4. INTENSIONALITY AND INTENTIONALITY

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ABSTRACT. This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.

The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl's basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano's explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.

It results that Brentano's thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not be strictly true. However, intentional descriptions will always be intensional, though not all intensional descriptions will be intentional.

The use of abstruse technical jargon in philosophy can easily create stumbling blocks which impede understanding. Beginning students are especially likely to be befuddled by such jargon; more experienced scholars also may find themselves confused by it. It is particularly awkward when different technical terms pertaining to similar subject matter come down to us out of different philosophical traditions without clear relations having been established between their meanings. Where technical jargon makes for such difficulties, it can be worth while to look back at the origins of the troublesome terms and to think about how they should be understood and about how their meanings are interrelated.

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Two technical terms which have come into widespread use in philosophy today are 'intensional' (spelled with an 's') and 'intentional' (spelled with a 't'). We encounter the former term in discussions of logic and the philosophy of language, where intensional logic and intensional contexts are contrasted with extensional ones. We encounter the latter term in discussions of phenomenology, where the intentionality of mental acts is emphasized. Because these two terms are so nearly the same in spelling, one inevitably wonders whether their meanings are the same or different. But in modern philosophical discussions there has not been agreement as to whether or how intensionality and intentionality are interrelated; and this reflects lack of clear agreement concerning the meaning of one or both of the two terms.

In this paper the notions of intensionality and intentionality will be considered in turn, and an attempt will be made to suggest how their interrelations may best be understood. The notion of intensionality has come down to us mainly out of the so-called analytic tradition in philosophy; the notion of intentionality has come to us mainly out of the phenomenological movement. To the extent that the relation between these two notions can be made less unclear, a modest contribution perhaps will be made toward better understanding between these two important philosophical traditions.

I. INTENSION AND EXTENSION

In discussing the two chief modes of meaning that terms possess, John Stuart Mill had written of denotation and connotation. His contemporary, Sir William Hamilton, also wished to make a distinction of this kind, but wanted to do so in his own way. Traditional philosophy has contrasted extensive with intensive quantities; Hamilton decided that the meaning of the a term is a quantity and has an extensive and an intensive dimension. Therefore, Hamilton introduced the words 'extension' and 'intension' for these two modes of meaning. The word 'extension' had of course been a familiar English word, but Hamilton gave it a new sense akin to Mill's notion of denotation. There had not previously been any such word as 'intension'; Hamilton coined it and gave it a sense akin to Mill's notion of connotation.

In this 19th-century British tradition, the extension of a general term consists of all and only those instances to which the term truly applies; and the intension of a general term consists of all and only those characteristics which anything must possess in order to be an instance to which the general term applies. The extension of a singular term consists of the thing the term designates, if there is such a thing; the intension of a singular term consists of the characteristics that an individual would need to possess.
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in order for the singular term to designate it, if there are any such necessary characteristics.

As logic developed in the 20th century, it became clear there is an important and broad range of statements whose logical structure is such that truth or falsity for any whole statement is determined by the extensions of the terms occurring in it. For instance, a statement of the form ‘All F are G’ will count as true if and only if the extension of ‘F’ is included in the extension of ‘G’. For these extensional statements, replacement of any term by some other term having just the same extension will not affect the truth or falsity of the statement. Moreover, the notion of extension can plausibly be broadened so that we may think of statements as having extensions too; these will be their truth-values. Truth-functionally compound statements may now be classified as extensional, in that the truth or falsity of a truth-functionally compound statement will remain unaltered when any component clause is replaced by another agreeing with it as regards truth or falsity.

A statement whose logical structure is such that the extensions of its term suffice to determine whether the statement is true may be called an extensional statement. A language in which only such statements can be formulated will be an extensional language. And the logic pertaining to such statements will be extensional logic. Extensionality may be understood as the feature possessed by statements whose truth-values and deductive relationships are fully determined by the extensions of their components.

In contrast to this, an intensional statement will be one without this extensional character; that is, one whose truth or falsity is not determined merely by the extensions of its components. And intensionality will then be the property possessed by statements when their truth-values are determined at least in part by non-extensional aspects of the meaning of their component parts.

