HENRI BERGSON: A BIBLIOGRAPHY 1911-1980

by

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ABSTRACT

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This is a 1,039-item updating and extension of Henri Bergson: A Bibliography, published by the Philosophy Documentation Center in 1974. While it concentrates on bibliographic items that have appeared in the 1970s, this bibliography contains items both by and about Bergson which were published prior to the 1970s. The present work is admittedly incomplete; but it attempts a more complete annotation than was available in the 1974 bibliography.
INTRODUCTION

The present work updates the author's Henri Bergson: A Bibliography published in 1974 by the Philosophy Documentation Center. While a significant proportion of the present bibliography consists of items dating from 1974 through 1980, this by no means constitutes its entire content. Some items presented here date from as early as 1903, while others spring from the epoch of Bergson's greatest influence (roughly, 1910-1920), and between this epoch and 1974. Even for the years 1974-1980 the entries are by no means complete. This is for several reasons inevitable. For one, writings concerning Bergson are in no way limited to standard philosophical sources. They may be found in literary, historical, psychological, sociological, anthropological, biological, and physical publications—to name a few. Interest in Bergson stemming from Arabic, Slavic, Oriental, and other linguistic families provides yet another barrier. The author's 1974 bibliography contains 4,381 items, while the present compilation contains 1,039. Given the difficulties inherent in Bergson bibliography, perhaps it will not appear strange that in putting together the present work the researcher has uncovered very nearly another thousand items, in various stages of disarray. With luck these will appear in some later bibliography—one which will also have to confess its incompleteness.

The present work departs in only two basic respects from the earlier Henri Bergson: A Bibliography. While items in this latter work written by Bergson are presented chronologically, in the order of their publication, items written about him are presented alphabetically, under the surname of the author. This asymmetry has been found confusing by many critics. The present work, therefore, while it separates items by Bergson from those written by other authors, presents both in chronological order. This new format may involve some difficulties; but it has the merit of consistency. It also makes evident the fact that interest in Bergson's philosophy, while it has passed through wide fluctuations, is continuing today and even increasing.

Annotation, in a bibliography as large as the present one, always provides problems. It is not possible to annotate every item; and annotation, when given, is rarely as complete as some readers would prefer. This bibliography, while it is more fully annotated than its predecessor, attempts to be significative, but not exhaustive. Scope, content, significance, are suggested in general terms. Items from the 1974 bibliography are sometimes presented
along with additional or wholly new annotations. This is particularly true of dissertations.

Certain items presented here may be of particular interest. These include entries exhibiting the extent of Bergson's influence on the early psychoanalytic movement, particularly in America; new data concerning the relationships between Bergson and both Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung; and several items showing the relevance of his thought to various problems in psychology, including experimental psychology. Reviews of the German translation of Creative Evolution by Karl Jaspers and the German translation of An Introduction to Metaphysics by Herbert Marcuse, are presented.

In all basics this bibliography follows the MLA Style Sheet, second edition. In certain minor respects, however, divergences have been allowed. Information concerning the number of pages in a book or dissertation is often included. The issue number of an article or review is given along with the volume number in all cases in which it has been possible to find the issue number. French and German dissertations are, with some misgivings, presented in the same form as American dissertations. Additional information is given, where possible, concerning the "cycle" (douzième cycle, troisième cycle . . .) in which the dissertation is classified. A list of sources used in compiling the present work is included at the end of the bibliography. That a source has been listed does not necessarily mean that all items contained in it have been presented in this bibliography. Usually a complete listing of bibliographic items from each source has been given. In some cases, however, bibliographic information has been incomplete. Sources, some of whose contents have not been presented in the bibliography, have been marked with an asterisk in parentheses (*).

This brief introduction concludes with both thanks and an invitation. The author invites scholars who wish to add data, new or old, to the Bergson bibliography to contact him and acquaint him with any pertinent items or sources. He also asks scholars searching for information not contained in this or the previous bibliography to contact him. The author wishes to thank Karen McGee Myers for her help in finding items in the Library of Congress, and Suzie Bretz, Joyce Sherwood, and Virginia Kirk for their help in typing this very bulky manuscript. Thanks go also to Lewis Feuer, Milič Čapek, and Mary Morkovsky for their many helpful suggestions.
ITEMS BY BERGSON

1911


1912

---------. "What is the Object of Art?" Camera Work, No. 37 (1912), 22-26. This is a lengthy excerpt from the English translation of Laughter.

1913


---------. "The Philosophy of Ideas." New Freewoman, 1, No. 13 (1913), 246-248. This is an excerpt from the English translation of Creative Evolution, pages 329 et seq.

---------. "Leib und Seele." Neue Rundschau, 24, No. 12 (1913), 889-908. This is a German translation of "L'Âme et le corps," a lecture first given, in French, on April 28, 1912 and presented in Bergson's collection of essays, L'Énergie spirituelle (1919). The name of the translator is not given.

1914


---------. "Science phychique et science physique." Zeitschrift für Pathopsychologie, 2 (1914), 570 et seq.

1915

---------. Le Châtiment; Le jugement des penseurs sur l'Allemagne militarisée; "quelques documents, parmi


---------. "Life and Matter at War." Hibbert Journal, 13, No. 3 (1915), 465-475. This is a reprint of the authorized translation.


1917


1920


1924

---------. "Letter to Marcus M. Marks." Review of Reviews, 70, No. 5 (1924), 506. This letter concerns the international exchange of students.


1927


1928

This is a Turkish translation of Time and Free Will.

1929


1931


1935


1936


1939


1940


----------. Introduzione alla metafisica, a cura di Oddino Montiani. Classici del pensiero e dell'educazione, No. 4. Lancio: R. Carabba, 1940, 110.

1941


1942


1943

---------.  Materia y memoria, ensayo sobre la relación del cuerpo con el espíritu. Trans. Martín Navarro. La Plata, Argentina: C. Calomino, 1943, 269.

1944


1945


1946


1949

1954

--------.  The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.  
Audra and Cloudesley Brereton, with the assistance of 
W. Horsfall Carter.  Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
1954, 320.

1955

--------.  Antologia.  A cura di Giovanni Palumbo.  Letture 

1957

--------.  Introducción a la metafísica y la intuición 

1958

--------.  The World of Dreams.  Trans. Wade Baskin.  New 

1959

--------.  Matter and Memory.  Doubleday Anchor Books, 

1960

--------.  "Essay Written at the Ecole Normale.  1878-1881."  
In Jean Guitton, La Vocation de Bergson.  Paris: 
Gallimard, 1960, 229-241.  This essay deals with the 
relationship between an author and his audience.  "A son 
insu et sans le savoir, l'auteur pense pour le publique, 
écrit pour les habiles.  Comme auteur, il tient compte 
des lettres; homme, il relève avant tout de l'humanité 
tout entière."

--------.  "Essay Written at the Ecole Normale.  1878-1881."  
In Jean Guitton, La Vocation de Bergson.  Paris: 
Gallimard, 1960, 242-255.  This essay examines the weak­ 
nesses of the "penetrating mind."  "Un esprit pénétrant 
peut ne point arriver à la vérité . . .  Il n'a pas 
encore cette souplesse, cette mobilité par lequel nous 
sortons un instant de nous-mêmes, et pensons par 
autrui" (p. 255).
1962


1963


1964

---------. Materie und Gedächtnis und andere Schriften. Fischer Paperbacks. Trans. R. von Bendemann, Julius

1965


1967


1970


1971


1972

1973


1974


---------. Ha-Hitpathut ha-yotseret. Trans. Yosef Ur. Yerusalem: Magnes, 1974, 251. This is a Hebrew translation of Creative Evolution.

1975


1976

1977

---------. "Letter to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, April, 24, 1919." In Daniel S. Robinson, "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1940," Coranto, 10, No. 2 (1977), 22-23. In this letter, which is written in English, Bergson responds to criticisms of his philosophy by Ralph Tyler Flewelling. Bergson states that he has not had a chance to examine Flewelling's arguments in detail and that he will do so in the future. He criticizes Flewelling's method, which involves "accepting, as if they were final, the ordinary ready-made concepts."

---------. "Letter to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, November 20, 1920." In Daniel S. Robinson, "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1940," Coranto, 10, No. 2 (1977), 25-26. In this letter Bergson turns down an invitation to lecture at the University of Southern California. Though he would like, Bergson states, to accept the invitation, his present obligations (some of which date from before the First World War) make this impossible.

---------. "Letter to Ralph Tyler Flewelling, April 6, 1933." In Daniel S. Robinson, "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1920," Coranto, 10, No. 2 (1977), 29. In this letter Bergson thanks Flewelling for an issue of the Personalist dedicated to his philosophy. He concurs with Flewelling's interpretation of his philosophy in its relations to personalism but criticizes Herman Hausheer's article likening Bergson's philosophy to that of Schelling.

ITEMS CONCERNING BERGSON

1903


1904


1905

Janet, Pierre. "A Propos du "Déjà vu"." *Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique*, 2, No. 3 (1905), 289-307. The author traces theories of false recognition from the mid-nineteenth century until 1905. Intellectualist theories by Wigan and others have been succeeded by the "impressionist" theories of Höффding, James, and Bergson, which describe false recognition as a malady of perception. These theories at least focus attention on the troubles of perception; but they suffer from vagueness. They do not explain the recognition of the object whose existence is affirmed for the second time. The explanation which the author gives of false recognition, however, is almost identical with Bergson's. False recognition and its associated phenomena stem from the failure of the individual to attend to present reality and present acts: "il y a un abaissement, une chute de la tension nerveuse et de la tension psychologique qui supprime cette fonction élevée et ne laisse subsister que les fonctions inferieures" (pp. 303-304).

1906


"Esquisse d'une théorie biologique de la sommeil."
(Archives Psychologique de la Suisse Romande, 4 (1904-1905), 245-349). Jung refers to Bergson's and Claparède's notion of sleep as "disinterest in the present situation."

1907


1908

Boutroux, Émile. "La Philosophie en France depuis 1867." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 16, No. 6 (1908), 683-716. Bergson's concept of laughter is mentioned on p. 708; his attack on psycho-physical parallelism is cited on p. 689; the ideas of Édouard LeRoy are noted on pp. 701 and 706; those of Albert Bazaillas are mentioned on pp. 689-709.

James, William. "Letter to James Jackson Putnam, August 19, 1908." In James Jackson Putnam and Psychoanalysis. Ed. Nathan G. Hale, Jr., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, 74-75. James states: "The program you sketch is, I think, the form which the more spiritualistic philosophy of the future is bound more and more to assume, tho I fancy it will always be dogged more or less by a more materialist or mechanistic-determinist enemy. Bergson will have been the decisive initiator, but the necessary vagueness from the conceptual or intellectualist point of view of so many of his ideas will make it long ere the general mind swings over to his doctrines" (p. 74).


Ross, G. R. T. "A New Theory of Laughter." Nation (London), 4 (1908), 348-349. This is a review of Le Rire.


are mentioned on p. 146 as representatives of a new tendency towards "realism."

1909


Pierce, Charles Sanders. "Letter to William James. March 9, 1909." In Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James. Vol. III. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935, 437-438. In this letter Pierce complains against being compared with Bergson. "... that philosophy is either a science or is balderdash, and that a man who seeks to further science can hardly commit a greater sin than to use the terms of his science without anxious care to use them with strict accuracy, it is not very grateful to my feelings to be classed along with a Bergson who seems to be doing his prettiest to muddle all distinctions ..." (p. 438).


---------. "Personal Impressions of Sigmund Freud and His Work, with Special Reference to His Recent Lectures at Clark University." Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 4, No. 5 (1909-1910), 293-310. The author introduces Freud's ideas to an American audience. On pp. 297-298 he likens Freud's idea that repressed feelings remain active to Bergson's notion that memories remain living and active forces. On p. 298 he mentions Bergson's belief that perceptions are really "nine parts memory."


Boutroux, Émile. "William James." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 18, No. 6 (1910), 711-743. This article was written on the occasion of James' death. It is a general review of his career and philosophy. On pp. 733-735, the author examines Bergson's influence on James.

Carr, H. Wilson. "III. Instinct and Intelligence." British Journal of Psychology, 3, Part 3 (1910), 230-236. In this paper, presented at a symposium in July, 1910, at a joint meeting of the Aristotelian Society, British Psychological Society, and Mind Association, Carr explains Bergson's view of the relations between instinct and intelligence. The criticisms of Bergson's philosophy based on the fact that some instinctive actions can be improved by practice and imitation only show that in some cases of instinctive action intelligence is present in some degree. But Bergson holds that intelligence and instinct are never present in pure forms but are both always present in some degree. That instinct can be "converted into intelligence" in some cases only proves that instinct, like intelligence, is a kind of cognition.

"Instinct and Intelligence." British Journal of Psychology, 3, Part 3 (1910), 209-270. This is a symposium held at a joint meeting of the Aristotelian Society, British Psychological Society, and Mind Association in London, July, 1910. It includes papers by Charles S. Myers, C. Lloyd Morgan, H. Wildon Carr, G. F. Stout, and William McDougall, with a reply by Charles S. Myers. Bergson's conceptions of instinct and intelligence are mentioned at several points.


McDougall, William. "V. Instinct and Intelligence." British Journal of Psychology, 3, Part 3 (1910), 250-266. This paper was given during July, 1910, at a joint meeting of the Aristotelian Society, the British Psychological Society, and the Mind Association. The author criticizes Bergson's contention that instinct is
a special kind of cognition. Intelligence and instinct are the same sort of activity, distinguished only by instinct being the result of innate, and intelligence of learned, factors. The studies by the Peckhams of the solitary wasps show, against Bergson and Fabre (who is described as having a "theological bias") that these wasps do not behave with perfect precision and have, therefore, no unerring vision of their object. Similarly, the intelligent behavior of such wasps under certain circumstances indicates that Bergson's distinction between the intelligent vertebrates and the instinctive arthropods is far from being established. The basic difference between arthropods and vertebrates is that the former have a very brief "youth" and little experience to draw on, while the latter have an extended youth and ample occasion to learn from experience. Furthermore, how instinct as a supposedly special kind of knowledge can specifically guide a wasp in the stinging of its prey or a bee in building its honeycomb is almost impossible to understand (pp. 253-258). In other respects the author is in agreement with Bergson; however, "I hold that the instincts are differentiations of 'l'élan vital' by means of which it pushes along diverging paths, creating by their agency the various great families of the animal kingdom; each animated by the great instincts common to all, the tendencies to seek food and to reproduce its kind . . ." (p. 258).


Montague, William Pepperel. "A Pluralistic Universe and the Logic of Irrationalism." Journal of Philosophy, 7, No. 6 (1910), 141-155. This is a review of A Pluralistic Universe by William James. The reviewer finds James' critique of "absolutism" convincing, but does not accept James' defence of Bergson's critique of "intellectualism."

Morgan, C. Lloyd. "II. Instinct and Experience." British Journal of Psychology, 3, Part 3 (1910), 219-229. This paper was given in July, 1910, at a joint meeting of the Aristotelian Society, the British Psychological Society, and the Mind Association. The author argues that instinct and intelligence are not two different ways of regarding the same process but are distinguishable sorts of processes. Those who, like Bergson, draw upon the behavior of the solitary wasps for examples of perfect instinctive adaptation, should carefully study the recent observations of Dr. and Mrs. Peckham on the subject.
Myers, Charles S. "Instinct and Intelligence. A Reply." British Journal of Psychology, 3, No. 3 (1910), 267-270. This is a reply to criticisms of a paper previously delivered during July, 1910, at a joint meeting of the Aristotelian Society, the British Psychological Society, and the Mind Association. (This paper appears in the same number of this journal, pp. 209-218.) The author criticizes Bergson's concept of instinct, as defended by H. Wildon Carr on pp. 268-269. If Bergson and Carr are correct, the author states, then instinct is a special sort of consciousness of which we can have no concept: "We are endowing insects with a mental possession, of the nature of which we have not, and can never have, the faintest glimmering" (p. 268). Bergson and Carr treat intuition as being nearer to instinct than to intelligence. Indeed, they tend to regard intuition in man as being analogous to instinct in the lower animals. But "intuition" in man can be explained as intelligence utilizing the unconscious mind. The author then uses the example of spontaneous recollection to show how "intuition" is really only the appeal to the "higher unconscious processes."

"A Philosophy of Freedom." London Times Literary Supplement, 9, No. 454 (September 22, 1910), 336. This is a favorable and very clear exposition of the basic concepts of Time and Free Will.

Putnam, James Jackson. "Freud's and Bergson's Theories of the Unconscious." Psychological Bulletin, 7, No. 2 (1910), 44-45. This is an abstract of a talk. Putnam explains Freud's views and Bergson's as being closely similar as regards the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental processes.


---------. "Vues sur les problèmes de la philosophie." Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 18, No. 5 (1910), 581-613; 19, No. 1 (1911), 64-99.

Stout, G. F. "IV. Instinct and Intelligence." British Journal of Psychology, 3, Part 3 (1910), 237-249. This
paper was presented in July, 1910, at a joint meeting of the Aristotelian Society, British Psychological Society, and the Mind Association. The author argues that intelligent actions are not instinctively determined, and that every instinctive action is determined by intelligence. He also argues (pp. 243-245) against Bergson and H. Wildon Carr that instinct is not "a peculiar way of knowing, distinct from what is ordinarily called Intelligence." There is nothing in the instinctive behavior of animals which can not be accounted for by a combination of intelligence and purely biological factors.

1911

"Mr. Balfour and M. Bergson." Spectator, 107, No. 4347 (1911), 633-634.

"M. Bergson on the Soul." Spectator, 107, No. 4349 (1911), 734-735. This article is a brief account of Bergson's lectures at London University.


Hulme, Terence Ernest. "Bergsonism." New Age, NS 10, No. 4 (1911, 11.

---------.. "Notes on Bergson. I." New Age, NS 9, No. 25 (1911), 587-588.

---------.. "Notes on Bergson. II." New Age, NS 9, No. 26 (1911), 610-611.
"Notes on Bergson. IV." *New Age*, NS 10, No. 5 (1911), 110-112.

"Notes on the Bologna Congress." *New Age*, NS 8, No. 26 (1911), 607-608.


"On the Nature of the Soul." *Athenaeum*, No. 4383 (October 28, 1911), 524. This is a brief report on Bergson's first two lectures on the nature of the self at University College, London.

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*Athenaeum*, No. 4384 (November 4, 1911), 560. This is a brief report on Bergson's concluding lectures on the nature of the self at University College, London.

Pitkin, Walter B. Review of *Time and Free Will* by Henri Bergson. *Psychological Bulletin*, 8, No. 5 (1911), 176-180. This review is both critical and highly affirmative. The author lauds Bergson's treatment of subjective time and of the free act, but criticizes Bergson's sharp distinction between quality and quantity, duration and space: "Bergson establishes the rich reality of time, but, alas! thinks it can be done only by virtually eviscerating space! Some day, perhaps, philosophers will not maltreat space either" (p. 180).


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*Westminster Review*, 175, No. 6 (1911), 699. The reviewer comments chiefly on Mitchell's translation of *Creative Evolution*, which he commends.


Review of *La Perception du changement* by Henri Bergson. *Athenaeum*, No. 4379 (September 30, 1911), 387. This is a brief expository review which likens Bergson's philosophy to an artistic vision.


Sheffer, Henry M. "Freud and Bergson." *The Jewish Review*, 1, No. 6 (1911), 529-543.


1912


"Bergson on Comedy." *Living Age*, 272, No. 3526 (February 3, 1912), 315-317. This review of *Laughter* by Henri Bergson was published originally in *The Outlook*. The reviewer concludes that "M. Bergson has chosen to illustrate his thesis in large part—indeed mainly—by reference to the theater, and he does not move with his accustomed mastery in the theater" (p. 317).


Caldecott, A. Review of *The Philosophy of Bergson* by A. D. Lindsay. *The Sociological Review*, 5, No. 1 (1912), 68-69. This is an expository, largely favorable review. The reviewer concludes that "the sociologist will see something of how higher intuitions effectually inform and guide the process of moulding into scientific knowledge the manifold . . . ." (p. 69).


Dimnet, Ernest. "Another French View of Laughter." Saturday Review, 113, No. 2945 (April 6, 1912), 420-422. This article is a critical response to a review of Bergson's Laughter by John Palmer in the March 23, 1912, issue of the Saturday Review. The author argues that Palmer misunderstands the French, who are quite capable of non-cerebral laughter, and that Bergson is by no means a typical Frenchman.

Gardiner, H. N. Review of Laughter; An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic by Henri Bergson. Psychological Bulletin, 9, No. 9 (1912), 354-358. This review is both explanatory and critical. The essentials of Bergson's theory of laughter are explained. On p. 358, he states: "And if comic laughter has a social function, as it doubtless has, and its spirit is akin to that of play, is it not at least as plausible to find that function in the serviceable relaxation it affords to the strain and stress of life as in the chastisement it inflicts on lapses from its 'requirements'?


---------. "Notes on Bergson. V." New Age, NS 10, No. 17 (1912), 401-403.


Overstreat, Harry Allen. "Mind and Body." Psychological Bulletin, 9, No. 1 (1912), 13-20. In this brief article the author reviews various recent attempts, including Bergson's, to deal with the mind-body problem. Bergson's concept of the self as ceaseless change is mentioned on p. 14; on pp. 17-18 his position is explained in general terms. The author states that "the one view which departs in a marked manner from the
conventional modes of treatment of the problem is that of Bergson. The novelty of his view is due to his thought of perception as a means, not to knowledge, but to action" (p. 17).

Palmer, John. "French and English Laughter." Saturday Review, 114, No. 2946 (April 13, 1913), 461. The author replies to criticisms of his interpretation of French character and of Bergson's concept of laughter by Ernest Dimnet in an earlier number of the Saturday Review. He admits that it is wrong to generalize about national character--yet concludes that, nonetheless, the French have never understood Shakespeare.

---------. "The Laughter of the French." Saturday Review, 113, No. 2943 (March 23, 1912), 362-363. The reviewer argues that Bergson has explained not the laughter of humanity, but the laughter of the "highly intellectual" French.

"Periodical Literature. French." The Sociological Review, 5, No. 1 (1912), 81-82. The author recounts the substance of the article by Bergson in the November issue of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, "L'Intuition philosophique." He also quotes from a "Bergsonian" article by Fr. d'Hautefeuille in the September issue of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale: "Morale normative et morale scientifique."

"Pressing Forward into Space." Nation, 94, No. 2411 (April 11, 1912), 355-356. This is a polemic against current revolt among young American intellectuals obsessed with Henri Bergson's philosophy: "But when the Futurist paints a baby it is a metaphysical baby born in the Bergsonian philosophy and bred in revolt" (p. 356).

Review of Laughter by Henri Bergson. Athenaeum, No. 4393 (1912), 5. This is a perceptive, critical review. The reviewer concludes: "But, rather than laugh at others' lameness, why not laugh at our own superabundant energy which bids us, instead of walking, seek to fly in the air? And, meanwhile, let us, as men and philosophers, none the less seek to fly. There is a lightness inherent in laughter of the purer kind that may suffice to save us from any serious fall."

---------. Edinburgh Review, 215, No. 440 (1912), 383-404. This is a review of books on laughter by William Hazlitt, Herbert Spencer, George Meredith, James Sully,
and Henri Bergson. The author concludes that "M. Bergson has been so struck by a certain aspect or part of the comic that he has taken it to cover the whole" (p. 397).

---------. Nation, 94, No. 2432 (1912), 139-140. This is an expository review, which, however, contains some criticisms of the English translation of Le Rire.


Smith, Norman Kemp. Review of Laughter by Henri Bergson. Hibbert Journal, 11, No. 1 (1912), 220-225. The reviewer states that "the present work, as I shall try to show, is an excellent illustration both of the striking merits and of many doubtfully praiseworthy features in Bergson's thinking" (p. 220). The reviewer criticizes Bergson's method of exposition which, he holds, does not deal with recalcitrant facts and conceals basic assumptions—making them, therefore, immune to proof. The reviewer, however, agrees with the basic assumption underlying Laughter, i.e., that "tension and elasticity are the two complementary forces that life sets in play" (p. 223). He also commends Bergson's "essentially critical" attitude towards humor.

Stebbing, Lizzie Susan. Review of Creative Evolution by Henri Bergson. The Sociological Review, 5, No. 2 (1912), 161-166. The reviewer explains the basic features of Bergson's metaphysics and epistemology on pp. 161-165. On pp. 165-166 she advances criticisms of Bergson's method and conclusions: "What is the value of the method? From the point of view of metaphysical theory, it would seem to have no value at all. By definition, intuition is individual and incommunicable" (p. 165).


Wilbois, Joseph. Devoir et durée: Essai de morale sociale. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1912, 408. Written by a disciple of Bergson, to some degree this work foreshadows ideas to be developed by Bergson in Two Sources of Morality and Religion.

1913

Emerson, L. E. "The Case of Miss A: A Preliminary Report of a Psychoanalytic Study and Treatment of a Case of Self-Mutilation." Psychoanalytic Review, 1, No. 1 (1913), 41-54. "The necessary function of psychoanalysis implies an ethical and philosophical foundation. In this respect it is interesting to note the close correspondence between the psychoanalytic theories and the Bergsonian doctrines. Here, too, should be mentioned the work and doctrines of William James. But this paper is no place to develop these suggestions so they will be merely mentioned" (p. 53). The author footnotes Bergson's Matière et mémoire and L'évolution créatrice.


