KANT AND THE STOICS ON THE EMOTIONAL LIFE

Michael J. Seidler

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Abstract:

This essay examines Kant's relationship to the Stoics with respect to the affective dimension of the moral life. Besides offering a general description and comparison of the two philosophies in this particular regard, it utilizes numerous specific Kantian references to and parallels with Stoicism to argue that his own position was, throughout its development, shaped by a growing contact with and appreciation of the Stoic view. The paper proceeds from some negative remarks of Kant about suppressing or even eliminating the emotions and inclinations found mainly in the Grundlegung and the second Critique, and then goes on to show how Kant was able to draw upon a number of Stoic distinctions and concepts, such as that between the affects and the passions, in order to mitigate these negative and exclusivistic attitudes and to reincorporate the affective components of the personality into his conception of a fully human moral life. Moreover, because of the numerous subtopics explored in making the main case for the Kant-Stoa link, the essay also accomplishes its subsidiary purpose of showing the importance of the sometimes overlooked emotional factor or dimension of Kant's ethics as such.
A few years ago, Roger Sullivan argued that the Kantian critique of Aristotle's moral philosophy is, at least in part, misconceived and invalid. In the course of his article, he noted that "some of Kant's criticisms in the second Critique are directed against the Stoics and Epicureans, and a new study of Kant's remarks concerning these two schools needs to be done." In fact, Kant's relation to the two Hellenistic schools goes much beyond the second Critique, and some other scholars of both the Stoa and Kant have independently referred to it recently in various ways. The present essay is a partial response to this larger need of seeing how Kant and the Stoics compare and relate with one another, especially as regards their moral philosophies. More precisely, it focuses upon an aspect of Kant's moral thought whose relation to Stoicism has been left largely unelaborated by previous commentators on this topic, namely, the nature and role of the emotions in the moral life of human beings.


2 For example, Michel Despland, Kant on History and Religion (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), p. 329, n. 67, refers to Stoicism as "the one philosophical ethic that comes closest to Kant's," and, at p. 257, to "the Stoics, who were probably to him the best antiquity had to offer." A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics (New York: Scribner's, 1974), p. 208, comments: "The Stoics offer a complete world picture and in a sense, as they themselves observed, one must swallow the whole thing or none of it. Points on which they seem to agree with other philosophers must always be considered in the context of the total system. If we ask which philosopher of subsequent times comes closest to the Stoics two candidates are particularly worthy of mention. Kant, who was certainly influenced by them, is a strong contender." The other contender is Spinoza. In this essay, I try to observe Long's advice about contextuality by frequently focusing on the Stoic position as such, rather than only looking for points of contact with Kant.

Careful discussion of the Stoics and of Kant from this particular angle is all the more desirable because both parties have traditionally been misunderstood as philosophers who supposedly undervalued or failed to appreciate the affective components of the human personality. Stoics suffered long under the selective gaze of critics who portrayed them as cold, inhuman shells engaged—to whatever degree of success—in suppressing or even eliminating the emotional dimension of the moral life. One need only refer to Horace's occasional gibes (e.g., Epistula I. 1. 106-8) and the place and posture of the Stoic in Raphael's School of Athens, for example, in order to catch the gist of this sort of historical criticism. Only rather recently has a wider and more careful study of the texts resulted in a removal of scholarly misconceptions and the popular caricature. Kant has also had some difficulty in shedding the stern and formalistic image of a 'philosopher of duty' who does less than justice to the role of emotion in man's moral life. Again, this perspective has been increasingly undercut in recent years by the greater availability and use of texts and translations of Kant's lectures on ethics and education, the Metaphysik der Sitten, and the Anthropologie, where more details of his conception of the moral life are filled in than are found in the Grundlegung and the second Critique—which have gotten the lion's share of attention from those interested in Kant's ethics. A

When they have considered it at all, treatment of our topic by these authors has been minimal or sketchy. Schink, the earliest and most thorough, makes some remarks about Stoic ascesis and apathy (p. 453), sympathy as an affect (pp. 473-74), the 'rigorism' of the Stoa and Kant with respect to sensibility (pp. 465-66), and about how a happy disposition properly follows rather than precedes virtue (p. 459). Zac identifies the resonances of Epictetus' sustine et abstine principle in Kant (p. 141) and points out Kant's view that a happy heart is needed if virtue is to be meritorious (pp. 146-47). Gabaude's closest approach to the topic are some comments about the passions in discussing the problem of an evil will (p. 63), and Martin makes a few loosely organized remarks, based mostly on secondary sources, about natural impulse in Stoicism, the conflict between passions and principles of reason, and the notion of ataraxia (pp. 89-90). The topic as a whole may and deserves to receive a more sustained and comprehensive examination than any of these authors have accorded it. Also see Michael J. Seidler, "The Role of Stoicism in Kant's Moral Philosophy" (Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University, 1981), esp. chap. 6.

4 Two recent works which continue this emphasis on the Grundlegung are Bruce Aune, Kant's Theory of Morals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), and Viggo Rossvaer, Kant's Moral Philosophy: An Interpretation of the Categorical Imperative (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979). Besides intense analyses of the Categorical Imperative and other features of the Grundlegung, both works also seek to relate the latter with some of Kant's other works,
discussion of the Stoic and Kantian views on the emotions is therefore justified because of the neglect and misrepresentation each has experienced in the past. Such an investigation has even greater legitimacy if it can be shown that Kant's position on the subject was not only similar to but also significantly influenced by that of the Stoics, as I think it can be shown.

My paper therefore has three interconnected aims which will be accomplished according to increasingly stringent criteria of adequacy. First, it presents the Stoic position on the affects and the passions, examining not only their nature but also various ways of regulating them. Secondly, the reader will find developed somewhat more thoroughly Kant's own view of the emotional life, his analysis of human affective psychology insofar as its components play adversarial or contributory roles in the realization of moral value in the world in and through human activity. Thirdly, I will utilize the previous two discussions in order to show that Kant's position was to a large extent based on--precisely because it was elaborated in constant and conscious interaction with--the Stoic view. This third objective demands a careful treatment of the previous two, though I do not claim in those instances that my discussion is as exhaustive of the subject as I would like to claim in regard to the third.

The actual organization of the paper is as follows. Part I begins by presenting a number of Kant's negative or critical remarks about the emotions and inclinations, comments which are then contrasted with other more qualified and even positive observations. The tension between these two sets of remarks cannot be resolved without further clarification of Kant's conception of the nature of the human affective machinery. Hence, in Part II, I examine Kant's distinction between the affects and the passions and show how it coincides rather precisely with Stoic antecedents. I also compare the Stoic and Kantian strategies for regulating these elements of the affective

notably the second Critique and the Metaphysik der Sitten. While it broadens the outlook, this sort of approach still leaves important portions of Kant's moral philosophy unconsidered, especially if one understands the latter to include some reference to the human (and not just the 'pure') dimension as such.

5 Those familiar with the Stoic view will readily notice the omissions in my treatment of it, especially those concerning the historical development of certain ideas and also the variations among individual Stoics on this general theme. Kant scholars will also miss a thorough consideration of moral incentives and Kant's struggle to properly characterize them, as well as an analysis of happiness and its relation to virtue in the concept of the highest good--two topics that would also require closer attention to the problem of Kant's noumenal-phenomenal dualism. In both instances, I can only plead my main purpose in order to justify the exclusions. As a comparative work of sorts, the essay faces the usual risk of critical scrutiny from both sides of the aisle.
life, and clarify various other feature of their respective views on the subject. Once these distinctions and elucidations are in place, we can return, in Part III, to the more positive construal of the emotions and inclinations as allies and contributors in humane moral living which has already been hinted at in Part I.

Instead of constantly interrupting my discussion of Kant's position with retrospective historical references to Stoic antecedents and similarities, I treat the two views separately within each section and subsection. There are several advantages to this approach. For one, it permits a better presentation of the Stoic view as an integral whole, such as it may have impressed Kant through his own primary and secondary contact with the sources. Moreover, in addition to facilitating a more adequate general comparison of the two moral philosophies as such, this tactic also allows for the occasional insertion of corrections at places where Kant's reading of the Stoics is deficient in some way (either erroneous or incomplete), and it also reveals more clearly his selectivity with respect to the larger Stoic view facing him. Most importantly, perhaps, this kind of parallel approach to the subject generates a more cumulative impact and appreciation of each tradition on the part of the reader, especially of how the one has had a shaping influence on the other. To keep the parallel treatments from drifting apart, I should also add, both the selection and sequencing of topics in my exposition of the Stoic view are consciously controlled by the guiding interest in Kant's own position. Furthermore, various related similarities and parallels between the two views which the main text could not thematically, and neatly, accommodate have been consigned to the notes.

Finally, a few cautionary remarks for the scrupulous reader about the paper's carefully restricted goals. The essay is not 1) narrowly critical of previous commentators on the Kant-Stoa connection since they have not generally addressed its topic in a thorough or controversial way. In fact, substantial portions of what it says have gone previously unnoticed. 2) Nor does it examine the specific supporting arguments given respectively by Kant and the Stoics for their own

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6 My consideration of the Stoic position will generally be guided by Kant's own knowledge of and access to Stoic ideas. Thus, most quotes and citations from Stoic authors will concern the Roman representatives or perpetuators of the school, especially Seneca and Cicero, with whom Kant was quite familiar. The importance of Seneca to Kant is noted by Jachmann, one of Kant's biographers: "Still in the final years of his academic teaching career, he read the Roman classical authors with much relish, [and] he studied especially Seneca for the sake of his practical philosophy." See Reinhold B. Jachmann, "Immanuel Kant geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund," in Wer war Kant? Drei zeitgenössische Biographien von Borowski, Jachmann und Wasianski, ed. Siegfried Drescher (Pfullingen: Neske, 1974), p. 148.
particular analyses of the emotional life, or criticize either set of arguments or conclusions from an independent philosophical standpoint. Such an approach would offer its own rewards, to be sure, but it is not the one pursued here. 3) While some of this emerges in the references employed hereafter, the paper also does not purport to be a study of Kant's ethics aimed solely or primarily at showing—in a specific fashion—how previous expositions of the latter have been hampered by an overly restrictive focus on a few works such as the Grundlegung and the second Critique. 4) And, as will also become clearer, the particular connections between Kant and the Stoics explored here cannot—without significant loss—be subsumed within a wider consideration of the general topic. Such an approach would sacrifice the opportunity to make many of the comments found below by virtually eliminating from consideration two of the three objectives that were noted earlier—and which I believe to be instrumental in achieving the third.

5) Despite certain features of its external structure, the paper is not a mere catalogue of parallels. Rather, the latter are employed strategically in order to explore the Stoic position and Kant's understanding and use of it, so as to present a fuller and more adequate picture of the Kant's moral theory and its background. My essay reveals an important side of Kant the moralist that does not receive sufficient notice by expositors and readers with more narrow interests in Kant's text, and argues that his stance in this respect was shaped significantly by his (direct or indirect) contact with ancient Stoic views. Therefore, although the paper is in one sense largely expository or descriptive, it is so structured and organized as to present a certain perspective or argue a case—one that can be supported and substantiated only by such a careful marshalling of evidence as follows hereafter.

7 All references to Kant's works will be (by volume and page number) to I. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, 29 vols. to date, Prussian (Berlin) Academy Edition (Berlin: Reimer [Walter de Gruyter], 1902--). Volume numbers appear as Roman numerals. Use is also made of Paul Menzer's Eine Vorlesung Kants über Ethik, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Pan Verlag Rolf Heise, 1925). This work will be cited as Vorlesung, and translations of it are taken from I. Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Evanston: Harper and Row, 1963).

Throughout the article, I will also make use of the following abbreviations and translations for Kant's works:


I. The Pros and Cons of Human Sensibility

Kant says some nasty things about the inclinations, especially in the Grundlegung and the KPV. In the former work, he notes: "All objects of inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth. The inclinations themselves as the sources of needs, however, are so lacking in absolute worth that the universal wish of every rational being must be indeed to free himself completely from them." Since the Grundlegung is very much concerned with


Other titles of Kant's works will be introduced as needed. The translations just cited are altered only in regard to Kant's own italics, which I retain. Whenever no translation is cited, the English version will be my own. Stoic sources and translations will be noted as they occur.

8 Grundlegung, IV, 428 (Beck, p. 46).
establishing the possibility of a pure ethics, sensibility in general is treated in guarded and sometimes uncomplimentary terms. The KPV remains similarly negative: "For inclinations vary; they grow with the indulgence we allow them, and they leave behind a greater void than the one we intended to fill. They are consequently always burdensome to a rational being, and, though he cannot put them aside, they nevertheless elicit from him the wish to be free of them." In both these passages, Kant speaks as though eventual disembodiment, leaving behind the sensibility altogether, were the ideal we should hope for. In a much earlier work, moreover, he attributes precisely this sort of attitude to the Stoics: "For that reason, the Stoic sage had to extirpate all those inclinations which contain a feeling of great sensible pleasure. For one plants along with them grounds of great discontent and dissatisfaction, which, according to the alternating play of the course of the world, can neutralize the entire worth of the former [pleasures]." This latter claim is not only historically inaccurate, however, at least as it stands, but Kant's own attitude toward the inclinations, as it is revealed in these passages, is extreme in view of other pronouncements and distinctions to be found in both early and later stages of his philosophical development.

Before turning to these, however, let us garner some more of Kant's negative remarks. In the Vorlesung, for instance, he speaks disparagingly of "a certain rabble of acts of sensibility which has to be vigilanty disciplined, and kept under strict rule, even to the point of applying force to make it submit to the ordinances of government. This rabble does not naturally conform to the rule of the understanding, . . ." Also, in both the KRV and Mds, inclinations (Neigungen) are referred to as obstacles (Hindernisse) to morality, and Kant speaks as if they were the chief and only barrier between the intelligible, moral world and our present state. The inclinations are frequently cast into a strict adversary role against moral effort on our part: "The impulses of nature contain resisting forces (some of them powerful) and hindrances to duty's fulfillment in the mind of

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9 KPV, V, 118 (Beck, p. 122).

10 Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Grossen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, II, 196. Cf. Cicero Tusc. Disp. IV. 10. 23, where it is said that all diseases have their opposites.

11 Vorlesung, 172-73 (Infield, p. 138). Also see pp. 175-76 and 310.

12 KRV A15/B29 and A809/B837, and Mds, VI, 405. See also Kant's Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik, II, 335-36, where Kant already (in 1766) elaborates on the discrepancy between a spiritual world which operates according to 'pneumatic' laws and our earthly, bodily world.
Moreover, the constant battle with his inclinations is what limits man to achieving virtue rather than holiness, and makes even the former a rather difficult and often chancy affair. It is easy, therefore, to paint an entirely negative picture of Kant's attitudes toward sensible inclinations. Yet, this would be only a partial and, thus, a flawed view.

