Self-Relation in Hegel's

*Science of Logic*

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Abstract

This paper uses self-relation to reconstruct Hegel's reasoning in the Logic. In the sphere of "being," self-relation is self-predication, and the predicate is the active, participial form of the category. Examining the first three and the last category in this sphere, I explain how Hegel argues that each category is itself engaged in the activity that it signifies. However, this self-predication adds new content to the category transforming it into a new category. Ultimately, this process leads to the collapse of "being" into "essence." Categories in this later sphere exhibit a different kind of self-relation: each contains its relation to itself as an activity that negates itself and then, negating this negation, returns to itself. Hegel's analysis at the beginning of "essence" is, I argue, parallel to Kant's "Transcendental Deduction," but relations among categories replace the transcendental ego. The significance of self-relation is that it (1) effects transitions to new categories by an internal mechanism, thereby (2) allowing the Logic to be a self-exposition of the categories that (3) avoids an external (Kantian) transcendental ground.
Self-Relation in Hegel's *Science of Logic*

That logic is the self-exposition of the categories might be said to be the theme of Hegel's *Science of Logic*, but the meaning of this idea develops and alters in the course of *Logic*. Initially, the idea of logic as a self-exposition of the categories means only that the methods of logic must conform to its subject matter, that the method of logic is the exposition of "the dialectic which it (the subject matter, the particular category) possesses within itself."\(^1\) But this idea of logic as a self-exposition is also the conclusion of the *Logic*.\(^2\) As a conclusion, it asserts not merely that the method must conform to the subject matter (the categories) but that method and subject matter are identical. A category is identical to its exposition: the Absolute is as it determines itself. The *Logic* itself, as the self-exposition of the categories, is the movement which is the categories. Therefore, the idea of logic as a self-exposition of the categories, while true at beginning and end of this work, has different meanings.

From this example we learn that the treatment of a topic like self-relation cannot consist in making true assertions about the topic, for any assertion that we make might always be true, yet differ in meaning at different points of the *Logic*. Instead of making general assertions about "self-relation" we must examine this topic in particular sections of *Logic*. When we see how it is used and how its use changes in different sections, we will be able to develop a dialectical understanding of it. In order to attain the technical apparatus necessary to compare different sections of the *Logic*, let us pursue our consideration of the idea of logic as a self-exposition of the categories. This example is by no means irrelevant to the topic because the self-exposition of the categories involves the idea of self-relation.

\(^1\)Georg Hegel, *Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1969), p. 54, 11. 28-29; hereafter cited as SL. Throughout this paper "logic" refers to the Hegelian science presented in this work. It ought not to be confused with the classical and modern disciplines of the same name.

\(^2\)SL, p. 843, 11. 2-12.
Hegel calls logic the exposition of the categories, and he also notes that it is without presupposition and a self-contained circle. On this basis we have called the Logic a "self-exposition". How can the exposition of the categories be self-contained and without presupposition? If the categories are defined in terms of something that is not a category, then the exposition will not be self-contained and will presuppose that something. Thus, the categories must be defined by categories. But this proposal is not sufficient. Suppose a category is defined by other logical categories. Then, the exposition of that category will be self-sufficient but not presuppositionless. It is self-sufficient because logic is the exposition of the categories, and we need not pass beyond logic for the exposition of any category. But the exposition of one category by another presupposes the category which appears in the definition: if A is defined as B, then A presupposes B. Thus, if the categories are always defined in terms of other categories, then the initial category would presuppose some other category. Either logic could not begin or it would not be without presupposition. The solution to this problem is to define the categories in terms of themselves. When a category is defined by itself, then the category does not presuppose anything else, and its exposition is clearly self-contained in logic. Therefore, it is by means of self-relation that logic can be the self-contained, presuppositionless exposition of the categories.

This solution, however, raises another problem: how can an exposition which depends on self-relation make an advance? When we define a category by means of itself, have we said anything more than 'A is A'? Surely, this identity is as true as it is insignificant. How can self-relation play a meaningful role in the exposition of the categories? If a self-relation is not merely an identity, but also contradicts itself, then the category collapses. In order to understand how this might happen, let us consider what is involved in one form of self-relation, self-predication.

A definition of one category in terms of another which has the form 'A is B' contains two moments which we can designate by the German prepositions an and für. In order to define A by B, the two categories must be distinct. Yet,

3SL, p. 70, l. 8.

4SL, p. 71, ll. 21-23.

5SL, p. 409, l. 27.
if 'A is B' then they are not distinct. This peculiar situation can be described by means of the an moment. Since A is defined by B, this latter (B), the being of A, is in it (A) (an ihm). But because A can be distinguished from B, A is in itself (an sich) different from B. A category's likeness with itself in opposition to its unlikeness is its "in-itself-being" (ansichsein). These two forms of the an moment, an sich and an ihm, both refer to the positedness or being of the category; an is the general moment of being of a category.

On the other hand, the für moment expresses the relation of the category to other categories. In a predication, 'A is B,' the predicate is for (für) the subject. A category which defines a second category (A) is both maintained in the second category and separate from it. As so related to A, B is for A, or B is for-another (für Anderes). Actually, subject and predicate stand in this relation in any predication. Thus, in any predication, 'A is B,' the predicate is for the subject (für Anderes). On the other hand, a category which lacks relation with other categories is only "for itself" (für sich). Thus the two forms of the für moment, für Anderes and für sich, describe the category's relation with other categories; für is the general moment of a category which describes its relation to other categories.

Therefore, an is the moment of the being of a category, and für is the moment of its relation. These two moments

6 Georg Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969), I, 192, ll. 10-12; hereafter cited as WL.

7 WL, I, 128, 1. 3.

8 SL, p. 119, ll. 8-9.

9 SL, p. 158, ll. 4-5.

10 These moments are important throughout the Logic. They are to be compared to the moments of the Phenomenology, "an sich" and "für uns." (G. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), p. 140, ll. 8-13.) The difference between the für moment of the Logic and the für moment of the Phenomenology expresses the difference between these two works, and shows the latter as a work intrinsically related to our (the knower's) consciousness.
are closely related; both are present in a predication. When one category is predicated of another, the second category is both for-another (für Anderes) and in this other (an ihm). Other relations among these moments are developed and explored in the course of the Logic.11

The question which motivated this discussion of the moments was how a self-relation could express more than trivial identity. We now see that in one form of self-relation, self-predication, a predication gives rise to (or at any rate explicates) the moments of a category. In asserting a self-predication, 'A is A', we are asserting that the category A has an ihm the category A. What A is an sich, as distinguished from any predicate we might apply to it, is just what is predicated of it in the self-predication. Thus, through self-predication, A is an sich A. Further, in this predication, A is not related to another category. It is not für Anderes, but für sich. These moments, an sich and für sich, are moments of the category itself. In participating in its own self-predication, the category A has acquired a new content; it has acquired the moments of an sich and für sich. Before its self-predication the category has a posited content. In predicating the category of itself, we add to this posited content that the category is self-related. The an and für mechanism translates the fact that the category is related to another category or to itself into a moment of the category. Since the category has acquired these new moments, it is no longer the same category which lacked these moments, that category has undergone a transition (übergeht) into a new category. We should note that a category which is self-related acquires the moments of an sich and für sich. This determination, to be an und für sich, is precisely the characterization of essence. The reason we do not pass into essence with these self-predications is that a category which is self-predicated becomes another category, and this new category contains within itself the self-relation of the first but does not itself participate in its own self-relation. When the categories of being are self-predicated, they pass over into new categories which latter are not yet self-predicated. Only with essence does a category not become another category in being self-related. This mechanism is difficult to grasp in this abstract formulation; it will become clear when we examine specific categories. It is, however, clear that the self-predication of a category adds new content to

11 E.g. SL, pp. 120-122, where the moment of für Anderes is identified with that of an sich.

12 SL, p. 390, l. 16.
the category, and is not merely an identity. Therefore, the means whereby the Logic is a presuppositionless science, self-relation, does not restrict logic to insignificant identities; in self-relation, new content is added to a category.