Jaspers, Karl. Review of Schöpferische Entwicklung by Henri Bergson. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychologie, 6, (1913), 885-886. The reviewer asserts that a reading of Schöpferische Entwicklung (Creative Evolution) is necessary to an understanding of Bergson's earlier, more psychological works (Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory, An Introduction to Metaphysics). He contends that a definitive reading of Bergson's philosophy is not yet possible, but remarks that Bergson's tendency to approach psychological qualities directly, through intuition--without which psychology per se is impossible--is quite meaningful, and coincides with many
contemporary efforts. Bergson's Creative Evolution brings together many of the psychological needs of the times. As a stimulus and a means towards clarity, Bergson's philosophy is useful, but one must warn against taking it as a model, and trying to resolve psychological and psychopathological problems through intuition. Bergson's interweaving of inexpressible metaphysical experience with clever logical argument is irresolvable (unaufloslich). An article by Richard Kroner in Logos, 1913, is cited in this regard.


Jung, Carl Gustav. "A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types." In Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology. 2nd ed. Ed. Constance E. Long. London: Balliere, Tindall and Cox, 287-298. This paper was given in 1913. In it on p. 293, the author likens his concept of libido to Bergson's élan vital, and utilizes a concept of "crystallization" which, he states, is similar to Bergson's. He connects Bergson's metaphysics with the aesthetic theory of Worringer. This essay appears in French in Archives de Psychologie, 13 (1913), 289-299. It appears in C. G. Jung, Collected Works, 6, 499-509. The references to Bergson are found on p. 504.

-------. "Letter to Dr. Löy, March, 1913." In "On Some Crucial Points in Psychoanalysis." In Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology. 2nd ed. Ed. Constance E. Long. London: Balliere, Tindall and Cox, 1922, 236-277. On pp. 274-275, the author states that "the purely causal, not to say materialistic conception of the preceding decades, would conceive the organic formation as the reaction of living matter, and this doubtless provides a position heuristically useful, but, as far as any real understanding goes, leads only to a more or less ingenious and apparent reduction of the problem. Let me refer you to Bergson's excellent criticism of this conception. From external forces but half the result, at most, could ensue; the other half lies within the individual disposition of the living material, without which it is obvious the specific reaction-formation could never be achieved. This principle must be applied
also in psychology." This exchange of letters appears again in C. G. Jung's *Collected Works*, 4, 252-289. The reference to Bergson is found on p. 287.

---------. "On Psychoanalysis." In *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*. 2nd ed. Ed. Constance E. Long. London: Balliere, Tindall and Cox, 1922, 226-235. In this paper, given in London in 1913, the author states that "from a broader standpoint libido can be understood as vital energy in general, or as Bergson's élan vital" (p. 231). This essay is retranslated as "Psychoanalysis and Neurosis" in C. G. Jung's *Collected Works* 4, 243-251. For Jung's reference to élan vital, see p. 248.


Paulhan, Françoise. "La Lutte Philosophique et la division des croyances." *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger*, 76, No. 10 (1913), 409-422. This is a review of *Le Materialisme actuel* by Henri Bergson, Henri Poincaré, Charles Gide and others.


"The Science of Dreams." The Independent, 76, No. 3386 (1913), 153. This is a comment by the editors on the English translation of Bergson's "Le Rêve," published in The Independent. The similarities between Bergson's concept of dreams and Freud's are noted. The editors conclude, however, that Bergson's view is more balanced than Freud's.

1914

Cheydleur, Frédérik D. "Essai sur l'évolution des doctrines de M. Georges Sorel." Diss. Grenoble 1914, 174. This is a "doctorat d'Université."

Dearborn, George V. N. Review of La Vie inconsciente et les mouvements by Theodule Armand Ribot. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 9, No. 4 (1914-1915), 361-362. The reviewer notes concerning Ribot's conception of the relations between the unconscious and mental activity, that "it opens up vistas of conjecture which Bergson and the philosophy of Heraclitus himself can not at present traverse" (p. 361). "The chapter on the general relations of motor ideas to the mental process does not require extended analysis. It is inherently in line with much recent thought (that, for example, of Bergson) in enlarging on the proof that every state of consciousness is a complex of which the kinesthetic elements form the stable and resistant part. If a metaphor be allowed, they are its skeleton. They assure its permanence" (p. 361).


Janet, Pierre. "Psychoanalysis: III. Traumatic Memories Relative to Sexuality." The Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 9, No. 2, (1914-1915), 153-187. On p. 178, the author states of the various attempts to broaden the concept of sexual desire by Jung, Putnam, Jones, and others, "one fact stands out clearly; all the terms employed by the psychoanalysts, such as 'sexual instinct,' 'cravings of sexual gratification,' 'libido,' etc., designate simply the 'élan vitale' of metaphysicians." But the use of such words by psychologists to explain everything can be very dangerous. On p. 180, he states that "such confusion is not favorable either to the study of the 'élan vital' or to that of sexual phenomena in humanity."
Jung, Carl Gustav. "The Content of the Psychoses. Part II, 1914." Collected Papers in Analytical Psychology. Ed. C. E. Long. London: Balliere, Tindall and Cox, 1923, 336-351. Also in Collected Works, 3, 153-178. On p. 351 (Collected Papers) the author states, "I realize that my views are parallel with those of Bergson, and that in my book (The Psychology of the Unconscious) the concept of the libido which I have given is a concept paralleled to that of élan vital; my constructive method corresponds to his intuitive work. When I first read Bergson a year and a half ago I discovered to my great pleasure everything which I had worked out practically, but expressed by him in consummate language and in wonderfully clear philosophical style." On pp. 347-348(n), he again likens his concept of libido to Bergson's élan vital.

------------- "On Psychological Understanding." Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 9, No. 6 (1914-1915), 385-389. In this essay, written in 1914, and delivered July 24, 1914, in London to the Psycho-Medical Society, the author likens his concept of libido to Bergson's élan vital on pp. 396 and 399. This essay appears again in C. G. Jung, Collected Works, 3, 179-193. In this new translation, I am able to find only one reference to Bergson, on p. 190.

Lepercq, Daniel. "A Propos du livre de M. Maritain." Revue Thomiste, 22, No. 2 (1914), 213-218. This is a review of La Philosophie bergsonienne by Jacques Maritain. The reviewer congratulates Maritain for "unmasking" the "perverse" Bergsonian philosophy.


Putnam, James Jackson. "Dream Interpretation and the Theory of Psychoanalysis." Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 9, No. 1 (1914-1915), 36-60. On p. 47 the author mentions Bergson's "poussée vitale." On p. 49 he states, "It has long been recognized as a sound psychological proposition (a proposition made great use of by Bergson in his careful reasonings) that everything a man does, or thinks, so far from standing alone, or having only a
short history, has a history at least as long as the man's life. Not only does each act or thought of the adult rest, in part, upon the experiences of the child, in the sense that the boy is, to speak broadly, the father of the man; but the life of the man actually contains the experiences of the boy, as integral and (virtually) active elements of its own essence. What is still more important, the kinds of reaction which through early accentuation become characteristic of childhood, either remain (in their own form) characteristics of adult life, even to a degree of which the adult may be wholly unaware; or else become the parents of new reaction-tendencies in which the old are virtually embodied. In the majority of cases such influences are discoverable—or, at least, hints of their presence are discoverable—by adequate dream analysis; and in pathological cases it is often a matter of great importance to make a thorough search for them" (p. 49).


Saussure, René de. "Réponse à M. Lutoslawski." Archives de Psychologie, 14 (1914), 298-299. This is a response to a criticism of the author's talk "Le Temps en général et le temps bergsonien en particulier." The author explains his distinction between qualitative and quantitative, and comments on Lutoslawski's equation of duration with God's creative aspect.

Solomon, Meyer. "On 'The Analysis and Interpretation of Dreams Based on Various Motives' and on the Theory of Psychoanalysis," a reply to Dr. James J. Putnam, with Critical Remarks on the Theory and Practice of Freudian Psychoanalysis." The Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 9, No. 2 (1914-1915), 98-138. On p. 117 the author quotes with approval Shimer's statement in a review of Bergson's Creative Evolution, "Beings advance in time, treading, as it were, upon a carpet which they weave with whatever colors and texture they wish but they are ever rolling this carpet up behind them and carrying it with them. Thus all of the past is preserved, though not indeed all as self-conscious memories. This would thus include our so-called organic memories, our instincts and our present-life (infancy and childhood
memories.) Hence, constantly enlarging with the volume of its past experiences, endlessly creating itself, memory does not usually depend upon the activity of an ever-present (biological, psychological or psychobiological) repression always playing a prominent role. When a certain tendency does not appear or is not well developed it does not signify that this is due to repression, although this may be the case; but it frequently means merely that the tendency has not been stimulated or developed, or is inherently weak."

Hence (pp. 117-118) subconscious ideas are not all (or even mostly) repressed ideas.

Werner, Charles. "Réunion des Philosophes de la Suisse Romande. Rolle, 25 juin 1914." Archives de Psychologie, 14 (1914), 296-299. The author gives an account of a discussion of René de Saussure's article "Le Temps en générale et le temps bergsonion en particulier" before the philosophical society of French-speaking Switzerland. The discussions revolve around the question of whether or not time is spatial. Professors Grandjean and Lutoslawski (a Polish philosopher), in particular, contributed to the debate. Lutoslawski concludes that time is God, in God's creative aspect.

1915

"Aspects of Dream Life." Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 10, No. 2 (1915-1916), 100-119. The author states, "Bergson at the close of his essay on dreams hints that the mind may transcent its conjectured limits and be influenced in profound slumber by telepathy. This is but an hypothesis which must long await verification" (p. 118). The author's own dreams which forecast the future have been largely erroneous.


"Mr. Wildon Carr and Philosophy of Change." Quest, 7, No. 2 (1915), 568-574. This is a review of H. W. Carr's The Philosophy of Change.
Ceresole, Pierre. "L'Irréductibilité de l'intuition des probabilités et l'existence de propositions mathématiques indémonstrables." Archives de Psychologie, 15 (1915), 255-305. The author argues against Henri Poincaré that the intuition of probability cannot be reduced to an objective and formal probability calculus.

Croce, Benedetto. What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel. 3rd ed. Trans. Douglas Ainslie. London: Macmillan & Co., 1915, 217. On pp. 213-215, after an incisive analysis and criticism of Hegel's philosophy, the author notes the emergence of a new romanticism as one condition for a true understanding of Hegel's philosophy. He sees the new romantics as setting up the old Schellingian ideal of aesthetic contemplation: "Thus Bergson, one of the writers who have attached themselves to this movement, advocates as a metaphysic of the absolute, an intuitive knowledge 'qui s'installe dans le mouvement et adopte la vie même des choses.' But was not this just what Hegel demanded, and the point from which he began—to find a form of mind, which should be mobile as the movement of the real . . . ." (p. 214). The author adds, however, that for Hegel such a view was only a starting point, not a conclusion. "The renunciation of thought would have been asked of Hegel in vain" (p. 214). (The author's quote above is cited as "Introduction à la Métaphysique" in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 11 (1903), 29.)


Woodbridge, Riley Isaac. *American Thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1915, viii, 375. John Fiske is viewed as a predecessor of Bergson on pp. 215-216; Bergson's pragmatic and empiricist affinities with William James and Charles Sanders Pierce are noted on p. 333; Bergson and Emile Boutroux are described on p. 335 as philosophers whose ideas are sympathetic to American thought; differences between Bergson and American neo-realists are explained on p. 348; W. Pitkin's criticisms of Bergsonian and Drieschian biology are detailed on pp. 352-353.

1916


Horton, Lydiard H. "The Apparent Inversion of Time in Dreams." *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 11, No. 1

--------. "On the Irrelevancy of Dreams." Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 11, No. 3 (1916-1917), 143-171. The author criticizes both Bergson's and Freud's theories of dreams in this article. His own concept of the dream is highly mechanistic, and is based on neurophysiology.

Jung, Carl Gustav. "The Conception of the Unconscious." Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology, 2nd ed. Ed. Constance E. Long. London: Balliere, Tindall and Cox, 1922, 445-474. In this talk, given in 1916 at the Zurich School for Analytical Psychology, the author states, "Special thanks are due to Bergson for having broken a lance for the right of the irrational to exist. Psychology will probably be obliged to acknowledge and to submit to a plurality of principles, in spite of the fact that this does not suit the scientific mind. Only so can psychology be saved from shipwreck" (p. 464). This talk appears again in C. G. Jung's Collected Works, 7, 269-304. The reference to Bergson appears on p. 288.


1917


1918


Scott, J. W. "Realism and Politics." **Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,** NS 18 (1918), 224-246. The author summarizes his article as follows: "The paper is intended to show how little surprising it is that the speculations of M. Bergson and Mr. Russell, in practice, should work out in the same way; that people in the more advanced social movements of the present time should think to draw inspiration from both sources. The thesis is that there is something common to both the ways of thinking, that with this part of themselves they touch social movements, and that the feature in which they at once touch social movements and touch each other is their realism" (p. 224).

Smith, Mary, and William McDougall. "Some Experiments in Learning and Retention." **British Journal of Psychology,**
The authors conclude, "In this paper we have adduced experimental evidence in support of Prof. Bergson's distinction between habit and memory; we have illustrated the great importance of effort or volition in rendering repetition effective in memorizing . . ." (p. 209).

Wechsler, I. S. "The Role of the Emotions in the Genesis of Insanition and Insanity from the Standpoint of Evolution." Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 12, No. 6 (1918), 375-389. "Every philosopher, from Thales to Bergson, has sought to explain the oneness of things" (p. 375). But now science is on the march.

1919


1920

Charles E. Cory. "A Subconscious Phenomenon." Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 14, No. 16 (1920), 369-375. The author begins his article as follows: "In his essay on Dreams, Henri Bergson makes the statement that the great discoveries of the last century were in the physical order, and that those of the twentieth century will probably be in the realm of the subconscious" (p. 369). The author agrees with this prophecy and gives a case history, involving automatic sketches.

De Laguna, Theodore. Review of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge by Alfred North Whitehead. Philosophical Review, 29, No. 3 (1920), 269-275. The reviewer asserts on p. 269 that Whitehead is clearly influenced by Bergson, but that Whitehead attempts to reformulate science so that it will no longer be open to Bergson's criticisms.


1921


Review of El Bergsonismo en la doctrina espiritista by Gregorio Giménez. Revista de Filosofía, 7, No. 6 (1921), 463-466.

Saussure, Raymond de. Review of La Psychologie française contemporaine by Georges Dwelshauvers. Imago, 7, No. 1 (1921), 216-217. The reviewer concludes his brief survey with the following statements concerning the forerunners of psychoanalysis: "Man konnte einen interessanten Vergleich ziehen zwischen dem, was er symbolische Assoziationen nennt und dem, was Bleuler autistisches Denken genannt hat. Mit Ribot erscheint zum erstenmal die Bedeutung der Affektivität. Gar manches in den Ideen Janets und Bergsons nähert uns dem Arbeitsgebiete Freuds noch mehr" (p. 217).

1922


University Press, 1922, 190. On p. 16 the author states that "I use the term 'limitation' for the most general conception of finitude. In a somewhat more restricted sense Bergson uses the very convenient term 'canalization.' This Bergsonian term is a useful one to keep in mind as a corrective to the misleading associations of the terms 'external' and 'internal,' or of the terms 'whole' and 'part.'" The author uses the term "canalization" again on p. 24. See also pp. 38-39.

1923


Fenichel, Otto. "Psychoanalyse und Metaphysik: Eine kritische Untersuchung." Imago, 9, No. 3 (1923), 318-343. The author attempts to refute the notion that Freudian metapsychology and metaphysics have anything in common. His immediate target is those psychoanalysts (Otto Pfister, James Jackson Putnam, Carl Gustav Jung, and Alphonse Maeder) who have tried to render psychoanalysis metaphysical. His more general target is the philosophy of Bergson which, he says, many psychoanalysts have tried to utilize on the basis of its presumed similarity with Freud's ideas. While "intuition" is indeed indispensable to psychoanalysis, submersion in so-called "pure duration" is impossible. The unconscious is timeless, and the extension of characteristics observed in the "I" to the external world is impossible. The author's "refutation" of Bergsonism shows little appreciation of either the metaphysical elements in Freud's metapsychology or the psychoanalytic content of Bergson's philosophy. He spends most of his article developing a notion of intuition which is Freudian but (presumably) not Bergsonian.

---------. Review of "Medizin und Philosophie" by Kurt Hildebrandt. Imago, 9, No. 3 (1923), 394. The reviewer complains concerning Hildebrant's article in the Monatsschrift fur Psychologie und Neurologie, 51, No. 1, that there are those who, reacting against the mechanistic notions of psychoanalysis, try to base their thought on "phantastischen Übertreibungen. Man Kann sagen, da sein unberichtiger Erfolg ebenso beschämend fur die offizielle Psychologie war die der berichtige! Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson seien leidenschaftlicher und anschaulicher als alle spezialistische Fachliteratur."


Rency, Georges. "La Vie littéraire: Paul Valéry." *L'Indépendance Belge*, 94, No. 252 (1923), 4. This is a review of Paul Valéry by Albert Thibaudet. The reviewer concludes that "entre Valéry et Bergson, il n'y a que l'épaisseur d'un technique."

Vettard, Camille. "Proust et le temps." *Nouvelle Revue Française*, 20, No. 1 (1923), 204-211.

Wheeler, William Morton. *Social Life Among the Insects*: Being a Series of Lectures Delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston in March 1922. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923, 375. Lecture Two of this series, "Wasps Solitary and Social" (pp. 43-89), contains several references to Bergson. On p. 45 the author asserts that while Bergson and other authors (e.g., McDougall) have exaggerated the abilities of the wasps, "the wasp's psychic powers compared to those of most other insects or even of many of the lower vertebrates seem to me, nevertheless, to be sufficiently remarkable." The egg-laying and blood-sucking activities of parasitoid wasps are described on pp. 48-49 by the author (against Fabre and Bergson) as reflex behavior.
"In other words, the internal hunger and reproductive stimuli, or appetites, are so intimately associated with one another that mere contact with the prey releases either the feeding or the ovipositing reactions, or both" (p. 49). The author contends that what Bergson and Fabre saw as stinging activities are really cases of parasitism (i.e., blood-sucking). On pp. 52-59, he examines the behavior of the sphex, concluding that "we are . . . unable to form any adequate conception of the extent of the racial experience of the solitary wasps as a group, and therefore of the amount of condensation or syncopation with which it is epitomized in the behavior of the individual wasp, and this disability on our part is largely responsible not only for the old supernatural conceptions of instinct but also for theories like those of Bergson, the Neodarwinians and the mutationists" (p. 59).

1924

Carteron, Henri. "Remarques sur la notion de temps d'après Aristote." Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, 98, No. 7-8 (1924), 68-81. This article deals with the concept of time in Aristotle, Kant, and Bergson.

Lefèvre, Frédéric. "Une Heure avec M. Paul Valéry." Les Nouvelles Littéraires, 3, No. 103 (1924), 1-2; No. 104 (1924), 4; No. 105 (1924), 6. The third part of this interview concerns Bergson. This interview forms the main part of Lefèvre's Entretiens avec Paul Valéry (1926).

Mead, George Herbert. "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control." International Journal of Ethics, 35, No. 3 (1924-1925), 251-257. The author examines Bergson's theory of perception on pp. 254-256, noting that it is a move in the direction of freeing psychology from Cartesian dualism. He refers to Bergson's concept of instinct on pp. 262-266, distinguishing the sociability of insects from that of human beings. On p. 263, he states, "I wish, however, to restrict the social act to the class of acts which involve the cooperation of more than one individual, and whose object as defined by the act, in the sense of Bergson, is a social object." See also p. 274.


Thompson, J. Arthur. The System of Animate Nature: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the Years 1915 and 1916. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1924, 687. The author makes various references to Bergson, on pp. 21, 32, 38, 99, 169, and 234. On pp. 207-210, he deals with Bergson's concept of instinct as one of the three major views of instinct. (The other two are the reflex theories and the theories which make instinct a kind of intelligent behavior.) On pp. 209-210 he states, "The position that instinctive behavior is on a different evolutionary tack from intelligent behavior may be defended apart from Professor Bergson's particular view of the difference. When we observe a spider executing an extraordinarily complex and sharply punctuated series of movements which result in a web and doing this effectively for the very first time, we seem to be in a world different from that of intelligence. And again when we observe insects continuing to go through a laborious routine which has lost all its point, and from bondage to which the least modicum of intelligence would deliver them, we seem to be in a world very different from that of intelligence."

1925


1926


Koechlin, Charles. "Le Temps et la musique." Revue Musicale, 7, No. 3 (1926), 45-62. The author distinguishes (on p. 46) four kinds of time: (1) "La durée pure, donnée de notre conscience profonde . . ."; (2) "Le temps psychologique"; (3) "Le temps mesure par les moyens mathématiques"; (4) "temps musical." The author identifies "le temps musical" with "le temps auditif," and argues that an auditory, musical time always has some relationship with space, since it appears to us to be measurable and divisible. In dealing with musical time we are dealing with a "spatialization du temps, mais fort différente de celle (basée sur la vue) que considère M. Bergson" (p. 46).


Russell, Bertrand. "Science, Relativity and Religion." Nation and Athanaeum, 39, No. 8 (1926), 206-207. This is a review of Science and the Modern World by A. N. Whitehead. The author compares Bergson and A. N. Whitehead on p. 207. Whitehead, Russell says, "is profoundly influenced by Bergson's belief in interpenetration." Whitehead's philosophy, he states, consists of two parts, "a logical construction leading to physics from a new set of non-material fundamentals, wholly admirable and profound; on the other hand, a metaphysic believed by the author to be bound up with his logical construction, but in fact--again I speak with deference--
separable from it." This metaphysics, which is not new, is approximately that of Plotinus or Bergson.


1927


Souday, Paul. "Dialogues critiques." Le Manuscrit Autographe, 2, No. 9 (1927), 135-140. The author responds here to Thibaudet's "Lettre à Paul Valéry."


Thibaudet, Albert. "Lettre à Paul Valéry." Le Manuscrit Autographe, 2, No. 8 (1927), 44-49.

1928

Blondel, Charles. La Conscience morbide. 2nd ed. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1928, ii, 402. This edition contains an appendix not found in the first edition. Blondel was one of the first to apply Bergsonian ideas to psychopathology.

Jung, Carl Gustav. "Instinct and the Unconscious." In Contributions to Analytical Psychology. Trans. H. G. and Cary F. Barnes. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928. In this talk, first delivered in July, 1919, before a joint meeting of the British Psychological Society, the Aristotelian Society, and the Mind Association, the author criticizes the neo-Darwinian account of the life-cycle of the yucca moth, and adds, "but such an explanation is far from being satisfactory. Bergson's philosophy suggests another way of explanation, where the factor of 'intuition' comes in. Intuition, as a psychological function, is also an unconscious process" (p. 274). He adds that while instinct and intuition are analogous, they are by no means identical. On p. 280 he claims that Bergson discovered an "archetype" in his "durée créatrice." This essay appears, retranslated so as to put more distance between Jung's ideas and Bergson, in C. G. Jung's Collected Works, 8, 129-138. It was published in its original form in the British Journal of Psychology, 10, No. 1 (1919), 15-26.

---------. "On Psychical Energy." In Contributions to Analytical Psychology. Trans. H. G. and Cary F. Barnes. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928, p. 32. Here Jung mentions Aristotle's hormé, Schopenhauer's "will," and Bergson's élan vital, and states, "from these concepts I have taken only the graphic or perceptual character of my term, not the definition of the concept." This paper appears in C. G. Jung's Collected Works, 8, pp. 3-66.


1929


"Filosofía Bergsoniana y Catolicismo de Carlos Malagarriga." Revista de Filosofía, 14, No. 4 (1929), 106. This is a comment on an article in the July, 1928, issue of Nosotros.

Marcuse, (Herbert?). Review of Einführung in die Metaphysik, by Henri Bergson. *Zeitschrift fur Sexualwissenschaft und Sexualpolitik*, 16, No. 6 (1929), 427. The reviewer is very critical of Bergson's "philosophischen Mystizismus."


Whitehead, Alfred North. *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*. New York: The Macmillan Company; Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1929, 545. The author refers to Bergson on pp. vii, 49, 65, 174, 319, 336, 428, and 489. On p. vii the author states, "I am also greatly indebted to Bergson, William James, and John Dewey. One of my preoccupations has been to rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti-intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been associated with it." On pp. 49-50, the author notes certain respects in which his theory of intuition differs with Bergson's. On p. 319, the author states, "on the whole, the history of philosophy supports Bergson's charge that the human intellect 'spatializes the universe;' that is to say, that it tends to ignore the fluency, and analyze the world in terms of static categories." He adds that, unlike Bergson, he does not believe spatialization to be an intrinsic vice of the intellect. On p. 489, the author asserts that "spatialization" is a "real factor in the physical constitution of every actual occasion . . . ."

1930

Carrell, Alexis. "The New Cytology," Science, 73, No. 1890 (1931), 297-303. The author, who is one of the first in French biology to accept Bergson's ideas, describes the conceptual shift necessary to the creation of a new cytology. "Time," he states, "is really the fourth dimension of living organisms. It enters as a part into the constitution of a tissue. Cell colonies, or organs, are events which progressively unfold themselves. They must be studied like a history. A tissue consists of a society of complex organisms which does not respond in an instantaneous manner to the changes of the environment... The temporal extension of a tissue is as important as its spatial existence" (p. 298). The author discusses the application of such ideas to the study of cell cultures in vitro, through the manipulation of the intercellular medium. He mentions discoveries resulting from this method, involving the problem of ageing and the nature of cancer.

