and, therefore, the source of a psychological egoist's belief that it is always rational to maximize one's own utility, notice that practical reason or belief is accorded the well-known Humean role of a "slave of the passions." As we shall see, subsequently, this follows on the ground that the egoist's principle becomes merely the means whereby he
INTERNALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION

rationalizes the (self-regarding) end set solely by his specific desires, whose genesis is "external" to, or "without the pale of," any appropriate evaluative belief about the rationality of maximizing one's own utilities.

II

But for the moment, what relevance does this distinction between generic and specific wants, and their relation to one another, have for the debate between determinists and libertarians? Briefly, by suggesting two obvious ways in which specific wants can originate, it provides us with the means for distinguishing alternative bases for action, one "externalist" and discernably causal (cf. section IV): and the other "internalist" and self-determined, in some significant sense not exclusively governed by causal laws. Moreover, it does this without, in either case, excluding desires from a central explanatory role in all actions, and whilst conceding the claim that such desires are causes. To show that no paradox is involved in claiming that desires, characterized thusly, fit unproblematically into an internalist schema, whose logic is, at least partly, contra-causal, we need only acknowledge, quite naturally (as above), that some actions and their related specific wants can originate in a generic want, together with the evaluative belief which "informs" it. Even if the generic want, in such cases, is interpreted as an effect of prior causes, human agency will remain autonomous (as argued in section III) to the extent that the cognizing agent is free from the purely causal influence of pre-existing, specific desires to provide the content of his generic wanting to act rationally, or not, with one ultimate principle rather than another. By appeal to those reasons for action set only by the formal demands of consistency and universalizability, he can decide, for example, that it is rational to act always so as to maximize his own utility, and come in precisely that way to (specifically) want to act egoistically, provided only that he cares about, or wants to, act rationally.

Similarly, but with a different outcome, he may decide that, all things considered, it is rational to act always so as to maximize average collective utility, whether or not it maximizes his own utility, and come in precisely that way, as differentiated from the mode predetermined by specific desires, to want to act benevolently, provided, etc. What is important in each of the cases just now cited is that although specific, self-regarding or other-regarding wants are perhaps causally related to those actions in which, ceteris paribus, they result, nevertheless the "coming to be" of those specific wants cannot be plausibly interpreted as simply causal. I say this because, in my judgment, wanting to act rationally, and believing that it is rational to maximize average collective utility, logically entail wanting to act benevolently, and similarly for wanting to act.
INTERNALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION

egoistically, etc. To give the matter its appropriate Aristotelian formulation, the generic want and its related cognition are the formal, but not the efficient, cause of the specific want. 6

The evidence for asserting this is simply that we could not coherently say of an agent who felt no motive at all to act benevolently that he none the less both wanted to act rationally and believed that it was rational to maximize average collective utility. The connection between the generic want, together with its related belief, and the resultant specific want to act accordingly, must then be a necessary one rather than a merely contingent one. Fortunately, this claim does not negate the facts of moral weakness, since there is still plenty of room for a breakdown between X's specific wanting to act benevolently, egoistically, etc., and X's actually acting benevolently, egoistically, etc. If the bearing of specific wants on their related actions is (efficiently) causal and thus contingent, there is no problem in allowing that such wants may sometimes be overridden by all those extraneous considerations typically implied by ceteris paribus clauses. The introduction of countervailing desires into the behavioral manifold merely provides one way of explaining why legitimate strivings do not always result in action. It cannot then be used to contest the necessity of the connection between my generic want/ultimate practical belief coupling and its relevant specific want, and my claim that the latter stands in an internal relation to its correlative coupling is intended to reflect that same necessity.