Quite in contrast to the foregoing remarks, Kant absolves the inclinations from some of his own charges. In the KU, he says that nature has given us certain impulses (Triebes) as "guiding threads, that we should not neglect or injure the destination of our animal nature." Also, in one of his historical essays, we read that "in itself and as a natural disposition, impulse serves a good purpose." The strongest defenses of sensibility and the inclinations come, however, in the Religion and the Anthropologie. In the former, Kant notes: "Natural inclinations, considered in themselves, are good, that is, not a matter of reproach, and it is not only futile to want to extirpate them but to do so would also be harmful and blameworthy. Rather, let them be tamed and instead of clashing with one another they can be brought into harmony in a wholeness which is called happiness." The Anthropologie, where the whole man is under investiga-
tion, goes even further, containing a section entitled "Apology for the Sensibility" which defends the senses against the threefold charge that they 1) confuse our representative powers, 2) give the understanding (or reason) a rough time instead of obeying it, and 3) deceive us. In all three cases, Kant lays the blame at the door of the understanding itself, which fails to make proper use of the sensibility. Specifically in regard to the second charge, Kant responds: "The senses do not lay down the law to understanding. They merely offer themselves to understanding so that it may dispose of their services. . . . The senses . . . are like the common people who—unless they are rabble (ignobile vulgus)—readily submit to their superior, understanding, but still want to be heard."\(^{17}\) It is the responsibility of the understanding, as ruler, to treat the inclinations as subjects in such a fashion that they do not turn into an uncontrollable mob. In neither the metaphor nor its application is there any question of eliminating the subjects altogether.

Kant understands, in these later passages, that the desire to be rid of one's inclinations altogether—if taken literally—is equivalent to wanting another nature. Given the way we are, all of our representations, whether of sensible or intellectual origin, are connected with feelings of pleasure or pain since they affect the subject's feeling of life.\(^{18}\) As a result, they also serve to stimulate positive and negative inclinations in us, desires to pursue or avoid the pleasurable or painful objects. Hence, the desire to literally be rid of our inclinations is a vain metaphysical yearning that is morally irrelevant, given our present state. What Kant wants, in fact, is for us to control our inclinations, not to eliminate them. A careful reading of some of the apparently anti-sensibility texts reveals this quite clearly. Kant speaks, for example, of the "indulgence" which we grant to the inclinations, allowing them to run rampant. He also mentions "the hindrances which man creates for himself through his inclinations." And he charges that we allow those

\(^{17}\) Anthropologie, VII, 145 (Gregor, p. 25). See Kant's entire "Apology for Sensibility" at VII, 143-46.

\(^{18}\) KU, V, 277. Throughout Kant's literary career, we find the notion of man as an "intermediate being" (Mittelwesen) (MdS, VI, 461). The theme is first developed in the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (I, 365-66, a passage—it is interesting to note—that is very similar to Cicero's De natura deorum II. 15.42), and it is reiterated in various later writings. Man's intermediate status accounts for the fact that he is incapable of both devilish vice and angelic virtue. (See Religion, VI, 34-35, and MdS, VI, 461.) Man always finds himself torn between the formal, intelligible realm and the domain of his material existence. (Grundlegung, IV, 400, 412-13, 439; KPV, V, 80-84). This insures that his virtue is a "moral disposition in combat" (KPV, V, 84) which must be forged through a "discipline of reason" (KPV, V, 82). The latter themes are evidently Stoic in nature.
impulses which are to guide us to become "fetters," even though we are "all the time free enough to strain or relax, to extend or diminish them, according as the purposes of reason require." In other words, we ourselves are to blame if our sensible inclinations control our lives to the exclusion of rational choice. The remedy, therefore, is not to hamstring or destroy the sensibility, but to place it under rational control. As Kant advises in the Pädagogik: "The first step towards the formation of a good character is to put our passions on one side. We must take care that our inclinations do not become passions." Kant's most characteristic and appropriate polemic against the inclinations is really directed against the passions as such, as he himself makes clear through eventual terminological adjustments.

Despite what Kant has said above, the very idea of wanting to rid oneself of one's basic inclinations as such would have appeared odd to an orthodox Stoic, for impulse or inclination (hormê) played an essential role in the oikeiôsis development of sentient beings, directing them toward the things consonant with the perfection of their own natures. The radical split between reason and sensibility (impulse) is not of Stoic (but of Platonic) origin. Rather, as Plutarch reports in treating the Stoic view, "impulse in man is reason prescriptive of action for him." Upon our reaching the age of discretion (7 or 14 years), reason takes over in consciously directing our sensible inclinations toward natural ends, now recognized explicitly as such: "But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life."

19 KFP, V, 118 (Beck, p. 122); MdS, VI, 405; KU, V, 432 (Bernard, p. 282). Also, at Refl. 7199, XIX, 272, Kant speaks of controlling our inclinations in order to attain happiness.


21 De Stoic, rep. 11. 1037F (pp. 450-51). Plutarch is reporting the views of Chrysippus. This reference is to Plutarch's Moralia, 17 vols., vol. 13, part 2: De Stoicorum repugnantiis, De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos, trans. Harold Cherniss, Index by Edward O'Neil, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976). Future references will also be to this volume.


For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically.  "22  Reason and impulse originate together in the ruling part of the soul (the hēgemonikon).  "23  Theirs is a cooperative venture, with reason being a sort of outgrowth of the inclinations, which do well enough as far as they go.  We simply do not find in orthodox Stoicism the sort of reason/sensibility antagonism that some of Kant's remarks evince.  In fact, the Stoic position is close to his own more balanced outlook on the matter.

Viewed in one way, inclinations are a simple given for the Stoics, and we can do no more than to describe them once they have arisen.  According to Seneca: "Every one of us understands that there is something which stirs his impulses, but he does not know what it is.  He knows that he has a sense of striving, although he does not know what it is or its source."  "24  But this comment refers only to the subjective origin of the inclinations, for we shall see later that one can identify for oneself, and then manipulate, many of the objective situations in which they are called forth.  Seneca also identifies certain other feelings that arise without our being able to control them directly.  These are semi-physiological in nature and include


Cf. Cicero De finibus, III. 7. 23 (pp. 242-43): "And . . . so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormē, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living. . . ."  This and subsequent like references are to M.T. Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, trans H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).


It is also noteworthy that, despite its positive impact in the present context, the close association of reason and impulse becomes a handicap for the Stoics when the issue becomes that of grounding moral principles.  Hence, Kant accuses the Stoics and other moralists of providing naturalistic and inadequate foundations for ethical principles.  See KPV, V, 35-41.

Though we are basically passive with respect to the initial occurrence of such affective reactions as well, we likewise have some indirect control over their growth and later occurrence. As in Kant, therefore, the blame (if any) for the disruption caused by such feelings and inclinations is attributable to our reason (insofar as this is viewed as an independent, controlling power) which allows these essentially wholesome stirrings to escalate into passions: "None of these things which move the mind through the agency of chance should be called passions [affectus]; the mind suffers them, so to speak, rather than causes them. Passion, consequently, does not consist in being moved by the impressions that are presented to the mind, but in surrendering to these and following up such a chance prompting." The key to order in our emotional life lies, accordingly, for both Kant and the Stoics, in a careful investigation of the nature of the passions, and of how to regulate and dominate them. To this subject we now turn.

II. The Affects and the Passions in Kant and in Stoicism

In order to grasp clearly the rationale behind the pro and con attitudes expressed by Kant and the Stoics toward the sensibility in the area of morals, we need to dissect the structure of this faculty more carefully. Hence, in this second section of the paper, I examine the Kantian and Stoic views on emotional disorder and its causes and treatments in four stages, beginning with their respective definitions and basic characterizations of the affects and the passions. Next, I briefly consider the subdivision and classification of such disorders in each philosophy. The third subsection will focus on methods of controlling the affects and passions. It is followed, in fourth place, by a discussion of the principle of apathy—a means of rational control—and the restrictions placed by the latter upon our affective nature, including our sympathetic response to others. It will be evident throughout how Kant's views are not only similar to but actually reliant upon a variety of Stoic sources.

A. The Nature and Definition of the Affects and Passions

Before considering directly Kant's treatment of the affects and passions as such, it is useful to spell out some of his affective

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25 De ira II. 2. 1-6. Compare Anthropologie, VII, 263-64 (Gregor, p. 131): "Certain internal feelings are closely akin to the affects, but are not themselves affects because they are only momentary, transitory, and leave no trace of themselves behind. . . ." Kant goes on to mention shuddering, dizziness, and seasickness.

terminology. Man is a being capable of feeling pleasure (Lust), which may be connected with the faculty of desire in two ways, either preceding or succeeding our desire for some object. Whichever the connection, Kant calls this sort of pleasure practical (praktische Lust), in contrast to mere contemplative pleasure (unthätiges Wohlgefallen) that is satisfied with the mere entertaining of a representation itself and does not actively pursue the realization or acquisition of the represented object. The kind of pleasure which follows desire is essentially that connected with moral feeling. But here we are concerned with pleasure that precedes and stimulates desire. Kant refers to such desire as "appetite" (Begierde) and carefully separates it from wish, which is an ineffectual tendency toward some object. The Anthropologie defines it thus: "Appetite (appetitio) is the self-determination of a subject's power through the idea of some future thing as an effect of this power." That is, appetite involves the self-determination of the subject to either pursue or avoid some object which it has perceived to provide either pleasure or pain to itself. Consequent upon appetite, moreover, is inclination (Neigung, inclinatio), namely, "habitual sensuous desire." And finally: "Beyond inclination there is . . . a further stage in the faculty of desire, passion (Leidenschaft) (not emotion [Affect], for this has to do with the feeling of pleasure and pain), which is an inclination that excludes the mastery over oneself." The rest of this subsection will be devoted to this final distinction between affects and passions.

27 For Kant, all pleasure is ultimately sensible feeling: KPV, V, 22-25.

28 Anthropologie, VII, 251 (Gregor, p. 119). In the same passage, Kant defines 'wish' (Wunsch) as "desiring something without using our power to produce the object." Also see MdS, VI, 212.

29 Anthropologie, VII, 251 (Gregor, p. 119). At MdS, VI, 212 (The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. John Ladd [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965], p. 11), Kant defines 'interest' as "the connection of pleasure with the faculty of desire, insofar as this connection is judged by the understanding to be valid according to a general rule (though only for the subject). . . ." Depending on whether the pleasure precedes or succeeds the desire, one speaks of pathological or intellectual interest. Also see Anthropologie, VII, 265, for some of these same distinctions.

30 Religion, VI 29n (Greene and Hudson, p. 24n). Also note Kant's definitions of Hang (propensity), Anlage (disposition), and Instinkt at VI, 28-29, 28-29n, as well as Anthropologie, VII, 265.
Affects and passions are distinguished by Kant as early as the Vorlesung, but not all too precisely. Still, the following passage is worth quoting, partly because it also shows the development of Kant’s affective terminology when compared to his later more precise usage, as well as his continued references to the Stoics in discussing the topic.

With regard to the guidance of the mind [Gemütes] in respect of the emotions [Affekte] and passions [Leidenschaften], we must distinguish these from feelings [Empfindungen] and inclinations [Neigungen]. A man can have feeling and inclination for something without having emotion and passion. If the feelings [Empfindungen] and passions [Leidenschaften] are so bound up with the reason that their soul is in harmony with reason, they can quite well be in keeping with our duties towards ourselves. These duties and the dignity of humanity demand that man should have no passion or emotion, but though this is the principle, it is open to question whether man can really achieve so much. In his work man must be thorough, regular and resolute, and must beware of giving way to the heat of passion. No man is sane when swayed by passion; his inclination is blind and cannot be in keeping with the dignity of mankind. We must, there-

Kant refers to Leidenschaften even earlier, though in a less technical manner. At Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes (1764), II, 264, he says: "The drives [Trieb] of human nature, which are called passions [Leidenschaften] when they are at a high degree, are the moving forces of the will. The understanding is added thereto only in order to estimate the sum total of the joint satisfaction of all inclinations [Neigungen] with respect to the imagined end, as well as to discover the means to that end." In this early passage, the passions do not themselves play a motivational role, though the drives of which they are aberrations do. At Anthropologie, VII, 267, Kant explicitly denies any legitimate motivational function to Leidenschaften as such. By this time, he has also made a clear distinction between understanding and reason, and reason has moved beyond its purely instrumental role. Kant now deems it sufficiently practical for both judging about and (en)acting moral values.

For Stoic parallels to Kant’s notion of reason’s self-sufficiency, apart from affective motives, see Seneca De ira I. 9. 1, 17. 2-3, and 10. 1. This final text (vol. 1, pp. 130-31) says: "Consequently, reason will never call to its help blind and violent impulses over which it will itself have no control, which it can never crush save by setting against them equally powerful and similar impulses, as fear against anger, anger against sloth, greed against fear. May virtue be spared the calamity of having reason ever flee for help to vice!"
fore, altogether avoid giving way to passion, and the rule laid down by the Stoics in this regard is correct.\footnote{\textit{Vorlesung}, 183-84 (Infield, pp. 146-47). Use of Kant's \textit{Vorlesung} must always be tempered by caution, since we do not have an original manuscript thereof, but several sets of student notes. Moreover, Infield's translation of the work is in serious need of revision, since it is often quite loose or free—as anyone can discover by trying to match Menzer's text with the translation. Throughout this paper, the attentive reader will find a veritable multitude of renditions for the affect/passion distinction in both Stoicism and Kant. It is very important to note, however, that these variations generally do not reflect any imprecision in the source writers themselves, who took great care to separate the terms and their meanings. Instead of altering the many translations employed, I have inserted the original terminology in places of potential confusion.}

It is clear here that Kant separates normal feelings and inclinations from aberrations thereof, the emotions and passions. We are to exercise control over the former in order that they do not turn into the latter. There is some confusion, though, in Kant's linking of feelings and passions at one point, as well as in the suggestion that passions as such might be in keeping with reason. Perhaps the switch is not Kant's own but that of the student notes on which our copy of the \textit{Vorlesung} is based. In any case, the distinction between affects and passions is thoroughly worked out in Kant's later works, which it now behooves us to consider.