Dandieu, Arnaud. Anthologie des philosophes français contemporains. Paris: Editions du Sagittaire, 1931, 533. The writings of twenty-two French philosophers are presented here, including Bergson, Poincaré, Durkheim, Meyerson and others.

1932

Cattaui, Georges. "Bergson and Mysticism." Spectator, 149, No. 5435 (1932), 264. This is a highly laudatory brief survey of the main themes of Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion.


Lasbax, Emile. "Daniel Essertier et les sources du bergsonisme sociologique." Revue Internationale de sociologie, 40, Nos. 3-4 (1932), 183-191. The author describes the efforts of Daniel Essertier (1889-1930) to apply
Bergson's philosophy to sociology, beginning with Essertier's teachers at Bordeaux and his doctoral theses at the Sorbonne (1928), "Les Formes inferieurs de l'explication" and "Psychologie et sociologie: Essai de bibliographie critique." The author states, "avec le don de mesure qui était le trait le plus frappant de son jugement, il se montrait par-dessus tout soucieux de réserver les droits de la psychologie en face de ceux de la sociologie, afin de ménager une entente durable et sûre entre ces deux disciplines" (p. 190).


Parmentier, Georges. "L'Originalité du Bergsonisme." La Nouvelle Revue, 119, No. 476 (1932), 220-225. This is a review of Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion by Henri Bergson.


Review of Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion by Henri Bergson. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 39 No. 2 (1932), 1. This is a brief and laudatory notice, which announces that a more detailed review will appear in a later issue of the Revue. It appears in a "supplément" to the Revue.


1933


Flewelling, Ralph Tyler. "The Culmination of L'Évolution créatrice." Personalist, 14, No. 2 (1933), 134-136. This is a review of Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion by Henri Bergson. The reviewer concludes, "Personalists will hail this marked advance in Professor Bergson's thinking as definitely aligning them with the personalist position and to them Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion will seem to bring the culmination of his thought" (p. 136).


Mead, Hunter. The Relation of the Philosophy of William James to that of Henri Bergson, An Essay. University of Southern California, School of Philosophy, William James Prize Essay, 1933/34. This manuscript is in the Hoose Library of Philosophy, U.C.L.A.

Review of Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion by Henri Bergson. Sophia, 1, Nos. 3-4 (1933), 478-480.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Adventures of Ideas. New York: Macmillan, 1933, 392. The author describes the "dogmatic fallacy," and on p. 287 notes types of reactions against it. "Another type of reaction is to assume, often tacitly, that if there can be any intellectual analysis it must proceed according to some one discarded dogmatic method, and thence to deduce that intellect is intrinsically tied to erroneous fictions. This type is illustrated by the anti-intellectualism of Nietzsche and Bergson, and tinges American Pragmatism."

1934

Barrett, Clifford. Review of Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion by Henri Bergson. Philosophical
Review, 43, No. 3 (1934), 301-305. The reviewer notes with surprise Bergson's "deep indebtedness" to M. Lévy-Bruhl for anthropological data, and chides Bergson for failing--here, of all places--to make his concept of God intelligible. The reviewer concludes, "Yet one can not feel that the book, taken as a whole, is disappointing, but rather that it is not systematically complete" (p. 305).

Bovet, Pierre. Review of Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion by Henri Bergson. Archives de Psychologie, 24, No. 96 (1934), 378. The reviewer cites some Swiss anticipations of Bergson's Les Deux Sources, including an article he himself published in the Année psychologique in 1912 distinguishing between two inner experiences "correspondant aux deux idées de Bien et de Devoir" and describing factors capable of evoking the feeling of Duty independently of the impression of Good. The reviewer's article was followed by Jean Piaget's Le Jugement moral chez l'enfant, which might have been titled Les Deux Sources de la morale chez l'enfant. It is extremely interesting that for Piaget the admiration of the young for the hero generates a morality based on authority and social life opens up a moral progress with indefinite perspectives while for Bergson the opposite is the case: social pressure creates a static morality while the appeal of the hero creates a dynamic morality. "Aux analyses approfondies de demain à resoudre la contradiction apparente."

Corday, Michel. The Paris Front: An Unpublished Diary: 1914-1918. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1934, 395. An entry for April 12, 1916, states, "----C---- has tried to persuade the philosopher Bergson to write a letter to Balfour suggesting that the present Allies should at once form a confederation to come into force when peace is declared. Bergson seemed attracted by the idea" (p. 158).


Ellwood, Charles A. A Review of Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion by Henri Bergson. American Journal of Sociology, 39, No. 4 (1934), 540. This is a very brief
review. The author concludes, "it is a masterly summing up of the social philosophy of religion which has been gradually taking shape in the minds of psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists . . . " (p. 540).

Jung, Carl Gustav. "The Meaning of Psychology for Modern Man." Collected Works, 10, 134-156. In this essay, written in 1934, the author likens his own concept of libido on p. 147 to Bergson's élan vital, Aristotle's horme, and Schopenhauer's "will." He adds skeptically that no concept seems capable of explaining what libido is like in itself.

1935


Jung, Carl Gustav. "The Tavistock Lectures (1935)." In C. G. Jung, Collected Works, 18, 1-264. On p. 121 of these lectures, Jung describes the "key god Aion" as an exemplification of Bergson's "durée créatrice."


1936

Forest, A. Review of La Pensée et le mouvant by Henri Bergson. Revue Thomiste, NS 19, No. 1 (1936), 272-274.


Mitchell, E. T. Review of La Pensée et le mouvant by Henri Bergson. Philosophical Review, 45, No. 1 (1936), 94-95. The reviewer concludes, "While this volume contains few ideas not already familiar to students of Bergson it does throw interesting sidelights on his fundamental theses and makes readily available practically all the journal articles of significance" (p. 95).

1937


Le Roy, Georges. "Le Dualisme cartésienne et la notion biranienne d'effort." Travaux de IX e Congres de Philosophie, Fasc. 9 (1937), 115-120.


Shotwell, James T. At the Paris Peace Conference. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 444. On pp. 221-222, the author states, "Friday, March 21, 1919. A repetition of the previous days. I have been acting as commissioner again. Continuation of discussion of the Labor Charter. Luncheon at the Maison Dufayel arranged by the French Government for some of our delegation, with Professor Bergson as the chief lion to meet. He recalled me when M. Monod, who had arranged the luncheon, jogged his memory, but I think his recollection was rather in the nature of an official duty than as an illustration of the 'reality of duration,' of which his philosophy makes so much. It
was quite a luncheon. There were some 20 or more there, including Beer, Haskins and Bowman, with Judge Mack, who had just arrived, Frankfurter, Melville Stone, head of the Associated Press, etc."


1938

Barnes, Harry Elmer and Howard Becker. Sociological Trends throughout the World. Vol. II of Social Thought from Lore to Science. New York: D. C. Heath and Co., 1938, 193-1178. The author describes the work of Charles Blondel on p. 847 as "a remarkable convergence of the influences of Bergson and Durkheim." On p. 862 he notes Daniel Essertier's Bergsonian criticisms of Durkheim in Psychologie et sociologie. On p. 885 he notes a similarity between Bergson's vitalism and that of Wilhelm Dilthey. On p. 947 he notes Bergson's influence on the Swedish philosopher and political leader Gustaf F. Steffen (1864-1929), "Because of the influence of Bergson's philosophy, Steffen rejects the idea that sociology is a natural science, maintaining that it must be based on a sort of intuitive insight that will render possible the understanding of the social actions of others."


Gladen, Karl. "Kommentär des Lachens: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Bergson über das Problem der Komik." Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft, 51, No. 4 (1938), 393-413. This is an exposition and criticism of Bergson's theory of laughter.

Schiller, Paul. "A Configurational Theory of Puzzles and Jokes." Journal of General Psychology, 18, No. 2 (1938), 217-234. The author develops a theory of jokes and of puzzles by stressing their similarities, and showing how both relate to the Gestalt phenomenon of configuration. On pp. 229-231 he criticizes Bergson's theory of laughter. Enjoying a joke, the author holds, is like solving a "puzzle: this joy of reasoning gives rise to laughter as it usually arises through sudden relief from embarrassment. The same joy of reasoning occurs if solving a puzzle" (p. 233).

1939


Maritain, Jacques. Quatre Essais sur l'esprit dans sa condition charnelle. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1939, 267. On pp. 31-32 the author urges that Freud's theory of neurosis is the therapeutic refutation of Bergson's theory that habit is to be limited to the physical organism alone. Freud shows us that the mind itself can be invaded by habit and automatism.

"À Monsieur Henri Bergson." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 46, No. 4 (1939), 557-558.


1940

Bonaparte, Marie. "Time and the Unconscious." International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 21, No. 4 (1940), 427-468. The author objects to the Freudian notion that the unconscious mind subsists unchanged by the passage of time, as well as to the idea that space and time are mere forms of human perception. Various references to Henri Bergson and to Pierre Janet are found in this article.

Crottwell, C.R.M.F. A History of the Great War, 1914-1918. 2nd ed. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940, 655. The author states, "In the years immediately preceding the war, however, the generation which knew not 1870 was soaked in the doctrine of immediate and brutal offensive, the efficacy of which was preached with almost mythical fervor. It appears to have been partly inspired by the Philosophy of Bergson, then so popular in France, of which the effect was to exalt instinct and intuition above the intellectual process of reasoning. It was also supported by the more material and solid consideration that the French field gun, the famous '75,' was greatly superior both in rapidity and accuracy of fire to anything the Germans could produce" (p. 10).


1941


Dooley, Lucille. "The Concept of Time in Defense of Ego Integrity." Psychiatry, 4, No. 1 (1941), 13-23. The author footnotes Bergson and Alexis Carrel, and studies the ego's use of "time" as a defense mechanism, i.e., a means by which the ego maintains its own integrity. Case histories in which this defense is misused are presented. The author fails to distinguish clearly between duration and clock-time.

Hocking, William E. "Whitehead on Mind and Nature." In The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. The Library of


Northrop. F.S.C. "Whitehead's Philosophy of Science." The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. The Library of Living Philosophers, No. 3. Ed. Paul A. Schilpp. Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1941, 167-207. The author holds that Whitehead's philosophy of science has been produced by three factors: (1) Bergson's emphasis upon the all-sufficiency of immediate intuition and the primacy of process, (2) the epistemological difficulties into which the scientist's bifurcation of nature led modern philosophers, and (3) the reconstruction in the fundamental concepts of contemporary science made necessary especially by Einsteinian relativity.

to Bergson or to Bergson's philosophy of language occur on pp. 312, 313, 319-320, and 321-322.

1942


1943

Huxley, Julian. Evolution: The Modern Synthesis. New York and London: Harper & Bros., 1943, 645. This is an important restatement, and presumed validation, of the principles of neo-Darwinism. On p. 28 the author states, "it is with this reborn Darwinism, this mutated phoenix risen from the ashes of the pyre kindled by men so unlike as Bateson and Bergson, that I propose to deal in succeeding chapters of this book." On pp. 457-458 he remarks, "How has adaptation been brought about? Modern science must rule out special creation or divine guidance. It cannot well avoid frowning upon entelechies and purposive vital urges. Bergson's élan vital can serve as a symbolic description of the thrust of life during its evolution but not as a scientific explanation. To read L'Évolution Créatrice is to realize that Bergson was a writer of great vision but with little biological understanding, a good poet but a bad scientist. To say that an adaptive trend towards a particular specialization or towards all-round biological efficiency is explained by an élan vital is like saying that the movement of a railway train is explained by the élan locomotif of the engine." On pp. 474-475 the author uses R. A. Fisher's dictum that natural selection is a mechanism for generating a high degree of improbability to demonstrate the inevitability of the formation of the human eye starting with the pigment-spot of one-celled creatures, including the case of the convergent evolution of the eye in man and the cephalopods. He refers to J.B.S. Haldane, The Causes of Evolution, (London, 1932), on this point.

Kubitz, O. A. "Eduardo Nicol's Situational Psychology." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3, No. 3 (1943), 303-312. The author notes on pp. 305-306 passages in Nicol's Psicología de las situaciones vitales (pp. 22-56) in which Nicol criticizes Bergson's concept of the self. The author summarizes Nicol's views as follows: "Bergson was right in regarding the self as temporal, but wrong in maintaining the dualism of perceptual and intellectual
functions. If it is admitted that intellectual and perceptual functions are never distinct, it is possible to find temporal and spatial characters, memory, and spirit all cooperating in an immediate present experience . . ." (p. 306).

1944


Keleher, James F. "The Search for the Intelligible Good." Thomist, 7, No. 4 (1944), 492-504. On p. 501 the author briefly discounts "Bergsonian vitalism" as being unable to distinguish living things from non-living.


1945

Benda, Julien. La France Byzantine; ou, le triomphe de la littérature pure, Mallarmé, Gide, Valéry, Alain, Giraudoux, Suarès, les surréalistes: Essai d'une psychologie originelle du littérature. Paris: Gallimard, 1945, 291. The author cites Marcel Proust several times as a disciple of Bergson. Proust, Bergson and many others from Mallarmé to Sartre are roundly criticized here for their failure to adhere to Cartesian rationalism.

Bertocci, Peter A. "A Reinterpretation of Moral Obligation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 6, No. 2 (1945), 270-283. On pp. 280-281 the author rejects Bergson's view that the experience of moral obligation is derived from social pressure.

1946


1947


Havet, Jacques. Kant et le problème du temps. La Jeune Philosophie, No. 4. 2nd ed. Paris: Gallimard, 1947, 230. For references to Bergson, see especially Chapter 4, "Le Temps et l'expérience interne."

Johnson, Allison H. "A. N. Whitehead's Theory of Intuition." Journal of General Psychology, 37, No. 1 (1947), 61-66. The author deals on pp. 63-64 with the distinction between Whitehead's and Bergson's concepts of intuition. Whitehead's intuition, the author states, is not to be distinguished from intelligence, and it is applied to both the physical and the vital. Moreover, Bergson seems to disregard the factor of "subjective form."


Moulyn, Adrian C. "Mechanism and Mental Phenomena." Philosophy of Science, 14, No. 3 (1947), 242-253. On p. 246 the author states, "According to Henri Bergson, the difference in time relationship between direct contact
stimuli and response, and between visual and auditory
stimuli and response, allows the animal time for the new
function of choice. He points out that where an amoeba
is determined by the stimuli which affect its surface, higher animals become 'centers of non-determination' as
the distance increases between the object which causes
the stimulus and the body of the animal. This means
that a new factor, different from pure mechanisms has
been introduced. It transpires then that conditioned
reflexes are very complicated reflex chains with an addi­tional factor superimposed. The central problem of the
discussion is how to analyze the undefined psychological
factor, which makes the conditioned reflex so different
from a purely mechanical reflex." The author takes as
his examples a "pure reflex"--eye closure after direct
contact of non-visible object with cornea--and a "con­ditioned reflex"--eye closure before corneal contact with
large visible object. The difference between the two
cases lies in the apparent fact that the conditioned
reflexes have a protensive, future-oriented character
which "simple" reflexes lack. He discusses the "basic
mental triad" as the psychic factor in the conditioned
reflex. Memory plays an important part in this triad.

Muller, Maurice. De Descartes à Marcel Proust: Essais sur la
théorie des essences, le positivisme et les méthodes
dialectique et reflexive. Neuchâtel: Editions de la
Baconnière, 1947, 161. The author states on p. 56,
"L'influence de Bergson sur Proust est une influence
diffuse, quoique tant de résultats obtenus par Proust
dans sa recherche du Temps perdu sont comparables (et,
peut-on dire, analogues) aux thèmes bergsoniens. C'est
probablement grâce à Bergson que Proust s'est dégagé
d'une psychologie conceptuelle où la trop grande
rigidité des notions laisse échapper la réalité mouvant
du moi."

Tindall, William York. Forces in Modern British Literature,
Bergson is discussed in this study of recent British
literature on pp. 105, 106, 108, 109, 192, 264, 284-285,
300, 304n, 305, 307, and 316. "Classicist" objections
to Bergson and his followers (for example, by Wyndham
Bergson's influence on George Bernard Shaw is noted on
pp. 192-193. Bergson's influence on T. E. Hulme and
British "imagism" is explained briefly on p. 264. Berg­
son's influence on the stream of consciousness novel is
briefly touched on in pp. 284-285. Virginia Woolf's
novels are said by the author to be more representative of the ideal of William James and Henri Bergson than those of James Joyce (p. 300); "Bergson's disciple Proust" is said to have influenced Woolf's later writing (p. 304n); that Woolf had not read Bergson but was familiar with him through the Bloomsbury group is asserted (p. 305). The author's section on the unconscious (Chapter 10) fails to mention Bergson.

1948


Eliot, Thomas Stearns. Sermon Preached in Magdalene College Chapel, 7 March 1948. Cambridge, 1948, 7. Here Eliot asserts that his "only conversion, by the deliberate influence of any individual, was a temporary conversion to Bergsonism" (p. 5).


1949


1950

is discussed on pp. 26-31, and 78-89; his concept of instinct on pp. 92-93; his biological theories on pp. 104-107; and his critique of relativity theory on pp. 172-175.


Fisher, Ronald A. Creative Aspects of Natural Law. The Fourth Arthur Stanley Eddington Memorial Lecture. Cambridge: The University Press, 1950, 23. The author, one of the founders of recent evolutionary theory, argues that philosophers such as Henri Bergson, Jan Christian Smuts, and Alfred North Whitehead have been correct to stress the creative character of evolution. Creative causality is inextricably linked with indeterminism, which is a fundamental feature of 20th century physics. "Bergson's title L'Évolution créatrice was therefore well justified, and well in advance of his time. The biological thought of his age was impeded and constricted by the assumption of completely deterministic causation; the so-called 'Mutation theory,' as a contribution to evolutionary thought, seems to me to be typical of the relative sterility of the epoch. Bergson, with striking originality, broke away from this assumption" (pp. 6-7). Bergson's error lay in his failure to distinguish clearly between determinism and mechanism, and his consequent introduction of the elan vital, a spiritual being whose mode of operation is "magical" (p. 10).


1951


author asserts that the "point of closest affinity" of Whitehead and Bergson lies in their acceptance of "the direction of creative advance as the time-dimension." See also pp. 743-744.


Seaman, Francis Chester. "The Impact of the Theory of Relativity on Some Recent Philosophers." Diss. Michigan 1951, 204. This dissertation considers the impact of relativity theory on four philosophers: Ernest Cassirer, Samuel Alexander, Henri Bergson, and Alfred North Whitehead. The author's abstract concludes, "Henri Bergson's philosophy was developed before relativity. In it there was an elegant symmetry between the self and the universe; a symmetry which was one recommendation of his scheme. But relativity theory with its alternative time systems disrupted this symmetry. Bergson never adequately reworked his system . . . . Whitehead's later philosophy, as expressed in Process and Reality, envisions the universe as composed of atomic actualities in process. Whitehead argues that relativity confirms that the real is atomic rather than one large continuous process. This provides a cue as to the resolution of Bergson's difficulty. By putting his 'vital' inside events, both the self and the universe can be conceived as growing by finite increments. Thus, through Whitehead, a resolution of Bergson's problem is achieved." (See Dissertation Abstracts, 11, No. 1 (1951), 387.)

1952


Mouly, Adrian C. "The Functions of Point and Line in Time Measuring Operations." Philosophy of Science, 19, No. 2 (1952), 141-155. The author analyzes the part played by the concepts of solids, planes, lines, and points in the
measurement of time. In the series solid, plane, line, and point there is "an ever increasing abstraction from and limitation of movement" as we move from solid to geometrical point (p. 142). This can be observed in the cases of both sight and touch. There is nevertheless a profound logical gap between the concept of the line and that of the point: "The concept 'straight line' must need include temporal facets because movement is a factor within the concept of straightness. But the definition of the geometric point excludes any temporal qualities because movement is excluded from the geometric point" (p. 144). The author then analyzes concepts of space measurement and time measurement, concluding that both the line and the point (including the instant) are required by time-measurement, which also requires a subjective temporal experience. The notions of temporal interval and temporal instant are derived, the author insists, from the "precious present" of subjective time.

"Reflections on the Problem of Time in Relation to Neurophysiology and Psychology." Philosophy of Science, 19, No. 1 (1952), 33-49. This paper is a sequel to the author's "Mechanism and Mental Phenomena," which appeared in 1947 in the same journal. In the present article the author analyzes in depth the "mental triad" posited in the earlier article to account for the non-physical element in conditioned reflexes. The "triad" in question is the threefold structure of temporality: past, present and future. The author analyzes "movement" as investigated by physics and biology. In physics, motion is derived from the past; in biology, it refers to the future. Physics thus deals with causality; biology with foresight, i.e., purpose. The essential difference here is provided by the fact that physics need not deal with "inner time" but the biological sciences must. The author footnotes both Bergson's Éssai and Matière et mémoire.

1953


Schilder, Paul. *Medical Psychology*. Trans. David Rapaport. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1953, 428. This book appeared originally, in German, in 1923. Its seventh section, "Affect and Experience," is excluded by the translator. The author refers to Bergson on pp. 31, 141, 144, 158, 159, 162, 309, 324, and 361. On p. 141, he notes, against Bergson's concept of memory, that sensory and motor phenomena are to a certain extent independent of each other; on pp. 144-145 he states that the functional theory of aphasia and agnosia is securely founded, and cites Bergson's proof that no images are destroyed by these maladies; on p. 159 he cites a mind-brain theory similar to Bergson's; on pp. 162-163 he illustrates Bergson's distinction between pure remembering and remembering which serves a specific purpose; on p. 361 he lists Bergson's essay on false recognition, *Time and Free Will*, *Creative Evolution*, and *Matter and Memory* as part of his bibliography.


Myers, Frederic William Henry. Human Personality, and its Survival of Bodily Death. Vol. I. New York, London, Toronto: Longmans, Green & Co., 1954, 477-479. This is a response to, and in part a criticism of, Bergson's article in the Revue philosophique (November, 1886) concerning a supposed case of clairvoyance. The clairvoyant in question turned out, Bergson discovered, to be capable of reading letters reflected on the cornea of his hypnotizer. The clairvoyant (a young boy) was unaware of this capacity, thus providing an instance of "simulation inconscient." Myers congratulates Bergson for his insights into this case, but points out that other facts alleged by Bergson may appear difficult to believe: "Well, M. Bergson says that he showed the boy a microscopic photograph of twelve men, its longest diameter 2 mm., and that the boy saw and imitated the attitude of each man. Also that he showed the boy a microscopic preparation, involving cells not greater than .06 mm. in diameter and the boy saw and drew these cells" (p. 478). These magnitudes do seem too small for the naked eye. But, Myers speculates, perhaps under hypnosis a muscular spasm can change the shape of the eye, turning it into a sort of "microscope." Myers had discussed Bergson's criticisms of this supposed case of clairvoyance at greater length in the January, 1887, issue of Mind. He mentions an exchange of letters between Bergson and himself. (Myers' book was first published in 1902.)

Read, Herbert. "Art and the Evolution of Consciousness." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 13, No. 2 (1954), 143-155. The author rejects the view, implicit in many modern biological evolutionary theories, that art is a late and unessential evolutionary development. He refers
(p. 10n) to Bergson's treatment of the biological function of consciousness in the Huxley Memorial Lecture, "Life and Consciousness," given in 1911. The author confesses himself to be "an unregenerate Bergsonian" on the question of whether art is an offspring of magic, religion, science, philosophy. To the contrary he holds that art is "the mainspring, the mental faculty without which none of these other graces of mankind would have had a chance of coming into existence . . ." (p. 151). He uses Bergson's "synoptic" views and those of Lancelot Law Whyte to defend the biological centrality of the artist's perceptions.


1955


Durkheim, Émile. Pragmatisme et sociologie: Cours inédit prononcé à la Sorbonne en 1913-1914 et restitué par Armand Cuvillier d'après des notes d'étudiants. Préface Armand Cuvillier. Paris: Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1955, 211. On pp. 41-42 the author notes that Henri Bergson and Henri Poincaré have been described by William James as pragmatists. The author, however, is skeptical concerning such claims. On p. 71, while criticizing the pragmatic critique of intellectualism, the author notes that William James derived some of his best arguments against the intellect from Bergson. On p. 74 the author asserts James' indebtedness to Bergson for the arguments of Chapter VI of A Pluralistic Universe. On pp. 74-81 he examines these arguments and discounts them as having any effect against a rationalism which accepts, and does not try to rule out, change. On pp. 106-107 the author notes the similarity between James' idea of the "concept" and Bergson's concept of the "dynamic schema." On p. 189 the author examines the pragmatist's claim that the true and the real are "heterogenous." He considers that in doing so he will also be
examining the objections which pragmatism has, at this point, borrowed from Bergson. This examination is carried out on pp. 190-197. There are some fascinating comparisons here of Bergson's concept of élan vital in biology and Durkheim's notion of social development from primitive to more sophisticated societies. The author concludes, "Ajoutons que la vérité, en même temps que chose sociale et humaine, est aussi chose vivante" (p. 196).