The contrast between extensional and intensional statements comes out especially clearly in connection with reasoning that involves identity (here we are concerned with identity in the logician’s sense, in which calling x and y identical means not that they are similar but that they are one and the same thing). With extensional statements it is a principle of identity that whenever x is identical to y and so-and-so is true of x, then so-and-so must also be true of y. This principle of the substitutivity of identity holds because, with extensional statements, whether the term so-and-so is true of a thing will depend merely on whether the thing is included in the extension of the term. For example, if Boise is indentical to the capital of Idaho, and Boise is a small city, then it logically follows that the capital of Idaho is a small city. With extensional statements like those in the example, this form of reasoning is
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valid. However, when we deal with logical relationships among statements some of which are intensional, this type of identity reasoning is not always valid. For example, from the assumptions that Boise is identical to Idaho's capital and that Idaho's capital obviously is in Idaho, it does not logically follow that Boise is obviously in Idaho (it does follow that Boise is in Idaho, but not that this is obviously the case). Here, the statement that Idaho's capital obviously is in Idaho must be classified as intensional, and the identity reasoning need not be valid when such statements are involved.

Some representatives of the analytic tradition in philosophy have favored extensional statements and have denigrated intensional ones. Thus Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* held a form of the view that all language, when correctly understood, will be found to be extensional; what appear to be intensional statements either are not statements at all, or will under closer scrutiny be seen to be analysable into extensional statements. This view came to be known as the thesis of extensionality. According to Carnap, this thesis "states that all statements about any propositional function are extensional (i.e., that there are no intensional statements." Later on, Logical Positivists modulated this into the position that extensionality is a desirable feature and that intensionality is an undesirable feature of language. They "recommended" that the language of science should be constructed in such a way as to make all scientific statements be extensional and none intensional. This preference for extensionality presumably grows out of admiration for *Principia Mathematica*, the monumental work of extensional logic which seemed to provide the structure of an ideal language for expressing mathematics and science. The greater simplicity and tidiness that an all-extensional language would have seems to have supplied the motivation for preferring it.

II. INTENTIONALITY

The notion of intentionality belongs to the phenomenological movement, and was made famous by Edmund Husserl in connection with his development of an idea of Franz Brentano's. Brentano derived the word 'intentional' from scholastic philosophy and used it in trying to characterize what he believed to be a philosophically fundamental trait of the mental marking off mental phenomena from physical phenomena. In an influential passage, he wrote:

Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intensional . . . inexistence of an object, and what we should like to call . . . the reference to a content, the directedness toward an object . . . of the immanent-object-quality . . . In rep-
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presentation something is represented, in judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in desiring it is desired, etc. This intentional inexistence is peculiar to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it. And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention. 9

Brentano seems to be saying that reference to an object is the decisive and indispensible feature of anything that is mental (psychical). He adds:

No hearing without something heard, no believing without something believed, no hoping without something hoped, no striving without something striven for, no joy without something we feel joyful about, etc. 10

These last remarks are of interest at least as a rejection of atomistic accounts of experience; they deny the view of traditional empiricism that each mental state is a single atomic unit of consciousness without internal logical structure. But, so far, the position remains unclear. What distinction is it that Brentano thinks marks off mental from non-mental phenomena? With regard to physical activities, one seems able to say with equal justice: No eating without something eaten, no burning without something burned, no evaporating without something evaporated, and so on. We do not yet have anything that looks like a promising contrast here between the mental and the non-mental. The question is how to spell out a definition of what intentionality is to mean. Without a good definition, we shall remain at sea as regards the use of this technical term.

There are other ways of introducing the notion of intentionality which do readily ensure a tight linkage between the mental and the intentional. Husserl introduces intentionality as the "property of being a 'consciousness of something'." 11 Following him, a recent philosophical dictionary declares that "Everything is intentional that has a conscious orientation to an object." 12 Put this way, consciousness and intentionality are by definition inseparable; and since the conscious is necessarily mental, it results that whatever is intentional must be mental. (Whether all mental phenomena are intentional would still have to be discussed.) However, this type of definition fails to illuminate Brentano's intent, for it provides no insight into how intentionality is supposed to constitute a distinctive feature of the mental, setting it off in some significant way from the non-mental. By flatly defining intentionality in terms of consciousness at the very start, this approach ensures that we shall not have any better grasp of what intentionality is than we already have of what consciousness is; and this rules out any chance that discussion of intention-
ality will clarify our understanding of consciousness or the mental.