In the KU, Kant characterizes the affects and passions as follows:

\textbf{Affections are specifically distinct from passions.} The former are related merely to feeling; the latter belong to the faculty of desire and are inclinations which render difficult or impossible all determination of the [elective] will by principles. The former are stormy and unpremeditated, the latter are steady and deliberate; thus indignation in the form of wrath is an affection, but in the form of hatred (revenge) is a passion. The latter can never and in no reference be called sublime, because while in an affection the freedom of the mind is hindered, in a passion it is abolished.\footnote{\textit{KU}, V, 272n (Bernard, p. 112n). There are precious few discussions of Kant's handling of the affects and passions, but see Johannes Schwartländer, \textit{Der Mensch ist Person: Kant's Lehre vom Menschen} (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968), pp. 50-51, and Hamby, "Kant on Moral Anthropology," pp. 187-97. Hamby details the various stages involved in the growth of the passions.}
Affect and passion both hinder man from acting as a free, rational agent should, the former through the high pitch of momentary emotion (feeling) which it involves, and the latter by a cool and deliberate rejection of the constraints and principles of moral reason. We should also take note, in the foregoing and subsequent passages, of Kant's continued use of the examples of anger and hate. These, as well as the general distinction involved, are also emphasized in Seneca's writings.

The MdS version of the distinction is even more explicit:

**Emotions and passions are essentially distinct.** Emotions belong to feeling, which, preceding reflection as it does, makes reflection more difficult or even impossible. Emotion is therefore called hasty or precipitate (animus praeceps), and reason declares through the concept of virtue that a man should collect himself; nevertheless, this weakness in the use of one's understanding, joined with the strength of the agitation, is only a lack of virtue [Untugend] and, as it were, something weak and childish. It may well be consistent with the best will, and moreover has the one good point that its storm soon subsides. A propensity to emotion (e.g., anger) is therefore not so closely related to vice as passion is. Passion is the sensible appetite grown into a lasting inclination (e.g., hatred in contrast to anger). The calmness with which one indulges passion permits reflection and allows the mind to frame principles for it. And so when inclination falls upon something unlawful, the mind is allowed to brood over it, to root itself deeply in it, and is thereby allowed to take up what is bad (intentionally) into its maxim; this, then, is specifically bad, i.e., a true vice.\(^{34}\)

Affects endanger our freedom less than the passions because they are spontaneous feelings that arise and subside quickly. Passions, on the other hand, involve a principled state of inclination, a chosen policy that is yet controlled and reinforced by some dominant sensible inclination often at variance with moral maxims and laws. Passions are such great obstacles precisely because they are practically 'reasonable' in an instrumental sense, and are not as anchored in the realm of mere sensibility alone as are the emotions or affects. In accordance with these characterizations, Kant also says that whereas affects need only to be tamed (zahmen), passions must be dominated (beherrschen).\(^{35}\) Moreover, we will see later that affects, even though they somewhat diminish our freedom, may sometimes play a positive role in the moral life of the individual and the race. Passions, on the other hand, offer no such benefits.

\(^{34}\)MdS, VI, 407-8 (Ellington, p. 67).

\(^{35}\)MdS, VI, 407.
Kant's description of the dichotomy culminates in the Anthropologie, where it is painted in its most dramatic terms:

Inclination that the subject's reason can subdue only with difficulty or not at all is passion. On the other hand, a feeling of pleasure or displeasure in his present state that does not let him rise to reflection (to rational consideration of whether he should give himself up to it or refuse it) is an affect.

A mind that is subject to affects and passions is always ill, because both of them exclude the sovereignty of reason. Both, again, are equally vehement in degree; but as far as their quality is concerned, they are essentially different from each other, both with regard to the preventative measures and the therapy that the spiritual physician must apply.

In an affect, we are taken unawares by feeling, so that the mind's self-control (animus sui compos) is suspended. So an affect is rash: that is, it rises swiftly to a degree of feeling that makes reflection impossible (it is thoughtless). . . . What the affect of anger does not accomplish quickly, it does not do at all; and it forgets easily. But a passion of hatred takes its time so as to get itself rooted deeply and think about its adversary. . . . passion (as a disposition of the mind belonging to the appetitive power) takes its time and reflects, no matter how intense it is, in order to reach its end.--An affect works like water breaking through a dam: a passion, like a stream that burrows ever deeper in its bed. An affect works on our health like an apoplectic fit: a passion, like a consumption or emaciation. An affect should be regarded as a drunken fit--we sleep it off, though we have a headache afterwards; but passion, as a sickness that comes from swallowing poison, or deformity, which requires a spiritual doctor within or without--though this doctor, for the most part, does not know how to prescribe medicine that would effect a radical cure; he must, almost always, use a mere palliative.

. . . Affects are honest and open: passions, on the contrary, cunning and hidden. . . . no one wishes to have passions. For who wants to have himself put in chains when he can be free?

Affects are not formally opposed to reason, even if they interrupt its hegemony for a brief time. Passions are formally opposed to reason because they involve a maxim on the part of the subject to pursue an end that is set and urged by an inclination. This end may be immoral or not, considered in itself, but passion always borders on vice or virtue.

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36 Anthropologie, VII, 251-53 (Gregor, pp. 119-20). Also see VII, 265-67.
immorality because it excludes (in principle) the guidance of moral reason. The association of passion with instrumental reason has a settling effect upon it, and it also leads easily to self-deception: it is usually futile to try to get a man-in-the-grip-of-passion to 'listen to reason'—because he already thinks himself to be supremely reasonable, and does not recognize the distinction between a free, autonomous, moral reason and a merely instrumental reason. Hence, the man under the sway of passion does not see his predicament as undesirable and so fights to keep his chains on: "Emotional agitation does a momentary damage to freedom and self-mastery; passion abandons them and finds its pleasure and satisfaction in slavery."^37 There is no acceptable degree of passion, and we should try to eradicate it entirely. Yet, this is obviously a far cry from eliminating our emotions and inclinations, or even our affects.

Four more observations may be made before turning to the Stoic counterparts of Kant's position—where we shall find some of the same themes anticipated. First, one notices throughout the discussion the language of health and disease. Affects and passions are sicknesses of the soul that require curing by a spiritual physician. Also, all appearance of strength and vigor to the contrary, they are fundamentally weak and unstable, especially the affects. True strength lies rather in having proper rational principles directing one's activity and achieving its stability. Second, since passions involve maxims of reason in the service of some dominant inclination, they occur neither in animals nor in purely rational beings. Moreover, they are directed only toward other people, not toward animals or things, concerning which we can have only passionate inclinations, not passions as such. Third, that which makes an affect or passion so fundamentally objectionable is its destruction of reason's comparative powers, its freedom to judge. A man under the sway of an affect or passion has lost his perspective and can no longer integrate his present feeling or inclination with all others. Finally, as we have indicated

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^37 Anthropologie, VII, 267 (Gregor, p. 134).

^38 Anthropologie, VII, 251, 255, 266.

^39 Mds, VI, 384, 408-9: Vorlesung, 184; Anthropologie, VII, 271-72. Stability is largely a result of rational consistency in one's principles and behavior, and there is much common ground between Kant and the Stoics in respect to this topic.

^40 Anthropologie, VII, 266, 268-70.

^41 At Anthropologie, VII, 254 (Gregor, p. 122) Kant says: "Generally speaking, what constitutes a state of emotional agitation is not the intensity of a certain feeling but rather the lack of reflection that would compare this feeling with the totality of all the feelings (of pleasure or displeasure) that go with our state." Also, at VII, 265 (Gregor, p. 133): "Passion (passio animi) is an inclination that
earlier, it is we ourselves, through failure to exercise proper control, who are to blame for our emotional aberrations. There is a voluntary element involved, especially in the passions, which is precisely why these states are such formidable obstacles to the life of virtue. We ourselves are the enemy.

Let us turn now to the Stoic position in which many of Kant's remarks are foreshadowed. A passage preserved from Clement of Alexandria clearly links the Stoic notions of impulse (hormē) and passion (pathos): "Impulse is therefore a turning of the mind toward or away from something. Passion, on the other hand, is an impulse that is either excessive or stretched beyond reasonable limits, or an impulse that has gotten carried away and is disobedient to reason. The passions are thus movements of the soul contrary to nature because they are disobedient to reason." This characterization is also found in other Stoic sources. Diogenes Laertius says: "Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess." Cicero likewise concurs: "This then is Zeno's definition of disorder, which he terms pathos, that it is an agitation of the soul alien from right reason and contrary to nature." Also, since the normal state of the soul was described by Stoics in terms of proper pneumatic tension, passions were appropriately defined as disruptions of that state: "They consider that the passions are caused by variations of the vital breath." Indeed, Zeno propounded a fit metaphor when he described the disruption as a "fluttering of the soul" (ptoia psychēs), a phrase which evokes the image of a frightened bird moving about.

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42 Grundlegung, IV, 457-58; KPV, V, 118; KU, V, 432; and MdS, VI, 405, 407-8.
44 DL VII 110 (pp. 216-17).
46 DL VII 158 (pp. 262-63). Also see SVF III 473.
47 SVF I 206.
There was some debate in the early Stoa over the relation of passions to reason. Whereas Zeno asserted that passions were consequent to certain judgments, Chrysippus claimed that they were equivalent thereto. This particular disagreement was part of a wider quarrel concerning the relation of judgment to appetite or tendency. At the root of the matter was the issue whether there is a distinct appetitive faculty that is needed by reason to carry out its injunctions. Posidonius claimed there was, and tried to appeal to Zeno in doing so; but he is generally considered unorthodox in this respect. In contrast to Kant's dualism, reason and impulse were to most Stoics two aspects of the same faculty, so that affects and passions, as impulses in excess, were disturbances of reason itself, and not the aberrations of some separate faculty disobedient to reason. Cicero presents the orthodox position in comparing Zeno with some 'older' (Platonic and Aristotelian) views: "... whereas the older generation said that these emotions were natural and non-rational, and placed desire and reason in different regions of the mind, he did not agree with these doctrines either, for he thought that even the emotions were voluntary and were experienced owing to a judgment of opinion." In describing how to uproot the passions,

48 See Seneca De ira I. 10. 1-2, 17. 1-3, III. 3. 5; and SVF III 461. The Stoic debate is in many respects similar to Kant's efforts to find an adequate notion of practical reason or the will.


Seneca likewise locates them in the mind: "For the mind is not a member apart, nor does it view the passions merely objectively, thus forbidding them to advance farther than they ought, but it is itself transformed into the passion and is, therefore, unable to recover its former useful and saving power when this has once been betrayed and weakened. For, as I said before, these two do not dwell separate and distinct, but passion and reason are only the transformation of the mind toward the better or the worse." Because reason and appetite are merely two states of the same ruling faculty (the ἡγεμόνικον), any disorder in one member will ipso facto affect the other as well. This connection of reason with appetite will, as in Kant, make the passions difficult to manage.

Despite their disagreement, Zeno and Chrysippus both noted the importance of proper judgment if passion is to be avoided. According to Diogenes Laertius: "Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability." Passions are ultimately traceable to wrong opinions which lack the consistent stability of true knowledge. These opinions, on the other hand, are produced because of improper haste in assenting to things. Implied in this, and already stated by Cicero above, is that passions are under our control, for we should, and can, judge properly. In a passage quoted earlier, we also saw that passions are not simply the impressions received from outside of ourselves, but our own surrender and assent to them. This notion of passions as judgments was utilized in formulating the Stoic definitions of specific passions, to be considered later on.

Passing on from these general remarks, let us consider the precise antecedents of Kant's distinction between affects and passions as such in Seneca and Cicero. The similarities on this point are so striking that it is hard to resist the claim that Kant borrowed directly from these sources. The key Senecan passage is the following:

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51 De ira I. 8. 2-3 (vol. 1, pp. 126-27).
52 DL VII 110 (pp. 216-17).
54 At Tusc. Disp. IV. 7. 14 (pp. 342-43), Cicero says: "But all disorders are, they [the Stoics] think, due to judgment and belief. Consequently they define them more precisely, that it may be realized not only how wrong they are but to what extent they are under our control." Also see IV. 38. 82, and De finibus III. 10. 35.
55 Seneca De ira II. 3. 1 and 5.
I have often before explained the difference between the
diseases of the mind [morbos animi, Kant's Leidenschaften] 
and its passions [adfectus, Kant's Affecte]. And I shall 
remind you once more: the diseases are hardened and chronic 
vides thereof. To give a brief definition: by "disease" we 
mean a persistent perversion of the judgment, so that things 
which are mildly desirable are thought to be highly 
desirable. Or, if you prefer, we may define it thus: to be 
zealous in striving for things which are only mildly 
desirable or not desirable at all. "Passions" [adfectus] are 
objectionable impulses [motus] of the spirit, sudden and 
vehement; they have come so often, and so little attention 
has been paid to them, that they have caused a state of 
disease; just as a catarrh, when there has been but a single 
attack and the catarrh has not yet become habitual, produces 
a cough, but causes consumption when it has become regular 
and chronic. Therefore we may say that those who have made 
most progress are beyond the reach of the "diseases" 
[morbos]; but they still feel the "passions" [adfectus] even 
when very near perfection.

The translator's practice of rendering adfectus as "passions" is a bit 
confusing, especially given Kant's usage, but it is clear that 
Seneca's morbus and adfectus correspond respectively to Kant's 
Leidenschaft and Affect. The descriptions coincide nearly perfectly, 
and even some of the clarifying examples are the same. There is a 
very similar distinction in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations: "For 
defects [vitia] are permanent dispositions [adfectiones manentes], but 
disorders [perturbationes] are shifting [moventes], so that they 
cannot be subdivisions of permanent dispositions." 57 Again, the 
translation and even the Latin terminology create some difficulties, 
but the distinction involved once more fits that of Kantian 
Leidenschaften and Affecte quite precisely.

As we have seen above, Kant repeatedly employs anger and hatred as 
examples respectively of affect and passion. This too has its roots 
in Seneca, where anger is also contrasted with hate. The latter is 
said to be incurable (inemendabilis), for it has taken deeper root 
than anger, which is more sudden and superficial. 58 Seneca does not

56 Ep. 75. 11-12 (vol. 2, pp. 142-43).

57 Tusc. Disp. IV. 13. 30 (pp. 358-59). For other distinctions of 
this type, see Tusc. Disp. IV. 10. 23-24, 11. 27 ff., and 13. 28-29.