"À la recherche de l'esthétique à travers les oeuvres de Bergson, Proust, Malraux." Arts, No. 509 (1955), 3. This is a review of Les Oeuvres et les lumieres: A la recherche de l'esthetique . . . by Andre and Jean Brincourt.


Whitehead, Alfred North. The Concept of Nature: Tarner Lectures Delivered in Trinity College, November 1919. Cambridge: The University Press, 1955, 202. This is the fourth impression of the first edition of this work, originally published in 1920. On p. 54 the author states, "The process of nature can also be termed the passage of nature. I definitely refrain at this stage from using the word 'time,' since the measurable time of science and civilized life generally merely exhibits some aspects of the fundamental fact of the passage of nature. I believe that in this doctrine I am in full accord with Bergson, though he uses 'time' for the fundamental fact which I call the 'passage of nature.' Also the passage of nature is exhibited equally in spatial transition as
well as in temporal transition." The author uses the term "duration" on pp. 37, 53, 55, and 186. On pp. 59, 73, and 190 he uses the phrase "families of durations."

1956

Chaix-Ruy, Jules. "Bergson et ses critiques italiens." 
Etudes Bergsoniennes, 4 (1956), 205-266. This article contains a bibliography, on pp. 225-226, of Italian works on Bergson.


Frye, Robert Edward. "Pragmatism in Recent Non-Pragmatic Systems: Santayana, Bergson, Whitehead." Diss. Indiana 1956, 168. While Santayana, Bergson, and Whitehead each recognize that the mind has a pragmatic function, each, the author states, takes a different view of its limitations. Santayana criticizes pragmatism for failing to give an account of the mind's purely contemplative capacities. The author criticizes Santayana for failing to show the relevance of man's purely speculative capacities to action, which Santayana describes as being based on "animal faith" and needing no coherent world view. The author examines Bergson's critique of reason, concluding that while Bergson attempts to safeguard speculation by showing reason's pragmatic bias, he ends by rendering intuition—and creativity—entirely blind. He can not account for the discipline of reason in his own work. Whitehead is able, by contrast, to show that speculative reason is both transcendent and orderly, and that intuition is a form of reason. Whitehead's extension of pragmatic doctrines allows him to accept Bergson's appeal to experience without negating the claims of reason. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 17, Nos. 1-4 (1957), 377.)


Hamilton, G. H. "Cezanne, Bergson and the Image of Time."

---------. "Lettres et entretiens de Bergson." Études Bergsoniennes, 4 (1956), 233-239.

---------. "Note pour une bibliographie bergsonienne." Études Bergsoniennes, 4 (1956), 243-254.


Russell, Bertrand. Portraits from Memory and Other Essays. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956, 247. Russell says of Whitehead, "He had always had a leaning toward Kant, of whom I thought ill, and when he began to develop his own philosophy he was considerably influenced by Bergson" (pp. 100-101). "It used to be the custom among clever people to say that Shaw was not unusually vain, but only unusually candid. I came to think later that this was a mistake. Two incidents at which I was present convinced me of this. The first was a luncheon in London in honor of Bergson, to which Shaw had been invited as an admirer, along with a number of professional philosophers whose attitude to Bergson was more critical. Shaw set to work to expound Bergson's philosophy in the style of the preface to Methusela. In this version, the philosophy was hardly one to recommend itself to professionals, and Bergson mildly interjected, 'Ah, no-o! It is not quite zat!' But Shaw was quite unabashed, and replied, 'Oh, my dear fellow, I understand your philosophy much better than you do.' Bergson clenched his fists and nearly exploded with rage; but with a great effort, he controlled himself, and Shaw's expository monologue continued" (p. 78). "Butler's influence on Shaw was much greater than most people realized. It was from him that Shaw acquired his antipathy to Darwin, which afterward made him an admirer of Bergson" (p. 79).
Tissier, A. "Il y a 10 dans mourait Bergson." France-Asie, 12, No. 117 (1956), 647-676.

1957


Kumar, Shiv K. "Space-Time Polarity in Finnegans Wake." Modern Philology, 54, No. 4 (1957), 230-233. The author asserts on p. 230 that "in the work of James Joyce, as in the entire thought of Bergson, space and time are presented as contraries, with durational flux as the only true reality." The author denies, however, that Joyce is consciously influenced by Bergson.


Moulyn, Adrian C. Structure, Function and Purpose: An Inquiry into the Concepts and Methods of Biology from the Viewpoint of Time. Pref. Yervant H. Krikorian. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957, 198. The author states, Biology in the wider sense needs a dynamic time concept like the precious present" (p. 117). Only man and some higher organisms share in this dynamic present, however, and even then a dualistic viewpoint is required. "By placing the time problem plumb in the middle of the discussion, one is forced to adopt a dualistic conception of living organisms and to develop two opposite approaches
toward them. The split between these two conceptions and approaches flows ultimately from the chasm: objective time versus subjective time. Vital phenomena which exist in objective time are observed extraspectively, they consist of causally-related elements, juxtaposed and exterior to each other. Vital phenomena which exist in subjective time are observed introspectively, they consist of teleologically-related components, inter-penetrating each other" (p. 163).

Review of Bergson éducateur by Rose-Marie Mossé-Bastide. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, 49, Nos. 5-6 (1957), 559-561.

Wagner, Geoffrey. "Wyndham Lewis and James Joyce: A Study in Controversy." South Atlantic Quarterly, 56, No. 1 (1957), 57-66. This is a study of the critic Wyndham Lewis and his indictment of James Joyce's presumably Bergsonian and Einsteinian views in Time and Western Man, The Childremass, and elsewhere. The author claims that after all [after all the endless controversy] Joyce was not Bergsonian.


1958


Hughes, Henry Stuart. Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1958, 433. "Bergson and the Uses of Intuition" are discussed on pp. 113-125; Bergson and Jung are discussed on 153 and 156; Bergson and Sorel are discussed on pp. 163-164, 176, 177, 180;
Bergson and the German mentality are discussed on 188; Bergson and Dilthey are discussed on p. 197; Bergson and Croce are discussed on pp. 201, 226-227; Bergson and Troeltsch on pp. 239-240; Bergson and Pareto on p. 263; Bergson and Durkheim on pp. 279, 280; Bergson and the youth of France on p. 341; Bergson and Peguy on pp. 345-346, 350, 351-352; Proust and Bergson on pp. 385-388; Bergson's later years on p. 394; Bergson and existentialism on p. 396; Bergson and war on pp. 415, 418.

Vandel, Albert. L'Homme et l'évolution. L'Avenir de la science, No. 28. 13th ed. Paris: Gallimard, 1958, 311. The author develops views of the nature of evolution which at many points paralleled those of Bergson. On pp. 21-22, he stresses Bergson's claim that change is "the law of nature;" on p. 47 he notes Bergson as the first to stress the manner in which the great phyla of the animal kingdom evolve through "dichotomy" (splitting); on pp. 70-71 he states the irreversibility of evolution as a fundamental biological law; on pp. 96-97 he describes the development of the nervous system and consciousness as the fundamental tendencies of animal evolution; on pp. 100-101 he quotes Bergson (and Teilhard) on the reality of biological time; on pp. 122-123 he defends Bergson's biology against the criticisms of Julian Huxley. See also pp. 107, 113, 124, 164-165, and 254.

1959


Collins, James. "Darwin's Impact on Philosophy." Thought, 34, No. 133 (1959), 185-248. Section 4 of this article (pp. 220-224) is titled "Bergson and the Methodology of Evolutionism." Bergson's view, the author states, "remains closer to the biologist's approach to nature and to the actual shifts in evolutionary theories, without surrendering the human significance of the genesis of life" (p. 220).


Groot, H. Review of Henri Bergson by Günther Pflug. Mens en Kosmos, 15, No. 6 (1959), 283-284. This is a brief, critical review.

---------. "Van de redactie." Mens en Kosmos, 15, No. 6 (1959), 249-251. This is an editorial comment on the accompanying Bergson number of Mens en Kosmos. It includes a general assessment of Bergson's epoch and his contemporary significance.


Lovejoy, Arthur Oncken. "Schopenhauer as an Evolutionist." In *Forerunners of Darwin*. Ed. Bentley Glass, Owsei Temkin, and William L. Straus. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, 415-437. The author argues that Schopenhauer did not, at the beginning of his philosophical activity, "put an evolutionistic construction on the conception of the will . . . ." (p. 418). Such a view of the will increasingly forced itself on him, however. Bergson's criticisms of Spencer's concept of evolution are noted on p. 433. Schopenhauer is treated as a precursor of Bergson on pp. 435-437. The author states, "there can be no doubt that in Schopenhauer we find the first emphatic affirmation of the three conceptions most characteristic of the biological philosophy of *L'Évolution créatrice*" (p. 436). These three conceptions are (1) the repeated production of absolute novelties, (2) the criticism of finalism, and (3) the concept of "blind purpose." (This article was first published in *The Monist*, 21 (1911).)


influence on the "Young Intellectuals" of New York is mentioned by the author on pp. 302-303. The influence of French syndicalism on American socialists is noted on pp. 304-305. Bergson's influence on Walter Lippman is noted on pp. 319-320. Bergson's influence in America is explored on pp. 228-230. The author states, "When Bergson finally came to America to lecture at Columbia in February 1913, a line of automobiles (still the vehicles of the well-to-do) clogged Broadway, one lady fainted in the crush at the lecture-room door, and regular students were crowded out of their seats by well-dressed auditors. According to Slosson, Bergson's American publisher sold in two years half as many copies of Creative Evolution as had been sold in France in fifteen years (7), and the presses poured out a flood of semipopular explanations" (p. 228). (Footnote 7 refers to Slosson's Major Prophets of Today, p. 14.)


Prins, D. H. Review of Bergson, \textit{Philosopher of Reflection} by Ian Alexander. \textit{Mens en Kosmos}, 15, No. 6 (1959), 284. This is a brief, descriptive review.


Zephir, Jacques J. La Personnalité humaine dans l'oeuvre de Marcel Proust: Essai de psychologie littéraire. Paris: Lettres Modernes, 1959, 331. There are many references to Bergson in this work, which likens Bergson's psychology to that of Marcel Proust.

1960


Core, Nicholas. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: His Life and Spirit. New York: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960. The author quotes Chardin as stating, "I remember clearly having read Creative Evolution with avidity at this time. But although I didn't very well understand at this period what exactly Bergson's Durée meant—and in any case it was not sufficiently convergent to satisfy me—I can see clearly that the effect of these passionate pages on me was merely, at the right moment and in a flash, to stir up a fire that was already burning in my heart and mind" (p. 10). The "time" referred to is 1912. This is one of the few remarks of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin concerning Bergson.


129; his theory of intuition is discussed on pp. 43-45, 63; Bergson's first meeting with Hulme on p. 57; Russell's attack on Bergson on pp. 58, 62-64; Bergson's influence on Hulme on pp. 58-61; Bergson at the Bologna Congress on pp. 81-84; Bergson's lectures in England on p. 86; Bergson's popularity in England on pp. 86-87; Hulme's personal impression of on pp. 205-208. Chapter Four, titled "Bergson" is found on pp. 57-67. In it the author explores Bergson's influence on Hulme.


Meland, Bernard Eugene. "From Darwin to Whitehead: A Study in the Shift in Ethos and Perspective Underlying Religious Thought." Journal of Religion, 40, No. 4 (1960), 229-245. On pp. 234-237 the author discusses the function of Bergson (and also of William James) in transforming 19th century mechanistic categories, and the relationships between this transformation and recent theological concepts. He suggests ways in which Bergson's and Whitehead's categories complement and correct each other, as well as a significant reinterpretation of Bergson's élan vital.


Virtanen, Reino. *Claude Bernard and his Place in the History of Ideas*. London: University of Nebraska Press, 1960, 156. The author refers to Bergson on pp. 1, 13, 63, 84, 97, 101, 110-112, 113-114, 116, 130-131, and 132. He concedes Claude Bernard's influence on Bergson but states, "It is striking to find Bernard's imprint on a philosophy as remote from his characteristic rationalist and determinist position as is the intuitionism of Bergson" (p. 110). Bernard's concept of the internal environment (milieu intérieur) is found in Bergson's *Creative Evolution*.

1961


Jones, Ernest. *Years of Maturity*. Vol. II of *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1961, 512. "As early as 1909 Jung was complaining to Freud about his difficulty in explaining to his pupils the concept of libido and begged him for a fuller definition. Freud tersely replied that he could give no clearer one than he had already. Only two years later Jung equated the concept with Bergson's elan vital, with life energy in general, and thus robbed it of its distinctive sexual connotation" (p. 283).


Yamamoto, Seisaku. "The Philosophy of Pure Experience." Diss. Emory 1961, 178. The author attempts to account for "pure experience" by examining and criticizing such philosophers as W. James, A. N. Whitehead, H. Bergson, and M. Heidegger. He explains what is meant by "pure experience" and analyzes it. He draws attention to basic epistemological problems involved in this notion. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 23, Nos. 10-12 (1961), 4385.)

1962


Church, Margaret. Time and Reality: Studies in Contemporary Fiction. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962, vi, 302. There are innumerable references in this book to Henri Bergson. The first chapter of this work (pp. 3-20) deals with the ideas of Bergson and Marcel Proust, and, secondarily, with Bergson's influence.
on Proust. Bergson's influence on James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* is suggested on pp. 63-65; his influence on Virginia Woolf is discussed briefly on pp. 69 and 98-99; his rejection by Aldous Huxley is noted on pp. 105 and 112; his relationship to William Faulkner is examined on pp. 228-230; his relations to Jean-Paul Sartre are examined on pp. 254-256.

Doubrovsky, Serge. "The Ethics of Albert Camus." In *Camus: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Ed. Germaine Bree. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962, 182, (71-84). "It is perhaps worth recalling here young Camus's vivid interest in Plotinus. His experience is the very opposite of Sartre's nausea . . . in Camus we detect a Bergsonism but without teleology. Though life, in Camus' work no longer moves in an ascending and reassuring direction, it still has impetus; though it has lost its finality it has preserved, so to speak, its vitality" (p. 74).


and Whitehead are alike, he states, in their (1) emphasis on continuous process, (2) denial of an underlying ego, (3) emphasis on the "impact" of the past and "tendency" towards the future, (4) emphasis on self-creation, (5) denial that extension is a "self-existent character of reality," (6) conception of God as having dynamic characteristics. Whitehead differs from Bergson, however, in (1) his denial that spatialization is an inescapable vice of the human intellect, (2) his insistence that spatialization is a real factor in the constitution of actual occasions, (3) his denial that instinct and intelligence constitute a fundamental dichotomy, (4) his view of evolution as lacking a fundamental overall impetus, (5) his denial of any fundamental distinction between life and matter. The author concludes, "Whitehead does seem to err in contending that Bergson's intuition is like his 'physical purpose'" (p. 135). Physical purpose involves conceptual prehension; Bergson's intuition, at least on one of its interpretations, involves no conceptual factor.


Meissner, W. W. "The Problem of Psychophysics: Bergson's Critique." Journal of General Psychology, 66, No. 2 (1962), 301-309. The author examines Bergson's critique of psychophysics in Time and Free Will, and on pp. 308-309 suggests its relevance to recent psychophysics: "Rather, it seems to me, the whole force of Bergson's critique ought to be felt in the posing of an honest question: Precisely what is the relation between the qualitative and quantitative aspects of physical measurement and what are the evidences which can be brought to bear in the examination of that relation?"


Thornhill, John. "The Philosophical Assumptions, Implicit and Explicit, of Arnold J. Toynbee's Philosophy of History." Thomist, 25, No. 2 (1962), 201-251. The author holds that Toynbee was influenced by Bergson's philosophy in developing his basic concepts of history. The author nonetheless claims that Toynbee's philosophy is independent of Bergson's.

Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa. Phenomenology and Science in Contemporary European Thought. Pref. I. M. Bochenski. New York: Noonday Press, 1962, 198. The author notes the similarities between Bergson's and Husserl's concepts of time (p. 106); she notes Bergson's influence on phenomenological anthropology (p. 136); on pp. 139-159 she notes Bergson's influence on Eugène Minkowski, and examines Minkowski's concepts of psychopathology; she notes Bergson's theory of dreams (p. 158).

Voronov, Albert Ivanovich. ИНТУИТИВНАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ БЕРГСОНА. Няз-во "Знание," 1962, 47. The title of this work is Bergson's Intuitive Philosophy.


1963

Barthélemy-Madaule, Madeleine. "Bergson adversaire de Kant: Étude critique de la conception bergsonienne du Kantisme suivi d'une bibliographie Kantienne." Diss. Paris 1963, 214. This is a "thèse complementaire."

---------. "Bergson et Teilhard de Chardin." Diss. Paris 1963. This is the author's "thèse principal."


Reck, Andrew J. "The Philosophy of A. O. Lovejoy (1873-1962)." Review of Metaphysics, 17, No. 4 (1963), 257-285. "The author argues that a coherent and closely reasoned philosophical position which he identifies as a temporalistic realism can be discerned in Lovejoy's works. In this expository essay, he first examines Lovejoy's temporalism, considered both as a method and as a metaphysics, and discusses Lovejoy's position in relation to currents of past and contemporary thought (pragmatism, Bergsonism, and relativity). He then considers the relationship between Lovejoy's temporalism and his critical realism, and examines his views on epistemological and psycho-physical dualism. Finally, the author discusses Lovejoy's method in intellectual history as the logical complement of his temporalistic realism." The Philosopher's Index: A Retrospective Index to U. S. Publications from 1940. Vol. iii, p. 1505.


Bergson in 1911 is discussed on p. 319; his article on Bergson's philosophy is discussed on pp. 322-323. Other references to Bergson may be found on pp. 328, 330, 456, 457, and 458.

1964


Čapek, Milič. "Simple Location and Fragmentation of Reality." Monist, 48, No. 2 (1964), 195-218. "Whitehead's criticism of the fallacy of simple location in space and time is nothing but another name for the rejection of the doctrine of external relations, i.e., fragmentation of reality into mutually external units. Long before Whitehead's criticism the reaction against the atomization of reality took place in psychology under the name of Gestalt Theory; even before that some outstanding physicists, such as Faraday and Maxwell, pointed out that the concept of isolated particle is a result of artificial abstraction since, as Mach later pointed out, 'to neglect the rest of the universe is impossible.' However, Whitehead went too far in holding that 'everything is present everywhere;' this view would lead to another version of 'the block universe' and is contrary to the present empirical evidence." The Philosopher's Index: A Retrospective Index to U.S. Publications from 1940. Vol. III, p. 1229.


Denat, A. "Note sur Bergson, Teilhard et Camus." Synthèses, No. 216 (1964), 134-137.

Fleming, Rudd. Review of Time and Reality: Studies in Contemporary Fiction by Margaret Church. Modern Language
Journal, 48, No. 5 (1964), 315. The reviewer concludes, "Time and Reality is not without intellectual value, but one wishes the author had given herself a freer hand, had been less tolerant of cliches, and had made it easier to distinguish between her positions and those of the critics she so generously quotes and summarizes."

Grossman, Morris. "A Glimpse of Some Unpublished Santayana Manuscripts." Journal of Philosophy, 61, No. 1 (1964), 61-69. Comments on Bergson constitute, the author states, "the largest single corpus in the Columbia collection" (p. 64). "Hasty hostility and capsule refutation" were gradually transformed in Santayana's unpublished writings, the author holds, into the more measured and restrained statements in Winds of Doctrine.

Hawkins, David. The Language of Nature. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1964, 372. On pp. 222-224 the author examines Bergson's conception of time. On pp. 222-223 the author states, "The thermodynamic point of view is much more congenial to Bergsonian metaphor than is the conceptual framework of dynamics, particularly eighteenth-century dynamics (where many philosophers have stopped)." He notes the agreement of Reichenbach and Bergson concerning the unreality of the future.

Levi, Albert William. "Bergson or Whitehead?" In Process and Divinity. Ed. W. L. Reese and E. Freeman. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1964, 139-159. The author concludes that for Whitehead, the Platonist, the analysis of reality requires both actual entities and eternal objects. For Bergson, who uses biological concepts, it is sufficient that there is matter and life.

1965


Fieschi, Pascal. "Le Temps perdu est retrouvé." In Proust, Génies et réalités. Paris: Hachette, 1965, 243-273. The author concludes that Marcel Proust was an "unorthodox Bergsonian:" "Si la vision de Proust a des traits encontestablement bergsoniens, el s'en faut de beaucoup que Proust soit un bergsonien orthodoxe" (p. 244).

McMahon, C. Patrick. "The Concept of Matter in the Metaphysics of Bergson." Diss. Saint Louis 1965, 255. The author poses the following question: If matter, for Bergson, is the antithesis of duration, how can it function in his mature metaphysics of duration? The author describes Bergson's reformulation of his concept of matter in Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution. When matter is no longer the antithesis of duration, but rather its lowest degree, the problems of its inclusion in a metaphysics of duration and of its interaction with spirit can be resolved. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 26, Nos. 7-8 (1965), 4731-4732.)


"Now it is important to note that Bergson does not dismiss science and retreat into irrationalism. Rather one brings intuition to focus on the same experience that we symbolize and conceptualize within the language of science" (p. 297). The author notes the similarities between Bergson's philosophy and more recent writings by Michael Scriven and William Kneale.

1966


Fressin, Augustin. "La Perception chez Bergson et chez Merleau-Ponty." Diss. Paris 1966. This is a "thèse, 3é cycle."


Janicau, Dominique. "Ravaisson et Bergson." Diss. Paris 1966, iii, 372. This is a "thèse, 3e cycle."

Kümmel, Friedrich. "Time as Succession and the Problem of Duration." In The Voices of Time, ed. Julius Thomas Fraser. New York: George Braziller, 1966, 710. The author states that Bergson's attempt to understand duration in its vitality marked an advance in the philosophy of time. But, on pp. 46-49, he criticizes Bergson's concept of duration for its inability to deal with the reality of, and the relations between, the "three times:" past, present, and future.


Lecointe, Michel. "La Matière biblique dans la Note sur M. Bergson et la philosophie bergsonienne et la Note conjointe sur M. Descartes et la philosophie cartésienne." Diss. Aix-en-Provence 1966, 167. This is a "mémoire pour l'obtention du Diplôme d'études supérieures."

Maurois, André. "Il y a ving-cinq mourait Bergson." *Historia*, No. 230 (1966), 108-112. This is a general account of Bergson's influence on his generation and of his central philosophical conceptions. It includes an account of Bergson's death. (See Index Analytique, 1 (1966), A-0038.)


Sauvegeot, Aurelian. "Rappel et souvenir." Vie et Langage, No. 166 (1966), 39-40. This is a response to an article by Felicien Mars which appeared in the August 1965, number of Vie et Langage. The author reexamines Bergson's distinction between "se souvenir" and "se rappeler." (See Index Analytique, 1 (1966), A-0038.)

Zacks, Hanna. "Perception and Action in Henri Bergson and Allied Philosophers." Diss. Columbia 1966, 181. The author contends that Bergson's theory of knowledge has as its main objective to prove that science and metaphysics are both possible. In approaching this objective, however, Bergson vacillates between two opposing standpoints both in his metaphysics and his theory of perception. The author traces the roots of this inconsistency to basic ontological, epistemological and anthropological assumptions. He examines Bergson's theory of perception and contrasts it with the pragmatic account of perception, as well as with the theories of Stuart Hampshire and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 27, Nos. 1-4 (1966), 803A.)

1967


Il New Catholic


Goudge, T. A. "Bergson, Henri." The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ed. Paul Edwards. Vol. I. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 287-295. The author concludes, "Too often, it is said, rhapsodic formulations are offered where there ought to be sustained logical analysis. There is, for instance, no clear statement of how real duration, the flow of consciousness, and the vital impetus are related. Are these separate processes, or just distinguishable parts of one process? Does matter have an independent status, or is it simply a 'devitalized' form of the elan vital? Such questions are difficult, if not impossible, to answer. Many critics have also deplored the encouragement that Bergson's doctrine of the intellect gave to the advocates of irrationalism and the cruder versions of pragmatism. Yet when all these criticisms have been made, the Bergsonian heritage remains an important element in twentieth-century philosophy" (p. 294).


Mathieu, Vittorio. "Studi bergsoniani dal 1945 a oggi." Cultura e Scuola, 6, No. 23 (1967), 88-92. This is a bibliographic essay. It details literature in Italy devoted to Bergson from 1945 through 1966.


Rideau, Émile. "Actualité de Bergson." Études, No. 326 (1967), 638-651. "Influence actuelle de Bergson: (1) L'affirmation de la liberté contre les conditionnements intérieures et les déterminismes du monde; (2) L'affirmation de l' 'élán vital' évolutif et de la 'finalité' interne des organismes: question toujours posée à une biologie, tentée de reduire la Vie à des mécanismes matériels; (3) La reconnaissance du courant religieux axial de l'histoire, qui à travers Israel aboutit aux au Christ et aux mystiques chrétiens, et qui resurgit dans tous les revivals religieux; (4) L'invitation à accorder, pour le salut même de l'humanité, le travail sur le monde et les 'énergies spirituelles'." The Philosophers Index, 13, No. 1 (1979), 104.