The significance of the an and für moments is, then, that through them the fact that a category is defined or related to another category can be expressed as a property of the category itself. These moments are crucial if Hegel is to show that the dialectic of the category is the category itself, for it is through these moments that the one becomes the other. We will better understand how the moments function when we go through some of the arguments of the Logic. We should, however, note that the status of these moments is not clear. They are called moments and are said to express the relation of categories, while they are also distinguished from categories. They initially appear as determinations parallel to something and other which express the relation of these two categories, as being-in-itself and being-for-another. As such, "each...contains within itself its other moment which is distinguished from it." The determinations of being are related as others; it is those of essence which contains their other within themselves. Thus, this relation of the an and für moments sounds very much like a determination of essence. If, in fact, a determination of essence has been imported into the sphere of being, then the logic is not, as Hegel has claimed, the presuppositionless genesis of the categories, for a category of essence would be presupposed in being. This is quite a serious charge against Hegel, and I am not sure whether his position can be justified. This criticism, however, rests upon an understanding of the relation of being and essence. I do not propose to examine the criticism any further in this paper; instead one of the goals of this paper will be to achieve an understanding of this relation.

To summarize the discussion up to this point, we have seen that Logic can be a presuppositionless exposition of the categories through the self-relation of the categories, and further that this self-relation is not merely an identity, but adds a new moment to the category.

15 SL, p. 418, 11. 5-8.
We have been assuming that the idea of the logic as an exposition is fairly clear. An exposition of a category is the presentation of what the category is. It is the answer to the question, 'what is category X?' There is, however, a paradox already contained in this question: if we inquire about X, must we not already know what X is, in some sense; but if we already know what X is, we do not need to inquire into it. The paradox can be stated as the question: when we inquire of a category X, 'what is X?', what do we know about the category already and what are we attempting to find out about it?

One answer which might be suggested is that when we inquire into the nature of a category, the category is present implicitly already and we seek to make the implicit explicit. This answer is not incorrect, but it is inadequate and can be misleading. The difference between the implicit and the explicit content of a category is not apparent; nor is it apparent how the two can contradict each other. A more fruitful and exact answer depends upon recognizing that the phrase which is often translated as "implicit" is, in German, an sich. In answer to the question, 'what is X?', we relate X to other categories or to itself; in other words, we explicate the für moment of the category. Thus, a more explicit answer to the question of what we know and what we seek when we inquire into a category is that we know the category an sich and we seek to explicate what the category is für sich or für Anderes. As compared with the other suggested answer, that we know the category implicitly and seek to make it explicit, this answer in terms of the moments has the advantage of making the difference between the undefined and defined category intelligible. Further, if our earlier assertion that the two moments can contradict each other is correct, then the analysis of the definition of a category in terms of these moments explains how the category as defined can be in contradiction with the category before it is defined. This explanation of the contradiction in a category is somewhat different than we might be led to expect if we think of the internal contradiction of a category as arising when the implicit meaning of the category is made explicit. If the contradiction is between the an and für moments of a category, then it does not merely arise when the category is made explicit, but because the category

16Cf. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. K. Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), B 168. Referring to both the transcendental and metaphysical deductions, Kant calls a deduction an "exposition (Darstellung) of the pure concepts of the understanding," i.e., an exposition of the categories.

17SL, p. 168, l. 34.
is made explicit. The reason for this is that making the
category explicit is relating the category to other cate-
gories, it is explications the für moment of the category,
and it is in the opposition between this moment and the an
moment that the contradiction lies. Thus, the contradiction
that lies in a category arises from the definition of the
category, from the attempt to define the categories in terms
of other categories. In itself (an sich) the category is
not contradictory. It is through the attempt to explicate
the category that the contradiction arises. From this we
infer that if we were content to leave the categories be
what they are, no contradiction need arise, it is in the
requirement that an exposition of the category be given;
i.e., that the categories be thought, that the contradic-
tions arise in particular categories. This requirement is
central to logic, which, as a science, is just an exposition
of categories.

In summary the an and für analysis of the categories pro-
vides a means of understanding how a self-predication might
lead to a contradiction, and of differentiating what we begin
with and what we seek in an exposition of a category. We fur-
ther suggested that the relation between these two is that a
contradiction arises in each category just in our defining
it. The discussion thus far has (1) been based upon an
abstract discussion of these issues, and it has (2) primarily
drawn on the categories of being. Self-predication and self-
contradiction will be clearer if we examine the arguments
which constitute the exposition of different categories. If
we first examine arguments of some of the categories of being,
we will be able to better understand how the mode of exposi-
tion of the categories of being, predication, differs from
the mode of exposition of essence. If we entered into all
the details of the arguments, we would lose sight of self-
predication. Consequently, we will present only the broad
outlines of the argument.

I

That self-predication plays a role in the logic of being
is only apparent upon examination. Each of the categories
of the major sections of quality is self-predicated and
this predication also leads to the collapse of the category.
"Being is", and the is-ness of being is nothing. "Deter-
minate being is a determinate being, a something." 18  (Das
Dasein ist Daseiendes, Etwas.") 19 "Being-for-self is thus

18  _SL_, p. 115, l. 19.
19  _SL_, II, 123, 11. 15-16.
a being-for-self...the one."\textsuperscript{20} ("Das Fürsichsein ist so Fürsichseiendes...das Eins.")\textsuperscript{21} Further, the final category of the sphere of being, indifference, is self-determined and its collapse results in the collapse of the entire sphere. Let us sketch the arguments which establish these determinations.

The Logic begins with being. Being is pure thought; it is without determination. A determination is a mediation; thus being, as lacking determination, is, in itself, \textit{(an sich)}, immediacy. Since it is through determination of predication that one category is related to another category, being's lack of determination is its lack of relation to any other category. The relation of one category to itself or to another category is described by its \textit{für} moments. Since being lacks any determinations, i.e., any relations, it lacks any \textit{für} moment. It is neither \textit{für sich} nor \textit{für Anderes}. Being is only like itself ("nur sich selbst gleich"),\textsuperscript{22} but this expression is not yet its self-relation but the lack of any relation at all. Because it lacks all determination, being is the most abstract of categories and it thereby includes everything. If being includes everything then it also includes itself; hence, being is. But being also has no relation to any category. Thus what being is, what it is \textit{für}, is nothing. Because being is a determination of everything, it determines itself, but it determines itself without determination; as nothing. The self-predication is, then, also the contradiction of being.\textsuperscript{23}

The result of this contradiction in being is eventually the category of determinate being, the simple unity of being and nothing.\textsuperscript{24} Since this unity of determinate being is a \textit{simple} unity, it is a unity without determination; i.e.,

\textsuperscript{20}SL, p. 163, 11. 30-32.
\textsuperscript{21}WL, I, 182, 11. 7-10.
\textsuperscript{22}WL, I, 82, 1. 23.
\textsuperscript{23}Based on SL, p. 82.
\textsuperscript{24}SL, p. 109. 11. 27- 8.
without mediation. The unity of determinate being is, there­by, immediate. As we have seen, the category of being is in itself immediacy. To say of determinate being that it is immediate is thus to predicate being of determinate being. 