The problem is that Brentano's talk of intentionality as directedness toward an object does not by itself yield the desired contrast between the mental and the non-mental; while Husserl's definition of intentionality as conscious directedness toward an object makes it a truism that intentionality characterizes consciousness only. What it would be best to have as an interpretation of Brentano would be an account of intentionality which would present it as a somewhat independent idea, appeal to which can somehow illuminatingly explain something basic about the difference between the mental and the non-mental.

Brentano's phrase 'intentional inexistence' gives the best clue toward an interpretation along the desired lines. With ordinary physical activities, the object acted upon must exist, in order for the activity to occur. Thus, the wind can rattle the shutters only if the shutters exist; Dr. Johnson could kick the stone only if there actually was a stone; and so on. DeSoto could seek the Seven Cities of Gold, however, whether or not there actually existed any such cities; and the ancients could fear the wrath of Zeus, whether or not there was any such god. Thus with many mental activities the situation is quite different from what it is with physical activities, it would seem. Moreover, this contrast can be extended also to cases where, so to speak, the "object" of an activity is that something be the case. Thus, the motion of the ship can bring it about that the passengers are seasick only if the passengers are indeed seasick; but DeSoto could endeavor that the Seven Cities of Gold be discovered whether or not it was the case that any such cities were ever going to be discovered.

Thus part of what Brentano is drawing attention to is this peculiarity attaching to many verbs for psychological activities—that these verbs take direct objects in such a manner that the truth of the sentences in which they occur does not require the existence of the objects of these verbs. (Here, of course, we employ the word 'object' not in the narrow sense of 'physical object', but in a broader sense in which one may speak of an 'object of attention' or an 'object of desire'.)

Now, Chisholm, in commenting on these passages from Brentano, professed to find in them an objectionable ontological doctrine, and this interpretation has been echoed by others, such as Ausonio Marras. This objectionable ontological doctrine is the view that the objects of fear, hope, worship, and so on, possess a special mode of being; a kind of limbo-reality greater than non-existence but less than actual existence. Perhaps Brentano did to some extent view the matter in this way. But I believe that in the main the passages in question do not have to be read in that
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fashion. These passages can be interpreted not as making any claim concerning any special ontological status for the objects of fear, hope, etc., but rather as affirming the more plausible and more interesting point that these psychological verbs can be used so that the sentences in which they occur are true even when the objects of the verbs do not actually exist.

Here is an aspect of language which can easily be misunderstood, and which it is difficult even to describe unambiguously. An objector may complain that a verb cannot have an object unless such an object exists. He is thinking in terms of the principle that nothing can have what does not exist. This principle is true enough for property ownership and many other relationships. But the objector mistakenly overgeneralizes. His principle does not fit the cases we are especially considering. When DeSoto sought the Seven Cities of Gold, there was no existent object of his search, yet his search did have an object. Whether a verb has an object depends merely upon what the sentence says in which the verb occurs. To tell what object the verb has, it is sufficient to understand the sentence. But when we ask whether the object actually exists, we are asking something more, something that usually cannot be answered merely on the basis of understanding the sentence; to answer it, we need further independent knowledge of what there is. Here what must be emphasized about sentences containing such psychological verbs is that the verb can have an object (because of what the sentence says), and the sentence can be true, even though further knowledge of what there is may lead to the conclusion that no such object is existent.

This point can be extended further. Not only with regard to the existence of the object, but also with regard to its determinateness (as G.E.M. Anscombe has emphasized), a contrast is to be drawn. If Diogenes kicked an honest man, not only must there have been an honest man, but also the man must have had fully determined properties: he must have been of some definite age, of some definite height, some definite shape, etc. But when Diogenes looked for an honest man, he need not have been looking for an old man rather than a young one, a tall man rather than a short one, or a fat man rather than a thin one. Looking for an honest man is an activity that can be carried on even if there is little determinateness as regards the properties of him who is looked for. And this same indeterminateness arises also where the object sought is a state of affairs: Diogenes endeavored that an honest man be found, but the properties of the state of affairs which he was endeavoring to bring about lack concrete determinateness.