Wellek, René. "French 'Classical' Criticism in the Twentieth Century." Yale French Studies, No. 38 (1967), 47-71. The author deals here with various criticisms of Bergson and Bergsonism by French neo-classicists. Among these critics are Pierre Laserre (p. 56), Henri Massis (p. 50), and Julien Benda (pp. 65-66). The attitudes of T. S. Eliot and T. E. Hulme towards Bergson are mentioned on pp. 69-70.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World: The Lowell Lectures, 1925. New York: The Free Press, 1967, 212. On pp. 51-52 the author states, "The simple location of instantaneous material configurations is what Bergson has protested against, so far as it concerns time and so far as it is taken to be the fundamental fact of concrete nature. He calls it a distortion of nature due to the intellectual 'spatialization' of things. I agree with Bergson in his protest: but I do not agree that such distortion is a vice necessary to the intellectual comprehension of nature. I shall in subsequent lectures endeavor to show that this spatialization is the expression of more concrete facts under the guise of very abstract logical constructions. There is an error; but it is merely the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete. It is an example of what I will call the 'Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness'." On pp. 147-148 the author describes Bergson as the most characteristic philosopher of his epoch, at least as concerns Bergson's relations to the science of his times: "Bergson introduced into philosophy the organic conceptions of physiological science. He has most completely moved away from the static materialism of the seventeenth century." The author notes that Bergson's protest against the spatialization of time is directed against taking Newtonian ideas as anything but abstractions. "His so-called 'anti-intellectualism' should be construed in this sense."

1968


Becker, Ernest. *The Structure of Evil: An Essay on the Unification of the Science of Man.* New York: George Braziller, 1968, 430. The author refers to Bergson very briefly on pp. 13, 113, 127, 147, 232 and 252. On p. 252 he states, "We noted earlier that Bergson saw the innovator as the instrument of evolution itself, nature working against encrusted social forms. Max Weber too held a similar view, and assigned a very important place in his thought to the charismatic person, the radical innovator who reworks all meanings and cuts through all the 'routinized' cultural forms."


by everyone else. When Bergson comes to New York City to
lecture at Columbia University in 1913, the city is
strangled in perhaps the first traffic jam of the brand-
new automotive age, as people fight to reach Morningside
Heights to hear one called the day's most influential
thinker. Bergson is so much the rage that one of
Thorndike's student assistants—who should know better—
is amazed that Thorndike will not walk across 120th
Street to hear the Frenchman speak (1). Thorndike, how­
ever, has no use for Bergson's new vitalism of the élan
vital and no need of another version of scientific opti­
mism; he already possesses his own" (p. 334). Footnote
On Bergson, see Henry May, Part 3" (p. 334n). On p. 414
the author states of Thorndike, "Thorndike is merely
quieter about his own refusal to attend Bergson's New
York lectures than is [John B.] Watson; he is no less
uninterested."

Kolakowski, Leszek. The Alienation of Reason: A History of
City, New York: Doubleday, 1968, vi, 230. The author
refers to Bergson on pp. 77, 78, 126, 131, 132, 135, 148,
152-153, and 217. On p. 78 he notes that Bergson,
Husserl, and Heidegger take for granted the separation
of the objects of science and of philosophy; on pp. 131–
132 he compares Bergson's and Husserl's epistemologies;
Bergson, conventionalism, and Edouard Le Roy are dis­
cussed by the author on pp. 135-137 and 148, as well as
on pp. 152-153, where the author holds that Le Roy showed
that Bergson's intuitionism is compatible with positivism.
He asks whether this can be termed a victory for posi­
tivism or not. On pp. 217-218 he describes Bergson's
philosophy as an epistemological and metaphysical Mani­
cheanism, "In other words, we would be compelled to
assume that our biological life and our metaphysical
explorations spring from two incompatible and even hostile
existential sources, or, to put it concisely, that the
physical world is a kind of malicious joke, a trick
played on us by some god or demon, while we, the victims
of this joke, suffer all the consequence of simultane­
ously and inevitably belonging to two hostile worlds . . . ."

Lebacqz, Joseph. De l'identique au multiple: Le Problème des
universaux reconsidéré à la lumière du bergsonisme et
des philosophies existentialistes. Bibliothèque de la
Faculté de philosophie et de lettres de Namur, fasc. 43.
Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts; Paris: Béatrice-Nauwel­
aerts, 1968, 164.


May, William Eugene. "The Reality of Matter in the Metaphysics of Bergson." Diss. Marquette 1968, 269. The author points out that the problem of the reality of matter arises naturally from Bergson's philosophy. He concludes that for Bergson matter is real because it is "within concretely enduring realities, a genuine tendency not to endure." This tendency can not succeed; it can only approach non-duration as a limit. Matter is, however, in no way independently real since it depends on spirit, with which it is permeated, in order to endure. (See *Dissertation Abstracts International,* 29, Nos. 7-9, 1969, 3184A.)

Meriwether, James B., and Michael Millgate. *Lion in the Garden: Interviews with William Faulkner.* New York: Random House, 1968, xvi, 298. On p. 70 William Faulkner describes his theology, "'Naturally,' he continued, 'I'm not talking about a personified or a mechanical God, but a God who rests both in eternity and in the now.' When I asked if he were thinking of the God of Bergson, he said, 'Yes, a deity very close to Bergson's. Listen, neither God nor morality can be destroyed.' I repeated this remark to myself, for he had said it with great emphasis.

"Since we had brought up Bergson, I next asked Faulkner to explain his conception of time. 'There isn't any time,' he replied. 'In fact I agree pretty much with Bergson's theory of time. There is only the present moment, in which I include both the past and the future, and that is eternity. In my opinion time can be shaped quite a bit by the artist; after all, man is never time's slave.'" On p. 72 William Faulkner stated concerning the French influences on his work, "I was influenced by Falaubert and by Balzac, whose way of writing everything bluntly with the stub of his pen I admire very much. And by Bergson, obviously. And I feel very close to Proust. After I had read *A la recherche du Temps Perdu* is said, 'This is it.'--and I wished I had written it myself."
This interview was conducted by Loic Bouvard, then a French graduate student studying political science at Princeton University. It was published first (in French) in the Bulletin de l'association amicale universitaire France-Amérique, January, 1954. The English translation was made by Henry Dan Piper and first published in Modern Fiction Studies, 5 (1959-1960).

Murillo Zamora, Roberto. "La notion de causalité dans la philosophie de Bergson." Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 7, No. 23 (1968), 1-127.

Meyerhoff, Hans. Time in Literature. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968, 160. The author cites Henri Bergson's notion of time "given as an immediate datum of consciousness" as the key to the notion of time in modern literature: "Yet it is so easy to understand why Bergson's philosophy has exercised so profound an influence on literature: the literary treatment of time, as we shall see, has always been 'Bergsonian' in the sense of analyzing time as an immediate datum of consciousness and as it enters into human lives and actions rather than 'into mechanics and physics'" (p. 10). Bergson's duration is employed by the author as a technical term on p. 14 et seq. See also pp. 36-37, 67, 76-77, and 153n.


Naess, Arne. Four Modern Philosophers: Carnap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, 367. The author states on p. 155n, "it is difficult to feel that Wittgenstein's Investigations and works with a similar orientation constitute a violent break with earlier philosophy, particularly for someone who has already felt the powerful impact of the pragmatic, Lebensform-theoretical positions of William James, Bergson, and Georg Simmel."


Robinet, André. "Le Drapeau noir de Péguy." Nouvelles Littéraires, 46, No. 2132, 1 août 1968, 4. This is a review of Vol. 8 of Les Études Bergsoniennes, which concentrates on the relations between Bergson and Charles Péguy.


as in a metaphysic of being, instead of an absolute creating, as in a metaphysics of knowledge" (p. 180).


1970


Bjelland, Andrew George. "The Foundations of Bergson's Metaphysics: An Essay on Henri Bergson's Early Metaphysical Dualism." Diss. Saint Louis 1970, 433. The author examines the "dialectical character of Bergsonian metaphysics" within the context of Bergson's mind-body dualism. Central to the understanding of Bergson's philosophy is his description of the "endosmotic tension" between two tendentially differentiated aspects of experience, the awareness of heterogeneous duration and the concept of homogeneous space. These notions, developed originally in Time and Free Will, are elaborated further in Matter and Memory, where the notions of spirit and matter are reformulated as modes of duration, the reality of spirit is stressed, and an account is presented of "the on-going interpenetration of the two." In the concluding chapter the author provides a critical exposition of Bergson's mitigation of the concepts of traditional dualism. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 31, Nos. 7-8 (1971), 4212A.)


Chambers, Connor John. "Henri Bergson and the Reality of the Physical World." Diss. Saint Louis 1970, 212. The author wishes to quarrel with those who conceive of Bergson's physical universe as "richly fluid," i.e., as embodying creative duration. Bergson's ultimate refusal to move beyond a temporal standpoint, his methodological identification of physics with mathematics, his confinement of the physicist within a psychologistic perspective prevent him from doing justice to physical reality. The author concludes with the suggestion that, had Bergson realized the full usefulness of his notion of extension and allowed the physicist greater methodological independence, his "common frontier" of metaphysics and science could
have been much more adequately described. In particu-
lar, it would have been possible to do justice to the
"real spatial diversity of the physical universe."
(See Dissertation Abstracts International, 31, Nos. 7-8
(1971), 4231A.)

Chandra, Subhash. "Intuition et instinct chez Schopenhauer

Clare. 1928; rpt. Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries

Coates, Wilson Havelock, and Hayden V. White. Since the
French Revolution. Vol. II of The Ordeal of Liberal
Humanism: An Intellectual History of Western Europe.
influence of the physics of Clerk Maxwell on the thought
of Mach, Croce, Bergson, Alexander, and Whitehead on
p. 121. On p. 164 he describes the social ideals of
Taine in their relation to those of Ravaissin, Bergson
and Durkheim. On pp. 278 and 279 he relates the thought
of Freud to that of both Dilthey and Bergson. The
author compares the thought of Bergson with that of Croce
Bergson's influence on Georges Sorel. On p. 449 he
states, "Bergson proved in the end to be irrelevant if
not hostile to liberal humanism . . . ." On pp. 270-278
the author examines Bergson's philosophy, treating Berg-
son as the closest French counterpart to German thinkers
like Dilthey and Weber. He concludes that in the end
Bergson's philosophy amounted to "little more than an
elaborate defense of religious mysticism" (p. 271). The
author concludes that Bergson did not fulfill his
responsibilities to humanity.

Costa de Beauregard, Oliver. "On Time, Information and Life."
In Evolution in Perspective: Commentaries in Honor of
Pierre Lecomte du Noüy. Eds. George N. Schuster and
Ralph E. Thorson. Notre Dame and London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1970, 193-210. The author considers,
from a physicist's viewpoint, the two fundamental con-
cepts of time, i.e., time as a measurable magnitude and
time as irreversible. Concepts of temporal irreversi-
bility have, the author believes, close ties to meta-
physics, especially with questions of finalism and
causality. The world of non-living matter (the "Carnot"
world) contrasts with the world of living things. The
Carnot world allows prediction but not retroduction;
the anti-Carnot world allows retrodiction but not pre-
diction. The Carnot world exhibits increasing
probability; the anti-Carnot world exhibits the opposite.
The author argues that the anti-Carnot world suggests a
kind of finalism: "I really do believe that these two
quotations from physicists have resonances consonant
with the thinking devoted to finality, in its corres-
pondence with low probability, by such great men and
inspired writers as Bergson and Lecomte du Noüy" (p.
209).

Cristiani, Aldo Horacio. "Duracion y tiempo en Bergson."
This is a discussion of Bergson's theory of duration,
with special reference to Einstein's theory of rela-
tivity.

De Burgh, William Goerge. From Morality to Religion. The
Gifford Lectures, 1938. 1938; rpt. Port Washington,

Dyserinck, Hugo. Graf Hermann Keyserling und Frankreich, Ein
Kapitel deutsch-französischer Geistesbeziehungen im XX,
book examines G. H. Keyserling's relations with several
French thinkers during the years 1925 and 1935,
including Henri Bergson.

Filali-Ansary, Mohamed Abdou. "La Notion d'intuition chez

Gidley, M. "One Continuous Force: Notes on Faulkner's Extra-
Literary Reading." Mississippi Quarterly, 23, No. 3

Gouhier, Henri. "Introduction to a Debate on Philosophical
Exigence." In Evolution in Perspective: Commentaries
in Honor of Pierre Lecomte du Noüy. Ed. George N.
Schuster and Ralph E. Thorson. Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1970, 123-131. The
author considers the development of philosophy, the
genesis of philosophy, and philosophy's nonphilosophical
sources. On p. 124 he considers Bergson's discussion of
the history of philosophy. On p. 125 he uses the com-
parison of Bergson and Kant to suggest that there is
progress in the history of philosophy. On p. 127 he
distinguishes the world of a philosopher (Bergson) from
the world of a poet (Valéry). On p. 128 he compares the
world of Bergson with that of Descartes. On p. 129 he
compares the genesis of Bergson's philosophy with that of Aristotle and Descartes. All three, he insists, found an empirical starting-point for their philosophies.

Grieder, Jerome B., Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism and the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970, 420. Bergson is mentioned in this study of the Chinese response to western ideas on pp. 133, 138, 157, 158, and 167. Concerning the "neotraditionalist" Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the author states on p. 133, "Liang turned to Bergson with particular enthusiasm, for he discovered in the Bergsonian idea of 'creative evolution' a means of salvaging the faith in evolutionary progress that had lain close to his heart since the early days of his association with K'ang Yu-wei." On pp. 156-157 he asserts, "Liang Ch'i'ch'ao, though he had at best a traveler's acquaintance with Europe, had spent time there on several occasions since the turn of the century, and in the course of his tour in 1919 he had called upon Bergson and Eucken. A few years earlier Chang Chun-mai had studied under both men."


Kayatta, George Nayef. "Comic Elements in Montaigne's Essays in the Light of Bergson's Le Rire." Diss. Case Western Reserve 1970, 329. The author uses Bergson's theory of comedy to analyze the "nature, purpose, span and expression" of the comic elements in Montaigne's Essays. Like Bergson, Montaigne views the universe as in constant flux and unpredictable. This similarity provides a basis for the comparison of Montaigne's views with Bergson's notion that the comic is simply a form of mechanization imposed on the living. The author examines both Montaigne's use of the simpler and the more complex forms of the comic. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 32, No. 1 (1971), 408A.)


Piclin, Michel. "Angoisse et espérance dans le bergsonisme, de Bergson à l'existentialisme." Diss. Paris 1970, 247. This is a "thèse complementaire."


Sgro, Serafino. La filosofia di E. Bergson e le sue implicanze pedagogiche. Regio, Calabria: Leo, 1970, 150.

Tadié, Jean-Yves. Introduction à la vie littéraire du XIXe siècle. Paris et Montréal: Bordas, 1970, 146. This study in literary history contains references to Bergson as well as to many other literary and political personages.


1971


Čapek, Milič. "The Fiction of Instants." Studium Generale, 24, No. 1 (1971), 31-43. The author argues that, on the basis of the nature of "phenomenal continua," it is possible to deny the reality of instants without accepting the self-contradictory "atomization" of time.

Cloutier, Paul Philip. "A Bergsonian Analysis of the Humor of Anatole France." Diss. Wisconsin 1971, 592. The author uses the "optic" of Henri Bergson's Le Rire to explore the diverse forces constituting the (sadly neglected) "comicality" of Anatole France. The author concludes that France placed great emphasis on the important role played by laughter in human life and lamented the recent demise of laughter under the impact of the new mediocrity. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 32, No. 2 (1971), 911A-912A.)


Doob, Leonard William. The Patterning of Time. New Haven: Yale, 1971, 472. On pp. 92-32 the author states, "Bergson made duration the key concept in his philosophical system and has had an important effect not only upon philosophy but also upon psychiatry; in addition his analysis is said to have 'brought about a new conception of character in much modern fiction' [Mendilow, 1952, p. 149], to which—in my opinion—film could be appended." The reference is here to A. A. Mendilow, Time and the Novel.


Freud, Sigmund. "Letter to James Jackson Putnam, July 8, 1915." In James Jackson Putnam and Psychoanalysis. Ed. Nathan G. Hale, Jr. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, 188-191. On p. 189 Freud remarks, "What I have seen of religious-ethical conversion has not been inviting. Jung, for example, I found sympathetic so long as he lived blindly, as I did. Then came his religious-ethical crisis with higher morality, 'rebirth,' Bergson, and at the very same time, lies, brutality and
antisemitic condescension towards me. It has not been
the first or last experience to reinforce my disgust
with saintly converts" (p. 189). The German version of
this letter appears on pp. 375-377. The editor points
out on p. 191n that this passage was omitted from pre-
viously published versions of this letter.

Fürstenberg, Hans. Dialektik des einunzwanzigsten Jahrhun-
derts; Ein Diskurs. Der neue Weg des Denkens von der
Atomphysik bis zu den Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1971, 127. This essay deals
with the concept of dialectic, with Max Planck, Henri
Bergson, and the philosophy of science.

Gagnebin, Samuel. "Pour comprendre Bergson." In A la recher-
che d'un ordre naturel by Samuel Gagnebin. Neuchâtel:
La Baconnière, 1971, 361-391.

Rackham Literary Studies, 1, No. 1 (1971), 27-34.

Gastazatorre - Echano, Luciano de. "Marcel Proust y Henri
Bergson: reflexión ante un Centenario." Arbor, 130,
No. 312 (1971), 59-72.

Giroux, Laurent. Durée pure et temporalité: Bergson et
Heidegger. Recherches publiées par les Facultés S. J.
de Montréal, Philosophie No. 4. Paris: Tournai, Desclée;

Goyard-Fabre, Simon. "Le Corps-image selon Bergson." Ecole
des Lettres, 2e cycle, 62, No. 13 (1971), 37-41. The
author examines Bergson's rehabilitation of the imagi-
nation in Matter and Memory through his treatment of the
body-image. (See Index Analytique, 6 (1971-1972), A-51.)

Hale, Nathan G. Jr. James Jackson Putnam and Psychoanalysis.
On pp. 48-49 and 56 the author describes Putnam's inter-
est in Bergson's philosophy, and Bergson's influence on
Putnam's approach to psychoanalysis. On p. 94 a letter
from Putnam to Sigmund Freud is printed, in which Put-
nam urges Bergson's views on the founder of psycho-
analysis. On pp. 96-97 Freud's reply to Putnam is
given: "I make bold to say that from the very beginning
I have agreed with Bergson's logical view of the matter.
I have made it mine." Other references to Bergson may
be found on pp. 106-107, 108, and 345.

---------. L'Ontologie de Merleau-Ponty. Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971, 140. The author argues that Merleau-Ponty conjoins phenomenology and ontology throughout his writings. The concept of "ambiguity" is thus not at the center of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. The author makes numerous references to Bergson. On pp. 24-52 he deals with Merleau-Ponty's attitude towards Bergson and Jean-Paul Sartre: "L'explication la plus simple consisterait a dire; Merleau-Ponty, d'abord phénoménologue, existentialiste, ami de Sartre, est devenu tout autre chose, philosophe de l'en soi, attentif a l'invisible, ami de Bergson" (p. 25).


Klein, Elise. "Esthétique et métaphysique chez Bergson et Vasconcelos." Diss. Toulouse 1971, xii, 191. This is a "thèse, 3e cycle."


Maiorana, Maria-Teresa. "Bergson et le rayonnement de sa pensée (Compte rendu sommaire)." Revue de Synthèse, 92, Nos. 63-64 (1971), 319-321. This is a review of Bergson by Madeleine Barthelemy-Madaule, La Durée chez Bergson by Osaman E. Chahine, and Volume IX of Les Études Bergsoniennes.


Mathieu, Vittorio. *Bergson, Il profundo e la sua espressione*. Esperienzi, No. 9. Napoli: Guida Editori, 1971, 453. This study of Bergson's theory of knowledge and its application to scientific knowledge contains an appendix discussing recent work on Bergson in France, Italy, and Germany.


Merleau-Ponty, J. Review of *Duration and Simultaneity* by Henri Bergson. *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger*, 161, No. 4 (1971), 445-446. This is a review of the Leon Jacobson translation of *Durée et simultanéité*. The reviewer finds Jacobson's translation satisfactory, and states concerning *Duration and Simultaneity*, "C'est un beau livre. Les erreurs qu'il contient, les vues discutables qui y sont présentées sur la théorie de la Relativité n'empêchent pas qu'il ne mette en pleine lumière des problèmes dont le triomphe d'Einstein a sûrement modifié les données, mais qu'il n'a pas fait disparaître: une ontologie qui voit le devenir à la source des êtres est compatible avec la Physique relativiste, sans qu'on doive donner de cette Physique l'interprétation douteuse de Bergson, ni admettre avec lui une véritable discontinuité épistémologique entre la Philosophie et le Science? Le lecture de *Durée et simultanéité* ne peut éviter de se poser ces questions" (p. 446).


Reichenbach, Hans. The Direction of Time. Ed. Maria Reichenbach. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1971, 280. The author refers to Bergson on pp. 16 and 17. He states that Bergson's attitude towards time (i.e., Becoming), though emotionally rewarding, cannot replace logical investigation. Bergson, moreover, has said that the physicist has misunderstood time by treating it as a mere dimension of space. But, he replies, "It is a hopeless enterprise to search for the nature of time without studying physics" (p. 17). We cannot tell whether an intuition is true simply by appeal to another intuition.


Spanos, William V. "Modern Drama and the Aristotelian Tradition: The Formal Imperatives of Absurd Time." Contemporary Literature, 12, No. 3 (1971), 345-372. This study deals primarily with Bergson, Sartre, Proust and Ionesco.

Tonnellat, Marie-Antoinette. Histoire du principe de relativité. Paris: Flammarion, 1971, 561. Bergson and Zeno's paradoxes are discussed here on p. 211; Bergson and relativity theory on pp. 212, 219; Bergson and Ernst Mach are discussed on p. 271; Bergson's criticisms of relativity theory are examined on pp. 280-293. The author concludes that Bergson's critique of relativity theory should not be accused of naïveté or anthropomorphism. Bergson's errors were based on "Textes elliptiques, incomplets, pru compréhensibles et certainement mal compris" of certain writers on relativity. This is an excellent, very important study.


1972

Antonio-Miguez, José. Review of La filosofía de Bergson by Manuel García Morente. Arbor, 83, Nos. 321-324 (1972), 139-143.


Cattaui, Georges. Proust et ses métamorphoses. Paris: Nizet, 1972, 300. The author holds (see p. 73) that
Marcel Proust opposes the Bergsonian temporal flux and that his work tends towards the abolition of time altogether.

Crane, John K. "Golding and Bergson: The Free Fall of Free Will." Bulletin of the Rocky Mountain Modern Language Association, 26 (1972), 136-141. The novels of William Golding are studies of free will. In Free Fall he employs Bergson's psychology, depicting his hero as freely giving up his powers of volition and rendering himself morally impotent. (See 1972 MLA Abstracts, 2, p. 22.)


Goyard-Fabre, Simon. "Gaston Bachelard, critique de Bergson." École des Lettres, 2e cycle, 63, No. 10 (1972), 31-34. The author discusses the opposition between Bergson, the philosopher of continuity and the plenum, and Gaston Bachelard, the philosopher of discontinuity. (See Index Analytique, 6 (1971-1972), A-51.)

---------. "Le Temps et la durée selon Bergson." École des Lettres, 2e cycle, 63, No. 9 (1972), 31-34. The author
discusses the problem of temporality, the heart of Bergson's philosophy. He examines several Bergsonian antinomies: consciousness and science; continuity and discontinuity, quality and quantity. He notes Bergson's denunciation of Zeno's paradox. (See Index Analytique, 6 (1971-1972), A-51.)


--------- Review of La Critique bergsonienne du concept by Jean Theau. Archives de Philosophie, 35, No. 4 (1972), 690-691.


Lattre, Alain de. "Perception et réflexion chez Descartes et chez Bergson." Études Philosophiques, 27, No. 2 (1972), 179-199. "'Percevoir, dit Bergson, finit par n'être plus qu'une occasion de se souvenir.' De se souvenir ou de réfléchir? De Descartes à Bergson, toute la différence est là. Et, dans le fond, les deux doctrines sont si proches que l'une ne tarde pas à nous paraître comme la variation de l'autre. Qu'on réfléchisse ou que l'on se souvienne, la perception se fait comme un oubli de ce que l'on perçoit. Mais, tot ou tard, il faut bien que les choses reviennent et qu'on en tienne compte: cela se voit au bout du souvenir, chez Bergson, au bout de cinq méditations, chez Descartes. Et, rétablies dans leur juridiction, elles nous forcent de penser d'autre façon ce que l'intelligence seule imaginait de concevoir. Du côté de Descartes comme dans celui de Bergson, la philosophie se présente alors comme l'effort pour composer un équilibre entre ces deux postulations adverses, celle de la perception et celle de la réflexion" (author's résumé, p. 179).


Poulakidas, Andreas K. "Kazantzakis and Bergson: Metaphysic Aestheticians." Journal of Modern Literature, 2, No. 2 (1972), 267-283. "It is an established fact that Kazantzakis knew the philosophical outlook of Bergson. Kazantzakis introduced into Freedom or Death such Bergsonian concepts as la durée, mémoire involontaire, and free will which develop his novel's stream of consciousness, themes, and his literary impressionistic style. Also, Kazantzakis' translation of Bergson's Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic in 1915 aided him in devising and developing his minor characters. Above all, Bergson's theory of creative evolution recalled for Kazantzakis an ancient Christian belief, clothed by the name of metousiosis (transubstantiation), the crux of Kazantzakis' philosophy. What Eastern Orthodox theology preaches, regarding the Mystery of the Holy Eucharist, and what Bergsonian philosophy taught in Creative Evolution and The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Kazantzakian philology synthesized. Metousiosis is the culminating point of a dynamic theology just as creative evolution is the undetected process of an intuitive science." (A.K.P. in 1972 MLA Abstracts, 2, pp. 77-78.)