58 De ira III. 41. 3. Also see De ira III. 5. 6, and Cicero Tusc. 
Disp. IV. 8. 21. The latter passage may also be compared with DL VII 
113, where hatred (misos) is distinguished from anger (orge) and wrath 
(menis). Wrath is characterized as "orge tis pepalaiomene kai

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spend much time on the contrast between anger and hatred, focusing instead upon the horrors of anger alone. Yet, we find that anger often seems to fit the characterizations of both Kantian terms. On the one hand, Seneca describes the angry man as insane and swept along as if by a hurricane or a raging demon, his anger like the transient and baleful strength of a feverish man. The beginning of the De

ira, for example, describes anger in terms that are perfectly appropriate for Kantian affects: "... this, the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions. For the other emotions have in them some element of peace and calm, while this one is wholly violent and has its being in an onrush of resentment, ... For it is equally devoid of self-control, forgetful of decency, unmindful of ties, persistent and diligent in whatever it begins, closed to reason and counsel, excited by trifling causes, unfit to discern the right and the true." Clearly, though, the features of persistence and diligence mentioned here seem to be out of character, as it were, belonging more to the passion of hate than to the explosiveness of anger as an affect. Seneca is mixing up descriptions that Kant kept better apart. The same thing happens in the following text:

Anger must not only be aroused but it must rush forth, for it is an active impulse; but an active impulse never comes without the consent of the will, for it is impossible for a man to aim at revenge and punishment without the cognizance of his mind. ... anger is that which overleaps reason and sweeps it away. Therefore that primary disturbance of the mind which is excited by the impression of injury is no more anger than the impression of injury is itself anger; the active impulse consequent upon it, which has not only admitted the impression of injury but also approved it, is really anger—the tumult of a mind proceeding to revenge by choice and determination.

Anger cannot very well sweep away reason and plot for revenge at the same time; one would seem to preclude the other. Clearly, then, Seneca describes anger in such a way that it qualifies, at one time, as a Kantian affect and, at another, as a passion. He does not clearly retain in these examples the distinction between passion

epikotos, epiteretike de" ("anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity") (Loeb, pp. 218-19). The term used to describe the anger of Achilles in the first line of the Iliad is, quite appropriately, menis.

59 De ira III. 3. 2-4, and I. 17. 5.
61 De ira II. 3. 4-5 (vol. 1, pp. 172-73). Cf. De ira III. 1. 3-5, and II. 2. 2.
(morbus) and affect (adfectus) which he makes in the abstract. Still, Kant could well have drawn his own contrast between anger and hatred from Seneca's often mixed examples. 

The analogy of sickness and health was also widely employed by the Stoics to characterize states of emotional disturbance. The man-in-the-grip-of-pasgion has lost his freedom and needs a spiritual physician to cure him. Furthermore, like Kant, the Stoics claimed that only human beings can be subject to passions, which are the foe of reason and can therefore occur only in reasonable beings. Thirdly, there is also mention of the fact that the passionate man has lost his perspective, in that passions hinder him from viewing the situation as a whole. And, finally, as we have noted before, passions are not mere passive feelings, but inclinations to which we actively assent: "Physical aversions can occur without blame, while it is not so with aversions of the soul in which all diseases and disorders are the result of contempt of reason." The ultimate blame lies with ourselves. Taken as a whole these as well as the foregoing comparisons show, at least, that the Kantian and Stoic conceptions of the nature of the affects and passions are quite alike. In fact, given the extent of the similarities involved, the stronger

62 At De ira I. 4. 1, and II. 6. 3, Seneca distinguishes anger (ira) from irascibility (iracundia). The latter is not equivalent to hatred, however, for this depends upon a maxim of reason, while irascibility is simply a temperamental condition. Yet, at Tusc. Disp. IV. 24. 54, Cicero says that no vice is more degraded (foedus) than iracundia. Also, it may be noted here, at Acad. ed., XX, 17 (among Kant's notes for the Beobachtungen), we find a reference to "the Stoics' doctrine of anger because of the disdain of others."

63 On passion as disease and weakness, see: Seneca De ira II. 2. 2, 10. 7, III. 3. 4; Ep. 16. 15; Ep. 116. 1; Cicero Acad. Post. I. 10. 38; Tusc. Disp. IV. 12. 27 ff.; Epictetus Disc. II. 15. 3; and DL VII 115. Cicero sometimes translates the Greek term pathos as perturbatio rather than as morbus, arguing that this better fits Latin usage. (Tusc. Disp. III. 4. 7, and De finibus III. 10. 35) Passions make it impossible for us even to listen to reason (Epictetus Disc. III. 2. 3), and a man under the sway of passion sees the better but lacks the strength to follow (Epictetus Disc. IV. 1. 147, Seneca De ira III. 4. 4). Philosophy is called the art of healing (Cicero Tusc. Disp. III. 3. 6) which frees us from the passions (Seneca Ep. 37. 3-4).

64 Seneca De ira I. 3. 4-8; Cicero Tusc. Disp. IV. 14. 31.

65 DL VII 112; Seneca De ira I. 11. 8. The latter passage (vol. 1, pp. 136-37) states: "The truest form of wisdom is to make a wide and long inspection, to put self in subjection, and then to move forward slowly and in a set direction."

66 Cicero Tusc. Disp. IV. 14. 31 (pp. 360-61).
suggestion is warranted that Kant's conception of emotional disorders owes a considerable debt to the Stoics.

B. Varieties of Affective Disorder

Both the Stoics and Kant subdivide their discussions of the affects and passions into more specific varieties of such disturbances. Yet, there is no obvious or direct correlation between them on this particular point, despite the coincidence of the characterizations just seen. Nevertheless, it is worth focusing on this topic, at least briefly, because it receives such little attention in discussions of Kant's ethics, and also because it helps to introduce the following subsection.

The Stoics generally begin their division with a fourfold breakdown into what are, in a sense, the cardinal passions. According to Cicero in De finibus: "The list of the emotions is divided into four classes, with numerous sub-divisions, namely sorrow [aegritudo], fear [formido], lust [libido], and that mental emotion which the Stoics call by a name that also denotes a bodily feeling, hēdonē 'pleasure,' but which I prefer to style 'delight,' meaning the sensuous elation of the mind when in a state of exultation."67 Diogenes Laertius' own report indicates the general agreement of early Stoics about this division: "The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief [lupēn], fear [phobon], desire or craving [epithumian], pleasure [hēdonē]."68 Frequently appended to each of these generic passions were multitudinous species and subspecies of more particular disturbances. The Stoics' facility at making such fine distinctions produced elaborate and subtle schemata which have been the bane of careful translators ever since and also deserve further study by contemporary historians and moral philosophers.69

In the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero spells out the Stoic definitions of the cardinal passions in terms of erroneous judgments or opinions: "Distress [aegritudo] then is a newly formed belief of

67 De finibus III. 10. 35 (pp. 254-55). Also see SVF III 378 and 391. In the latter passage, the passions are defined in terms of contractions and expansions of the soul. The four passions are also mentioned in Virgil's Aeneid (VI. 733), where Anchises speaks to his son Aeneas in the underworld concerning the lot of man. Virgil was a favorite classical author of Kant.

68 DL VII 110 (pp. 216-17). Cf. DL VII 111-14, for the various subspecies.

present evil, the subject of which thinks it right to feel depression and shrinking of soul; delight [laetitia] is a newly formed belief of present good, and the subject of it thinks it right to feel enraptured; fear [metus] is a belief of threatening evil which seems to the subject of it insupportable; lust [libido] is a belief of prospective good and the subject of this thinks it advantageous to possess it at once upon the spot."70 Passions are thus mistaken judgments about present and future goods and evils. The error in them is due to a lack of perspective, an over- or under-emphasizing of the good or evil involved, or to a total miscalculation of something's value (because of a certain amnesia with respect to the Stoic adiaphora doctrine). This characterization of the passions as false opinions will be seen to play an important role when we consider therapeutic approaches to emotional ills.

Kant subdivides the affects and passions in the KU and Anthropologie. The only hint provided us as to the origins of his division comes in the latter work, and then only for the affects: "Affects are, generally, pathological occurrences (symptoms), and can be divided (by an analogy with Brown's system) into sthenic affects, that proceed from strength, and asthenic effects, that come from weakness. Sthenic affects are of such a nature as to excite the vital force, but because of this they often exhaust it too; asthenic affects tend to slacken the vital force, but in so doing they often prepare for its recovery as well."71 We find the same distinction in the KU, where sthenic affects are associated with the sublime and asthenic affects with the beautiful: "Every affection of the strenuous kind (viz. that excites the consciousness of our power to overcome every obstacle--


71 Anthropologie, VII, 255 (Gregor, p. 123). Kant also refers to Brown at MDS, VI, 207. Oswald Külpe's note in the Academy edition (VII, 363-64) indicates that John Brown taught that the peculiarity of a living substance lies in its irritability. A surplus of stimulation thus has a 'sthenic' effect, and a lack thereof an 'asthenic' effect. According to Gregory Zilboorg, M.D., A History of Medical Psychology (New York: Norton, 1941), p. 286: "John Brown (1735-1788) was destined to become the most influential exponent of the theory of irritability and exhaustion of the nervous system leading to asthenic states. His Elementa Medicinae (Edinburgh, 1780) was widely read not only in England; he had a number of followers in France and Germany. Brown's theory seemed so plausible to contemporaries and to future generations that such terms as 'neurasthenia' (Baird) and 'psychasthenia' (Pierre Janet) introduced in the nineteenth century reflected the theoretical premises of a century before." On Brown's influence, through Kant, on German medicine, see Guenther B. Rissee, "Kant, Schelling, and the Early Search for a Philosophical 'Science' of Medicine in Germany," Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 27 (1972): 145-58.
animi strenui) is aesthetically sublime, e.g. wrath, even despair (i.e. the despair of indignation, not of faintheartedness). But affections of the languid kind (which make the very effort of resistance an object of pain—animalium lanuginem) have nothing noble in themselves, but they may be reckoned under the sensuously beautiful. Kant offers laughing as a sthenic affect, and weeping as an asthenic or melting affect. Both of them provide a sort of emotional purgation and relief which he considers physically wholesome. He also discusses timidity and fortitude, as well as other related temperamental states, but does not explicitly apply the distinction he has just made, leaving that task—for better or worse—to us.

The passions are divided by Kant into "passions of natural (innate) inclination and passions of inclination that proceed from human culture (acquired inclination)." That is, some passions arise in the natural state of mankind because the inclinations of which they are the aberrations are already present therein, while other passions arise only in 'cultured' situations that have activated certain further propensities that might have remained dormant in a natural state. Kant distinguishes further as follows: "The passions of the FIRST kind are the inclinations to freedom and to sex, both of which are connected with emotional agitation. Those of the SECOND kind are the manias for honor, for power, and for possession, which are not connected with the impetuosity of an affect, but with the constancy of a maxim established for certain ends. The former can be called ardent passions (passiones ardentes); the latter, like avarice, cold passions (frigidae)." The natural passions tread the borderline between affect and passion, but the cultural passions entail a cold, calculating use of reason, which seeks to satisfy the craving of some inclination (honor, power, or possessions). Also, each of these three generic passions evokes a different type of (emotional) response from other people: we hate a man who wants to be better than we, fear him who aspires to power over us, and despise one whose only concern is filling his already brimming coffers. Clearly, affects and passions tend to stimulate one another, both in ourselves and in others, and this offers an additional clue about how to control them.

C. Controlling the Emotions and Inclinations

The Stoics not only defined and described emotional disturbances, but also gave detailed advice on how to regulate and control them.

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72 KU, V, 272-73 (Bernard, p. 113).
73 See Anthropologie, VII, 254-57 and 260-65; as well as KU, V, 331-32.
74 Anthropologie, VII, 267 (Gregor, p. 135).
75 Anthropologie, VII, 267-68 (Gregor, p. 135).
76 Anthropologie, VII, 274.
Kant also comments on this topic, but not quite as extensively, just as his classification of the affects and passions is also less detailed.

Most of the Stoic advice on how to regulate passions and affects seems to concern the affects. Yet, since Seneca's (and Cicero's) distinction between affectus and morbus (standing collectively for the Greek pathos) is not worked out clearly in detailed applications to specific areas, the policies considered sometimes seem to apply to both categories. Seneca says explicitly though that anger (an affect) which has hardened into hate (a passion) is incurable, and some of the Stoic passages quoted above also speak of the passions as semi- or entirely permanent, implying that they cannot be cured or regulated, at least not easily. An examination of those texts where emotional therapy is described will indeed show that most—though not all—of the advice concerns the affects (affectus), which have not been so rooted in evil maxims as to become incurable.

The De ira of Seneca is full of advice on controlling the affects, and it characterizes their initial growth in three stages:

That you may know, further, how the passions [affectus] begin, grow, and run riot, I may say that the first prompting is involuntary, a preparation for passion, as it were, and a sort of menace; the next is combined with an act of volition, although not an unruly one, which assumes that it is right for me to avenge myself because I have been injured [in the case of anger], or that it is right for the other person to be punished because he has committed a crime; the third prompting is now beyond control, in that it wishes to take vengeance, not if it is right to do so, but whether or no, and has utterly vanished reason. We can no more avoid by the use of reason that first shock which the mind experiences—than we can avoid those effects mentioned before which the body experiences—the temptation to yawn when another yawns, and winking when fingers are suddenly pointed toward the eyes. Such impulses cannot be overcome by reason, although perchance practice and constant watchfulness will weaken them. Different is that prompting which is born of the judgment, is banished by judgment.

77 De ira III. 41. 3, Ep. 75. 11; Cicero Tusc. Disp. IV. 13. 30; Epictetus Disc. III. 2. 3, IV. 1. 147. Compare, however, Seneca Ep. 72. 6 (vol. 2, pp. 100-101): "The mind, however, once healed, is healed for good and all."

78 De ira II. 4. 1-2 (vol. 1, pp. 174-75). Cf. De ira II. 18. 1 (vol. 1, pp. 202-5): "In my opinion, however, there are but two rules—not to fall into anger, and in anger to do no wrong. ... so we must use one means to repel anger, another to restrain it."
The most promising stage, therefore, at which to attain control over the affects, seems to be the second. Yet, as Seneca himself suggests, there are some further preliminary precautions which we can take, and also some steps to amend the situation even after the initial outburst has run its course.

The best policy of all is to exclude the affects from the very start. This is much easier than coping with them later on, for "when they have established themselves in possession, they are stronger than their ruler [reason] and do not permit themselves to be restrained or reduced." Once reason has given up a portion of its power, it can no longer dominate the affects, for these become mixed with it and undermine it. It is like opening the city gates to a violent enemy, who then corrupts and conquers from within: "The enemy, I repeat, must be stopped at the very frontier; for if he has passed it, and advanced within the city gates, he will not respect any bounds set by his captives." This is simply the old idea about an ounce of prevention and a pound of cure.

Some of the specific precautionary measures that we can take involve knowing our own weaknesses and then avoiding situations in which these will be challenged. We cannot change in any large measure the natures and temperaments with which we were born, but we can, and should, especially in the case of children, take care to place ourselves into the appropriate circumstances, namely those that do not lead us to passionate outbursts. We should take great care, for example, about the people with whom we associate:

We should live with a very calm and good-natured person—one that is never worried or captious; we adopt our habits from those with whom we associate, and as certain diseases of the body spread to others from contact, so the mind transmits its faults to those near-by. The drunkard lures his boon companions into love of wine; shameless company corrupts even the strong man. . . . an invalid does not benefit so much from a suitable location or a more helpful climate as does the mind which lacks strength from association with a better company. . . . Moreover, the man who lives with tranquil people not only becomes better by their example, but finding no occasions for anger he does not indulge in his weakness.