"...Dasein seiendo ist." As will be seen, participles are consistently used as the predicative form of a category. We will consider the significance of this fact after we have explicated some other arguments for the self-predication of categories of the sphere of being.

The form of predication suggests that the two categories, being and determinate being, are the same: determinate being is being. But this form also presupposes a distinction between the two categories. Determinate being, in itself, is not the same as determinate being which has been determined as being. In being determined, determinate being undergoes a transition to a new category; it becomes "quality."

Determinate being is, then, determined by the category of being. But determinate being is, in itself, the unity of being and nothing; it is not merely being. Thus, determinate being negates its determination as being. Determinate being is equally determined and not determined as being: it is equally true that 'Dasein ist seiendo' and 'Dasein ist nicht seiendo.' We have only to recall the meaning of determinate being to be struck by these determinations. Determinate being is itself the unity of being and not-being. Since determinate being is determined as being and not-being, determinate being is a determinate being, a something. ("Das Dasein ist Daseiendes, Etwas.")

Determinate being is, an sich, the simple unity of being and nothing. These latter are, then, the moments of determinate being. However, in the unity which is determinate being, these moments are negated. As alternately affirming and negating its own moments, determinate being stands in the relation of determinate being to its own moments. The self-predication of determinate being thereby expresses that the posited content of determinate being, the simple unity of being and not-being, is mirrored in the relation this category has with its moments; it affirms and negates them.

25 WL, I, 117, l. 35.
26 SL, p. 115, l. 19.
27 WL, I, 123, l. 15-16.
Thus, the category of determinate being is the very relation it has with its moments. In accord with the participial form used in the self-predication to express the category's relation to its moments, we can say that determinate being is what it does. We have been able to argue that determinate being is determined by itself. Thus determinate being is self-related. But this self-relation is not achieved through the negation of a relation to other categories. As we have seen, determinate being is determined by being. Therefore, the self-relation of determinate being is not yet the self-relation of für sich. Instead, the self-relation of determinate being is "determinate being's own determinateness." Recalling the language we used to describe the moments of predication, the being of determinate being lies in its determination, which is just determinate being. Determinate being is an determinate being; therefore, determinate being is an sich. An sich, the moment of being, is also simple self-relation because being is self-related (nur sich selbst gleich); and the self-relation which is the content of determinate being is this an sich. Thus, through its self-predication and the an and für mechanism, determinate being acquires the content of being self-related. But determinate being is in itself only the simple unity of being and nothing. This new content which is added to the category through its self-predication negates the original simple unity. Hence, self-determined determinate being must pass over into a new category. It becomes something, "simple self-relation in the form of being." We have seen that determinate being is self-related, but that this self-relation does not belong to the content (an sich) of the category, and that when self-relation is posited in the content, determinate being becomes something. Hence, determinate being is what it does, but this relation does not lie in its content. The self-relation of determinate being is, then, the transition of the category into something.

In this argument, I have shown how self-relation is used to predicate determinate being of itself, the meaning of self-predication, and how this predication changed the content of the category. This change resulted in the transition of determinate being to a different category, something. This argument would not suffice as an explication of determinate being. My goal here, however, is to explain how a category is self-related. For this purpose it is more important to understand the main movements of the argument than to understand its details. Let us consider one more self-predication, that of being-for-self (Fürsichsein).

28 SL, p. 115, 1. 18.

Being-for-self is posited as the negation of negation;\textsuperscript{30} i.e., the sublation of otherness which has returned to itself. As we have noted, a category is für sich when it lacks a relation to other categories and is only related to itself. Being-for-self (Fürsichsein) is posited as für sich. In other words, Being-for-self is posited as self-related through the sublation of otherness: being-for-self is, an sich to be für sich. This identification is not to be confused with co-presence of the moments which will characterize essence.

The content (an sich) of being-for-self is, then, self-relation. We now turn to the question of determining the relations of being-for-self with other categories, to the explication of its für moment: what is being-for-self? In reply to this question we cannot predicate another category of being-for-self. As we have seen, in any predication of one category to another each is for the other (für Anderes) and acquires, as a part of its content, this being for other. If, however, the content of being-for-self is only self-relation, only to be for itself (für sich), then no other category can be predicated of it without contradicting its content. It must lack relations with other categories. Thus, because being-for-self is posited as self-relation, it must lack relation with other categories. Being-for-self is then the self-relation which is the sublation of otherness.

In understanding being-for-self as the sublation of otherness, we are involved in a contradiction, for we are defining being-for-self in terms of that with which it is supposed to lack relation, otherness. If being-for-self is defined as the sublating of otherness in self-relation, its very definition contains a category, the other, which being-for-self was supposed to exclude. We attempted with being-for-self to arrive at a category which excludes otherness, only to find that the very definition of the category contains it. In more formal terms, being-for-self contains determinate being (the other) because the former is the negation of otherness posited in the immediacy of being.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{30}SL, p. 157, l. 17.

\textsuperscript{31}SL, p. 158, l. 31. The immediacy of being is simple self-relation, "nur sich selbst gleich."
Thus determinate being is a moment of being-for-self. What then is the relation of determinate being to being-for-self? Clearly they are not others, for if they were others to each other, each would be für the other. But being-for-self is not für any other; it is only für sich. So, they are not others. Because being-for-self is only for itself, für sich, it is not related to other categories. Thus, being-for-self is not related to its moment, determinate being. These two, determinate being and being-for-self, appear to be distinct but the argument will show that if taken as distinguished, they prove indistinguishable. Both are sublated in the unity of self-predicated being-for-self.

Being-for-self shows itself to be self-contradictory because it is defined by means of its moment, otherness, and yet is supposed to sublate otherness. Thus, being-for-self is seen as standing alongside of its moment, the other (or determinate being). However, this contradiction can be transcended if being-for-self can sublate the otherness of its own moment, determinate being. Now this is just the meaning of a self-predicated being-for-self. Being-for-self which is a being-for-self is that sublation of otherness which sublates the otherness of its own moments. It is left without moments; it is the one. Thus, if it can be shown that being-for-self is self-predicated, the contradiction in undetermined being-for-self is removed.

How then is being-for-self self-predicated? Thus far we have two apparently distinct notions, being-for-self and its moment, determinate being. If we can show that these two are indistinguishable, then the otherness and difference of the moment has been sublated into a unity; and we are thereby entitled to the self-predication of being-for-self. The way in which these two are shown to be indistinguishable is by defining them both in terms of the unity. Initially, they are distinguished and determinate being has arisen because being-for-self is the sublation of otherness and thereby presupposes it. But determinate being is only a moment of being-for-self; it exists only to be sublated in the unity which the latter is supposed to achieve. As a moment, determinate being is für Anderes. This other, however, cannot be simply being-for-self because, as we have seen, being-for-self cannot be an other to determinate being. Instead, the other is the unity which being-for-self is supposed to achieve, and does achieve in its self-relation. Determinate being in being-for-self is a "being-for-one."