Yet, it may still be rejoined that the concomitant operation of a want to act rationally and a want not to do what one believes it is rational to do is no more problematic than the co-existence in each of us of such ordinary conflicting desires as the want to keep one's cake and the want to eat it. Surely, it will be said, it cannot then be argued (as I have) that it is incoherent to assert of an agent who does not want to act benevolently, that he both wants to act rationally and believes that it is rational to act benevolently, for "... we can, without contradiction express inconsistent desires. . ." 7

I believe that the plausibility of this kind of objection depends on the failure to distinguish between the manner in which generic, as opposed to specific, wants function. X can both (specifically) want and not want to eat his cake without contradiction, because he subscribes to more than one point of view concerning its disposition. For example, as a gourmand, who is not quite sated, X wants to eat it, without delay, but feels qualms about doing so, because as a person who is concerned about his health, X wants to postpone eating his cake until well after the heavy meal which he has just consumed. This is all harmless enough. But notice how (logically) odd it becomes to assert of X
INTERNALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION

that, from his own gourmand's point of view, he cares nothing at all about eating the cake which he would enjoy, and now has sufficient appetite for enjoying. Our conception of what a gourmand is cannot be divorced from that kind of indulgence, since it is largely defined by reference to it. 8

Generic wants, I submit, stand in a similar functional relation to those specific wants whose existence is accounted for by reference to what X, qua rational agent, comes to adopt as a conception of practical reason. A not unnatural way of recasting the same point is to stress that, where it is the case that X wants to act rationally, the purpose of X's having a belief about what it is rational to do is so that he will know what it is, in any specific, action-guiding sense that he is already (generically) motivated to do.

To then say of X, and with special reference to the point of view defined by his generic desire, that he does not have some motive (albeit not necessarily, or even commonly, a dominant one) to do what he believes it is rational to do is, in my view, no less absurd than claiming of X, qua gourmand, that he has absolutely no interest in "rounding-off" his meal by eating the cake which would sate his appetite. That it should not seem contradictory merely reflects the aforementioned extent to which competing, recalcitrant desires can coherently act to defeat the practical force of the informed want to act rationally. In this sense, although X will necessarily want to maximize average collective utility as an internal function of his belief that it is rational to do so, and his want to act rationally, he may well not want to act benevolently more than he wants, or needs, to satisfy his own immediate (externally determined) desires, and in the process of attaining the latter, he thus fails to realize in action that rational benevolence for which informed generic desire is the formal cause.

III

I have already acknowledged that the generic want to act rationally is itself causally determined, and it might even be said that my caring, or not caring, about the formal constraints of rational choice (i.e., consistency and universalizability) is a contingent matter of temperament or conditioning. Still, for the internalist, where the context of deliberation is defined by a background of generic desire, there is no equally compelling reason for insisting that the agent's choice of an ultimate action guiding belief, which will provide a point for his caring about acting rationally, is itself causally determined. At the very least, any "hard-deterministic" attempt to show that it is will need to go beyond the claim that all desires are causes, since no want more generic than the want to act rationally can be adduced to explain, causally or otherwise, X's ultimate belief about what it is rational to do, and it is
clear enough that the want to act rationally, itself, cannot causally account for X's choice of a principle to which that want is joined, in a 'form-content' relation. It is equally clear that X's want/belief motive cannot be causally explained by reference to the specific desire for which it is the formal cause.

The determinist must make one or both of two moves in this connection. Firstly, given my account of the sometime, partly cognitive origin of specific wants in those practical judgments which subsume them, he can argue that all practical beliefs also come into being in a strictly causal way. Secondly, the determinist can claim (cf. section IV), albeit problematically, that cognitions, in the guise of ultimate practical principles, impinge on human agency only to that extent conditioned by a combination of beliefs and wants whose ultimate origin is external to, and unconnected with, those same principles. Since cognitions, interpreted thusly, furnish only a justificatory, non-explanatory role in practical reasoning, with respect to those specific wants for which they provide the directive, it will be of no account, for the determinist, if a choice among them, cannot be shown to be causally determined because of a failure of theory in the context of his first option.

Putting aside the second of these two moves for the moment, it may be useful to remark that determinist cum materialist theories linking cognition and precedent causes, in any comprehensive way, remain mere programs at best. Moreover, it can, I think, be indicated fairly simply just why such a program is unpromising if applied at the level of those ultimate beliefs chosen only because they fulfil the formal requirements of rationality, and not because they satisfy an agent's specific desire for one genus of action over another. The first of two chief reasons for saying this is that preferences of the latter sort are amongst the most important of those psychological antecedents, attention to which normally forms the core of any causal account of practical beliefs. In cases of the kind under consideration, where the relevant cognitions become preconditions for the genesis of conative dispositions to satisfy their directives, it becomes tendentious to proceed as if some covert, deterministic explanation had nonetheless to be found as a way of supposedly "truly understanding" X's choice of an ultimate practical belief.