Price, Connie Barnett Crank. "Consciousness and History in Bergson's Philosophy." Diss. Pennsylvania State 1972, 149. The author sets out to show that for Bergson consciousness is ultimate and irreducible, and is the ground of human experience. Though it is the "irreducible component of experience," consciousness is itself constituted by "unique and significant experiences." Bergson's concept of duration is a further conformation that consciousness is a ground. Duration involves creativity,
and Bergson proposes that human creativity is the standard of history. The author concludes that "certain arbitrary postulations of exclusiveness from the movement of history" kept Bergson's theory of history from being as pervasive as his theory of consciousness. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 23, No. 3 (1972), 1323A.)


Rousseau, Richard W. "Secular and Christian Images of Man." Thought, 47, No. 185 (1972), 165-200. The author discusses the image of man in Bernanos, Bergson, Sartre, Camus, Teihard de Chardin and others. Bergson is treated here as a proponent of "man in motion." The author concludes, "This image of creative movement as always upward and the identification of ultimate reality has one weakness. It is unrelated or insufficiently related to the concrete individual and his relationship to the world of men and things. And the experience of history has shown us the disastrous results of uncontrolled energy" (p. 170).


Salet, Georges. Hazard et certitude: Le Transformisme devant la biologie actuelle. Paris: Editions scientifiques Saint-Edme, 1972, xxxvii, 454. The author denies that the theory of biological evolution is consistent with recent biological discoveries, "en revelant l'extraordinaire complexité des êtres vivants, meme les plus simples, la Biologie a rendu de plus en plus invraisemblable l'explication de la vie et l'évolution par le hazard" (p. 128). Part 8 of this study contains quotes from Bergson, Cuenot, and Vialleton.

Sawnor, Edna A. "Borges y Bergson." Cuadernos Americanos, 185, No. 6 (1972), 247-254. The author argues that critics who have sought to find the philosophical master of the writer, Jorge Luis Borges in David Hume, George Berkeley, or Arthur Schopenhauer are mistaken. Henri
Bergson is the "verdadero filósofo de Borges" (p. 247). Bergson influenced Borges during the latter's student days in Europe, from 1914 until 1921.


T., R. Review of El tiempo en la filosofía francesa del siglo XX by the Faculty of Arts and Letters, University of Buenos Aires. Dialogos, 3, No. 23 (1972), 243.

El tiempo en la Filosofía francesa del siglo XX. Cuadernos de Filosofía. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Año 10, No. 13 (1970), 239. This volume, published in 1972, deals with the problem of time as developed in twentieth century French philosophy. Among the thinkers considered are Paul Ricouer, Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis Lavelle, Henri Bergson and Olivier Costa de Beauregard. It is preceded by an overview, "Two Attitudes Towards_time" ("Dos actitudes frente al tiempo") by Eugenio Puciarelli.

Uritus, Ronald Michael. "Cognition and Action in Bergson's Ethics." Diss. Saint Louis 1972, 283. This study focuses on the problem of the extent and presence of cognitive activities—both analytic and intuitive—in Bergson's account of moral philosophy and moral action. The author concludes, after examining the role of cognitive elements for Bergson in practical, creative, and moral activity, that while Bergson admits the need for various sorts of cognition in moral activities, in many instances these are subordinated to affective factors. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 34, No. 9 (1972), 6052A.)


Ansbacher, Heinz L. "Adler's Interpretations of Early Recollections: Historical Account." Journal of Individual Psychology, 29, No. 2 (1973), 135-145. This paper discusses a central tenet of Adlerian psychoanalysis, the importance of early childhood memories as a key to personality. Adler's concept of memory was strongly influenced by Bergson, through the work of Paul Schrecker, a young Viennese who had studied under Bergson in Paris in 1911.


Biondi, A. "Teilhard and Bergson." Teilhard Review, 8, No. 3 (1973), 82-85.


as a living organism, the phenomenologist conceives the perceiving consciousness as an entity devoid of psychology, for he is interested in 'primitive formations' of time-consciousness. Merleau-Ponty, for example, reduces time to pure subjectivity. For him the subject is temporality. He states, 'Time . . . arises from my relation to things . . . . We are the upsurge of time.' Alain Robbe-Grillet—the most representative figure in the New Novel movement—has adopted the phenomenological time in his novels where the narrator acts as the only subjective time-consciousness. In his novels mechanical time gradually disappears. He presents a narrator who acts as a subject-temporality, hence time is created as the novel is created." (In 1974 MLA Abstracts, 2, 39.)


Clark, Terry Nichols. Prophets and Patrons: The French University and the Emergence of the Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973, 282. The author notes Theodule Ribot, Gabriel Tarde, and Henri Bergson on p. 58 as representatives of French social philosophy; on p. 80n he describes the Bergson enthusiasts who met with Georges Sorel and Charles Péguy at the Cahiers de la Quinzaine as having failed to create a "cluster;" he describes Bergson's thesis (L'Essai) on p. 83 as a "classical monument of scholarship;" on p. 192 he notes briefly Bergson's relations with Gabriel Tarde; on pp. 192-193 he characterizes Bergson's lectures at the Collège de France; he notes the increasing popularity of Bergson's ideas in France after 1905 on p. 215; he notes Bergson's support of chairs of sociology and of economic and social sciences on p. 219n; he notes on p. 222 Bergson's participation, in 1923, in curriculum revision; he notes Bergson's influence on Daniel Essertier and Émile Lasbax on p. 224. See also pp. 88n and 166.


Devaux, André-A. "Bergson en son temps." Études Philosophiques, 28, No. 2 (1973), 199-202. This is an appreciative review of Mélanges, a collection of many of Bergson's writings, letters, and lectures.

Dewey, John. Lectures in China, 1919-1920. Ed. and trans. Robert W. Clopton and Tsuin-Chen Ou. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1973, 337. The editors point out on p. 8 that while in China, Dewey gave a series of lectures concerning William James, Henri Bergson, and Bertrand Russell titled "Three Contemporary Philosophers." Copies of these lectures can be purchased from the University of Hawaii. On p. 326 the editors note that Dewey devoted two lectures each to James, Bergson, and Russell. On p. 101, in a talk titled "Economics and Social Philosophy," Dewey stated, "Recently the French philosopher Henri Bergson has proffered the definition of man as the tool-making animal—a peculiarly apt definition, in my opinion. Bergson's definition directs attention to man's ability to devise from the materials of nature instrumentalities for the satisfaction of his desires—a characteristic which lower orders of animals do not possess, and which is therefore unique to man."


---------. "René Le Senne face à Henri Bergson." Études Bergsoniennes, 10 (1973), 135-169.


Giroux, Laurent. "'Matière et mémoire' de Henri Bergson." Dialogue (Canada), 12, No. 4 (1973), 670-675. The author examines Bergson's mind-matter dualism, his theories of memory and perception. Various difficulties in Bergson's position are stressed and a new starting point is suggested, based on a concept developed by existentialism.

Gerrard, Charlotte F. "Bergsonian Elements in Ionesco's Le Piéton d l'air." Papers on Language and Literature, 9, No. 3 (1973), 297-310. The author concludes, "Le Piéton de l'air is not a parody, bitter like Adamov's La Grande et la petite manœuvre, but an outright féerie. Rather than representing the mixed genres of Ionesco's absurdist plays and even his later ones, Le Piéton de l'air is pure fantasy and laughter. Even the apocalypse
reported by Berenger does not destroy the underlying mood of the comic. After all, such masters as Moliere and Shaw allowed serious thoughts to enter their theatre without writing tragedy or philosophy. No bow to these latter dramatic categories is in order, so much as is a curtain call for Henri Bergson" (p. 310).


Hamilton, James Jay. "Georges Sorel and the Inconsistencies of a Bergsonian Marxism." Political Theory, 1, No. 3 (1973), 329-340. Sorel tried to revise orthodox Marxism by means of Bergson's vitalist epistemology. Sorel applies Bergson's psychology of the free, creative man via his own concept of social myth, in which the rational and irrational merge. But there can be no coherent synthesis of Marxism's deterministic economic and social analysis with the individualist, intuitionist, anti-rationalist philosophy of Bergson. Social regularity frustrates Bergson's defence of individual freedom. Hence Sorel's doctrine of freedom becomes untenable, which invalidates the justification for revolution.

Johnson, Patricia J. "Bergson's Le rire: Game Plan for Camus' L'Etranger?" French Review, 47, No. 1 (1973), 46-56. "Camus's surprising declaration that critics have neglected the comic theme in his work suggests the re-examination of one of his major works, L'Etranger, to determine how the author's judgment is justified. A search among Bergsonian principles is less an automatic gesture than it is a compelling examination of laughter studies by a philosopher whom Camus admired and knew very well: Bergson as source for Camus's comic elements is justifiable and critically sound, especially with respect to the comedy of form, of movement, of language, and of situation. Only the application of Bergson's theories concerning the comedy of character is blocked by L'Etranger's first person narration. This emphasis on an individual point of view, rather than that of society, creates in turn a bizarre feeling of absurdity rather than outright laughter." (Abstract by author in 1973 MLA Abstracts, 2, 20-21.)

Jones, Louisa. "The Comic as Poetry: Bergson Revisited." Nineteenth Century French Studies, 2, Nos. 1 and 2 (1973-1974), 75-85. The author states, "I would like to show here firstly, how close Bergson came to making the
connection between poetry and humor and in what ways; secondly, what assumptions held him back; thirdly . . . three distinctive types of humor in contemporary literature which are quite at home in a lyrical context" (pp. 75-76).


Le Breton, Maurice. "Les Romanciers américains et la personne." In Problèmes de la personne. Ed. Ignace Meyerson. Paris: Mouton, 1973, 305-311. The author deals with those (recent) novelists who have boldly probed beneath the "social self" to reveal the deeper, non-rational self: a programme which, he states, was first envisaged by Bergson in 1888 (Les Données immédiates de la conscience, Ch. II). In France Marcel Proust moved in this direction; in England James Joyce, Virginia Woolf and Aldous Huxley also have transformed the methods of the novelist in order to accomodate the new psychology of flux. The American novel from 1920-1930 underwent a similar development. Hemmingway, who initially confronted the "irrationality" of the profound self, turned away from it in his later novels. Dos Passos confronts "le dessai du Moi profond" in mass society, while Faulkner portrays the inner self in the solitude of an isolated region of the South. Faulkner's psychological analyses pierce to the heart of the problem of the person. A discussion of these ideas follows on pp. 313-318.


Megay, Joyce N. "La Question de l'influence de Bergson sur Proust." Diss. Nebraska 1973, 246; Paris 1976. The author unites a critical analysis of the literature from 1913 to 1973 dealing with Bergson's supposed influence on Proust with her own analysis of the writings of Bergson and Proust. She concludes not only that Bergson did not influence Proust, but that at most essential points they stand in profound disagreement. In their critical attitudes toward the superficial self, voluntary memory, intelligence, and language, Bergson and Proust are in essential agreement; but they part paths over the nature of the deep self, psychological time, involuntary memory, the positive role of intelligence, the nature of the real, and the power of poetic expression. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 34, No. 12, Part I (1974), 7767A-7768A.)

--------. "La Question de l'influence de Bergson sur Proust." Bulletin of the Rocky Mountain Modern Language Association, 27, No. 1 (1973), 53-58. (The journal in which this article appears is now titled Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature.)


Nicholas, Joan Dunston. "Bergson's Theory of the Unity of the Person." Diss. Saint Louis 1973, 277. The author examines Bergson's concept of the unity of the person, pointing out that this unity is an indivisible movement, not a static substratum. For Bergson, man can draw more from himself than he has, and can shape his own personality. The author criticizes Bergson's epistemology, definition of substance, and his concepts of matter and spirit. Bergson "overlooks the validity of the apprehension of being." Substance can not be conceived merely as a continuity of change since change is not intelligible without the notion of something that changes. Bergson's dualism prevents him from including the body as "an integral part of man." (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 35, No. 5 (1974), 3060A-3061A.)

Prasad, B. K. "Bergson's élan vital and Ramanuja's Brahman." Indian Philosophy and Culture, 18, No. 2 (1973), 190-199.


Review of Bergson and Modern Physics by Milič Čapek. Choice, 10, No. 1 (1973), 398-399. This is a brief, highly affirmative review. The author concludes, "Čapek gets inside Bergson, brilliantly defending his relevance to contemporary physics with a mastery of recent developments. Highly recommended in its own right and as a sequel to Čapek's The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary Physics, (1961)."

Rodríguez-Echeverría, Alvaro A. "La intuicion bergsoniana." Logos (Mexico), 1 (1973), 319-357.


Schmidtke, Charles Raymond. "Bergson's Meaning of Continuity." Diss. Tulane 1973, 260. The author investigates Bergson's concept of continuity and the manner in which he orients philosophy towards the resolution of the problem of continuity. Though Bergson hopes to resolve the problem of continuity through the experience of life itself, this approach is not anti-intellectual, nor does it "destroy analysis" as some critics have claimed. The mathematical concept of continuity, as analyzed by Dedekind and Huntington, provides support for Bergson's concept of continuity. A satisfactory examination of the nature of continuity requires an investigation of the relationship between the theories of the mathematicians and Bergson's metaphysics. This dissertation compares and contrasts various aspects of the mathematical concept of continuity with Bergson's notion. The author believes that he has added "another dimension" to Bergson's method (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 34, No. 5 (1973), 2707A.)


Smirnov, Alexandrovich.  Problems of the Psychology of Memory. Trans. Samuel A. Corson. New York and London: Plenum Press, 1973, 338. This book was published originally in Moscow in 1966. It contains several criticisms of Bergson's concept of memory. These appear in Chapter 6, "Reflective Activity," Section 2, "Meaningful Points of Support and their Separation," pp. 172-187. Memorization and reminiscence both, the author teaches, require "points of support." He quotes Bergson as one who "attached great significance to them" (p. 172) and relied on psychologists (Audebert, André) with similar ideas. To learn by heart is for Bergson to focus on one point where a multitude of images seem to be concentrated; progress in memorizing is thus increasing ability to reduce ideas, words, images to a point. The author objects that this is factually incorrect. Bergson's views are biased by his concept of intuition, which is able to grasp the material as a whole. But Bergson fails to point out that we must deal with a logical chain of ideas: with several points of support. Also Bergson suspiciously fails to mention the necessity of dividing the material into meaningful parts, although "it is this process which is the basis for understanding the logic
of the material" (p. 173). The author concludes by criticizing Bergson's concept of the "dynamic schema" as the basic point of support. This is the old "idea-force," a notoriously idealistic notion. He cites several experiments against Bergson.

**Tallón, Andrew.** "Memory and Man's Composite Nature According to Bergson." New Scholasticism, 47, No. 4 (1973), 483-489. This is a study of the interrelations between Bergson's two sorts of memory.

**Tamás, Miklós Gaspar.** "Bergson a Módszerről." Magyar Filozofiai Szemle, 17 (1973), 112-140. This article concerns Bergson's philosophical method.


**Weber, Jean-Paul.** "Bergson and Proust." In In Search of Marcel Proust: Essays from the Marcel Proust Centennial Colloquium Held at Claremont Colleges, on Nov. 12, 13, 14, 1971. Ed. Monique Chedfor. Claremont, California: Scripps College and the Ward Ritchie Press, 1973, 55-77. The author concludes that Proust was influenced by Bergson's concepts of memory and duration. He holds that Bergson is, to a large extent, the model for Ralph Savaie, a comic character in Proust's incomplete early novel Jean Santeuil. While arguing for Bergson's influence on Proust, however, he is careful to point out the many differences in the viewpoints of the two men.

**Wells, David F.** "George Tyrrell: Precursor of Process Theology." Scottish Journal of Theology, 26, No. 1 (1973), 71-84. The author discusses G. Tyrrell as one of the European Catholic Progeny of Bergson. (The other
important set of Bergson's progeny are categorised as American Protestants.) (See Review by J. G. Janzen in Process Studies, 3, No. 2 (1973), 135.)


Wyss, Dieter. Psychoanalytic Schools from the Beginning to the Present. Trans. Gerald Omm. Intro. Leston L. Havens. New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1973, 568. This is a translation of the author's Die Tiefenpsychologischen Schulen von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (1961). On p. 105 the author discusses the final phase of Freud's thought, resulting in "that irrational mythology of drives, which established the work of the strictly scientific founder of psychoanalysis as being closely akin to the related, modern (irrational) enquiries of Bergson and a Klages, to the inroads made by the irrational in Surrealism and Existentialism, and even to the writings of C. G. Jung, but which failed to grasp the true nature of the irrational." On p. 282 the author notes that Harry Stack Sullivan's concept of "empathy" is taken from Bergson.

1974


Chambers, Connor J. "Zeno of Elea and Bergson's Neglected Thesis." Journal of the History of Philosophy, 12, No. 1 (1974), 63-76. The author contends that Henri Bergson's neglected Latin Thesis is not a defense of Kant's theory of space, as has been supposed. In this thesis Bergson's debt to Zeno is twofold. First, Zeno's paradoxes provide Bergson with a basic set of problems.
Second, taking his theses before a predominantly Kantian faculty, Bergson cleverly illustrates in the Latin work his mastery of Zeno's classical method of academic protest, illustrating the weaknesses of Kant's theory of space no less than Aristotle's.

Colum, Jovan. Дневник сa Атлантika и други eseji. Београд: Нолит, 1974, 166. The romanized title of this work is Dnevnik sa Atlantika i drugi eseji.


Edwards, William Sterling, and Peter D. Edwards. Alexis Carrel: Visionary Surgeon. Foreword Charles A. Lindbergh. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1974, 143. In 1913, "at a large dinner in Paris at the home of the philosopher, Henri Bergson, the guests were discussing the epidemics that were decimating the French army in Morocco. Cruel asked, 'But how can we let the soldiers die without remedy?' Metchnikoff responded, 'The vaccines are inefficient.' Coudert turned to Carrel and asked, 'What does Dr. Carrel think about this?' 'They are too ignorant in France to plan for the future,' he replied from the end of the table. These words fell in a dismayed silence" (p. 61). This was just after Carrel was given the Nobel Prize for surgery.

Felt, James W. "The Temporality of Divine Freedom." Process Studies, 4, No. 4 (1974), 252-262. In this essay the author attempts to correct A. N. Whitehead's concept of God through an examination of Bergson's concept of freedom. The non-temporal freedom of Whitehead's "primordial" aspect of deity must be joined with a temporal freedom,
as suggested by Bergson. This temporal freedom must find its place in Whitehead's "consequent" aspect of deity. Only thus can God's love for individuals, and not just types or kinds of individuals, be understood.


Fiddian, R. W. "Unamuno-Bergson: A Reconsideration." Modern Language Review, 69, No. 4 (1974), 787-795. "The theories of intrahistoria and durée of Unamuno and Bergson can fruitfully be compared and contrasted. Both thinkers postulate the existence of an autonomous cosmic force in which qualitative timelessness transcends the quantitative framework of historical time. But Bergson's dynamic and monistic view of mind and matter as homogeneous activity is at variance with Unamuno's quietist and dualist interpretation of reality as a combination of opposites such as mobility and stasis, time and eternity. In addition, whereas the two systems accommodate the notions of humanity and God, Unamuno's admission of teleological consciousness, plenitude and transcendence in intrahistoria differs from Bergson's immanentist philosophy of durée which denies the purposive faculty of mind, diverges from the conventional idea of God, and sees the temporal structure of the world as open-ended." (Abstract by "RWF" in 1974 MLA Abstracts, 2, 62.)


Grogin, Robert C. "Bergson and the French Catholic Revival: 1900-1914." Thought, 49, No. 3 (1974), 311-322. The author explores Bergson's impact on Teilhard de Chardin, Charles Péguy, the Maritains, Édouard Le Roy, Joseph Lotte, Paul Claudel, and others. "Bergsonism, after all was never a school which set guidelines for its members, but rather a tendency in pre-war France, where men could call themselves Bergsonians and still be their own masters" (p. 322).

Jous, Dominique. "La Notion de creation dans <<L'Évolution créatrice>> d'Henri Bergson." Diss. Liege 1974. This work is listed as a "mémoire de licence."

Lafrance, Guy. La Philosophie sociale de Bergson. Collection "philosophica" Vol. III. Ottawa, Canada: Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1974, 148. The author finds many similarities between Bergson's social philosophy and that of Émile Durkheim.


Megay, Joyce N. "Bibliographie critique sur la question de l'influence de Bergson sur Proust." Proust Research Association Newsletter, No. 12 (1974), 14-21. The bibliographer deals here only with major studies devoted to the relationships between Marcel Proust and Bergson. Additional related bibliographic sources are presented by the author in the next number of the Proust Research Association Newsletter.


Morot-Sir, Édouard. Review of Morality in Evolution: The Moral Philosophy of Henri Bergson by Idella J. Gallagher. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 12, No. 3 (1974), 410-411. The author states, "Then I would emphasize, more than Mrs. Gallagher has done, the deep opposition to Kant, and consider that one of the most important intentions in writing The Two Sources of Morality and Religion was to sweep out the Kantian influence which pervaded French official values after 1870 and continues today, in spite of Henri Bergson's gallant fight" (p. 411).

Nedeljko, Đuras. Интуиционизам и дијалектика. Beograd: Научно дело, 1974, 184. Both Henri Bergson and A. O. Lovejoy are discussed in this work, whose romanized title is Intuicionizam i dijalektika.


Piclin, Michel. Schopenhauer, ou le tragédien de la volonté. Seghers-Philosophie. Paris: Seghers, 1974, 176. This study of Schopenhauer contains a comparison of his philosophy with Bergson's.


Rossi, Patrizio. "Tempo e memoria bergsoniani nell' Enrico IV di Luigi Pirandello." In Proceedings: Pacific Northwest Conference on Foreign Languages, ed. Walter C. Kraft, Vol. 25, Part 1: Literature and Linguistics. Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1974, 296. "Bergsonian philosophical schemes are used in Enrico IV where dramatic tension is constructed on the relation between memory and time. By comparing the development of the plot of Enrico IV with the ideas exposed in Materia e memoria, Enrico IV is seen as one of the best plays by Pirandello, although critics often point out
that Pirandello is dealing with abstract ideas and not with emotions and feelings which are truly human."
(1974 MLA Abstracts, 2, 47.)


--------- "La libertad como maduración en la filosofía bergsoniana." Razon y Fe, 190, No. 922 (1974), 328-341. This is an exposition of Bergson's concept of freedom.

role in Bergson's philosophy. By means of his interpretation of the calculus, Bergson was able to show that mathematics is able to describe motion; not by spatializing and fragmenting motion but by taking it as an indivisible "whole." Once the "whole" of motion is given, its constituent "parts" can be derived. This root conception is one which Bergson was able to apply prophetically to other sciences, notably to quantum physics.

Whitehead, Alfred North. "Reflections on Time and Endurance." Southern Journal of Philosophy, 12, No. 1 (1974), 117-126. This is a classroom lecture delivered by Whitehead in 1934, as part of a course titled "Cosmologies Ancient and Modern." Whitehead compares Bergson's concept of duration with Descartes' concept of "perpetual perishing" and Epicurus' view of time as an "accident of accidents." Whitehead likens his own position to Bergson's and twice commends Bergson for the "tremendous service" he has performed for philosophy. He also criticizes Bergson's concept of the intellect and its function. (These notes were originally transcribed, and subsequently edited and published, by Joseph Gerard Brennan.)


Winther, Truls. Paul Claudel og det skapende ord. Oslo: Universitet i Oslo, 1974, 343. This is a criticism and interpretation of the work of Paul Claudel.

1975


Bergson has shown, he states, how the human intellect attempts to discern the repetitive and the foreseeable in experience; Bergson has also shown that man's creative intellect makes new classifications and new modes of prediction. To complete the philosophy of creative evolution, however, it is necessary to explain why creative people prefer relatively disordered geometric figures to simply ordered figures—a fact which the author's research makes clear. Creative people, the author concludes, have learned to prefer a "disorder" which can be transformed into a new vision of order to a simply-established order based on concepts which are already old.


Downer, Shirley. "Une Vue de la comédie sauvage selon les théories du rire de Bergson." Chimères, 9, No. 1 (1975), 32-42. The phrase "comédie sauvage" has been suggested
by Professor Kenneth White to describe a new type of comic theater, in which violence is at the base of the comic situation. The author uses Bergson's theory of laughter to explore the "comédie sauvage," which includes works by Alfred Jarry, Louis Aragon, and Tristan Tsara.

Fizer, John. "Ingarden's Passes, Bergson's Durée Réelle, and William James' Stream: Metaphoric Variants or Mutually Exclusive Concepts on the Theme of Time." Dialectics and Humanism (Italy), 2, No. 3 (1975), 23-48. "The intent of this article is to give an analytical view of Roman Ingarden's understanding of temporality of intentionally contingent objects, particularly those of the work of literary art, and to juxtapose it with the views of Henri Bergson and William James. According to Ingarden, due to the ontological and structural complexity of these objects there exist three distinct possibilities of time in them. First, when their intentionality is bracketed from the lived experience, they become purely spatio-temporal phenomena; second, when they are conceived as artistic objects, their temporal sequence is given simultaneously; and third, when they are treated as aesthetic objects, their temporal phases exist serially through our experienced presentification. Bergson's, James' and Ingarden's positions on time reveal some resemblance but also substantial differences which are to be understood respectively in terms of their differing philosophies, vitalism, radical empiricism and phenomenology." (Abstract in The Philosopher's Index, 10, No. 1 (Spring, 1976), 62.)