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32 SL, p. 159, l. 6.
Likewise, it can easily be shown that being-for-self, before it is self-related, is also a "being-for-one." This is clear from the fact that the content of being-for-self is only für sich, and that it is merely one side of its eventual self-relation. Since the self-predication of being-for-self establishes a unity, being-for-self, which is merely a side of the relation and not yet self-related, is a "being-for-one." It is well to examine this argument in the detail of the an and für language. The content (an sich) of being-for-self is simply to be für sich. If another category is predicated of it, being-for-self acquires the content of being für Anderes thereby contradicting its original content. Thus, the only possible predicate of being-for-self is itself. However, when being-for-self is predicated of itself it acquires an additional content. In a self-predication, being-for-self lies an being-for-self, and the category thereby contains the moment of an sich in addition to that of für sich. Since it acquires an additional content in self-predication, being-for-self becomes a new category—the one. Hence, undetermined being-for-self is merely a moment of the unity which comes to be in its self-predication. As a moment, being-for-self is for its own self-predication, the one; it is a being-for-one.

Since both determinate being and being-for-self are moments of self-predicated being-for-self, the one, they are both "being-for-one" and thereby indistinguishable. Since being-for-self has sublated the difference between itself and its moment, determinate being, it is determined as a being-for-self. In its self-predication, being-for-self has acquired a new content and becomes a new category, the one. Thus, self-predication proves itself unable to express the being of being-for-self, for in its self-predication, being-for-self becomes another category and we must begin the process of determination anew.

It is important to understand how the self-predication of being-for-self was achieved—(1) Undetermined being-for-self was distinguished from its moment, determinate being, and (2) both distinguished from the unity of the self-predicated being-for-self. It was then shown that insofar as the two are distinguished from the unity of self-predication, (1) they are identical and therefore (2) they are the unity of

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33 SL, p. 159, 1. 22.
34 WL, I, 182, 11. 7-10.
self-predicated being-for-self. In short, insofar as being-for-self and determinate being are distinguished from the unity of self-predicated being-for-self, they are sublated in that unity. In this formulation, the dialectic of the argument is clear. It is clearly not a deductive argument. Nevertheless, it is a characteristic argument, and a similar movement appears in essence, as we shall see.

What remains puzzling about the argument is that it depends upon understanding being-for-self and determinate being as moments of a unity which only comes to be when these two are seen as indistinguishable moments of this unity. The argument presupposes the unity of self-predicated being-for-self in order to establish that unity. Clearly, the argument is circular. But the entire Logic is circular. Circularity in itself is not a sufficient ground for the rejection of an argument; circularity is simply a fact of Hegelian dialectic. What makes this particular argument puzzling, however, is that being-for-self is understood as a moment of a unity which does not yet exist. Why is being-for-self defined in terms of its self-predication? Understanding Hegel does not depend on making the argument of being-for-self unpuzzling; instead we must attempt to understand why it is puzzling. The argument for the self-predication of being-for-self reflects the character of the category. The content of being-for-self is to be für sich; the content does not contain the an element. Because the content of being-for-self does not contain an element which expresses its being, but only the element which expresses its relations, the category cannot be understood in terms of its being; i.e., in itself (an sich) or as defined by another (an ihm). Instead, the category must be understood in terms of its relation with other categories or itself, in terms of its für moment. But being-for-self lacks relation to other categories; and, therefore, it can only be understood in terms of its relation to itself. And this self-relation of being-for-self is self-predicated being-for-self, the one. Therefore, because of its content, being-for-self can only be understood in terms of its own self-predication. Thus it is defined by its relation to that self-predication before the latter exists.

Therefore, the puzzle which we have seen in being-for-self is a reflection of the character of the category. This explanation does not resolve the puzzle, but it lets us see that it necessarily arises from the nature of the category we are considering. If we understand the argument of being-

\[35\] SL, p. 71, l. 22.
for-self as a deduction with the category as its premise, the argument is easily shown to be circular. If, however, we understand the argument as the exposition of the category of being-for-self, it shows us that an understanding of this category presupposes understanding it in terms of its self-predication, the one. The argument of being-for-self is not intended to establish a deductive conclusion but to show why and into what the category collapses. Once the argument is given this significance, there is no longer any motive for doubting its validity. Hegel is exploring relations among ideas; we must resist the impulse to impute additional significance to logic. As the self-exposition of the categories, the Logic is only the arguments themselves.

In the arguments we have presented, categories are shown to be determined by other categories, and the category which is a predicate usually assumes a participial form. What is the significance of this form? Grammatically, the present participle functioning as a noun indicates the object which is engaged in the activity expressed by the participle. Thus, Fürsichseidendes refers to an object engaged in the activity of sublating otherness. The self-predication of being-for-self thus indicates that the category being-for-self is something which is engaged in the activity of being-for-self (sublating otherness). The participle predicated of a category is thus distinguished from the subject as the activity of what is posited in the subject.

Why should the predicative forms of the categories of the sphere of being be present participles? This question is one of many that remains puzzling to me. It is, however, possible to externally justify this form by examining its consequences. What Hegel ultimately wants to show is the unity of theoretical and practical, that being is as it presents itself; i.e., that being is what it does. In the sphere of being, the being of the category and its activity are distinct as subject and predicate. The self-predication of a category with its own participles thus asserts the identity of the being of the category with what it does.

The exception is apparently, 'being is.' We should note, however, that this proposition does not specifically appear in the section on being, and that in the section on determinate being, where being is treated as a predicate, the participial form is used. We might speculate that being has not yet assumed a predicative form in the section devoted to it. However, this is speculation and the issue remains puzzling.
Therefore, that the predicative form of the categories of being is the participle is significant in that it enables the self-predication of a category to identify the being and activity of a category, and the adequate identification of these two is an ultimate goal of Hegel's logic. Thus, for the attainment of this goal, we should be thankful that the predicative form of the categories turns out to be the participle. Why the predicative form should be an activity still remains puzzling.

This puzzle as to the predicative form has a counterpart in a puzzle concerning the form of the subject. As we have noted, the content of a category (i.e., the category as a subject) consists of the moments of an and für. Why should the content have this form? Again, we can justify the form externally. The goal of the Logic, we have noted, is the adequate identification of the posited being and its activity.

In different terms this goal is the adequate identification of the an and für moments. As we have also noted, in a self-predication, a category is an sich and für sich. This dual determination is a step toward the ultimate identification of these moments; even though this identification fails in the sphere of being because in self-predication a category undergoes a transition to another category. That the content of a category is expressed in terms of an and für is fortunate in that the moments which the category acquires in self-predication are an and für moments. Thus, self-predication seems to contain the possibility of expressing what the category is (its an moment) by means of predication (its für moment). An example is in order. The content (an moment) of one category is to be für sich. Predicates of this category, in particular, its self-predication express its für moment. But in this self-predication the category also acquires the content of being für sich. Thus, the content acquired from its für moment (für sich) is identical with the content of its an moment (für sich). This identity of the moments proves inadequate because the category acquires additional content by means of its self-predication, namely to be an sich, and it thereby becomes another category. In short, the advantage of an and für as the content of the category is that these terms are also the relational moments of the category. That a category is e.g. für sich can express both its content and its relations with another category. Thus, the ultimate goal of the Logic, the identification of
being and its relations (or activity) requires terms which can be both content and activity of a category. This dual role of the an and für moments has, no doubt, lent difficulty to foregoing discussions, but the source of the confusion is, unfortunately, inherent in the subject matter. This justification of the use of an and für to express the content of the categories is again only external; i.e., it enables us to achieve a goal. Why the form of the content of a category is expressed in terms of an and für remains puzzling.