I suggest that we need look no further for the (motivational) source of that belief that X's need to provide, as a basis for action, his otherwise empty and purely formal desire to act rationally with a determinate content or point. That this appeal to consistency and universalizability as reasons for action, is, itself, best comprehended outside the pale of a deterministic frame of reference is perhaps suggested by a second consideration, to wit: although these formal criteria, along with certain facts about the world,
do indeed limit the range of beliefs from among which X must make his choice about what it is rational for any similarly situated agent to do, they do not appear, uniquely and predictably, to determine that same choice—not at least from the perspective of a morally neutral theory of action.

For example, even if we reject the supposition which I have left uncontested elsewhere in this paper, namely, that an egoistic principle of action will satisfy, upon close inspection, a universalizability condition, we are still left with any number of overlapping, but incompatible, moral principles of both a utilitarian and a non-utilitarian variety which, it seems reasonable to assume, satisfy the two internal standards of rationality, and amongst which there is, therefore, "nothing to choose" vis-a-vis those same final demands. Impartial observers of human behavior will find little grist for their scientific mills in the logic of agency construed thusly, particularly when we recall that the choice situation is so structured as to preclude the "bad faith" of being resolved through appeal to specific preference for any one set of directives.

It is also significant to keep in mind that we have no reason, grounded in our formal criteria, to chide our paradigmatic, rational agent, X, for failing to proceed beyond the first randomly formulated principle that survives the tests of consistency and universalizability. If we nevertheless assume that X will normally entertain a multiplicity of alternative contents for his generic want, the problem remains, for the determinist, of trying somehow to isolate that particular event or events in X and/or his circumstances which stand as cause to the effect represented by X's ineluctable choice of that one ultimate principle from amongst a pool of potential summa bona which makes action possible (from an internalistic point of view).

A healthy skepticism about the prospects of such an enterprise is, I suggest, in order when we note not only the paucity of pertinent, causal antecedents lurking in X's motivational "wood-pile," but also the existential nature of the plight ("anguish") confronting the agent who is, in effect, legislating or self-determining his own preference for this or that life-style in the very process of "informing" his generic desire with, and thus committing himself to, one of any number of competing, but equally rational, action-guides.

IV

We may now sketch the gist of our determinist's second response to the view of autonomy articulated in the first paragraph of section III; an interpretation of human motives which gives us the "discernibly causal basis for action" mentioned in section II. What is significant about this
INTERNALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION

point of view is its unrepentant "externalism." The externalist will need to argue that where specific wants of a given description explain why the agent acts as he does, they do so without reference to any relevant beliefs of the same description.

If, for example, a self-seeking agent acts egoistically, his doing so cannot be occasioned by his wanting to act rationally, together with his ultimate belief that it is rational always to maximize his own utilities. Rather, he acts egoistically simply because he wants always to maximize his own utilities on external, psychological grounds that have no direct bearing on his holding an egoistic principle. When our egoist, determined thusly, appeals to a covering principle at all, it is only because he chooses to rationalize, or putatively justify, what he cannot help doing as a result of, and what is therefore sufficiently explained by, pre-rational mechanisms. In this sense, practical belief, according to the externalist, plays only that central role in human agency for which "the passions" allow.

It is not surprising, then, that the determinist who treats desires as causes should slide into an externalist position as regards the genesis of specific wants, given the primacy of explanatory function that such attitudes possess for the externalist. A very elegant theory of action emerges in which human, as well as all other animate and inanimate, actions can be subsumed under one comprehensive causal order.

Although I am reluctant to diminish the effect of this splendid picture, there does seem to be no overriding, non-aesthetically biased, reason for committing oneself to its totally reductive account of human nature. Whilst I know of no way of showing that the Hobbesian theory of reasons for action which it implies is false, it is sufficient to point out that alternative sources of motivation are possible, as indicated by my own "internalist" analysis of the logic of practical principles (cf. section II), which partly locates the source of a positive orientation for doing Y in a relevant prescriptive belief about Y being a rational directive to action.