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Heidsieck, François. "Bergson et la physique contemporaine." Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 80, No. 4 (1975), 528-540. This is a review of Milič Čapek's Henri Bergson and Modern Physics.

Johnson, Richard E. In Quest of a New Psychology: Toward a Redefinition of Humanism. New York: Human Sciences Press, 1975, 348. The author proposes a "new heuristic model for psychology" based on the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Humanistic psychology, lacking such a foundation and, hence, lacking a scientific base, will soon fade and dissolve. The author states concerning Bergson, "I have tried to make the basic tenets of his philosophy directly relevant to contemporary issues in psychology and readily available to all those persons concerned about the modern crisis in human and social evolution" (p. 19).

Jones, W. T. The Twentieth Century to Wittgenstein and Sartre. Vol. V of A History of Western Philosophy. 2nd ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1975, 435. Chapter II is titled "Three Philosophies of Process: Bergson, Dewey and Whitehead." In this general analysis of Bergson's thought, the author compares Bergson to Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Nietzsche, Kant, Goethe, and others. He finds Bergson's metaphysics was crippled by his destructive criticism of the human intellect. The section on Bergson, which contains several lengthy quotes, stretches from pp. 17-34. On p. 34 the author states that Bergson's "activism" played a role in the development of pragmatism.

McLean, Jeanne Priley. "Immediate Experience and the Problem of Expression: A Study in the Philosophy of Bergson." Diss. Loyola of Chicago 1975, 151. The author states that the problem of expression in Bergson is closely bound up with his distinction between intuition and intellect, while this distinction is in turn rooted in his metaphysics of duration. In the first chapter the author examines Bergson's metaphysics and in the second the relationships between intellect, intuition and reality. If the intellect deforms our intuitions of a fluid reality, is there any alternative way in which our intuitions can achieve valid expression? In chapter three the author examines those texts in which Bergson asserts that language, music, and art can provide a more fluid, hence more accurate description of duration. In the final chapter the author examines Bergson's proposal that philosophy employ an intuitive method and develops
the implications of this proposal for philosophical discourse and method. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 31, No. 4 (1975), 2260A-2261A.)

McMahon, Joseph John. "Bergson's Theistic Evolutionism." Diss. Saint John's 1975, 299. The author divides Bergson's philosophy into an earlier period, terminating in Creative Evolution, and a later period, as expressed in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. The earlier period finds Bergson without God, while the later finds Bergson with God. Since he finds no necessary connection between the earlier and the later Bergsons, the author concludes that it must have been pressures extrinsic to Bergson's philosophy that led Bergson to talk of the existence of God. It is fascinating to speculate on what these social and professional pressures may have been. (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 36, No. 9 (1975), 6148A-6149A.)


--------- "Proust et Bergson, en 1909." Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Marcel Proust, No. 25 (1975), 89-96. The author concludes, "Toujours est-il que les faits que nous venons de relever indiquent assez clairement que Bergson n'était pas au Centre des préoccupations de Proust au moment où celui-ci se mettait à composer le premier volume de La Recherche" (p. 96).


Nakamura, Yumiko. "De la Conception du bon sens chez Bergson." Études de Langue et Littérature Françaises, No. 25-26 (1975), 70-88. (Published by La Société Japonaise de Langue et Littérature Françaises.) The author identifies Bergson's concept of intuition with his concept of "good sense," and discusses the necessary ambiguity of intuition, with its reference both to reflection and to practical applications. She states, "le bon sens consiste à faire effort pour remonter la pente dont la base est le sens commun (le tout fait) et dont le sommet est l'intuition, en essayant de coincider avec le se faisant" (p. 71).
Reck, Andrew J. "Process Philosophy, A Categorial Analysis." Tulane Studies in Philosophy, 24 (1975), 58-91. The author examines the categories of process philosophy, suggesting ten categories as essential. Alexander, Whitehead, Dewey, Mead, James, Bergson, Hartshorne, Ushenko, Pepper, and Randall are among the process philosophers whose views are discussed.


---------. Review of Henri Bergson et le calcul infinitésimal by Jean Milet. Revue de Métaphysique et Morale, 80, No. 3 (1975), 389-390. The reviewer states that Milet's book is important, that Milet has demonstrated the centrality of calculus and the problem of the continuum in Bergson's thought. Bergson's philosophy is "un rationalisme du temps."


Schmidtke, Charles R. "A Crossroads for Process Philosophy." Tulane Studies in Philosophy, 24 (1975), 92-100. (Studies in Process Philosophy II) "Two different strands in process philosophy are explored, the one originating from Bergson's notion of an intuitive comprehension of the universe, the other stemming from Whitehead's approach, which aims to achieve a coherent account of the universe through logical construction. Schmidtke illustrates the difference between these two forms of process philosophy pursuing the analysis of continuity in the two philosophers. The logical difference between their two approaches turns, he thinks, on the priority
given by Bergson to his vision of a continuous unity of creative energy, whereas Whitehead emphasizes atomic entities and portrays the extensive continuum as merely potential. One evidence of the difference is in the question 'whether time is to be considered epochal or durational.' Schmidtke asks if it is not possible to synthesize these two traditions within process philosophy; speaking as a Bergsonian, he seems to hold that such a synthesis is not possible, because he regards Whitehead's concept of continuity as fundamentally deficient. In particular, he holds that Whitehead's treatment of continuity in terms of 'indefinite divisibility' fails to provide a sufficient condition for continuity. Schmidtke ties this deficiency to Whitehead's starting point, which introduces discreteness into the original datum from which he generalizes, with the result that Whitehead lacks an account of 'an actual continuity of reality.' Although seemingly having argued that a synthesis is not possible between the two thinkers, Schmidtke closes his article in a way suggesting that it might be possible if only Bergson were taken more seriously." (J. Gilmour, Process Studies, 6, No. 4 (Winter, 1976), 301.)

Sears, John F. "William James, Henri Bergson, and the Poetics of Robert Frost." New England Quarterly, 48, No. 3 (1975), 341-361. The author states, "Frost understood that time is real and makes a difference. Perhaps he learned this first from nature, but it must have been confirmed by his reading of Bergson's Creative Evolution and particularly by Bergson's effort to express it through metaphor" (p. 354). Frost's "vitalism" is discussed here on pp. 354-361.

Sherover, Charles M. The Human Experience of Time: The Development of its Philosophic Meaning. New York: New York University Press, 1975, 603. On p. 157 the author describes Bergson as having revived René Descartes' dualism of time and duration; on p. 163 he describes Bergson as having "built on" the thought of Rudolph Lotze; on p. 167 he claims that both Bergson and Samuel Alexander depended on Lotze as the ground of their temporal realisms; on pp. 168-174 the author gives a general account of Bergson's philosophy, stressing Bergson's insistence on the irreducible centrality of duration for philosophy; on p. 175 he distinguishes Bergson's views of time and space from those of Samuel Alexander; on pp. 179-181 he compares Bergson's and Alexander's conceptions of the "instant," the specious present," and "Causality;" on pp. 218-238 he reproduced the third
chapter, "Concerning the Nature of Time," from Bergson's Duration and Simultaneity; on p. 239 he notes Samuel Alexander's belief that Bergson, and then he, were the first two philosophers to take time seriously; on p. 240 he quotes Samuel Alexander's remark to this effect; on pp. 268-269 Hans Reichenbach's remarks on Bergson's and Heraclitus' "emotional" attitude towards time are quoted; on pp. 348-349, the author relates the close ties between Bergson and William James; on p. 422 John Dewey's remarks on Bergson and on William James in "Time and Individuality" are quoted; on pp. 451-453 the author suggests that the phenomenological movement in France had its own Bergsonian origins and examines the relevance of Bergson's thought to the phenomenology of Eugène Minkowski; on pp. 480 and 482n two remarks by Jean Piaget concerning Bergson are reproduced, one referring to Bergson's concept of duration as "invention," the other to Bergson's critique of relativity theory.


Stone, Charles. "Two Types of Knowledge in Bergson and Buber." Pakistan Philosophical Journal, 13 (1975), 77-81. "The epistemologies set forth by Buber in Ich und Du and Bergson in An Introduction to Metaphysics entail a dualism through the manner in which man knows reality: on the one hand it can be perceived through its individual qualities or attributes whereby the subject is always distinct from its object of knowledge; on the other--and for both this was the more important perspective--reality can be known in its inexhaustible wholeness whereby no dichotomy exists between subject and object." (Philosopher's Index, 9, No. 4 (Winter, 1975), 123.)


Theau, Jean. Review of La Philosophie sociale de Bergson by Guy Lafrance. Dialogue, 14, No. 4 (1975), 700-704. The reviewer states, "Guy Lafrance, servi justement pas sa double compétence et, fait plus rare mais encore plus heureux, par sa double sympathie, établit d'une façon quasi dirimante que Bergson a mis en pratique dans le domaine de la sociologie la règle qu'il avait adoptée.
dans celui de la physique, de la psychologie et de la biologie: se rendre docile aux enseignements de science contemporaine lorsqu'on s'aventure sur son terrain" (p. 702).

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"Le Rapport Quantité-Qualité Chez Hegel et Chez Bergson." Philosophiques, 2, No. 1 (1975), 3-21. "If we read Time and Free Will and The Science of Logic, we are struck by more than a few similar phrases about number, quantity, and mathematics in general. These similarities are even more striking as the two stand so far from each other. Nevertheless, if we analyze the developments which both have devoted to number, quantity, and mathematics in general, we see that the similitudes in language are not accidental: they arise from an analogy in the ordering of the notions. In Bergson as well as in Hegel, quantity follows quality and is opposed to it by a kind of negative process. But after we have emphasized the correspondences between the two doctrines, we better perceive their differences: for in Bergson the negative process, which is a reversal, is not at all an "aufhebung," which could be conceived by a logical dialectic: it must be studied empirically." (The Philosopher's Index, 9, No. 3 (Fall, 1975), 97.)


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Winther, Truls. Paul Claudel og det skapende ord. Oslo: Gyldendal, 1975, 156. This is an enlarged version of the first part of the author's thesis.


1976

Becco, Anne. "Leibniz, Bergson et le Language." Études Bergsoniennes, 11 (1976), 9-24. The author finds that Bergson's and Leibniz's views of the nature and importance of language are not incompatible. She examines the works by Leibniz in Bergson's private library.


Cocking, J. M. "Memorial Distinctions." London Times Literary Supplement, 75, No. 3889 (1976), 1214. This is a review of Joyce N. Megay's Bergson et Proust. The reviewer congratulates Megay for her contribution to the debate over the relations between Bergson and Proust, but states, "Whatever the importance of Proust's encounter with Bergson it was not absorption but dialogue. In general the evidence suggests that Proust was clearly aware of what he had in common with Bergson and afraid that others, seeing it just as clearly, would underrate his own originality."

Curtis, James M. "Bergson and Russian Formalism." Comparative Literature, 28, No. 2 (1976), 109-121. The author states on p. 109, "This paper suggests that, to a considerable extent, Russian formalism did succeed in creating 'an epistemologically based aesthetics,' for a conceptual paradigm which derives from the thought of Henri Bergson informs the criticism of the two principle theoreticians of formalism, Viktor Shklovsky and Yury Tynianov."


Delhomme, Jeanne. "Le Sens Interne." Études Bergsoniennes, 11 (1976), 35-65. The author examines the Kantian "Categories of the Understanding" from a Bergsonian point of view. The examination leads to Bergsonian "categories."


Goulet, J. Review of La Philosophie Sociale de Bergson, Sources et Interpretation par Guy Lafrance. Philosophiques, 3, No. 1 (1976), 81-92. "Utile contribution à la connaissance 'sociologique' de Bergson, contemporain de l'école française. On regrette toutefois que l'auteur ait laisse passer l'occasion de montrer en quoi le bergsonisme social, meme quand il s'allie à la science, se refuse--en vertu de son unite--a toute reduction et a toute interpretation autre que metaphysique." (The Philosopher's Index, 10, No. 4 (1976), 66.)

Greenberg, Louis M. "Bergson and Durkheim as Sons and Assimilators: The Early Years." French Historical Studies, 9, No. 4 (1976), 619-634. This article deals with the early personal histories of Henri Bergson and Émile Durkheim. It touches, particularly, on "certain failings of their fathers."


Hall, Dorothy Judd. "The Height of Feeling Free: Frost and Bergson." Texas Quarterly, 19, No. 1 (1976), 128-143. The author describes the lasting impact of Henri Bergson on the American poet Robert Frost. This influence was occasioned in 1911 when Frost read the English translation of Bergson's Creative Evolution, and can be found in such poems as "The Grindstone," "West-Running Brook," and "Kitty Hawk," among others.
Harris, Geoffry. "Bergson and Catholic Thought." Month, 2nd N.S., 9, No. 12 (1976), 414-417. This is a review and criticism of A. E. Pilkington's Bergson and His Influence: A Reassessment. The reviewer defends Bergson against many of Pilkington's criticisms, and reviews Bergson's influence on French Catholic thought in the early decades of the 20th century.

Holder, Keith. "Elements of Henri Bergson's Creative Evolution in the Stream of Consciousness Novels of Virginia Woolf." Master's Thesis, Midwestern State 1976, 78. The author holds that though Virginia Woolf was not influenced by Bergson, many aspects of her novels are Bergsonian. He attributes this similarity to the Zeitgeist. The author concludes his study with an original short story which, he believes, embodies Bergsonian ideas.

Huett, Richard. "Nietzsche and Bergson, A Discursive Dialogue." Midwestern Journal of Philosophy, 4, No. 1 (1976), 30-34. "An attempt, through a brief, imaginary encounter, to point up some of the principal themes of the two philosophers, wherein they are similar and where they differ. The fundamental identification between the two, however, is that 'Essentially, nevertheless, we affirmed the multiplicity of existence, the creativity of the universe, the novelty that continues to emerge. We called Heraclitus father and disowned Parmenides.' In addition, it is suggested that there is a relationship between style and content." (The Philosopher's Index, 10, No. 2 (1976), 81.)

Hurley, Patric J. "Bergson and Whitehead on Freedom." Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 50 (1976), 107-117. "Both H. Bergson and A. N. Whitehead hold that freedom is an ubiquitous factor in the world, yet the two approach the subject from different perspectives. Bergson, to avoid any trace of mechanism, insists that the free act is creative of radical novelty. Whitehead, observing that significant freedom involves vision, postulates a realm of eternal forms which convey to the free agent information about the corresponding environment. The two positions are thus at odds with each other. A modification of Whitehead's position is suggested which might allow it to retain its own distinctive advantages yet avoid the charges of mechanism from the Bergsonian camp." (The Philosopher's Index, 11, No. 4 (1977), 68.)


Lafrance, Guy. "Lire Bergson (réponse à J. Goulet)." Philosophiques, 3, No. 2 (1976), 279-284. "This article is a controversy on reading Bergson. It is in part a reply by the author to a criticism of his book La philosophie sociale de Bergson, Sources et interpretation. In his reply the author demonstrates the necessity for an accurate understanding of Bergson's social philosophy, to situate Bergson's thought within its intellectual climate which was one of confrontation with sciences and in particular with the social sciences and social ideas of his time. The main trend of the author's book was to make explicit how Bergson was well informed of the questions discussed by the anthropologists and the sociologists of his time and how his social thought was seriously taking into account those discussions." (The Philosopher's Index, 11, No. 2 (1977), 94.)

Levert, Paule. "Passé-Durée-Présent." Études Bergsoniennes, 11 (1976), 77-86. The author studies Bergson's concepts of memory, of the past, and of the present, relating Bergson's thought to that of Louis Lavelle. Mention is made of a similarity between Bergson's philosophy and the associationism of David Hume.

Lucas, Thierry. Review of Henri Bergson et le calcul infinitésimal by Jean Milet. Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 74, No. 22 (1976), 285-286. The reviewer concurs with the author's claim that Bergson saw the infinitesimal calculus as having introduced time into mathematics, thus making possible a new "rationalité du temps." He
regrets that the author does not examine the views of contemporary mathematicians, particularly those who espouse "non-standard analysis."

Megay, Joyce N. Bergson et Proust: Essai de mise au point de la question de l'influence de Bergson sur Proust. Essais d'Art et de Philosophie. Paris: Vrin, 1976, 170. The author denies that Henri Bergson's philosophy influenced the novels of Marcel Proust. This is a very careful and detailed study, which examines the history of attempts to relate the thought of Proust and Bergson.

Morkovsky, Mary Christine. "Henri Bergson on Freedom without Antecedent Possibility." Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 50 (1976), 99-106. "Henri Bergson maintained that freedom described or defined in terms of possibility negates the dynamism of real duration. He also claimed that free choice involves conceiving several possible actions. The article summarizes definitions of freedom unacceptable to Bergson and the metaphysical implications of his view of possibility. It concludes that his views on human freedom are consistent. Creative duration enhances antecedent reality rather than adding to antecedently existing possibility. Conceptual possibility is an immobilization and intellectual product, rather than a source of continuous, ongoing evolution." (The Philosopher's Index, 11, No. 4 (1977), 76.)


Novikov, A. V. От позитивизма к интуитиву: критические очерки буржуазной эстетики. Москва: Искусство, 1976, 253. The romanized title of this Russian-language work is От позитивизма к интуитиву. It contains addresses, essays, and lectures on 19th and 20th century aesthetics and on the philosophy of Bergson.
Piclin, Michel. "Bergson, La Transcendance et le Kantisme." Études Bergsoniennes, 11 (1976), 87-113. The author examines Bergson's and Kant's conceptions of time. Kant's notion of the aesthetic (artistic) object is closely similar to Bergson's "durée."

Pilkington, Anthony Edward. Bergson and His Influence: A Reassessment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, viii, 253. The author examines the degree of Bergson's influence on four thinkers: Charles Péguy, Paul Valéry, Marcel Proust, and Julien Benda. He illustrates Péguy's indebtedness to Bergson as well as his intellectual independence. He finds any relations of influence by Bergson on Valéry difficult to trace and any clearcut and simple conclusions in this respect difficult to formulate. His conclusions concerning the relations between Bergson and Proust are highly complex. He is in any case clear that there are many important divergences between the philosopher and the novelist over the concepts of memory and of time. The author's analysis of Benda's lifelong campaign against Bergson and Bergsonism is extremely perceptive. The author examines Benda's arguments, showing many to be merely "verbal."

Pipa, Arshi. "L'Influence de Boutroux et de Bergson sur Montale." Revue des Études Italiennes, NS 22, No. 3 (1976), 193-204. The author studies the influence of the philosophies of Bergson and Boutroux on the poetry of Montale.


Robinet, André. "Documentation Bergsonienne." Études Bergsoniennes, 11 (1976), 5-8. Professor Robinet lists letters between Bergson and Harald Höffding and between Bergson and Dr. John Landquist. A brief note from Bergson to Edmund Husserl is mentioned.

Roche de Coppens, Peter. "The Rediscovery of Bergson's Work. Its Implications for Sociology in General and the Sociology of Religion in Particular." Revista Internacional de Sociologia, 34, No. 17 (1976), 133-160. The author proposes that Bergson's work, now long neglected, is due for rediscovery. He describes Bergson's milieu and the development of his philosophy, claiming that several figures in recent history are directly or indirectly in Bergson's debt, including William James, Carl Jung, Pitirim Sorokin, Arnold Toynbee, Mircea Eliade, Roberto Assaglioli, and others. Bergson's great merit, the author holds, is to make us rethink our received opinions about what is real and important. His greatest contribution can be to our understanding of human nature. Bergson makes this possible by showing (1) valid knowledge stems not only from the senses and the intellect but also from lived human experience; (2) man is not only a biosocial and a psychological but also a spiritual being; (3) to fully actualize himself man must turn towards and take into account his spiritual nature.


Sonnenfeld, Albert. Review of Bergson et Proust by Joyce N. Megay. French Review, 50, No. 2 (1976-1977), 349. The reviewer states, "In other words, Megay's thesis ["un abîme les sépare, en ce qui concerne leur vision du monde"] is not a constant in a relentlessly overstated polemic but a conclusion reached after judicious presentation of textual evidence . . . ." The reviewer, however, does question the author's literal-mindedness.


Stearns, J. Brenton. "Becoming: A Problem for Determinists?" Process Studies, 6, No. 4 (1976), 237-248. "A doctrine of central importance to process metaphysics (especially to Bergson, Čapek, and Hartshorne, and probably also to James, Weiss, and Whitehead) is that the determinist contradicts himself when talking about a fully determinate
future. Since actuality adds nothing to an entity's definiteness, to say that a future event is definite now is to say it is actual now—a contradiction. I argue in reply that a determinist can consistently believe in an authentic future and that process metaphysics itself provides conceptual apparatus for thinking about the asymmetries of time without grounding itself on a flimsy refutation of determinism." (The Philosopher's Index, 11, No. 2 (1977), 111.)


Zwart, P. J. About Time: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin and Nature of Time. Amsterdam and Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Co.; New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., 1976, 266. The author (who is both a philosopher and a scientist) attempts to clarify a number of philosophical issues about time. He adopts a relational view "in which time is regarded as a concept based on the primitive relation of before-and-after" (p. 1). The author states, "In any case time works, it is active, and consequently it is real. The efficacy of time constitutes its reality" (p. 4). Bergson's distinction between physical and psychological time is mentioned here on p. 44; Bergson's refutation of Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise is stated and refuted on pp. 210-211, on the basis that Bergson refers only the special case of discontinuous motion; Bergson's attempted resolution of Zeno's paradoxes is briefly examined on pp. 224-226. The author carefully examines, and argues effectively against, the concept of physical time-reversal on pp. 140-160.

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Alderman, Harold. "The Place of Comedy." Man and World, 10, No. 2 (1977), 152-172. The author compares Bergson's "subjective" theory of comedy with James K. Feibleman's "Object-oriented" view. On p. 169 he states, "In summary, comedy, as we have seen, is reducible neither to
an objective property (Feibleman) nor to a subjective response (Bergson). Comedy, rather, is the worldly celebration of place in which comic object and comic subjectivity meet in the discovery of otherness."

Appan Ramanujam, A. "Bergson's Philosophy of Laughter." Indian Philosophical Quarterly, 4, No. 2 (1977), 7-17. "The aim of this article is to highlight a particular form of logic at work in the phenomenon of laughter—the logic of imagination. In my estimation the interpretations offered by Bergson follow naturally from his metaphysical standpoint. The article opens with an introduction emphasizing the importance of laughter as a specifically human phenomenon. It is followed by a brief statement of Bergson's metaphysical position and his concept of imagination which is a key to his work on laughter. The rest of this article is devoted to show how in Bergson's hands laughter ceases to be an elusive phenomenon." (The Philosopher's Index, 11, No. 4 (1977), 53.)


Čapek, Milíč. "Immediate and Mediate Memory." Process Studies, 7, No. 2 (1977), 90-96. In this essay Čapek
replies to criticisms of his view of Bergson's concept of memory, criticisms posed in David Sipfle's review of Capek's *Bergson and Modern Physics*.

"La Pensée de Bergson en Amérique." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 121-122, Nos. 3-4 (1977), 229-350. The author analyzes the influence of Bergson on several American philosophers: William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, Horace Meyer Kallen, Ralph Barton Perry, John Dewey, George Santayana, Josiah Royce, Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, and Ralph Tyler Flewelling. His analysis of the relations between Bergson and James (pp. 330-340) shows the close affinities of the two thinkers, as well as their very important mutual influences.


Flewelling, Ralph Tyler. "Letter to Henri Bergson, 1919." In Daniel S. Robinson's "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1940." *Coranto*, 10, No. 2 (1977), 23. In this letter Flewelling replies to Bergson's response to criticisms of Bergson contained in the manuscript to the first half of Flewelling's *Bergson and Personal Realism* (1920). The criticisms which he has posed, Flewelling states, are more tentative than they may at first appear. He urges Bergson to read the second half of his manuscript before coming to any conclusions.

"Letter to Henri Bergson, 1920." In Daniel S. Robinson's "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1940." *Coranto*, 10, No. 2 (1977), 24. In this letter, sent along with a copy of the first issue of *The Personalist*, Flewelling invites Bergson to respond to criticisms posed in the second half of the manuscript to Flewelling's *Bergson and Personal Realism* (1920).
"Letter to Henri Bergson, October 8, 1920." In Daniel S. Robinson's "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1940." Coranto, 10, No. 2 (1977), 25. In this letter Flewelling re-extends an invitation to Bergson to lecture at the University of Southern California.

"Letter to Henri Bergson, December 1, 1920." In Daniel S. Robinson's "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1940." Coranto, 10, No. 2 (1977), 26. In this letter Flewelling thanks Bergson for agreeing to lecture at the University of Southern California, on any occasion in which he might come to America again.

"Letter to Henri Bergson, August 18, 1921." In Daniel S. Robinson's "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1940." Coranto, 10, No. 2 (1977), 26-27. In this letter Flewelling introduces Bergson to President William Arnold Shanklin of Wesleyan University, who wishes to extend an invitation to Bergson to give a course of lectures.