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79 Seneca De ira I. 7. 2 (vol. 1, pp. 124-25). Also I. 8. 2 (pp. 126-27). Cf. KPV, V, 156 and 88-89, where Kant says that mixing sensible incentives with pure moral ones undermines the effectiveness of the latter.

80 Seneca De ira II. 20. 1 ff.

81 Seneca De ira III. 8. 1-3 (vol. 1, pp. 272-75).
Also, as in physical illness, there are certain symptoms which presage
the onset of an outburst. We should learn to recognize these and take
appropriate curative and evasive action while we are still in control.
All of these measures require adequate self-knowledge, and the steps
to be taken vary with individual circumstances: "We are not all
wounded at the same spot; therefore you ought to know what your weak
spot is in order that you may especially protect it." General
remedies do not always work for the individual, neither in prevention
nor in cure.

Passions may also be countered at the second stage, where we judge
about states of affairs and about the appropriate responses to them:
"But there is one method of healing both distress [aegritudo] and all
other diseases [morbos] of the soul, namely to show that all are
matters of belief and consent of the will and are submitted to simply
because such submission is thought to be right. This deception, as
being the root of all evil, philosophy promises to drag out utter­
ly." To one on the verge of an affective outburst, it should be
pointed out that the object of his delight (laetitia) or lust (libido)
is not a good (bonum), nor is that an evil (malum) toward which he has
fear (metus) or distress (aegritudo). The Stoics' doctrine of
adiaphora serves them well here, as does their characterization of
pathe as judgments. Yet, Cicero indicates that most people will not
be easily persuaded that the objects of their passionate likes and
dislikes are not actually good or evil, and so he proposes that "the
sure and proper means of cure is found in showing that the disorders
are of themselves essentially wrong and contain nothing either natural
or necessary." That is, rather than focusing upon the object of the
affect or passion, deal with the disturbance itself and get the
'sufferer' to see its objectionable qualities along with the possi­
ibility of his avoiding such a state. Supposedly, the man in this
condition does not care very much about whether his value judgment
(about objects) is correct, but he might just care enough about the

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82 Seneca De ira III. 10. 4 (vol. 1, pp. 280-81). Also see III. 1.
1-5, and Cicero Tusc. Disp. IV. 27.59--28.61.
83 Cicero Tusc. Disp. IV. 38. 83 (pp. 422-23).
84 See Cicero Tusc. Disp. IV. 28. 60, III. 31. 75-76; Seneca De ira
II. 22. 2-3, and 1.3--2.2.
85 Tusc. Disp. IV. 28. 60 (pp. 396-97). See also IV. 29.62, and De
finibus III. 9. 32. At Tusc. Disp. III. 32. 77 (pp. 316-17), we read:
"The first remedial step therefore in giving comfort will be to show
that either there is no evil or very little; the second will be to
discuss the common lot of life and any special feature that needs
discussion in the lot of the individual mourner; the third will be to
show that it is utter folly to be uselessly overcome by sorrow when
one realizes that there is no possible advantage."
effects of his state upon himself in order to stop, listen, and revise his conduct.

Even if the affect or passion has gone beyond the first two stages, the Stoics did not succumb with resignation. In this matter, they were persistent optimists: "Yet nothing is so hard and difficult that it cannot be conquered by the human intellect and be brought through persistent study into intimate acquaintance, and there are no passions [affectus] so fierce and self-willed that they cannot be subjugated by discipline. Whatever command the mind gives to itself holds its ground. ... There are a thousand other instances to show that persistence surmounts every obstacle and that nothing is really difficult which the mind enjoins itself to endure." If a disturbance is indeed so great that nothing seems to help in controlling it, think of the brevity of life: "And nothing will help us so much as pondering our mortality. Let each man say to himself and to his fellow-mortal: 'Why do we, as if born to live forever, take delight in proclaiming our wrath and in wasting the little span of life? ... Your fortunes admit no squandering, and you have no spare time to waste.'" If the loss of life's goods, of control over life, will not restrain us, perhaps the prospect of 'losing' (by squandering) life itself will.

86 Seneca De ira II. 12. 3-5 (vol. 1, pp. 192-95). In the omitted section of this passage, Seneca gives various examples of people who put themselves under strict control in order to reach some objective or to develop some skill (e.g., walking on a tightrope, or carrying huge burdens). Cf. II. 29. 1, and 13. 1.

87 Seneca De ira III. 42. 2 (vol. 1, pp. 350-51). Cf. III. 43. 5 (pp. 354-55): "Soon we shall spew forth this frail spirit. Meanwhile, so long as we draw breath, so long as we live among men, let us cherish humanity. Let us not cause fear to any man, nor danger; let us scorn losses, wrongs, abuse, and taunts, and let us endure with heroic mind our short-lived ills. While we are looking back, as they say, and turning around, straightway death will be upon us."

A remarkably similar passage occurs at Acad. ed. XX, 185-86 (among Kant's notes for the Beobachtungen): "I encounter the mistake almost everywhere that one does not sufficiently ponder the brevity of human life. Of course, it is wrong on that account to have it constantly before one's eyes, so that one despises life and looks only to the hereafter. But [it is correct to have it before one's eyes] in order that one properly occupies one's post here [in life], and so that one does not place it too far beyond the plan of our actions through some foolish conceit. The grave inscriptions of various ancients utilize the brevity of life [or the pondering of it] in order to encourage a voluptuous and sumptuous gratification, and a greedy eagerness for enjoyment. But, properly understood, it serves only to free the disposition, through sufficiency, from the dominance of such drives as entangle us in preparations whose enjoyment is inadequate to our efforts because of the brevity of life. The contemplation of a near
Kant also focuses upon controlling the affects rather than the passions, and for similar reasons. In fact, he refers to the latter as "an enchantment that . . . refuses to be corrected." Also: "For pure practical reason, the passions are cancerous sores; they are, for the most part, incurable because the patient does not want to be cured and shuns the rule of principles, which is the only thing that could heal him." While this does not exclude all hope, there is little to be done for one who refuses therapy. In the case of the affects, however, various methods are available.

Control of our feelings and inclinations (so that they do not become affects) is very much concerned with our body, which must be subordinated to reason's plans:

The body must first be disciplined, because it contains principles which affect the mind and can change its condition. The mind must, therefore, ensure that it establishes an autocracy over the body so that the latter cannot change the mind's condition. The mind must gain such mastery over the body that it can guide and direct it in accordance with moral and pragmatic principles and maxims. This demands a discipline, a discipline which is only negative; the mind need only secure that the body does not exercise any compulsion upon it; it cannot well prevent the body from affecting it. Much depends on the body in matters of our faculty of knowledge, of our faculty of desire and aversion, and of the passions [emphasis added].

As Seneca already pointed out, we cannot always avoid the first stage in the growth of affects, since this depends largely upon external circumstances. Yet, we are able to take some precautionary measures, such as training our body to do without certain things and to hold up death is pleasant in itself, and [it is] a corrective for bringing man to simplicity and for helping him to [achieve] a sensitive peace of soul, [a state] which begins as soon as the blind heat with which one formerly pursued the imagined objects of one's desires is ended." Also see KPV, V, 30.

88 Anthropologie, VII, 266 (Gregor, pp. 133-34).

89 We must deem ourselves capable of controlling our emotions because we ought to do this. But the process will often take some time. See KU, V, 432; MdS, VI, 380, 407-8, 477; and Streit der Facultäten, VII, 30. This final work has at last become available in an entire English translation: I. Kant, The Conflict of Faculties: Der Streit der Fakultäten, translated, with an Introduction, by Mary J. Gregor (New York: Abaris Books, Inc., 1979).

90 Vorlesung, 197-98 (Infield, p. 157).
when tested in adversity. Kant also notes that children should have their temperaments so molded when they are young that they develop a happy, friendly, and sociable outlook. Such a balanced disposition will be less likely to fall prey to exclusive and dominant inclinations and feelings later on in life. Cultivating the arts and sciences, as well as social etiquette, also plays an important role in teaching us restraint and control of our emotions and drives. We will return to this topic later on.

Some further hints for controlling the affects mentioned by Kant correspond roughly to Seneca's second and third stages. Since an affect involves lack of reflection which would compare one's present state and feeling with all others, another remedy might include getting the person (oneself or others) to take stock of the whole situation. Yet, as Cicero indicated already, this is not always an effective strategy, because affects by their very nature exclude reflection (and passions refuse advice on the grounds that they do not need any). But affects are brief, and if we wait for them to subside the light of reason may yet begin to flicker again. For this reason, Kant advises delay in punishing to the angry father and schoolmaster, and points out how we can subdue and angry man who enters the room by politely offering him a seat. Like the Stoics, Kant is generally optimistic about being able to exercise control over our affective lives, as long as we pursue this goal intelligently and diligently.

D. The Principle of Apathy and Human Sympathy

In seeking to regulate and dominate the passions, Kant often appeals directly to the Stoic principle of apathy. The term had acquired such a bad reputation in the eighteenth century, however, through gross misinterpretation, that Kant feels called to offer a determined vindication of the idea: "The word 'apathy' has come into bad repute, just as if it meant lack of feeling and therefore subjective indifference regarding the objects of choice; it is taken for..."
a weakness. This misinterpretation can be avoided by giving the name 'moral apathy' to that lack of emotion which is to be distinguished from indifference. In moral apathy the feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on moral feeling only because respect for the law is more powerful than all of these feelings together. Stoic moral apathy is to be distinguished from Cynic insensibility. It does not mean that we cease to feel sensible impressions and feelings, but only that these are unable to determine our decisions because the latter are solidly rooted in reason and strongly supported by the moral feelings resulting from this association. In a sense, moral apathy simply involves the control of one set of feelings by another. Given the specific definitions of affect and passion on the part of both Stoics and Kant, the notion of 'a-pathy' is a natural and unobjectionable consequence of their respective accounts.

Since reason subdues the high intensity of many affects and also orders them so that they do not constantly struggle with one another, the state of apathy is a calm state, one of virtuous strength: "Emotion always belongs to sensibility, no matter by what kind of object it may be excited. The true strength of virtue is the mind at rest, with a deliberate and firm resolution to bring its law into practice. That is the state of health in the moral life, emotion, on the contrary, even when it is aroused by the representation of the good, is a momentarily glittering appearance which leaves one languid." The final statement here suggests that even the state of enthusiasm--being excited about the good--is not morally unobjectionable. We shall reconsider this later on. But Kant rejects, when talking about fundamentals, any alliances with potentially dangerous allies.

By apathy, Kant also makes clear, we do not mean the natural disposition of some individuals not to get overly excited about anything. Sagehood and virtue would be all too easy and automatic for such individuals if this were the case: "Given a sufficiently strong soul, the natural gift of apathy is, as I have said, a fortunate phlegma (in the moral sense). The mere fact that a man is endowed with it still does not make him a sage, but he has been favored by nature so that it will be easier for him to become one than for others." Like the innocence bred of a sheltered existence

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97 MdS, VI, 409 (Ellington, p. 68).

98 Anthropologie, VII, 254 (Gregor, p. 122). Also see KU, V, 272.
unfamiliar with 'the ways of the world', we may rejoice in the fact that we have been kept pure from evil, but no congratulations are then in order for any sort of personal achievement. Kant is proposing apathy as a moral principle to be followed even by those who are not naturally phlegmatic: "Therefore, insofar as virtue is based on internal freedom, it contains a positive command for man, namely, that he should bring all his capacities and inclinations under his authority (that of reason). And this is a positive precept of control over himself; it is additional to the prohibition that man should not let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy). For unless reason takes the reins of government in its own hands, feelings and inclinations play the master over man." Apathy is therefore a duty, not a gift of nature. Kant points out that, even so, it is not the final stage, for we must go beyond the point where feelings and inclinations do not control us and, instead, begin actively to employ them in realizing rational goals in the world.

The notion of apathy leads directly, in both Kant and the Stoics, to a consideration of sympathy and other natural affections—which are supposedly excluded by it. Hence, Kant says approvingly: "The principle of apathy—namely that the sage must never be in a state of emotional agitation, not even in that of sympathetic sorrow over his best friend's misfortune—is a quite correct and sublime moral principle of the Stoic school; for an affect makes us (more or less) blind." Sympathy, understood as a state of emotional disruption, is at worst counter-productive, possibly deteriorating our friend's position, and at best ineffectual in alleviating it. Kant emphatically rejects such commiserative feelings (and displays). In the MdS, he does so by distinguishing between a humanitas practica and a humanitas aesthetica:

The first kind is free and is therefore called sympathetic (communio sentiendi liberalis), and is based upon practical reason. The second kind is not free (communio sentiendi illiberalis, servilis) and can be called communicable (like a susceptibility to heat or to contagious disease); it is also called commiseration, because it spreads itself naturally among living men. Obligation extends only to the first kind.

It was a sublime way of representing the wise man, as the Stoic conceived him, when he let the wise one say: I wish I had a friend, not that he might give me help in poverty, sickness, captivity, and so on, but in order that I might stand by him and save a human being. But for all that, the very same wise man,

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100 Anthropologie, VII, 253 (Gregor, p. 121). On sympathy as a weak, pathological feeling, see KPV, V, 85, 118, and Pädagogik, IX, 487.
when his friend is not to be saved, says to himself: What's it to me? i.e., he rejects commiseration.

Indeed, if another person suffers and I let myself (through my imagination) also become infected by his pain, which I still cannot remedy, then two people suffer, although the evil really (in nature) affects only the one. But it cannot possibly be a duty to increase the evils of the world.

The sage will do everything in his power to help his friends, as well as others, but he will not join in their suffering by lamenting, especially if this only makes things worse. Kant's position on this issue is well in tune with his persistent distinction between active (practical) and pathological love, which also owes a debt to the Stoics. 102


At KU, V, 272, Kant says that the sage and the principle of apathy are sublime because, even though subject to sensible ills, they (morally) transcend these by considering them inferior to moral qualities and goals.

102 Vorlesung, 242-54; Grundlegung, IV, 399; KP V, 82-93; MdS, VI, 401-2, 450 ff. The link is made explicit at Refl. 6581, XIX, 93: "According to the Stoics, active love reaches its maximum when it is equal to one's powers."