The underlying idea is that there is a way of speaking about cases of seeking or endeavoring or fearing, in which we describe what is sought, endeavored, feared, etc., in terms of its content for the one who is seeking, endeavor-
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ing, fearing. While this idea is not yet a very clear one, it does suggest that only certain descriptions will be admissible when we are speaking in this way: only those descriptions which describe what the search, endeavor, or fear is about so to speak from the standpoint of the searcher, endeavorer, or fearer—that is, in terms of his intentions, what he intends by way of his searching, endeavoring, or fearing. We might call such descriptions "internal." This is only a rough metaphor, to be sure. But what it suggests is, I believe, indicative of the idea of intentionality which Brentano is trying to characterize. This fundamental intentionality of the description has as its necessary consequences the two features previously noted, namely, inexistence (which Brentano spoke of) and indeterminateness (which he did not comment on). Because the description is to be internal to the viewpoint of the one performing the activity, naturally it has to be possible that the object of his attitude may not actually exist (or be true). Hence, intentional inexistence is a consequence of the internal character of these descriptions. And for the same sort of reason, indeterminateness also is a consequence, because the object of a person's attitude will be indeterminate in its properties to the extent that his attitude is one of envisaging with indefiniteness that which he intends—and always it is with considerable indefiniteness that we envisage what we fear, desire, seek, etc.17

So far, we have been putting the matter mainly in the "material mode," speaking about activities and their objects rather than about verbs and sentences. This way, one stays close to the viewpoint of Brentano and to his idea that he was classifying mental activities and mental phenomena, not sentences. This approach, however, is potentially misleading. It is not as though someone's activity as such will be intentional or non-intentional; rather, it is when spoken of in certain ways that what he does will or will not be intentional. Consider Diogenes: his activity under the description searching for an honest man is intentional. But under descriptions as walking through Athens, carrying a lantern, and disturbing his countrymen his activity is not intentional. The phenomenologist might object that searching is a very different activity from walking, carrying, and disturbing. Of course in general it is, but in this particular case the way Diogenes went about searching for an honest man was by walking through Athens, carrying a lantern, and disturbing his countrymen. His conduct is one and the same activity whether we use the intentional or the non-intentional descriptions.

Therefore, when we wish to speak carefully, we had better frame our remarks about intentionality more nearly in the "formal mode"). We should not say of Diogenes' conduct as such that it was either intentional or non-intentional; rather, we should say that under certain true descriptions it was intentional, while under others it was non-intention-
Within the tradition of contemporary analytic philosophy, various writers have attempted to pin down the notion of intentionality by providing analyses of what it is for sentences to be intentional. These presumably are to be analyses which will divide sentences (and clauses) into two groups, one of which will include the cases of hoping, striving, and other mental activities which Brentano was interested in, and the other of which will exclude these cases. There have been a number of such proposed analyses; William Lycan, writing a few years ago, listed nine proposed analyses which seemed to him to be worthy of consideration. The proposal being developed here does partially overlap with those proposals, but they have contained a good deal of arbitrary construction, and I think have moved away from the notion which was of importance to Brentano. Since the term 'intentionality' comes to us out of Brentano's work, I believe that we should try to respect his proprietary interest in it, and I believe it is wiser to use the term in a sense that could plausibly be ascribed to Brentano. In deciding how to use the word, I would prefer to look back at what he may have had in mind rather than rushing forward to invent some rather arbitrary new definition.

Therefore, I propose that we understand intentionality simply as this situation I have been discussing, which arises when and only when a verb is employed so as to take an object the description of which has the distinctive features of inexistence and indeterminateness. We may perhaps think of these features as resulting from the "internal" character of the description; but the metaphor of internality is so elusive that it is better to frame the definition in terms of the comparatively sharper notions of inexistence and indeterminateness.

I recognize that phenomenologists have thought of intentionality as involving far more than this. But I would like to distinguish between the basic notion of intentionality and the ambitious metaphysical and phenomenological theses which Husserl and others advanced. I suggest that the whole of phenomenological philosophy should not be packed explicitly into the initial definition of intentionality. The goal of clarity can best be served if we start from a basic and not too ambitious definition of this notion. Let the ambitious and exciting thesis about intentionality come later.

III. INTENTIONALITY AND THE MENTAL

If intentionality is understood in the way proposed, what becomes of the thesis that intentionality is the distinctive mark of the mental? This is the thesis which Bren-
tano advocated, which Husserl insisted upon (though with modifications), and which more recently has been viewed with favor by Chisholm.

Presumably we should formulate this thesis along the following lines: when and only when an occurrence or state of affairs is mental can it be truly described by intensional descriptions. These descriptions would be of the subject-verb-object form, where the object is intentional in the way previously spoken of, having the distinctive features of inexistence and indeterminacy. Put in this way, Brentano's thesis seems comprehensible. But it does not seem to be true, for counterexamples arise.