"Letter to Henri Bergson, March 29, 1933." In Daniel S. Robinson's "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1940." Coranto, 10, No. 2 (1977), 28-29. With this letter Flewelling encloses two copies of the Bergson issue of The Personalist. He wishes Bergson well and hopes Bergson will find the issue to his liking.

"Letter to Henri Bergson, June 6, 1933." In Daniel S. Robinson's "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1940." Coranto, 10, No. 2 (1977), 30. In this letter Flewelling thanks Bergson for his warm response to the Bergson issue of The Personalist. He encloses with his letter a letter of introduction to Louis J. Hopkins, an American philosopher who wishes to meet Bergson.
Gentile, Luigi. "Origini, Funzioni e Natura del Linguaggio Nella Filosofia di H. Bergson." Aquinas, 20 (1977), 417-418. "The author has written this article because he is firmly convinced that the knowledge of the origin, nature and function of language in Bergson's thought helps a thorough understanding of it. After pointing out that human communication is deeply linked to human nature and to social structure, the author analyzes the connections between instinct, intelligence, intuition and language. He proceeds to call attention to the connections between language and 'duree,' language and thought. To explain these connections means to clear up such problems as causality, freedom and the human person. The author concludes by saying the word must always serve the idea and not vice versa." (The Philosopher's Index, 12, No. 3 (1978), 101.)

Hartshorne, Charles. "The Neglect of Relative Predicates in Modern Philosophy." American Philosophical Quarterly, 14, No. 3 (1977), 308-318. "This partly systematic, partly historical essay, as closely reasoned as any the author has written, analyzes the logic of the idea of relativity or dependence. Relative predicates (e.g., 'is causally conditioned by') imply dependence of their subjects on other subjects. They express internal or constituitive relations. That x is relative to y need not, and typically does not, mean that y is relative to x. The relation of entailment models this asymmetry. Ontological dependencies are similarly asymmetrical. Extreme monists assert symmetrical dependence and extreme pluralists assert symmetrical independence as the rule. Ontology should follow formal logic and accept the basic asymmetry of dependencies." (The Philosopher's Index, 12, No. 1 (1978), 65-66.)

Herbert, G. S. "The Concept of Future in Bergson and Heidegger: A Comparative Study." Indian Philosophical Quarterly, 4, No. 3 (1977), 597-604. "The Concept of the Future is important in any philosophy of time and the aim of this paper is to show that there can be more than one view of future and of time. Bergson and Heidegger hold that real time is self-generic and cannot be quantified. Both of them distinguish between two types of time, but with a difference--Bergson: pure time and alloyed time; and Heidegger: authentic and inauthentic time. For Bergson future is open, indefinite and infinite. For Heidegger future is limited, definite and finite. This difference arises because Bergson thinks
in terms of creative evolution, whereas Heidegger thinks on the basis of authentic Dasein. Any point of view is equally possible and justifiable from the standpoint of a philosopher." (The Philosopher's Index, 11, No. 4 (1977), 67.)

Johnson, William M. Review of Twentieth-Century French Thought from Bergson to Levi-Strauss by Joseph Chiari. The French Review, 50, No. 5 (1977), 794-795. The reviewer criticizes the author for treating so many diverse philosophers as if they were in agreement.


Lasine, Stuart. "Sight, Body, and Motion in Plato and Kafka: A Study of Projective and Topological Experience." Diss. Wisconsin-Madison 1977, 731. The author distinguishes two basic modes of knowledge. The first, based on the biological process of metabolic exchange, involves a fluid world in topological space. The second, based on the model of sight at a distance, keeps the fluid world at a distance at the cost of the possibility of intercourse with it. The comparison of these two modes of knowing creates a "model for textual analysis." In the first two chapters texts by Lucretius, Schopenhauer, Freud, Bergson, and Sartre dealing with the problems of sight and body are examined. In the last two chapters, Plato and Kafka are examined. Both Plato and Kafka prefer sight to intercourse with the fluid world. The author concludes with an examination of the distorting effect of "detached beholding." (See Dissertation Abstracts International, 38, No. 12 (1978), 7314A.)


Lutzow, Thomas H. "The Structure of the Free Act in Bergson." Process Studies, 7, No. 2 (1977), 73-89. "The study shows that Bergson's thought can be interpreted axiomatically with indetermination accepted in a Cartesian-like fashion as the most basic indubitable fact. Accepting indetermination from the start, Bergson lists each
of the mental and physical structures, e.g., conscious perception, memory, affection, intellect, space, the organic and inorganic fields, as its necessary conditions. This approach is clearly opposed to mechanism as well as Kantian phenomenalism in that these latter views take the experience of freedom to be an illusion. In the end, Bergson offers us a finalism that has the present level of human freedom as an intermediate goal in evolutionary process with the structures listed above as necessary consequents supportive of that goal." (The Philosopher's Index, 12, No. 3 (1978), 116.)

Marcel, Gabriel. "Discussion à la suite de cet exposé." Cahiers Charles Du Bos, 21 (1977), 47-63. In the course of a discussion with André-A. Devaux concerning Devaux' article "Du Bos disciple de Bergson?" Marcel ponders Bergson's early emphasis on the philosophy of Herbert Spencer, and his influence on Marcel's philosophical development.


Minafra, Vincenzo. "Intuizione e filosofia negativa in Henri Bergson." Raccolta di Studi e Richerche (Bari, Italy), 1 (1977), 231-239.

Mitchell, Bonner. Review of Bergson and His Influence by Anthony Edward Pilkington. World Literature Today, 51, No. 3 (1977), 411. The reviewer states, "All serious students of Proust, including erudite specialists, should
now consult (Pilkington's) thirty-two dense pages on the subject. The other studies are equally lucid and convincing."

Mitchell, Timothy. "Bergson, Le Bon, and Hermetic Cubism." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 36, No. 2 (1977), 175-183. The author discusses the influence of the ideas of Henri Poincaré, Henri Bergson, and Gustav Le Bon on cubism. He proposes a re-evaluation of hermetic cubism in the light of the notions of science and philosophy confronting artists in the first decade of the 20th century in France. On p. 176 he states, "Bergson's philosophy is as important to the development of cubism as Schelling's Nature Philosophy was to German romantic painting."


Morkovsky, Mary Christine. "L'Accomplissement de l'homme dans sa rencontre avec Dieu." Communion (Talizee), No. 15-16 (1977), 65-73. The author deals from a Bergsonian perspective with the problem of human fulfillment through the encounter with God. "Quand il est co-créateur avec Dieu, et quand tout comme son Père céleste il a à cœur d'œuvrir et d'etendre la vie, l'homme trouve son accomplissement" (p. 71).


Robinson, Daniel S. "The Bergson-Flewelling Correspondence, 1914-1940." Coranto, 10, No. 2 (1977), 21-37. The author presents, and comments on, a series of letters between Henri Bergson and Ralph Tyler Flewelling, an American personalist who was the founder of the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California and of the journal The Personalist. These letters begin with discussions of Flewelling's vivid criticisms of Bergson in his Bergson and Personal Realism (1920) and conclude with Flewelling's acceptance of Bergson's philosophy as expressed in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932).


Soulez, Philippe. "Lorsque Freud parle de Bergson." Psychanalyse à l'Université, 3, No. 9 (1977), 93-109. In this article, the second of two devoted to the topic of the relations between Bergson and Freud, the author examines the two known references by Freud to Bergson: (1) The passages in Wit and its Relations to the Unconscious in which Freud critiques, and in part utilizes, Bergson's theory of comedy, and (2) Freud's letter of 1910 to James Jackson Putnam, leader of the early psychoanalytic movement in the United States. Freud, the author concludes, doubtless read Bergson's Matter and Memory (1896). He and Bergson clearly agreed (1) that the unconscious can not be reduced to brain mechanisms, and (2) that all memories are stored in the unconscious; none are lost. The author, in establishing this dual thesis, mentions Bergson's psychology lectures circa 1892 and his close contact with Marie Bonaparte, who, in turn, was Freud's French translator.

Tanigawa, Atsuchi. "Genèse et structure de l'esthétique d'Etienne Souriau." Bigaku, 28, No. 4 (1977), 56. (In Japanese) "E. Souriau est philosophe avant d'être esthéticien et c'est le problème de la connaissance qui l'a amène à méditer sur l'art et non inversement. Dans la première oeuvre, 'Pensée vivante et perfection formelle; qui date des 1925 et constitue l'un des premiers documents de la réaction contre le bergsonisme, Souriau cherchant à réhabiliter le rationnel comme instrument d'une
connaissance de l'ontique, demande au sentiment esthétique d'une perfection formelle de justifier la réalité objective de cette connaissance. Mais cette perfection n'est pas une donnée toute faite en dehors de l'esprit, et pour ainsi dire passive et statique. Il préfère placer la perfection dans la création ou l'instauration. De ce point de vue, le seul et le meilleur moyen de saisir l'être sur le vif, c'est de le créer soi-même sous le signe de la perfection, voilà pourquoi l'activité instauratrice de l'artiste est le type de la révélation métaphysique des réalités abolues, et pourquoi c'est bien l'esthétique qui est le modèle d'un accomplissement de l'idéalité en connaissance ontologique." (The Philosopher's Index, 12, No. 2 (1978), 97.)


Thinés, Georges. Phenomenology and the Science of Behavior: An Historical and Epistemological Approach. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977, 174. "The peculiar nature of subjective time was first stressed in an explicit manner by Bergson; it was not primarily a phenomenological issue. However, in contrasting the continuous time-flow of consciousness with the discontinuity of measurable physical time, Bergson inaugurated, concurrently with William Hames, a new approach to the nature of consciousness which had major consequences in phenomenology and psychology" (p. 51). The question of psychological time was later raised indirectly and in new terms by "purposive machines" which were, for a time, "hastily endowed with temporal characteristics similar to those of the living subject" (p. 52). The author rejects this identification on pp. 52-55. He refers to F.J.J. Buytendijk, Prolegomena to an Anthropological Physiology, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1974, 223-224, where Buytendijk states, "Thus the modern automation exists in the same sort of Bergsonian time as the living organism. This is only apparently the case. The automaton does show quasi-living forms of time; duration (durée-Bergson), prolepsis, 'tentative and retrograde purpose' (Auersperg), a memory (knowledge of the past); but it is impossible to take these properties into consideration in themselves, i.e., without the designer who has included all this in his programming . . . . A subjectively determined performance can not be described.
as a series of processes which take place in physical time, because each performance develops itself. The concept of genesis can only be used in the organic world."


Tulving, Endel. "Cue-Dependent Forgetting." In Current Trends in Psychology: Readings from the American Scientist. Ed. Irving L. Janis. Los Altos, California: William Kaufmann, Inc., 1977, 142-150. The author begins his exposition of contemporary theories of memory with a quote from Creative Evolution: "We trail behind us, unawares, the whole of our past; but our memory pours into the present only the odd recollection or two that in some way complete our present situation." He defends the theory that forgetting is "cue-dependent," i.e., that forgetting involves not the loss of memory-traces but the failure to retrieve the correct memory. By providing the correct "cue," it is often possible to retrieve a memory which is supposedly lost. The author defends this theory of memory against the theory that memory is "trace-dependent."

Wagner, Helmut R. "The Bergsonian Period of Alfred Schütz." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 38, No. 4 (1977), 187-199. "The article discusses the attempt which Schütz made in 1925 to link Weber's Sociology of Understanding to Bergson's philosophy. The major unfinished essay analyzed is devoted to a preliminary construction of a theory of the ego, comprising six "life-forms" ranging from pure duration to the thinking I. The author suggests that Schütz gave up this attempt, realizing that Bergson's 'pure duration' remained inaccessible to experience and introspection. Therefore, he turned to Husserl who contributed the main phenomenological support to his fundamental study of Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt." (The Philosopher's Index, 12, No. 2 (1978), 99.)

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debida (1933), tratando de demostrar la estrecha relación existente entre el poema de Pedro Salinas y la filosofía de Bergson, así como el grave problema que la adherencia inicial a la misma supuso para el poeta" (p. 98).


Čapek, Milič. "Bergson, Nominalism, and Relativity." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 10, No. 3 (1978), 127-133. This is a response to a review of the author's *Bergson and Modern Physics* by Pete A. Y. Gunter in an earlier issue of the *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* (6, No. 1, 1975). The author deals with two issues raised in the review: the question of Bergson's supposed nominalism and the question of the relations of quantum and relativity theories. Bergson, in spite of received opinions, is not a nominalist; he is instead a conceptualist. The author denies Gunter's contention that relativity and quantum physics are distinct, incompatible theories. He also denies that relativity theory permits velocities faster than light, or particles "travelling into the past."


"normaliens." In particular, he describes their mutual competition as debaters and their (very distinctive) personalities.


----------. "Philosophic Understanding and the Continuity of Becoming." International Philosophical Quarterly, 18, No. 4 (1978), 375-393. "This studies two different modes of philosophic understanding, Bergson's emphasizing intuition, and Whitehead's emphasizing intellection, brought to bear on a single problem, the analysis of becoming. Bergson's conclusion that becoming is fundamentally continuous, Whitehead's that it is epochal or episodic, are apparently antithetical. It is argued, however, that the intuitive and intellectual methods are in fact mutually interrelated, the latter ancillary to the former, so that the respective conclusions are seen as mutually complimentary rather than antithetical. The two modes of analysis stand in need of one another, and intuition, properly understood, must be taken seriously as a philosophic method." (The Philosopher's Index, 13, No. 1 (1979), 84.)


Gunter, Pete A. Y. "Bergson, Conceptualism, and Indeterminacy: A Rejoinder to Capek." Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 9, No. 3 (1978), 135-137. This is a reply to Milič Capek's response to the author's previous review
(Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 6, No. 1, 1975) of Čapek's *Bergson and Modern Physics*. The author agrees with Čapek that Bergson is not a nominalist, but urges that the question of nominalism be pursued in an ontological and not merely an epistemological context. Only the most basic features of duration should, on Bergson's terms, be viewed as universals. The author agrees with Čapek that relativity and quantum physics do not really allow for "particles travelling backward in time." He disagrees, however, concerning the complete compatibility of quantum determinism and relativistic indeterminism.

---------. "Bergson's Philosophical Method and its Applications to the Sciences." Southern Journal of Philosophy, 16, No. 3 (1978), 167-181. "Henri Bergson has often been interpreted as anti-intellectual and anti-scientific because his philosophical method, with its polarity of intuition and intelligence, has been misunderstood. The interaction of philosophical intuition and scientific intelligence is understood by Bergson as being fruitful for both terms. Intuition, a form of reflection and not mere "feeling," is awakened by the fragmentary and static concepts of scientific intelligence. In turn, intuition of the dynamisms of nature can provoke new, more supple scientific concepts. Intuition and intelligence thus constitute the terms of a dialectic. Bergsonian method continues to apply, e.g., to thermodynamics and chronobiology." (The Philosopher's Index, 14, No. 2 (1980), 98.)


Holland, Norman N. "What Can a Concept of Identity Add to Psycholinguistics?" In Psychiatry and the Humanities, Vol. III of Psychoanalysis and Language. Ed. Joseph E. Smith. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978, 171-234. The author argues that the wholeness of a person can be understood "as variations on an identity theme" (p. 172). The author quotes Bergson's *Matter and Memory* (p. 136, Macmillan, 1911) to the effect that listening is an active process. The author adds,
"Perhaps the most useful term for this scanning process is Halle and Stevens' 'analysis-by-synthesis.' They propose 'a recognition model for speech' in which 'patterns are generated internally in the analyzer according to a flexible or adaptable sequence of instructions until a best match with the input signal is obtained;' in other words, an analysis 'achieved through active internal synthesis of comparison signals'." The author footnotes M. Halle and K. N. Stevens, "Speech Recognition: A Model and a Program for Research," in Eds. J. A. Fodor and J. Katz' The Structure of Language, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964, 604.

Humes, Joy Nachod. Two Against Time: A Study of the Very Present Worlds of Paul Claudel and Charles Péguy. Chapel Hill: North Carolina Studies in the Romance Languages and Literature, University of North Carolina Department of Romance Languages, 1978, 171. In Chapter III, "... And Time Again" (pp. 80-100), the author examines Bergson's influence on Charles Péguy, an influence which, she states, "would be difficult to exaggerate" (p. 80). (The great philosophical influence on Paul Claudel was, by contrast, the author observes, Aquinas.) See also p. 140, where the author discusses the relevance of Bergson's concept of interpenetration to Péguy's idea of ancienne France.


Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. L'Union de l'âme et du corps chez Malebranche, Biran et Bergson: Notes recueillies et


Weinstein, Michael A. Meaning and Appreciation: Time and Modern Political Life. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1978, ix, 155. The author claims to use a Bergsonian method in this book. He defines the essence of politics as the control over space, and proposes an "appreciative logic" for today's man who can no longer direct his life through meaningful action.

The author refers to Bergson on pp. xii, 33, 41, 82, 107, 114, 209, 220, 280, and 321. No significant corrections have been made in these passages over the 1929 or other previous editions.


1979

Appan Ramanujam, A. "A Study in the Development of the Philosophy of Henri Bergson." Diss. Annamalai (India) 1979. The goal of this study is to analyze the shift in Bergson's thought which occurred between the writing of Creative Evolution (1906) and the writing of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). In the first part of this thesis the author examines the historical roots of Bergson's thought. He argues that Bergson's concept of duration was founded on the thought of Herbert Spencer, Boutou, Renouvier, Balmes, Delboef, Lotze, William James, and James Ward, while Bergson's concept of intuition was indebted to Jules Tannery, Jules Lachêli, Ravaisson, Cournot, Fouillée, Guyau, Schopenhauer, and Maine de Biran. The author holds that Bergson's psychology was influenced by Ribot, and that Lalande, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Renouvier, Ravaisson, and Marin influenced the formation of his concept of élan vital. The author concludes that William James and Émile Durkheim played significant roles in the formulation of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.

The second part of this thesis concerns Bergson's earlier and later concepts of God, intellect, and intuition. In Creative Evolution God is the impersonal and undetermined "push" behind evolution. In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion God becomes both personal and purposeful.

The third part of this thesis examines the shift in Bergson's thought in greater detail. It includes a discussion of Bergson's attitudes towards Roman Catholicism and Judaism, his concepts of the relations between intuition (especially mystical intuition) and practical problems, his limitation of moral duties to human beings, and his conception of Oriental religion. The author finds basic inconsistencies in Bergson's thought. Mystical intuition is portrayed by Bergson as both practical action and as absorption in God. But it is hard to see
how it can be both. Similarly, Bergson preaches an "open morality." But such a morality can not be limited to man alone. To be truly open it must include duties explicitly to the sub-human world as well as to the human. Bergson's treatment of Indian mysticism as "incomplete" will amuse the student of Indian philosophy. The ideal of universal brotherhood had been emphasized in the Upanishads, Jainism, and Buddhism well before Christianity.


Barron, Frank. The Shaping of Personality: Conflict, Choice, and Growth. New York: Harper and Row, 1979, 359. In Chapter 25 ("The Conflict of Connected Opposites," pp. 295-306), the author examines Bergson's distinction between intellect and intuition and relates this distinction to recent theories of brain lateralization. (In the process he describes Bergson as the "mentor" of the most significant contributor to cognitive psychology, Jean Piaget.) The author believes that Bergson's attempt to distinguish mind from brain via data drawn from the study of the aphasias shows much naïveté, but concludes that work done on hemispheric specialization bears out Bergson's distinction between two opposed principles of mental functioning. In this connection he notes, "modern theorists such as Joseph Bogen (the neurosurgeon who first performed the split-brained operation in human beings) and R. W. Sperry, who had earlier initiated such experiments with cats, have found Bergson's ideas useful in understanding some of these new observations concerning the functioning of the human brain" (p. 297).

Brisson, Mary Jo T. Landiera. "The Presence of Henri Bergson in Antonio Machado." Diss. North Carolina 1979, 243. The author analyzes the direct relationships between Bergson and the poet Antonio Machado in four areas: personality, pedagogics, poetry and language, and the comic. She concludes that the similarities are most pronounced in the case of the comic. These similarities may be traced, the author concludes, to the zeitgeist rather than to direct influence. (See Dissertations Abstracts International, 40, No. 8 (1980), 4619A.)

Gentile, Luigi. "Relatività E Assolutezza Della Filosofia in Henri Bergson." Aquinas, 22, No. 1 (1979), 94-117. "In order to go through Bergson's thought, Gentile considers
fundamental the clarification of the essence and the method of the 'philosophy' as they result from the whole philosopher's work, which is discussed in a profound and documented way. He discusses the concepts of space, time and duration, of intelligence and intuition, of philosophy and science, of spirit and matter, and he demonstrates how Bergson succeeds, through his 'positive metaphysics,' in escaping the pernicious dilemma of either dogmatism or scepticism. Gentile, having completed his study of Bergson's very complex philosophy, concludes that even though Bergson disregards a Manichean interpretation, he does not believe that the different philosophy should be considered in the same light."

(The Philosopher's Index, 13, No. 4 (1979), 102.)


Langer, Suzanne K. Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art Developed from Philosophy in a New Key. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979, 431. Chapter VII of this study in aesthetic theory ("The Image of Time," pp. 104-119) discusses Bergson's theory of real duration as fundamental to a satisfactory musical aesthetics, and a satisfactory theory of musical aesthetics as fundamental to all aesthetic theory. The author criticizes Bergson, however, for his rejection of symbolism in metaphysics and his repudiation of space. According to Professor Langer, for Bergson duration is "formless."


Nye, Mary Jo. "The Boutroux Circle and Poincaré's Convention­alism." Journal of the History of Ideas, 40, No. 1 (1979), 107-120. On p. 120 the author, after arguing for the influence of Émile Boutroux and his circle on Henri Poincaré, notes, "Paradoxically for his conservative aims, Boutroux's philosophy provided an opportunity for the budding of philosophical and scientific relativism, and Poincaré was to spend long hours defending conventionalism against this skeptical variant. The relativistic offshoot took root in Paris in Bergson's intuitionism, and, in reaction, the French scientific community,
including Poincaré himself, may well have sought defensively to emphasize more than ever experimentalism and the dependence of science on observed experimental data, rather than to take risks in speculative metaphysical approaches. If so, the influence of the Boutroux Circle in the long run may have increased the already experimental character of French science at the turn of the century, a character which could still be seen after the First World War in French skepticism about quantum mechanics and general relativity theory . . . ." See also pp. 107n and 118.

O'Neil, L. Thomas. Towards the Divine Life: Sri Aurobindo's Vision. New Delhi: Manohar, 1979, 103. On pp. 13-17 the author discusses the relationships between the philosophy of Bergson and the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. Aurobindo attacks Bergson's concept of evolution for its lack of a concept of teleology. He attacks Bergson's notion of intuition for its dualistic bias. The author concludes, "Thus, Aurobindo finds in Bergson a system which man must go beyond. Bergson has just scratched the surface of an analysis of evolution and does not go deeply enough into it" (p. 17).


Shinohara, Motoaki. "Memory and Art in Bergsonism." Bigaku, 30, No. 4 (1979), 1-11. This article is in Japanese.


Vergotte, Antoine. "L'Articulation du temps." Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 77, No. 34 (1979), 219-232. According to the author, time consists of the articulation of natural processes by the chronothetic act of language in the present. The idea of objective time is
therefore a derived concept. In its dialectical relations with the past and future, the present, as a bringing forth, also establishes the possible. Memory, in the same way, is a temporalizing act of remembrance. The writing of history, with its variations and its ambiguities, must be understood through the analysis of remembrance as a collective act instituting the present. Finally, in discussion with Bergson and Husserl, the author examines the two inseparable and opposed characteristics of time: discontinuity and continuity or synchrony in diachrony. The difference between active and passive repetition illustrates the analysis of time presented here. The author attacks Bergson's (presumed) view that time is entirely continuous.

Weinstein, Michael A. *Structure of Human Life: A Vitalist Ontology.* New York and London: New York University Press, 1979, 188. The author's "critical vitalism" is to be distinguished from the "classical vitalism" of Bergson. Critical vitalism does not support Bergson's concept of an eternal creative process; instead it reveals "embodied experience" to be a complex of conflicting tendencies incapable of final resolution. The author states, "I understand philosophy to be the guardian of the deeper truth of our being. A philosopher should stand, without compromise, between myth and science, warning us against the siren songs of our own creations" (pp. 2-3).

1980

Duffin, Kathleen E. "Arthur O. Lovejoy and the Emergence of Novelty." *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 61, No. 2 (1980), 267-328. The author argues that A. O. Lovejoy's advocacy of the genetic method of historical analysis and his temporalism both spring from his concept of emergent evolutionary process. On pp. 274-275 he examines Lovejoy's lectures on Bergson's philosophy: "While Lovejoy casts a critical eye on parts of Bergson's scheme of creative evolution, he finds that much of what Bergson expresses echoes his own ideas about the inadequacy of idealist thought, and the supremacy of the temporal" (p. 275).

Herman, Daniel J. *The Philosophy of Henri Bergson.* Washington: University Press of America, 1980, 102. The author tackles the difficult problem of the relations between mechanism and finalism in Bergson's philosophy. He argues that the passages in *Creative Evolution* in which
Bergson criticizes final causes are really directed at a narrow and mechanical conception of final causality, and that in *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* Bergson clearly and unmistakably utilizes a finalistic argument. Human social evolution for Bergson points toward an ultimate harmonious convergence of otherwise conflicting tendencies. The "open society" is the final cause of the evolutionary process.
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