Note also the following important distinction by Kant (Anthropologie, VII, 235-36; Gregor, pp. 103-4): "A man who gets neither overjoyed nor dejected is even tempered [gleichmütig], and far removed from one whose dull feelings make him indifferent [gleichgültig] to the contingencies of life. . . . Sensitivity [Empfindsamkeit] is not opposed to even temper; for sensitivity is a power and strength by which we grant or refuse permission for the state of pleasure or displeasure to enter our mind, so that it implies a choice. On the other hand, sentimentality [Empfindelei] is a weakness by which we can be affected, even against our will, by sympathy for another's plight; others, so to speak, can play as they will on the organ of the sentimentalist. Sensitivity is virile; for the man who wants to spare his wife or children trouble or pain must have enough fine feeling to judge their sensibilities not by his own strength but by their weakness, and his delicacy of feeling is essential to his generosity." Cf. Refl. 590, XV, 245.
When we turn to the Stoics themselves, we are surprised at how infrequently the term 'apathy' itself occurs in the extant texts, especially considering the reputation it acquired. Yet, the notion finds expression in numerous other ways. It was taken quite literally by the Stoics to mean 'being without passion'. One of the best extant texts on the subject comes from Lactantius' *Divinae Institutiones*:

"For the Stoics remove all affects [affectus] from man, by whose impulse the soul is moved: desire [cupiditatem], pleasure [laetitiam], fear [metum], and sadness [moestitiam], of which the two former are [derived] from future or present goods, and the two latter from [future or present] evils. In the same manner, they call these four (as I said) sicknesses, not so much inborn by nature as derived from false opinion. And on that account they think that they can be radically extirpated if the false opinion of goods and evils is taken away. For if the wise man deems nothing good and nothing evil, his desire will not glow nor his pleasure be excited, nor will he be terrified by fear or depressed by grief."  

In teaching that the passions and affects should be removed entirely, the Stoics seemed to contradict the Peripatetic view that emotions should only be moderated, not entirely suppressed. Thus Seneca says: "The question has often been raised whether it is better to have moderate emotions [adfectus], or none at all. Philosophers of our schools reject the emotions; the Peripatetics keep them in check. I, however, do not understand how any half-way disease can be either wholesome or helpful." Also: " moderate passion [adfectus] is nothing else than a moderate evil."  

It seems, however, that this dispute is due to a verbal misunderstanding, for unmoderated emotions were precisely what the Stoics meant by affects (and passions). They never proposed removing all feelings from human life, nor did Peripatetics want to retain uncontrolled emotions. Both camps sought to produce a state of emotional health, but called it by a different name. The Stoics' terminology is actually more precise. Yet, they paid a heavy price for their precision, being frequently misinterpreted and even ridiculed because of it.

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Seneca presents us with one of the few explicit commentaries upon the Stoic notion of apathy, and he clearly distinguishes its true meaning from the caricature:

We are bound to meet with a double meaning if we try to express the Greek term "lack of feeling" [apatheian] summarily, in a single word, rendering it by the Latin word impatientia. For it may be understood in the meaning the opposite to that which we wish it to have. What we mean to express is, a soul which rejects any sensation of evil; but people will interpret the idea as that of a soul which can endure no evil. Consider, therefore, whether it is not better to say "a soul that cannot be harmed," or "a soul entirely beyond the realm of suffering." There is this difference between ourselves and the other school [the Cynics]: our ideal wise man feels his troubles, but overcomes them; their wise man does not even feel them. . . . In this sense, the wise man is self-sufficient, that he can do without friends, not that he desires to do without them. When I say "can," I mean this: he endures the loss of a friend with equanimity. 105

The apathetic man is not one who feels no pain or other sensation, or one who has no natural inclinations, but one who will not let pleasure, pain or desire interfere with his rational plan of life. Moreover, as we have already seen with Kant, the state of apathy is not one of weakness, but one of quiet, virtuous strength: "... to be wroth is not manly, but a mild and gentle disposition, as it is more human, so it is more masculine. Such a man, and not he who gives way to anger and discontent, is endowed with strength and sinews and manly courage. For the nearer such a mind attains to a passive calm [apatheia], the nearer is the man to strength. As grief is a weakness, so also is anger. In both it is a case of a wound and a surrender." 106 Seneca also says: "Virtue alone is lofty and sublime,

105 Ep. 9. 2-5 (vol. 1, pp. 42-45). Also see Seneca De providentia I. 2. 1-2, Ep. 74. 30-31, De ira I. 16. 7; and SVF III 574. On the 'austerity' of the Stoic sage, see SVF III 637-49.

and nothing is great that is not at the same time tranquil." The Stoic doctrine of apathy is the natural outcome of their stress upon the life of reason and the doctrine of adiaphora. It must be sharply distinguished from both Cynic insensibility and Epicurean ataraxia, for, in contrast to both of these, it signified an inner calm that often led to active service and involvement in the external world.

Because of misinterpretations of the doctrine of apathy, Stoics were often characterized as cold, inhuman shells in whom the milk of human kindness did not flow. Seneca addresses this charge as follows:

I am aware that among the ill-informed the Stoic school is unpopular on the ground that it is excessively harsh and not at all likely to give good counsel to princes and kings; the criticism is made that it does not permit a wise man to be pitiful, does not permit him to pardon. Such doctrine, if stated in the abstract, is hateful; . . . But the fact is, no school is more kindly and gentle, none more full of love to man and more concerned for the common good, so that it is its avowed object to be of service and assistance, and to regard not merely self-interest, but the interest of each and all.

It is true that the wise man does not experience pity (misericordia), since this is an extreme emotional state of sadness which incapacitates the subject. But he will be merciful and helpful toward those in need. He will evince his commiseration in action rather than in ineffectual tears.


108 Epicurean ataraxia was a kind of cross between Cynic insensibility and Stoic apathy. Epicurus counselled a withdrawn and sheltered life, since he thought that only thus could one be free of the twin evils of pain and fear. Whereas the Cynic lived in the midst of men as if they did not exist, the Epicurean actually withdrew himself from their company in order to enjoy quiet and refined pleasures, not the least of which was that of friendship. See DL X 116 ff.


110 Seneca draws a sharp distinction between misericordia (pity) and clementia (mercy). The former is "the failing of a weak nature that succumbs to the sight of others' ills" (vitium pusilli animi ad speciem alienorum malorum succidentis") (De clementia II. 5. 1, vol. 1, pp. 438-39; also see DL VII 111, and SVF I 213), the latter "the inclination of the mind towards leniency in exacting punishment" ("inclinatio animi ad lenitatem in poena exigenda") (De clementia II. 3. 1, vol. 1, pp. 434-35). Misericordia regards only the plight and not the cause of it, whereas clementia is combined with reason and
The following texts are prime candidates as possible sources for Kant's specific remarks about Stoic sympathy:

Consider, further, that the wise man uses foresight, and keeps in readiness a plan of action; but what comes from a troubled source is never clear and pure. Sorrow is not adapted to the discernment of fact, to the discovery of expedients, to the avoidance of dangers, or the weighing of justice; he, consequently, will not suffer pity, because there cannot be pity without mental suffering. All else which I would have those who feel pity do, he will do gladly and with a lofty spirit; he will bring relief to another's tears, but will not add his own.

The emphasis, as in Kant, is upon actively assisting the other person rather than being caught up in his incapacitating suffering. A passage from Cicero is even more similar:

It is urged too that it is useful to feel rivalry, to feel envy, to feel pity. Why pity rather than give assistance if one can? Or are we unable to be open-handed without pity? We are able, for we ought not to share distresses ourselves for the sake of others, but we ought to relieve others of their distress if we can. . . . Who could approve of allowing oneself to be distressed

thus has freedom in decision, sentencing not by the letter of the law, but by what is fair and good. (De clementia II. 5. 1, 2. 2, 7. 3) A related Stoic doctrine was that there are no degrees of justice (DL VII 127; SVF I 197, and III 262-63), and that, therefore, the wise man does not pardon or forgive offenses (DL VII 123; Cicero Pro Murena 29. 61). He is also infallible and incapable of offending or hurting himself or others. (DL VII 123) Seneca tries to reconcile these doctrines in his discussion of punishment and mercy in both De ira and De clementia, but he is not always consistent, proposing at one point, for example, that mercy (clementia) is opposed to strictness (severitas) (De clementia I. 1. 4, De ira I. 18. 3) and, at another, that mercy is in harmony with severitas but opposed to cruelty (crudelitas) (De clementia II. 4. 3). Often it is difficult to see just how justice and mercy are supposed to be distinct from one another. (De clementia I. 2. 1)

One notable feature of Seneca's treatment, which contrasts with Kant's, is his repeated claim that punishment ought to look toward the future and to the welfare of both society and the criminal. There is no sign of Kant's strict retributivism. See De clementia II. 7. 1-5; De ira I. 6. 3-5, 15. 1-3, 16. 1-3, 19. 5 ff.; II. 10. 6-8, 31. 7-8. For Kant's views on punishing and pardoning, see Vorlesung, 63-69; KPV, V, 37-58; and MDS, VI, 351-57, and 234-35. On the topic of Stoic apathy and Seneca's notion of clementia, see also John M. Rist, "The Stoic Concept of Detachment," in Rist, ed., The Stoics, pp. 259-72.

instead of making an effort to get a thing one wants to possess? for to want to possess and do nothing is downright aberration of mind.  

We have no duty to suffer along with others and to increase, as Kant put it, the evils in the world. Instead, we should practice an active love that seeks in every way it can to bring about the greatest amount of natural well-being that is compatible with furtherance of morality.

III. The Contributory Role of the Emotions in the Moral Life

As a whole, the previous section has been an extended qualification of Kant's negative remarks about the sensibility in regard to morals, and a further elaboration of his more cautious pronouncements thereon—both briefly exhibited in the first section of this paper. Through a detailed discussion of the affect/passion distinction, the classification and control of affective disorders, and the principle of apathy, we have seen how the close similarity between Kant and the Stoics on many various points suggests strongly that the latter were instrumental in helping Kant to formulate and refine his own stance on these issues. Indeed, it is both ironic and just, in view of the popular association of Kant and the Stoics as harsh or unfeeling moralists—which more learned treatments have not sufficiently dispelled, to find that it is none other than the Stoics who assist Kant in developing the more balanced outlook that is truly his. Because of these links between them, the removal of certain misconceptions is redemptive for both.

It now remains for us, in this third section, to pass beyond the mere qualification of negative remarks and to present both the Stoics and Kant as thinkers who realistically appreciated the positive contribution of feelings and inclinations to a humane ethics for the whole man. There follows next, accordingly, a glance at the Stoic theory of 'eupathies'—a subject of which Kant must have been aware because of his familiarity with certain Stoic texts, though he does not mention it explicitly. Then, our focus will turn at greater length to a number of topics in Kant that, singly and collectively, exhibit his healthy respect for man's emotional life. These include: his preference for the Stoics over the Cynics because of their respective attitudes toward sensibility; the role of enthusiasm in moving us toward the good; the provisional and complementary function of the so-called 'adoptive virtues' or good moral (natural) qualities; the support rendered by the four natural temperaments toward the creation of a genuinely virtuous disposition; the refining influence of the arts, sciences, and social mores; and the rightful place of pleasure in the life of human beings. These themes are carefully assembled, once again, not only to demonstrate Kant's proper regard for the emotional components of the moral life throughout the various

\[112\] Tusc. Disp. IV. 26. 56 (pp. 390-91).
periods of his philosophical activity, but also to allow his ties with Stoicism to surface whenever possible.

Toward the end of the previous section, we saw how Seneca distinguishes Cynic insensibility and Stoic apathy: the wise man is not an unfeeling clod but someone who perceives and suffers evils without succumbing to them. Cicero also emphasizes the contrast with Cynicism. Even though the wise man must avoid the passion of love, he may have a non-passionate affection:

Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure [amores quidem sanctos] is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic Sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally.

Diogenes Laertius is even more direct in observing that sometimes the Stoic ought to feel emotions, in the sense that not having them in certain contexts is morally improper: "Now they say that the wise man is passionless [apathē], because he is not prone to fall into such infirmity. But they add that in another sense the term apathy is applied to the bad man, when, that is, it means that he is callous and relentless." Marcus Aurelius says it best, perhaps, advising that one should be "impervious to all passions [apathestaton] and full of natural affection [philostorgotaton]."

As a counterpart to their theory of the 'cardinal passions' and their subspecies, the Stoics spoke of so-called 'eupathies' (eupathē) or 'good passions'. The term is obviously a misnomer, for these emotions are not passions at all, strictly speaking, but feelings under the rule and in the service of reason. "Also they say that there are three emotional states which are good, namely joy [chara], caution [eulabeian], and wishing [boulēsin]. Joy, the counterpart of pleasure, is rational elation; caution, the counterpart of fear, rational avoidance; for though the wise man will never feel fear, he


\[114\] DL VII 117 (pp. 220-21).

\[115\] Meds. I. 9. 3 (pp. 8-9). Cf. Seneca De ira I. 5. 3, and De clementia II. 5. 3.
will yet use caution. And they make wishing the counterpart of desire (or craving), inasmuch as it is rational appetency. Just as the primary passions have numerous subspecies, so do each of these eupathies—an indication of the pervasive presence of such emotional states in the Stoic conception of moral living. There is no eupathetic counterpart to the passion of pain (lupēn) or distress (aegrítudo), it may be observed, because the wise man is supposedly not subject to the influence of present evils. While this exception may be indefensible and the various subtle distinctions in need of careful scrutiny, the general theory of eupathies was surely overlooked by those who contributed to the historical caricature of the apathetic Stoic sage.

The Stoics even allowed pleasure back into life after the passions and affects had been regulated. Thus, Diogenes Laertius speaks of pleasure (hēdōnē) as a by-product of life according to nature, akin to the thriving of animals and the full bloom of plants. Seneca says much the same thing, adding the important proviso that pleasure is neither the cause nor the (anticipated or aimed at) reward of virtue, but merely its outcome—an additional delight. Even more positively, he explains to someone who is afraid of the austerity of the apathetic way of life: "Do not fear; I am not robbing you of any privileges which you are unwilling to lose! ... I shall simply strip away the vice. For after I have issued my prohibition against the desires [cupere], I shall still allow you to wish that you may do the same things fearlessly and with greater accuracy of judgment, and to feel even the pleasures [voluptates] more than before; and how can these pleasures help coming more readily to your call, if you are their lord rather than their slave?" These views on eupathies and

116 DL VII 116 (pp. 220-21). Also see SVF III 431-42, especially 432 and 437; Cicero Tusc. Disp. IV. 6. 13-14; and Seneca De ira I. 16. 7.