On the one hand, some mental phenomena do not seem to be intensional at all. In certain cases, mental states seem to involve no objects. For instance, someone can feel elated without his elation having any object; it can be just general elation, not an elation about anything. If there is no object, this case certainly cannot meet the criteria of intensionality as we are construing them. In certain other cases, mental states involve objects, but not with the features of inexistence and indeterminateness. For instance, suppose that John recognizes Bill. This can be so only if Bill exists and has determinate properties. So recognition does not meet the criteria of intensionality in the sense proposed. Elation and recognition both surely are clear cases of mental phenomena. So not all mental phenomena are intensional.

Moreover, on the other hand, we can cite cases which seem to be intentional in character, yet which do not seem to be cases of what is mental. For example, it can be true to say of a motor that it needs oil. Here the description of what is needed is "internal," so to speak. We cannot exactly say that it is "from the point of view of the motor," as inanimate things hardly have points of view; but the need is a need of the motor, a need for oil. So here the needing seems to have an object, oil, and the features of inexistence and indeterminateness seem to be present, for the motor needs oil whether or not there is any oil and the oil needed is more or less indeterminate as to quantity, and other properties. Hence it looks as though this needing oil is intentional. Yet here we seem to have to do with a physical rather than a mental phenomenon. When intensionality is understood in the way proposed, it seems to be possible for non-mental phenomena to be intentional.

Of course there are replies which a phenomenologist might wish to make here. One reply would be to grant that motors do need oil and that this need is intentional, but to hold, as Husserl and Sartre seem to have held, that such needs always are brought into being ("constituted") by the mental activity of conscious beings. Here the idea would be that the statement concerning the motor is genuinely inten-
An ambitious metaphysical claim of an idealistic type is involved in this reply. It is worthy of attention, but it cannot easily be justified. For my own part, I do not believe there is any significant sense in which the need of a motor for oil is created by mental, rather than by non-mental activity. So I do not find this way of dealing with the counterexample convincing.

A second kind of reply which might be employed by someone wishing to evade the counterexample would involve trying to distinguish between cases that are fully translatable into non-intentional language, and cases that are not. The proposal is that only the latter cases should be regarded as genuinely intentional and be indentified with the mental. The statement that the motor needs oil, on this view, would admit of being translated into some statement which is definitely non-intentional; perhaps it means roughly that the motor, if unlubricated, will soon seize up and become inoperable, whereas, if lubricated, it will have a long useful life. Assuming that it can thus be translated into non-intentional language, the statement that the motor needs oil will be classified as non-intentional. In contrast to this, statements that are genuinely intentional will not admit of any such translations. The statement that Diogenes searched for an honest man, on this view, defies translation into any non-intentional description of his behavior. The view is that in this way Brentano's thesis can be defended against such proposed counterexamples.

However, the alleged distinction depends upon a murky notion of translatability. What is it that supposedly can be done with the statement about the motor but cannot be done with the statement about Diogenes? As we already saw, Diogenes' behavior can be described in non-intentional language as consisting of walking through Athens, carrying a lantern, and disturbing his countrymen. Why should not this count as a "translation" of the statement that Diogenes searched for an honest man? After all, the suggested "translation" of the statement about the motor is a very loose translation and does not provide any strict equivalence of meaning. In consistency, ought we not to accept a loose translation of the statement about Diogenes also? Thus the second kind of reply to the counterexample proves unconvincing too. The counterexample stands as a plausible one.

The claim by Brentano and other phenomenologists that all and only mental phenomena are intentional therefore seems to be untrue, if intentionality is understood in the manner proposed in this paper—the manner which seemed to make the best sense as the straightforward way of introduc-
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...ting intentionality at the start.

Of course this result at most merely shows that the intentional in the proposed sense does not stand to the mental in the very simple relationship of universal concomitance. The possibility remains open that there may be less simple relationships of importance between the intentional and the mental.

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How are intensionality and intentionality related? Using the formulations of these two notions that have been developed, let us first ask whether every case of intentionality is a case of intensionality.