In claiming this I do not wish to deny that most persons are usually motivated by psychological factors over which they wield little or no conscious control. Rather, I want to indicate why it would be a mistake to reductively exclude a "full-blooded," rational autonomy from the pale of explanatory reasons for action on the purported ground that no such reason explanations are complete which do not include a reference to both belief and desire. If the central (internalist) thesis of this paper is correct, that same belief and desire, interpreted generically, can sometimes function conjointly to (self-) determine action in a way that defies reduction to causal explanation in terms of
INTERNALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION

specific desires. Determinists are free to seek an alternative causal account of the nexus between generic desire and ultimate practical belief. However, the foregoing argument poses for them the, perhaps insuperable, problem of having been deprived of their "favourite son" (i.e., Humean "passions") as a candidate for the missing link.

It may well be the case that few agents will ever, in fact, be motivated to act as they do only because they want to act rationally and believe that it is rational so to act. Most commonly they will do what they want to do without thinking about it, and hope, quite piously, that if forced to justify their behaviour, some relevant principle could be found to rationalize it. So there is this germ of truth in externalism. Yet, it is both consistent with the requirements of practical reason, and perfectly coherent, to point out that for some of us, the well-springs of what we do are sometimes partially internal to the basic principles that we freely cognize, and which act as the psychic conduits through which generic desire is channelled in one direction rather than another. Surely there is a real difference in the two positions. Kast characterizes it by distinguishing heteronomously acting "in conformity with principle" from autonomously acting "out of principle," and makes motivation by "inclination" the test whereby autonomy is compromised. There seems every reason to follow him in this provided that 'inclination' is defined as 'specific desire, externally determined'.

As against the externalist postulate that practical principles can only specify, as rational, ranges of action which the agent wants to perform on causal grounds external to his principle, the internalist holds that practical principles prescribe relevant ranges of action, from among which the agent, or self, establishes preferences, just so far as he commits himself, categorically and autonomously, to one ultimate principle as the content for rational desire. What is distinctive for the "problem of free-will" about this same internalist theory of practical judgement, is its founding of the locus of free human agency in that choice of ultimate practical principles which is unaffected by the operation of causally determined specific desires. In this sense, it is clearly non-'compatibilist,' and rejects those traditional attempts to reconcile freedom and determinism which rest their case on the distinction between "freely" doing what one wants and involuntarily doing that which one is compelled to do by others or by external forces. To the extent that all such specific desires are viewed by determinists as effects of prior causes, it can make no real sense to claim that agents, whose actions are exhausted by doing what they most want to do, act freely in the process for there is no reason to believe that they could have
chosen otherwise (following Chisholm\textsuperscript{12}), or that they are therefore responsible for what they do.

Alternatively, as I have tried to show, the internalist can base at least a \textit{prima-facie} case for responsible, genuinely "intentional" action on his contention that any meaningful choice amongst ultimate principles of practical rationality necessarily requires some internal reference to a co-existing, generic desire, the genesis of whose content is not prejudiced by external, non-cognitive factors over which the agent has no substantive control. When the choice situation is viewed in this "internalist" light and specific desires becomes subordinate to and conditional upon the operation of "informed" generic desire, it remains less contentious to claim of the agent so-motivated that he "could have chosen otherwise," since his options cease to be determined by the causal chain of specific desire for whose initiation he cannot thus disclaim responsibility.\textsuperscript{13}

To the obvious counter-claim that uncaused choices are random happenings and not the \textit{deings} of specific agents, who cannot be held responsible for them, in consequence, it is apposite to respond that, in the "internalist" case at hand, we are not considering a kind of undetermined choice, period. Rather, we are highlighting a choice of guides to action which is event underdetermined, and nomologically irreducible, with respect to any combination of the agent's desires and circumstances, the transcendence of which presupposes an agent-cause. As its own source of specific desire, such a cause is both active and self-determined, despite the fact that the background of "desire and purpose" within which certain specific desires are brought to fruition is, itself, event determined. Since no such succession of events, culminating in the effect instanced by the want to act rationally, is sufficient to motivate the agent, qua mere locus of generic desire, the only way to explain (within an internalist framework) the actualization of certain concrete action tendencies is by appeal to some freely rendered commitment to principle of the agent itself.

That such a decision is not "happenstance," however, is evidenced by the consideration that it does not occur \textit{in vacuo}, but entirely as a result of the agent's need to impart specificity, in whatever direction, to a precedent desire which would otherwise remain merely generic and without practical force. At the same time, since a choice of this or that "categorical imperative" is not uniquely determined by the desire to satisfy formal criteria of rationality, its outcome cannot plausibly be described as a "law-like" happening on "all fours" with other effects of antecedent desires, and its status as a genuine doing of a responsible agent-cause is thus assured.