117 Cicero Tusc. Disp. IV. 6. 14. One might question the logic of this. If the wise man needs to have 'rational avoidance' of future evils—which presumably entail pain or moral defects—why should he not have some eupathetic feeling that corresponds to present pain? To deny this seems to imply that there is some change on the part of future objects as they enter the present (as we approach them), thus warranting the change of our affective relationship to them. The Stoic claim for an exception here does not seem to hold up.


119 Ep. 116. 1 (vol. 3, pp. 332-33). Pleasure (voluptas) is to be distinguished from joy (gaudium), a eupathy in the strict sense. Gaudium is not so much pleasure as the satisfaction of having done the right thing. It is akin to Kant's moral feeling. See DL VII 94-95; Seneca Ep. 59. 1-2, 14, 16-18; in comparison to MDS, VI, 377 and 391. Also see John M. Rist, "Problems of Pleasure and Pain," in his Stoic Philosophy, pp. 37-53.
pleasures were not mere stopgap measures to ward off criticism. They constituted an integral part of orthodox Stoicism from the very start. Only, since the Stoics were usually swimming against the stream, which included both Epicureans and Peripatetics, the harsher and more exclusivistic-sounding prescriptions of the school naturally surfaced more easily and gained a wider currency.

Kant also wishes to include the emotions in a fully human moral life. In the Vorlesung passage quoted earlier, he observes: "A man can have feeling and inclination for something without having emotion and passion. If the feelings and passions are so bound up with the reason that their soul is in harmony with reason, they can quite well be in keeping with our duties towards ourselves." Also, one of the Reflexionen states: "The mind must be in a state of calm because it ought to move all other powers purposively. (The heart can be in motion.) Someone can be resolved, vigorous, valiant, yes—even eager, without becoming violent and vehement." Like Seneca, moreover, Kant emphasizes his point that there is room in life for emotion and sensibility through a contrast with Cynicism. Pyrrho's picture of the sage in the following passage is not very complimentary, and Kant does not try in the least to pretend otherwise: "The insensible man is secure against folly through his dullness [stupidity], but in common eyes he has the look of a sage. Pyrrho, on a ship during a storm, saw a pig calmly eating out of its trough while everyone was fearfully bustling about, and said, pointing to the animal: 'Such should be the tranquility of a sage.' The insensible man is Pyrrho's sage." Pyrrho's attitude here is very similar to that of the Cynics, whose moral ideal of simplicity Kant explicitly rejects as insufficient

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120 Vorlesung, 183 (Infield, p. 146).
121 Refl. 1515, XV, 854.
122 Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes, II, 262. Cf. DL IX 68. Pyrrho was, of course, technically a Sceptic and not a Cynic, nor does Kant suggest the latter. Still, Pyrrho's practical adherence to his own doctrine about suspending judgment (epochê) over all uncertain things made his lifestyle almost indistinguishable from that of Diogenes, Crates and other Cynics—thus making him a good example for Kant in this matter. So careless was he, in fact, that his own long life (nearly ninety years) was due solely to the solicitude of his friends, who kept him out harm's way. See DL IX 62. The likelihood that DL was Kant's source for the anecdote is great since the same work (IX 69-70) also speaks of the Sceptics as "zetetics" and "seekers after truth," characterizations which Kant applies already in 1765 to philosophers as such. See Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen, II, 307.

Kant discusses the Cynic view further when comparing various moral ideals, including those of the Stoics, Platonists, Epicureans, and Christians. See Vorlesung, 8-9, and Refl. 6894, XIX, 197, for example.
elsewhere. Two objections are implied in Kant’s reference to this anecdote. On the one hand, Pyrrho’s 'Cynic' peace and tranquillity are too easily attained and thus have an air of unreality about them. Kantian (and Stoic) virtue, in contrast to this, are to be earned through struggle, not by abstention from life. In Kant’s view, the "tranquillity of the sage" is not mere idleness but rather, like the rest enjoyed by the aged, "refreshment after labour." On the other hand, the Cynic conception of the sage is also rather uncouth and barbaric, lacking many of the humanizing traits that Kant respected and himself cultivated. We will return to this second point shortly.

As for the first, in commenting on the Cynic ideal of natural simplicity, Kant refers to the rustic innocence of young girls and peasants. His remarks on this topic have an indirect antecedent in Seneca, possibly mediated by "that refined Diogenes, Roussean," to whom they may also be addressed. In the Vorlesung, we read: "If, for instance, a simple country girl is free of the usual vices, she is so merely because she has no opportunity of going astray; and if a peasant makes do and is quite content with poor fare, he does not do so because it is all the same to him whether his food is simple or sumptuous, but because it is his lot, and if he had an opportunity of living on a higher scale he would take it. Simplicity, therefore, is only a negative thing." Virtue untried, in other words, is simply not virtue, and we shall see later how Kant distinguishes the 'virtue' of good natural dispositions from good behavior on principle. His example, we want to note here, is very similar to the following passage from Seneca which speaks of the innocence of early man:

What, then, is the conclusion of the matter? It was by reason of their ignorance of things that the men of those days were innocent; and it makes a great deal of difference whether one wills not to sin or has not the knowledge to sin. Justice was unknown to them, unknown prudence, unknown also self-control and bravery; but their rude life possessed certain qualities akin to all these virtues. Virtue is not vouchsafed to a soul unless that soul has

According to Pohlenz, Die Stoa, vol. 2, p. 77, it was Pyrrho who originally coined the term 'apathy'. Kant associates with Pyrrho the notion/term Ataraxie (Refl. 1488, XV, 727; Refl. 1648, XVI, 64), which he distinguishes from Apathie (Refl. 1515, XV, 854), but he does not tell us anything about the difference between them. Also see Anthropologie, VII, 256.

123 Vorlesung, 203 (Infield, p. 162).
been trained and taught, and by unremitting practice brought to perfection. For the attainment of this boon, but not in the possession of it, were we born; and even in the best of men, before you refine them by instruction, there is but the stuff of virtue, not virtue itself.\textsuperscript{125}

There is therefore a sense in which the Cynic 'innocent' has not really 'lived' at all. Kant's stress of Stoic engagement in life precluded his whole-hearted acceptance of such a view. Yet, despite his emphasis on life's struggle, and his appreciation of the humanizing niceties of society and culture, he sometimes longed for such innocence which, even if it is not yet virtue, is also by the same token free of the grave and petty vices with which life is generally littered.\textsuperscript{126}

A recurrent topic in Kant which pertains to the question of whether and how the emotions are to be linked with moral effort is that of enthusiasm. Here too the natural, spontaneous, and untutored man of the Cynics and Rousseau stands in the background. Kant addresses the issue as early as the \textit{Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes} (1764) and returns to it as late as the \textit{Streit der Facultäten} (1798) and the \textit{Anthropologie} (1798). While there are some fluctuations in his position as he moves from a moral-sense affiliated ethics to a 'pure' one, he never entirely rejects his early stance. In the early essay, Kant is discussing the notion of a 'phantast' and says:

\begin{quote}
The same sort of representation impinges in entirely different degrees upon the perception, according to men's varying dispositions. There is, therefore, a sort of fancy [\textit{Phantasterei}] that is attributed to someone only because the degree of feeling to which he is moved by certain objects is judged to be too extravagant for the moderation of a healthy mind. . . . He who becomes
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{125} Ep. 90. 46 (vol. 2, pp. 428-29).

\textsuperscript{126} See \textit{Anthropologie}, VII, 133, where Kant ruefully and eloquently compares an unspoiled and ingenuous simplicity to the human "art of pretense" (\textit{Kunst zu scheinen}). A note to this passage confirms the mood with a line from Persius (\textit{Serm. 3. 38}), another favorite author of Kant: "Naturam videant ingemiscantque relicta." ("Let them look at nature and sigh over the things which they have left behind." Kant alters the original passage slightly to suit his present purposes.)

On the virtue of simplicity, also see \textit{Beobachtungen}, II, 224; \textit{Vorlesung}, 269-70; and \textit{KU}, V, 275 and 335.

Kant's biographer, Borowski, reports that Kant, who did not generally like to leave his own house and town, paid his longest and most frequent out-of-town visits to Wobser, a forest ranger in the vicinity of Königsberg. He would stay with Wobser for up to a week, and it was there that he worked out his \textit{Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen} (1764). See Drescher, ed., \textit{Wor war Kant?} p. 77.
more heated [excited] through a moral perception, as through a principle, than others are capable of imagining with their feeble and often ignoble feeling, appears in their imagination as a fantasizer [Phantast]. I set Aristides [the Just] in the midst of exploiters, Epictetus in the midst of courtiers, and Johann Jacob Rousseau in the midst of the doctors of the Sorbonne: It seems to me that I hear a loud scornful laughter, and a hundred voices calling: What fantasizers! This ambiguous appearance of fancy in moral perceptions that are good in themselves is enthusiasm, and nothing great has ever been accomplished in the world without it.\footnote{127}

Kant remained somewhat undecided about enthusiasm as he increasingly stressed the self-sufficiency of reason for both moral dijudication and execution. As an affect which carries the imagination and feeling beyond the full control of reason, enthusiasm could not very well be proposed as either necessary or even helpful to morality. Hence, Kant says in the Mds: "Only the apparent strength of a fever patient makes the lively sympathy with good rise to an emotion [Affect], or, rather, degenerate into it. This kind of emotion is called enthusiasm, and it is with reference to this that one is to explain the moderation usually recommended for the exercise of virtue (insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui, ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam. Horace); for otherwise it is absurd to suppose that a man can be too wise or too virtuous."\footnote{128} Yet, in the Streit, Kant reservedly approves of enthusiasm, noting that it is always oriented toward the ideal and that it can never be grafted onto mere self-interest.\footnote{129}

The Anthropologie, moreover, speaks positively of 'taking something to heart'. By this, Kant means "to make a firm resolution to adopt any good advice or teaching . . . to reflect on it in order to connect our volition with feeling strong enough to ensure that we shall carry it out."\footnote{130} Both passages, therefore, seem to allow for feeling in


\footnote{128} Mds, VI, 408-9 (Ellington, p. 68). Also see KU, V, 271-72 and 275, as well as note 105 above (for the source of Kant's Latin quote).

\footnote{129} Streit der Facultäten, VII, 86.

\footnote{130} Anthropologie, VII, 236 (Gregor, p. 104). Cf. VII, 267, and Religion, VI, 24n.
connection with the enactment of moral ideals. Enthusiasm, though it is a sensible affect not fully under the control of reason, tends to increase moral goodness in the world, both in individuals and in general. Hence, even though Kant frowns upon it as an interference with reason, he cannot, because of its close affinity to reason-generated moral feeling in man, dismiss it entirely.

Despite his pronounced rejection of pathological sympathy in favor of principled practical love, Kant is willing to let the former (and other similar feelings) play a provisional role in morality. Again, there is continuity on this topic between his earlier and later writings. In the Beobachtungen (1764), he distinguishes true virtue from good moral qualities such as sympathy and complaisance. The former needs to be based on principles, while the latter are a gift of nature. Yet,

... in view of the weakness of human nature and of the little force which the universal moral feeling would exercise over most hearts, Providence has placed in us as supplements to virtue assisting drives, which, as they move some of us even without principles, can also give to others who are ruled by these latter a greater thrust and a stronger impulse toward beautiful actions ... I can therefore call them adoptive virtues, but that which rests upon principles, genuine virtue. The former are beautiful and charming; the latter alone is sublime and venerable.

Although he seems to go through a somewhat negative stage with respect to such moral qualities and feelings in the Grundlegung and KPV (which stress the pure and rational foundations of morality), Kant is again quite positive about them in the MdS and the Anthropologie (where the human mode of practical reason comes to the fore, but without revoking the previously achieved purity in the order of incentives). Here, Kant notes the utility of such natural inclinations.

131 See Anthropologie, VII, 253-54, where Kant speaks approvingly of "an enthusiasm of good intentions" which belongs to the faculty of desire rather than to feeling.

132 Beobachtungen, II, 217-18 (Goldthwait, pp. 60-61). Cf. Vorlesung, 308-9; Refl. 6839, XIX, 176: "Virtue is propelled: 1. by passion [Leidenschaft] (Romer) ..."; and Refl. 6708, XIX, 137: "The system of the ancients was either 1. of simplicity or 2. of wisdom. The former a. of sufficiency or b. of innocence. That of wisdom either of prudence or morality. ... The wise man is such either by inclination [Neigung] or by principles [Grundsätzen]." These passages well exemplify Kant's practice of delineating basic philosophical options for himself by referring to ancient philosophers, especially in moral questions.

133 Grundlegung, IV, 393-94; KPV, V, 118.
tions both as preliminary or provisional incentives, until our properly moral incentives attain their requisite force, and also as supplementary drives for performing our duties. The MDS even says that we have an indirect duty to cultivate such feelings (e.g., *schmerzhaftes Gefühl*) in ourselves by not avoiding debtors' prisons, hospitals, etc., "for this feeling, though painful, nevertheless is one of the impulses placed in us by nature for effecting what the representation of duty might not accomplish by itself." 134

Not to be overlooked here, particularly because of its connection with Stoicism, is Kant's occasional association of the motivations that lead men to act morally (in at least an external sense) with the four traditional temperaments. 135 Those who act on the basis of natural inclinations such as the 'adoptive virtues' are said to be of sanguine temperament; those motivated by a sense of honor—another of nature's helps to move people to moral action—are most akin to a choleric temperament; while those who are phlegmatic seem to have little moral feeling or concern at all. About the melancholy temperament, Kant says: "Thus genuine virtue based on principles has something about it which seems to harmonize most with the melancholy frame of mind in the moderated understanding." 136 This scheme is of interest to us not only because it reveals Kant's awareness of how man's affective and dispositional qualities function in morality, but also because his portrait of the melancholy man, who acts according to principles and has genuine virtue, is, to some extent, a portrait of the Stoic sage, of Rousseau, and perhaps even of Kant himself:

He whose feeling places him among the melancholy . . . has above all a feeling for the sublime. . . . The enjoyment of pleasures is more earnest with him, but is none the smaller on that account. All emotions of the sublime have more fascination for him than the deceiving charms of the beautiful. His well-being will rather be satisfaction than pleasure. He is resolute.