In summary, we have established that self-relation is an important idea even in the sphere of being, and shown some of its uses here. While some of the arguments for the self-predication of particular categories have been sketchy, it is hopefully clear at least what is meant by self-predication. It should further be clear that self-predication adds some new content to the category and the category thereby becomes a new category. In the sphere of essence, as distinct from being, self-relation does not add anything new to the category because the categories of essence contain self-relation as a part of their content. Thus in essence, self-relation does not lead to a transition into a new category. In the sphere of being, self-relation is a methodological principle by means of which transitions among categories are effected. In the sphere of essence, however, self-relation is a part of the content of the categories and, therefore, directly treated. Hence, we will consider the transition to essence in detail. In order to understand this transition, let us first consider the last category of being and explain why it is the last category.

II

The last category of being is indifference, Gleich- 

gültigkeit, which is the negation of every determination of being. Being is initially, without determinations. It is "nur sich selbst gleich." Thus, indifference is the determination of being; for, like being, indifference is without determination. But to be without determination is precisely the determination of indifference; i.e., indifference is indifferent. Indifference

37SL, p. 375, l. 8.

38WL, I, 82, l. 24.
is, then, determined as indifferent; but, in itself, indifference is indifferent to its determination; i.e., indifference, an sich negates any determination. Therefore, indifference negates itself and collapses. Indifference is in itself to lack all determinations. Yet indifference is self-determined. As lacking all determination, indifference is not "for another" but only "for itself." Indifference is self-related. We have noted that self-relation asserts that the category stands in the relation of itself to its moments. The moment of indifference is only itself indifference. Thus the self-determination of indifference asserts the indifference of indifference to itself. In general, a self-determination, or indeed any predication, is a transition to another category. But the indifference of indifference is just what indifference is in itself. In other words, the self-determination of indifference is not a transition, but an expression of what indifference is in itself, negative relation to itself.

The self-determination of each of the other categories of the sphere of being has negated the original category, for all determination is negation. The determinations of these categories were merely others to the category. The category of indifference, however, contains as its content the opposition to any determination. Consequently, the determination of indifference is not merely an other to it, but the negation of its content as well. The self-determination of indifference is thus called the absolute or second negation of it. Noting the conclusion of the last paragraph, we can say that the self-determined indifference is the absolute negation of indifference and also an expression of what it is in itself. In determining indifference we

\[39\text{WL, I, 456, 1. 32 - 47, 1. 5.}\]

\[40\text{SL, p. 113, 1. 21.}\]
have passed beyond it and yet expressed what it is. The relation of indifference to its determination is different than the relation of any other category of being to its determinations. With the determination of indifference we negate the sphere of being and pass beyond it.

This is a Hegelian way of saying that the analysis of experience in terms of determinations of experience proves contradictory. The contradiction of the category of indifference stated in these terms is that when we understand the character of the determinations of experience as indifferent to further determinations, we have determined indifference and thereby contradicted it and passed beyond it to a higher level. The understanding of indifference as indifference is a determination of it, and thereby a contradiction of its very nature. In determining indifference we pass beyond it.

Essence emerges because immediate experience proves self-contradictory and in order to understand it we must pass beyond it. Essence, then, is something beyond being which explains being. But what is essence? It seems as if we do not yet have an idea of what this word denotes; all we do have is an idea of the relation of essence to being. In fact, however, this relation of essence to being, that essence is the beyond of being which truly is, is precisely what the word essence denotes. Let us recall that one of the tasks of the Logic is to show that thought can be understood by means of itself: no transcendent objects are needed in order to understand thought. Therefore, one of the points Hegel makes about essence is that the idea does not denote something which lies beyond thought. Essence itself is an idea, and it is simply the idea of something which is beyond being but explains it. In order to show that essence does not lie in anything more than this relation, Hegel need only show that the determinations which we associate with essence apply to this relation. Does the idea of 'something beyond being which explains being' actually explain being and actually lie beyond it? The affirmative answer to this question shows that the determinations of essence apply to the notion of essence proposed. Let us also note that we are here inquiring into the validity of the self-predication of the proposed notion of essence. As in the category of being-for-self, it is the self-relation which justifies the definition of the category. In essence, however, the determination of 'what lies beyond being and explains it' as lying beyond being and explaining it is not a transition to another category. No new content is added to the category in its self-determination.
According to the notion of essence we have proposed, essence is defined in terms of being. The notion is misleading on two counts. First, essence, as it has emerged from the category of indifference, is in-and-for-itself (an und für sich). Essence must be understood in terms of itself. It is contrary to the nature of essence to define it by what it is not, being. Second, defining essence in terms of being is impossible because the sphere of being has proven self-contradictory and collapsed. What we want to achieve in the transition to essence is a means of understanding being. Therefore, essence is supposed to explain being and not the other way around. Thus, the first task in the consideration of essence is to explain being in terms of it. But since the only notion we have of essence as yet involves being, this task seems to involve a vicious circle. In other words, what we seek in the consideration of essence is to answer the question, 'what is essence?' if essence is defined as explaining being, then the definition presupposes what it is that essence is to explain, being.

Although the relation of being and essence is circular, the circle is not a vicious one. The way that Hegel defines essence is based on the recognition that both essence and being must be present. First, being is defined in terms of essence. Then, essence is defined by relating itself to this new being, a process reminiscent of the definition of being-for-self as a being-for-one. We can discover how to define being in terms of essence by considering the notion of essence we have mentioned. We need not yet resort to Hegel's technical terminology. Essence is the beyond of being which explains its. (1) Because essence explains being, it is prior to being. From the point of view of essence, being has collapsed and is nothing in itself. The truth of being lies in essence. (2) Because essence is the beyond of being, essence is not being. Then it is also true that being is not essence, and the two are related as others. Being, then, is the (first) negation of essence. Taking account of both components of the definition of essence, being is the nothing which is the negation of essence. Since essence is what is in-and-for-itself, what truly is, it is opposed in its content to being which is defined in essence as nothing. Being, then, is other than essence: it is not essence. But further, being is opposed in itself to what essence is: being is what essence is not: being is not-essence. Being is the immediate, and essence is something

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41 SL, p. 391, l. 19.

42 SL, p. 389, l. 1.
which lies beyond the immediate, the not-immediate. Being is the absolute negativity of essence. Essence truly is; being is the negation of essence which is nothing in itself. Being in essence is nothing more than the negative posited as negative. With this determination, we have defined being as it is in essence. If being is defined in terms of essence, then being can be explained by essence. Let us recall that this is precisely the reason that essence is introduced.