Consider an example. Suppose Philip fears that Mathilda will refuse his proposal of marriage. This way of speaking about Philip's fear is intentional, because it displays the features of inexistence and indeterminacy. There is inexistence because the description can be true of Philip whether or not what he fears is true, viz., that Mathilda will refuse him. And it involves indeterminacy, in that his envisaging of that which he fears is more or less indeterminate in its characteristics—an actual refusal would have to occur through specific words spoken at a specific time of day, etc., but the refusal which Philip fears is not specific in these respects.

Next, with this example, consider whether this way of speaking about Philip's fear is intensional. Does it conform to the law of identity, as regards substitutions (this is just one test it would have to pass in order not to be intensional)? From 'Philip fears that Mathilda will refuse his proposal of marriage', together with the supplementary information that, unknown to Philip, Mathilda is identical to his future wife, we cannot validly infer that Philip fears that his future wife will refuse his proposal of marriage. To accept that conclusion would be to ascribe quite the wrong content to Philip's fear. If the sentence describing Philip's fear were extensional, all substitutions under the law of identity would have to be permissible. Since some such substitutions fail, we must classify the sentence as intensional.

Here in this example we see that intensionality accompanies intentionality. And it is clear that what holds in this instance must hold in general. Any way of speaking that is intentional will have to impose limitations upon the range of substitutions that are permissible, hence substitutions under the law of identity cannot be relied upon, and we get intentionality. Thus the intentional is a subclass of the intensional.
Finally, looking at the matter in the converse direction, are all statements that are intensional also intentional? Here if we are adopting the proposed notion of intensionality the answer has to be negative. This is because there is a wide range of intensional statements that do not come close to having the features needed for them to be intentional. Consider the sentence "Necessarily John and his cousin have a grandparent in common." Knowing John's cousin is identical to William will not entitle us to infer the conclusion "Necessarily John and William have a grandparent in common" (where the conclusion is to be read as affirming it to be a necessary truth that John and William have a grandparent in common). Thus this statement is intensional. But nothing about the example remotely enables us to regard it as intentional; there is no intentional object, no inexistence, no ideterminacy of the sort we called for.

The points made in this paper have not, I think, been large or exciting ones. They have been directed toward putting forward and making plausible an interpretation of how intentionality should be defined, especially as this notion arises in Brentano. If what has been said is in the right direction, then it may be of help toward clarifying the situation, preparatory to the broaching of much larger philosophical questions concerning the nature of the mental and the character of the intentional.

FOOTNOTES


2. According to William Kneale, Hamilton was influenced in this by his reading of Cajetan. See William Kneale, "Intentionality and Intensionality," The Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume XLII (1968), 78-90.


4. It has been suggested that Hamilton based it on the word 'intention' or on the scholastic 'intentio,' respelling it with an 's' so as to parallel the spelling of 'extension.' See Ausonio Marras (ed.), Intentionality, Mind, and Language (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), introduction. However, this suggestion is misleading, for Hamilton clearly emphasizes that it is the contrast between extensive
and intensive quantities which leads him to introduce the terms 'extension' and 'intension'.

5. Here by 'terms' are meant the general terms and singular terms which occur in the statement. Logical connectives (syncategorematic terms) are not included.


8. Conceivably, an ideological commitment to empiricism or materialism also was of importance in this motivation. Perhaps intensional language was regarded as somehow contaminated by rationalistic or mentalistic presuppositions. However, it is difficult to see how or why commitment to empiricism or materialism should lead anyone to prefer extensional language, so this line of explanation is dubious.


10. Brentano, same section.


15. Russell in his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1919), chapter 16, harshly accused Meinong of having made this mistake. Such an accusation with more doubtful when made against Brentano. And even with Meinong, Russell's earlier account of him had been more sympathetic and more sensitive to the complexities of interpretation. See Bertrand Russell, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions," Mind, 13 (1904), 204-19, 336-54, 509-24.

16. G.E.M. Anscombe, "The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammati-
17. Here an objector might complain that sometimes we fear or love a particular individual being, whose properties are perfectly definite. But it is the being when "externally" described as actually existing, whose properties are fully determinate. From the "internal" point of view of the one who fears or loves, the object has only as much determinateness as is envisaged by the one who fears or loves. And this is always far less that full definiteness of properties.

18. The question whether intentionality is more a feature of sentences or of mental acts is discussed by Wilfrid Sellars and Roderick Chisholm in "Intentionality and the Mental," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science III, edited by Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven, and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958), 498-539.

19. One influential discussion was offered by Roderick Chisholm in his Perceiving (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), chapt. 11.