136 Beobachtungen, II, 219 (Goldthwait, p. 63). Compare, however, Refl. 1146, XV, 508: "Orthodoxy is choleric: the Stoic. Fanaticism is melancholy: the Platonist. Superstition is phlegmatic. Unbelief [is] sanguine: the Epicurean." Kant goes on to note (at II, 219-20, 222-24) that the choleric man is motivated by a sense of honor, a remark which is consistent with his charge elsewhere (Vorlesung, 79-80; KPV, V, 127n; and Religion, VI, 57-58n) that the Stoics were too concerned about honor as a moral motive, an attitude exemplified in the 'proud' demeanor of their sage. In any case, Kant himself tells us not to take such assignations of temperament too seriously: Anthropologie, VII, 291n.
On that account he orders his sensations under principles. . . . Of such a nature are principles in comparison to impulses, which simply well up upon isolated occasions; and thus the man of principles is in counteraction with him who is seized opportunely by a good-hearted and loving motive. But what if the secret tongue of his heart speaks in this manner: "I must come to the aid of that man, for he suffers; not that he were perhaps my friend or companion, nor that I hold him amenable to repaying the good deed with gratitude later on. There is now no time to reason and delay with questions; he is a man, and whatever befalls men, that also concerns me." . . . Affability is beautiful, thoughtful silence sublime. . . . He has a high feeling of the dignity of human nature. He values himself and regards a human being as a creature who merits respect. . . . He is in danger of becoming a visionary [Phantast] and a crank.

Such melancholy people, Kant thinks, are extremely rare. More frequent are those who act from good inclinations (of sanguine temperament). But most people belong into the two remaining categories, acting either for the sake of honor or for the 'dear self'. Despite the fact that the moral value of their acts decreases in this very order, Kant thinks that it is a good arrangement on the whole. For the self-seeking individuals are "the most diligent, orderly, and prudent; they give support and solidity to the whole, while without intending to do so they serve the common good, provide the necessary requirements, and supply the foundation over which finer souls can spread beauty and harmony." This view, which is quite similar to Mandeville's 'private vices, public virtues', also points ahead to the "cunning of nature" in Kant's philosophy of history.

Hence, though Kant rejects Cynic innocence as insufficient by itself for genuine virtue, he recognizes its appeal and its value as a provisional and complementary factor in morality. The spontaneous

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137 Beobachtungen, II, 220-22 (Goldthwait, pp. 64-67). Each of the four temperaments also has its own kind of aberration. Kant's classical reference in the quoted passage is to Terence's Heautontimoroumenos 77: "Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto" ("I am a man, [and] I deem nothing human alien to me"). This line, which is reiterated by Cicero (De officiis I. 9. 30, and III. 10. 42), was a favorite of Kant, who also employs it at Gedanken bei dem frühzeitigen Ableben d. Herrn Joh. Fr. v. Funk, II, 40, and MdS, VI, 460. The thought it expresses highlights another theme common to both Kant and the Stoics, namely the brotherhood of man which receives a technical elaboration as Kant's kingdom of ends.

138 Beobachtungen, II, 227 (Goldthwait, p. 74).

enthusiasm, the adoptive virtues, and the various temperaments of the so-called natural man are helpful in developing and maintaining a true moral disposition and behavior and, rather than being eliminated once it is achieved, they complement and, as it were, adorn principled human virtue.

In contrast to the Cynic's scorn of convention and its niceties, Kant also appreciates the value of our various socializing and civilizing practices and institutions, which both depend on and in turn foster the development of the affectively based 'adoptive virtues' and other helpful moral sentiments. He realizes that the moral life of man is lived in a wider social context, and that the so-called 'finer virtues', and even the pretenses, of social life are of long-term service to human morality. Such civilizing attitudes and practices are an immediate propaedeutic to morality because they involve the control of our feelings and inclinations and thus begin to make us masters of ourselves:

The beautiful arts and the sciences which, by their universally communicable pleasure, and by the polish and refinement of society, make man more civilized, if not morally better, win us in large measure from the tyranny of sense propensions, and thus prepare men for a lordship in which reason alone shall have authority, while the evils with which we are visited, partly by nature, partly by the intolerant selfishness of men, summon, strengthen, and harden the powers of the soul not to submit to them, and so make us feel an aptitude for higher purposes which lies hidden in us.

Any sort of artistic, scientific, and even athletic achievement in the world requires a good deal of self-denial. Even if this sort of self-control is not immediately moral in intention, its natural effect is to make it easier for moral principles to gain control.

Despite his hatred of insincerity, Kant is even willing to put up with many of the recognized pretenses and niceties of social protocol, as long as these are of indirect service to morality and do not actually thwart it by deceiving us. Acting 'as if' we were moral can eventually lead to real moral dispositions and behavior: "Men are, one and all, actors—the more so the more civilized they are. They put on a show of affection, respect for others, modesty and disin­terest without deceiving anyone, since it is generally understood that they are not sincere about it. And it is a very good thing that this happens in the world. For if men keep on playing these roles, the

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real virtues whose semblance they have been affecting for a long time are gradually aroused and pass into their attitude of will." This "art of pretense" by which we conceal our real sentiments and present an outward appearance of better ones is a "school for self-improvement," but we must take care that we ourselves are not taken in by it, since it would then make genuine moral dispositions impossible.

Despite this danger, it is nevertheless important to develop such habits, and not only for the purely instrumental reason that they are of immediate service to virtue. Kant also tells us to cultivate these parerga of virtue in order to "associate the Graces with the virtues." The cultivation of such habits and inclinations furthers our humanity, namely, "the way of thinking that unites well-being with virtue in our social intercourse." Kant returns again to the contrast with Cynicism: "The cynic's purism and the anchorite's mortification of the flesh, without social well-being, are distorted figures of virtue, which do not attract us to it. Forsaken by the graces, they can make no claim to humanity." Our humanity is, as

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141 Anthropologie, VII, 151 (Gregor, p. 30). Cf. VII, 152-53, 264-65. Also see Kant's 'ode' to sincerity at Religion, VI, 190n.

142 Anthropologie, VII, 133 (Gregor, p. 14). Also see Vorlesung, 179.

143 KRV A748/B776, III (B edition), 489 (Kemp Smith, p. 599).

144 MmS, VI, 473. Also see VI, 473-74, Religion, VI, 23n, and Anthropologie, VII, 151-53. At Acad. ed. XXIII (Kant's sketches for the MmS), 410, we read: "Cicero De finibus: A philosopho si afferat eloquentiam non aspemer: si non habeat non admodum flagitem. Parerga moralia. Beiwerke, welche die Tugend verschönen." (The Latin translates as: "If a philosopher offers eloquence, I will not despise it, but if he does not have it I will not insist on it.") Cf. De finibus I. 5. 15.

145 Anthropologie, VII, 277 (Gregor, p. 143). Cf. Vorlesung, 250 (Infield, p. 198): "To be humane is to have sympathy with the fate of others; to be inhumane is to harbour no such feelings of sympathy. Why are certain studies called humaniore? Because they have a refining influence upon men. However restricted the learning which the student absorbs, these studies, by occupying his mind, produce in him a refinement and suavity which he never loses." Also see Vorlesung, 294; MmS, VI, 456; Logik, IX, 45-46; and Acad. ed. XX, 99. In the passage from the Logik Kant emphasizes the humanizing role of a classical education.

146 Anthropologie, VII, 282 (Gregor, p. 147) In the same passage, Kant also refers to the social graces as "a garment that dresses virtue to advantage," and, at MmS, VI, 458 (Ellington, p. 123), he
it were, larger than our morality, at least if the latter is understood in a narrow sense, and the ends of our humanity are not served only (albeit primarily) by the pursuit of strict and rational moral ideals. They also entail a subservient and compatible development of our affective or emotional capacities, not only for purposes of aiding genuinely moral dispositions but also in order to foster the creation of human social products such as culture and civilization which are likewise integral to both individual and communal human perfection.

Finally, we may conclude by observing that just as the Stoics did not reject pleasure as such entirely, but wanted only to regulate and subordinate it to reason, neither does Kant. Much of the socializing and humanizing activity referred to above involves pleasure, especially of the 'finer' variety. Kant often points out that he opposes the total elimination of pleasures from life. Let me make this point with a passage containing another Stoic reference. Kant is in the process of maintaining that in order to keep our powers of sensing lively, we must impose a rule of gradualness upon our experience. Suddenly, he exclaims:

Young man! Deny yourself gratifications (of entertainment, revelry, love and so forth), if not with the Stoic intent of giving them up completely, then with the refined Epicurean intention of having ever increasing enjoyment to look forward to. If you are stingy with the ready case of your vital feeling, you will actually be richer for having deferred your enjoyment, even if, at the end of your life, you have had to waive most of the profit from it. Like everything ideal, consciousness of having control over your enjoyment is more fruitful and comprehensive than anything that is used up in gratifying the senses, and so deducted from the total quantity.

speaks of "a great moral ornament [of the world], namely, the love of mankind." These comments highlight the aesthetic dimension of the present discussion. Kant is quite traditional, even 'classical', in closely associating the good and the beautiful (kalon k'agathon). Moreover, it may also be noted that one instance where the virtues and the graces are closely joined together is in friendship, where we feel both love and respect for one another. On the theme of friendship in Kant, see Vorlesung, 254-65, and Mds, VI, 469-73.

147Vorlesung, 96, 198-99, and 218-19. The last passage (Infield, p. 173) reads: "We ought not, however, slavishly to shun all amusement, provided we enjoy it in such a manner that we can at any time dispense with it. The man who does not wrong himself or another, but does his duty, may enjoy as much pleasure as he can and will; he will still be good-natured and fulfill the end of his creation." Cf. KPV, V, 88-89.

148Anthropologie, VII, 165 (Gregor, p. 42). Also see VII, 204 and 237, for similar statements. At Vorlesung, 219, Kant suggests, as
Giving a qualified approval to pleasures, Kant suggests here that the rational control of our feelings and inclinations is itself the most pleasurable activity of all. Though it may sound somewhat odd or at least unexpected to hear Kant giving advice on how to maximize one's pleasures, this initially surprising statement is quite in character with the man who insisted that the number of his dinner guests should be "not below the number of the Graces and also not above that of the Muses."\(^{149}\)

IV. Conclusion

We began this paper by adducing some of Kant's negative remarks about the emotions and inclinations that have served in the past to depict him as a rigorous formalist in ethics with little or no regard for its emotional side. Contrasting these statements with others more qualified and moderate led, in the second section, to a more careful examination of Kant's analysis of the moral sensibility. Finally, Section III elaborated a number of Kant's distinctly positive observations about the emotional components of the moral life, thereby rectifying the overly negative impressions with which we began.

As is well known, Kant's formal ethical reflection first took place in the German school tradition of Wolff. He also subscribed early on (in the 1760s) to a version of the British moral-sense ethics of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, before undertaking the slow laborious work of unearthing the pure rational foundations of knowledge and moral obligation that bore visible fruit in the early 1780s. Such attention to Kant's philosophical development is important when considering his critical remarks about the sensibility in morals. For, given his efforts to 'purify' the foundations of morals of all empirical content, a certain negativity toward his own early stance and also those of others is to be expected, if only for the sake of contrast. Kant eventually balances out the picture by reincorporating the sensibility into his ethics, but this required that his position proceed first through a second, antinomic or dialectical stage. That here, that the Stoics forbade pleasures altogether. This claim is obviously at odds with some of Seneca's pronouncements, such as those in note \(^{119}\) above.


is, the realignment of sensibility under reason had first to go through a stage of denial where the primacy of the latter was asserted at the former's expense, and where the two were seen as entirely at odds. Thus, if view Kant's apparently incompatible remarks about the emotions and inclinations in terms of his thought's historical development, we do not find them to be necessarily inconsistent. Rather, they appear as parts or stages of the destructive constructiveness of a creative systematic philosopher seeking to incorporate his past within the novelty of his present work. Once Kant had properly redefined the reason-sensibility relationship, he was able to reaffirm many of the positive remarks about the emotions and inclinations which he had made earlier— as we in fact see him doing in the *Religion*, the *MdS*, and the *Anthropologie*, as well as in some of the so-called historical essays.

The central and most interesting conclusion which emerges from the evidence gathered in this paper is that Kant's position concerning the emotional side of the moral life was shaped by his interaction with the Stoics, to whom it is similar in many respects. Not only was he familiar with the Stoics at an early stage of his career, but he continued to read them avidly to its very end— "for the sake of his moral philosophy" (see Note 6). It has been shown that Kant's efforts and ability to harmonize reason with sensibility in morals, to replace his earlier one-sided with a more balanced perspective, go hand in hand with an increasingly sophisticated and detailed grasp of the Stoic position on this subject. This claim does not mean, of course, that he accepted the Stoic stance in its entirety, or uncritically, nor that he was uninfluenced by other moralists; but one need not make these claims in order to hold the thesis I have tried to defend.

My case for Stoic influence on Kant's view of the emotional life has been based on such features as are available, apart from autobiographical or biographical pronouncements by and about Kant concerning his intellectual history. These include numerous direct references by Kant himself to the Stoic position, both early and late in his philosophical career. Moreover, I have also identified various other unacknowledged parallels between Kant's position and those of the Stoic authors available to him. These latter kinds of coincidences concern not only specific distinctions and concepts, but also more general similarities in types of problems and the manners of their solution. It is true, to be sure, that similarities and parallels are, without other testimony, no automatic guarantee of influence, but one cannot rest too snugly on such a caveat either. For the claims of influence, as opposed to accidental sameness, become more cogent as the parallels and similarities increase in number and accuracy— as they in fact do in our case. Furthermore, our contention is significantly strengthened by the pervasiveness of the Kant-Stoa connection in other respects not examined here (see Note 3).

Finally, we can also appeal to Kant's general attitude toward his forbears in order to improve our case. For, despite his concerns to maintain the novelty of his Copernican revolutions in natural and
moral science, Kant was very aware of and sympathetic toward his historical predecessors. In general, he viewed the previous history of philosophy as a progressive development leading up to his own position, not as a mere catalogue of errors highlighting the latter by way of purely negative contrasts. He says, for instance, that we are all "colleagues in the grand council of human reason," and that "thinking heads"—no matter when they live—"belong to a world of scholars which stands in uninterrupted association."\(^{150}\) In other words, he took his predecessors seriously and utilized them as both foils and contributors in guiding his own stance on various subjects. This was especially so in the case of "the ancient moral philosophers, who pretty well exhausted all that can be said upon virtue,"\(^{151}\) and among whom—there is little doubt—the Stoics were foremost in his mind.

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\(^{150}\) *Reflg. 2566, XVI, 419-20, and Reflg. 1448a, XV, 632.* In the same vein, compare *Reflg. 2159, XVI, 255*: "If one wants to be an inventor, then one has to be the first; if one wants only the truth, then one requires predecessors." Likewise, *Reflg. 778, XV, 340-41*: "There is no progress of the spirit, no invention, without imitating in a new respect what one already knows... Everything stands under the law of continuity, and that which is entirely broken off belongs in the world of chimeras."

\(^{151}\) *Religion, VI, 24n* (Greene and Hudson, p. 20n).

Michael J. Seidler  
Dept. of Philosophy  
University of Portland  
Portland, OR 97203