This definition has been based upon the idea that essence is prior to being because the latter must be explained in terms of the former. Let us also notice the sense in which being is prior to essence: essence has emerged out of being. But in this sense, being seems to be independent of essence. Surely, our immediate experience is independent of our way of accounting for that experience. But if our immediate experience is independent of essence, then essence is surely not adequate to explain being. If being is not merely the negative posited as negative, but "contains an immediate presupposition." then it is independent of essence and the latter is not its truth. Hegel shows first that (1) being does contain this "immediate side." However, he goes on to show that (2) these determinations which distinguish being from essence are determinations of essence. Finally, we see that (3) essence sublates this determinateness in itself. These three propositions form the core of the section titled "Illusory Being." We will continue arguing in this popular language. Although we thereby avoid the difficulty of Hegel's technical language, we unfortunately cannot avoid the difficulty in the argument. We should, however, constantly bear in mind the course the dialectic will take. Because being contains a side independent of essence, being is itself a determination of essence (as Schein), and thus essence both determines itself to be and negates this determination in its own self. The reason this argument is a dialectic is that it is the independence of being from essence which is the basis for sublating being in essence; because being is independent of essence it is sublated in essence. The dialectic is thus the synthesis of opposites, independence and sublation; it is dialectic in the classical sense.


According to its definition in terms of essence, being is negation. In its own sphere being was immediacy. In essence, being seems to have lost its immediacy and becomes negation. But it is the immediacy of being which distinguishes it from essence, even in essence itself: being is the immediate and essence is to be not-immediate. It follows that being as it is in essence, negation, must recover the immediacy which distinguishes it from essence. Hegel does not show merely that immediacy as well as negation pertain to being in essence. Instead, he shows the dialectical truth that being in essence is immediate precisely because it is negation as negation. In other words, it is in virtue of the nothingness of being in essence that being is (or is immediate) in essence. The complete absence of being in essence is the very reason for its presence. We must not cringe at these paradoxial locutions; they are a sign of dialectical argumentation where opposite predicates must often be attributed to the same subject. Nevertheless, to avoid these locutions, and to signal the altered meaning of being in essence, Hegel terms this latter "illusory being" (Schein).

The immediacy of being in essence which is recovered is not the simple immediacy of being but an immediacy reflected through the negation which being is in essence. The argument for this immediacy runs as follows. Being in essence, Schein, is the negative posited as negative; it is the negative of essence. As such, Schein is an other to essence. The "other" is a category specifically treated in determinate being where it has presumably been analyzed into two moments, determinate being and the negative of determinate being (Dasein and Nichtdasein). Thus the 'other' contains a moment of being and a moment of negation. But Schein is the negative as negative; it lacks being. As an other, Schein must thereby lack the other's moment of being, Dasein, and contain only the moment of negation, Nichtdasein. But as pure negation (Nichtdasein), Schein is negation (Nicht-dasein) in its immediacy. Now immediacy is the determination of being, and Schein has, therefore, recovered the immediacy of being. In short, Schein is pure negation in relation to essence. A pure negation is an unmediated negation; and thus Schein, as immediate negation, is in the

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46 This should be Hegel's reasoning, but I have not been able to locate it in the text.
determination of being. As pure negation, Schein has recovered its immediacy.

However, Schein is negation only in relation to essence. It is thus able to recover an immediacy only because it is mediated by essence. The immediacy of Schein is then reflected immediacy, an immediacy which belongs to it in virtue of the fact that Schein is the negative of essence. Further, it is this immediacy which distinguishes Schein from essence. Thus, the first proposition is proved. Schein contains an immediacy independent of essence.

It remains to show that insofar as Schein is distinguished from essence it is sublated in essence. Let us note that we are not showing that Schein sublates itself and becomes essence, for Schein is only being and we have already seen why being has become essence. Instead, we are showing that Schein is a determination of essence, and that essence sublates its own determination in itself. The remarkable feature of essence is that its determination is not a transition to a new category, but is merely a moment of essence itself. First, we must show that Schein is the determinateness of essence. Schein has already been distinguished from essence as the negation which is immediate. We need to show that these two are also determinations of essence.

Negation or not-being is a determination of essence because essence is defined as the negative of being. As we have already noted, essence is not-being. That immediacy must also be a determination of essence follows from the requirement that essence is the beyond of being which explains being. As explaining being, essence must be prior to it and thus immediate. We can also understand the immediacy of essence by means of a more technical argument. The negativity which we have just shown to be a determination of essence is not mere otherness but "absolute negativity for essence is in itself a negative of being." The first negation of being

\footnote{SL, p. 395, l. 32. - p. 396, l. 7.}

\footnote{SL, p. 397, 11. 12-13.}

\footnote{SL, p. 397, 11. 13-20.}

\footnote{SL, p. 397, 11. 22-24.}

\footnote{SL, p. 395, l. 7.}
is determinateness or otherness. The absolute negativity of being is being itself which "has sublated itself both as immediate being and also as immediate negation." Being preserves itself in its absolute negativity. This latter is the "equality with itself" (Gleichheit mit sich) and thereby essence is determined as an immediacy of being. There are clearly three steps to the argument. Essence is the absolute negativity of being; absolute negativity is essence's equality with itself; and equality with self is the determination of being. The first and third steps are clear; but I do not see the argument for the identity of absolute negativity and equality with self. Hegel may have made this identification prior to this section, but I have not been able to locate it. A similar and related identification, being and self-relation (Beziehung auf sich), does occur often and will soon emerge again. These two are not to be confused.

Whatever the argument may be, Hegel is claiming that the immediacy of essence follows from its negativity. This immediacy is, then, not the simple immediacy of being, but an immediacy mediated by negativity. The immediacy of essence is exactly the same reflected immediacy we discovered in Schein. Thus, essence is determined as an immediate not-being. Therefore, the second proposition is proven: those determinations which distinguish Schein from essence, immediacy and not-being, are determinations of essence. Possessing the determinations which constitute Schein, essence is determined as Schein. Thus, the second proposition asserts that insofar as essence is not Schein, essence is Schein.

Schein is, then, a determination of essence; but when we look closely at essence, we see that essence should lack determination. Consider the popular notion of essence as the beyond of being which explains being. Since essence explains being, essence must be understandable in itself. When we predicate one category of another, we are saying that the subject is understandable in terms of the category predicated of it. Therefore, since essence is understandable in itself, it should lack determinations.


54 E.g. SL, p. 150, 1. 24. (WL, I, 166, 1. 13.)
However, essence is determined as Schein. But this deter-
mination is also sublated in essence because of the nature of
essence. To understand this mechanism we need to consider
essence and Schein closely. Unfortunately, there is no way
of presenting Hegel's argument which is easier to understand
than the text. Essence has been determined as Schein by dis-
covering the determinations of Schein in essence, the abso-
lute negativity which is immediacy. 'Essence is Schein,'
('Das Wesen scheint,') but essence and Schein are both
immediate not-beings. Hence, the predication of one by the
other is a self-relation. Therefore essence is self-related.
In the categories of being, a self-relation adds additional
content to a category and that category thereby becomes
another category. In essence, however, the self-relation
of essence belongs to the content of the category and does
not add additional content. To see this we need only con-
sider the categories of essence and Schein in this deter-
mination.

A. Essence is absolute negativity which was shown to be an
immediacy. The self-relation of essence is the negation of
negation. The negation of essence is Schein (being in essence);
and essence, which has determined itself, is Schein.