Indeed, the agent-cause, itself, has every reason to welcome imputation of responsibility for its "commitment to
principle," though obviously not for all of the unforeseen consequences of the latter's implementation. Whatever else such a cause might have chosen within the limits imposed by a generic desire, its actual undertaking does both conform to, and arise out of, a desire to act rationally and is therefore "answered for" in the one sense that really matters. It is, of course, a moot empirical question as to whether or not any one or more agents would actively seek a freedom and correlative responsibility of the sort articulated here. Self-determination may pose too strong a test of will for most; its related "anguish" a sufficient motive for backsliding, helter-skelter, into the causal realm of specific desire or "passion." Nonetheless, if the central thesis of this paper is correct, where the agent-cause sustains, in "good faith," a choice amongst fundamental conceptions of practical reason, the way of informed generic desire is its one and only. It is neither here nor there whether that same way is perceived as carrying with it the force of a positive or of a negative value, and aside from my debt to Sartre, the use of inverted commas in conjunction with "good faith" is intended to convey just that sentiment.

In this latter connection, it might be useful to close by re-emphasizing the following. It is only when specific wants, such as the want to maximize one's own utility, or the want to maximize collective utility, are viewed in abstraction from their sometime origin in (the ultimate demands categorically set by) practical reasoning, that is, as the sole determinants of action, that it then become credible to follow the externalist in treating reason or belief as "the slave of the passions," and bona fide agency as an illusion.

FOOTNOTES

1. The definitive statement of this view is found in Donald Davidson's "Actions, Reason, And Causes," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 60 (1963), 685-700.

2. In at least some of its variants this position is probably inspired (as Davidson remarks) by "Ryle's treatment of motives in The Concept of Mind." Although wants are the basic motives that concern me here, I shall not need to distinguish between wants, desires, and pro-attitudes, all of which are treated as much the same kind of conation.


5. "Externalism", and its antipodal, "internalism" were borrowed from W.D. Falk by W. Frankena for his, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. by A.I. Melden, (Seattle, 1958), 40-81. My own use of both terms here is a logical
extension of Frankena's.

6. Notice here that just because we are dealing with a generic want "informed" by a belief, which act together as a formal, rather than an efficient cause, we do not have a counter-example to my concession above that all desires (as such) are a kind of cause (in the ordinary efficient sense). In the earlier context I had in mind those wants whose operation is later described as specific.


8. Against purveyors of psychological hedonism, interpreted as an a priori thesis, I assume here that while it is not analytic to claim of X, period, that he has a motive to perform any act which he would enjoy performing, it is analytic to claim of a gourmand (with respect to food consumption) that he has such a motive.

9. Although it takes some "reading between the lines," the best extended defense of this conception of practical reason is to be found in J. Kalin's, "Two Kinds of Moral Reasoning; Ethical Egoism as a Moral Theory," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 5 (1975), 323-56.

10. In my "Beliefs, Wants, and Ethical Egoism," Philosophia, vol. 9 (1979), 9-20, I do attempt at least to subvert externalism rendered as a comprehensive theory of reasons for action.

11. As opposed to the attenuated sense of freedom that reconciliationists regard as compatible with determinism.


13. An appropriate internalist variant of Sartre's, "feeling is formed by the actions one does; therefore I cannot consult it as a guide to action" (Existentialism and Humanism (London: Methuen Ltd., 1973), 37) might be stated as follows: "specific desire is formed by the principles one chooses; therefore I cannot consult it as a guide for that choice."

14. In order to provide bipolar instantiations of the want to act rationally, I have assumed, without argument, throughout my essay that either of these wants may be used to manifest rational desire on internalist, as well as externalist, grounds. However, in both my "Beliefs, Wants, and Ethical Egoism", op. cit., and my "Egoism and Internalism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 55, 139-41, I try to narrow the field by denying that the internalist can rationally vindicate wanting to act egoistically. Consequently, the reader may prefer, here and elsewhere, to contrast the want to act benevolently with another, non-egoistic desire whose universalizability is less moot.