B. Schein is a negativity; it is nothing in essence. Further,
it is nothing which is the negative and other of essence. As
such it is the negative which has been determined as negative.
In this self-relation Schein regains its immediacy. As a
negativity which is an immediacy Schein is essence. Therefore
essence is negated when it is determined as Schein, but
Schein as a determination of essence is merely essence itself.
The determination of essence by Schein is a self-relation
which is a returning to essence. But what Schein returns
into is identical to that which becomes Schein. 56 Essence is
the unity of absolute negativity and immediacy. But essence
is determined as Schein. Schein is the absolute negativity
of essence. The determination of essence by Schein is the
negation of essence; but in this negating, Schein recovers
its immediacy and becomes essence. Thus the determination
of essence by Schein is the negation which is a return, and
thereby an immediacy. Therefore the determination of essence
by Schein is a self-relation which does not add anything to
the content of essence. As a determination of essence,
Schein is sublated in essence. In conclusion, insofar as

55WL, II, 23, 11. 3-5.

56SL, p. 398, 1. 11.
Schein is distinguished from essence it is a part of essence; the distinguishing of Schein from essence is the activity of essence itself.

III

Before we proceed with the argument we should note some points about the preceding argument which can easily be overlooked in its complexity. First, we began the consideration of essence by considering the relation of being and essence. Because the Logic is the exposition of the categories we enter the consideration of each category x with the question, 'what is x?' And because the Logic is the self-exposition of the categories we must answer this question in terms of other categories. Hegel's own consideration of essence follows this form more closely than our presentation. In considering the question, 'what is essence?' Hegel attempts to determine essence by means of the predication of other categories, the mode of relation in the sphere of being. The initial consideration is whether being applies to essence; and the conclusion that it does is mitigated with the insight that it equally does not. There are several points which must be made in conjunction with this and the preceding arguments: (1) The predication of being to essence fails to do justice to the complexity of essence. (2) This consideration is not merely a path to be rejected or a thought experiment which fails but a necessary part of essence. (3) Schein is not merely a determination of essence but the activity of essence itself. (4) In essence predication itself proves to be an inadequate form of determination. (5) Essence which is understood as Schein is grasped without going beyond the rational. (6) The argument can be phrased in Hegel's technical terminology of an and für. (7) The argument is relevant to the problem of self-relation. After discussing these points we will briefly sketch the discussion of reflection, and then consider the transition to essence in Kantian terms, and as a refutation of Kantian philosophy. Finally we will raise questions concerning the Hegelian approach.

(1) "Essence is," but as such being is merely an other to essence and not its absolute negativity. It is useful to refer to the analogy of essence to the past. Is the past? The past is preserved as the past, but the past is also what is no longer. Thus we must answer this question.

in the affirmative but recognize that the determination of the past with being does not do justice to the complexity involved in this notion. The same is true of the determination of essence with being.

(2) Being as it is in essence is Schein. But Schein is present in essence as the negation of essence within itself, as we have seen. Essence determines itself as being or as immediacy. Therefore, the determination of essence by being which is considered in the section entitled "The Essential and the Unessential" is not a mistaken path which leads nowhere. Instead, it belongs to essence itself to determine itself as being. Likewise it belongs to essence to sublate this determinateness. Consequently, the sublation of this determination in Schein also belongs to the nature of essence. Thus, in these two sections, essence is engaging in that activity which is characteristic of essence. Hence, we must reject McTaggart's suggestion that the first categories of "Essence" which do not appear in the Encyclopedia could be eliminated. They reflect the essential motion of the category.

(3) The determination of essence as Schein and the sublation of that determination belongs to essence itself. In non-technical language, essence is defined as a negative of being. Thus, essence is being; essence determines itself as being. And, equally, essence is not-being. Essence determines itself and sublates the determinateness. In more technical language, essence is absolute negativity, or negativity in itself. This negativity is not determined by any other category but is "only like itself." This Gleichheit mit sich is the immediacy of essence, Schein. Schein is, then, the "Schein of essence." In other words, essence itself is "das Scheinen seiner in sich selvst." essence itself becomes immediate. Scheinen (as a verbal noun) is then the activity of essence.


59 WL, II, 22, 1. 18.

60 WL, II, 23, 1. 21.
(4) In the sphere of being, a category is determined by predicking another category of it. The predicates which come closest to being adequate to define their subjects are the predicative forms of those very subjects. It is in the self-predication of a category that predicate is most adequate to subject. As we have noted a self-predication asserts that the relation of a category to its own moments is the posited content of the category. In other words, a category does what it is. The problem we encountered with the self-predications of being is that the predication added new content to the original category which thereby underwent a transition to a new category. On the other hand, the determination of the category of essence with Schein is not a transition to a new category. Essence equally determines itself and sublates the determination. The determination of essence with Schein is, then, the going out from and returning to essence. This movement of essence is termed reflection and the return of self-relation. Like the categories of being, the content is mirrored in its relation with its moment, Schein. Although essence is determined with Schein, it is not a self-predication.

Unlike the categories of being, the identity of what essence is with what it does is not expressed by a self-predication. We have argued that essence is determined by Schein, and that because essence is identical with Schein, the determination is sublated. Thus, the determination of essence by Schein is a self-determination but not a mere self-predication. Because Schein is identical with essence, a predication of essence with it would not add anything to essence. This predication would thus achieve the ideal sought throughout being where the predicate expresses just what the subject is. However, in achieving this ideal, essence is identical with its determination. Therefore, essence sublates Schein in itself, and the presumed predication collapses into the unity of self-relation. In achieving the ideal of the predicates of being, Schein collapses as a predicate, and predication itself proves inadequate. Essence is in itself to be self-related. It is the movement which determines itself as Schein and sublates that determinateness. Because it is a movement, essence cannot be determined by means of predication. How, then, is essence determined? Part of the task of the consideration of reflection is to determine the movement which is reflection; i.e., to answer this question. Instead of the determinations of being which are determinate beings; i.e., negations, the determinations of essence are posited beings; it is the immediacy of the self-relation which determines essence. We will not go into
more detail concerning the determinations of essence here. The point to be made is that determinations of essence are different from those of being, and that the latter determinations prove themselves to be inadequate in essence.

(5) The result of the arguments we have presented is that Schein is essence in the determination of immediacy. Let us recall that when we began our discussion of essence, it seemed as if this word should denote an object beyond immediate experience. Instead, we have succeeded in explaining essence as Schein, which is immediate experience grasped as the negation of negation. Essence, then, is the idea of something beyond experience; but this idea can be understood as a relation of experience. Conversely, experience is not beyond essence, the sphere of understanding. For Schein is a determination of essence. The fact that being can be explained in terms of essence (in terms of understanding) confirms one of the goals of the Logic. This is the proof of an idea which can be expressed with the slogan, 'the real is rational.' Immediate experience insofar as it is independent of understanding is a determination of it, Schein. Likewise, essence is not beyond experience; it is Schein which is experience as the negation of negation.

(6) We are now ready to consider the results of the argument in Hegel's more technical an and für terminology. Essence has emerged out of the category of indifference as what is in-and-for-itself (an und für sich). This determination is the content of the category, its an moment. When we inquire into the meaning of essence we are explicating its für moment. The significance of the fact that the in itself of essence is to be in-and-for-itself is apparent when we recall the character of these two moments. The moment of in itself (an) is the general moment of being; i.e., of positedness and immediacy; and the moment of for itself (für) is the general moment of relation. Since a relation is a determination and negation, the für moment is the moment of negation. Because the content of essence includes both moments, essence is the unity of immediacy and negation. We can express this by saying that essence is true being which is the negation of being.

The task Hegel executes in the section on essence is the explication of the categorial relations of essence, its für moment. In the sphere of being, the content of a category is shown to mirror its relations to its moments by self-predication. But in the sphere of being, this self-predication always added an additional content which altered the original category. In a self-predication, as we have seen,
a category is both in-and-for-itself (an und für sich), and the predication adds one of these to the original category. A category which is self-predicated acquires as part of its content, the determination to be self-related. In the sphere of being this determination was always an addition to the content of the original category. Essence, however, is in-and-for-itself so that its self-relation is not an addition to its content, and further its content is to be self-related.

Since essence contains immediacy in its content, its determination as Schein expresses what essence is. But Schein is also the negative of essence. As a unity of immediacy and negation, Schein is essence itself. Thus, the determination of essence with Schein is a self-relation. The activity of essence is to determine itself as Schein and to negate this determination and return to itself. In this activity essence is an sich because it determines itself as immediate, and it is für sich because it returns to itself. Because essence determines itself and negates its determination, it participates in the activity of being an und für sich. Therefore, essence is self-related.

(7) The self-relation of essence is not a transition to another category but the return to the category essence. In the sphere of being, we predicated categories of each other in order to express the content of the category. Schein, however, does not merely express the content of essence. It is crucial to the understanding of essence that it determines itself as Schein and then negates the determination. The self-relation of the essence is not adequately expressed by predicating Schein of it because the self-relation of essence is not a predicate but the activity of returning to itself. In being, the activity of the category is expressed by the predicate which has a participial form. In essence the activity of the category belongs to the content of the category. The transition from being to essence is a transition from expressing self-relation by means of self-predication to expressing self-relation by an activity which returns to the original category. In its active form, as determining itself and sublating this determination, essence is called reflection.

This discussion concludes the points we wished to make concerning the arguments for the determination of essence with Schein, and brings us to the consideration of reflection.
We will not give these arguments in detail. We will merely attempt to show the distinction between the three forms of reflection based on a consideration of the content of essence.

IV

Essence, as containing Schein, has become reflection, the self-movement. Schein becomes reflection and is lost. The task of the consideration of reflection is to recover Schein in reflection; this goal is not achieved until "Determining Reflection." As Schein, essence is absolute negativity; i.e., the negative an sich. A category which is an sich is "only like itself" and thereby self-related. The self-relation of negation is the negating of negation; it is the movement of negating itself. But the self-relation, or Gleichheit mit sich of negation is also its immediacy. Thus the immediacy of the negating movement which is absolute reflection is just this movement itself.

(1) Positing Reflection - In positing reflection immediacy is grasped as a determination of negation as follows. Self-relating negativity is the transition from nothing to nothing. It is thus the negation of nothing which coincides with itself, the negative. As the "self-coinciding," negation is determined as immediate. In other words, immediacy is produced as a result of negation.

(2) External Reflection - "Absolute" reflection is negation in itself and thus self-relating negation. Self-relating negation is the negation of negation; i.e., the negation of its own self. As the negation of itself, reflection presupposes a self to negate; it therefore presupposes an immediacy of which it is the negation. External reflection is the negating of a presupposed immediacy or being.

(3) Determining Reflection -

A. Reflection has determined itself as positing and external; these are contradictory determinations which are to be united in determining reflection. External reflection negates an immediacy; but this negation is the positing of an other and this other is "something posited," ein Gesetztes.  

62 SL, p. 406, l. 3.

63 WL, II, 32, l. 17.
B. Posited being (Gesetztsein) is only negation in itself, but as such it too is self-related or immediate. Thus, posited being is the presupposed immediacy, and the movement of reflection reflects it into itself. There are two moments present - the positedness, which is negation as such or immediacy, and the reflection into itself.

C. It remains to grasp these two moments in the unity of the determinateness of reflection. Both moments have arisen out of essence determined as self-related negation. Positedness is the negation which is, at the same time, relation to itself. It is, then, the negation which is reflected into itself. Thus "the determinateness of reflection is the relation to its otherness within itself." 65

With this conclusion a unity of immediacy and negation has been achieved. In the section titled "Schein," Schein is first identified with the immediacy of essence, and Schein is then grasped as the movement which is called reflection: "illusory being is the same thing as reflection..." 66 While Schein is the moment of immediacy, reflection is the moment of negation. The task of the sections on reflection is to recover the immediacy of Schein within the movement which is reflection. We now see that this goal is achieved by understanding the movement as not merely negation but as a self-relation or reflection-into-itself, and the terminus of the movement as a negation in itself, positedness. In other words, within reflection, negation as negation, we discover immediacy as the self-relation which is the movement of reflection, while negation is the static moment, positedness. These moments are exactly the reverse of those of the beginning of the

64 SL, p. 407, last paragraph.

I noticed after working out this section that, as I have presented them, the three forms of reflection correspond to Dieter Henrich’s three meanings of immediacy, Hegel im Kontext (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), p. 106. My discussion of essence thus differs from Henrich’s in that I do not think these forms of immediacy are all present in the section on Schein. Instead, I have shown them emerging organically in the exposition of reflection. I have thus shown them to be organically interrelated rather than merely three forms of immediacy.

66 SL, p. 399, 1. 20.
chapter, where immediacy is the static moment, Schein, and negation the active moment, reflection.

Immediacy and Negation were united in Schein; but Schein is being in essence. The two moments were united at the cost of determining essence as its opposite, Schein, a determination which essence sublated in itself. Now, the two moments are again united as the determinateness of reflection; they are united not as essence determined as immediate, but as essence as it is in itself. In itself, essence is positedness and reflection into itself, negation which is at the same time self-relation.

The issue which is being treated in the sections on reflection becomes clearer if we take note of a Hegelian pun. The result of positing reflection (die setzende Reflexion) is "a positedness" (ein Gesetztes) or "posited being" (Gesetzteseins). Das Gesetztes is an adjectival noun form of the past participle of the verb setzen, to posit. It is clearly related to das Gesetz a law or rule. The significance of this relation is indicated by Hegel's historical remark. Reflection has been taken (e.g., by Kant) as the "movement of judgement" which relates the particular with the universal. Hegel's examples of given universals are "the rule, principle, (and) law." What Hegel is considering in the section on reflection is the application of a law to an immediacy or particular. For Kant, this is a question of judgement. On the contrary, Hegel argues in effect that the law and the movement of its application (positedness and reflection-into-self) are united in the determinateness of reflection.

67SL, p. 399, l. 7.

68SL, p. 408, ll. 28-30.

69Note the Miller translation is not consistent, for example, SL, p. 401, ll. 7-8. (WL, II, 26, ll. 13-14.)

70SL, pp. 404-405.

71SL, p. 404, l. 22.
Indeed, the issues which we have been considering in discussing the transition to essence are very much Kantian issues, and this fact is quite clear as soon as we translate Hegel's terminology into the more familiar Kantian language. Considering the issues in Kant's terms and the Kantian approach to them will allow us to gain a clearer perspective on the Hegelian approach. First, what Hegel calls "Schein," the immediacy of essence, is termed "intuition" by Kant. "Reflection," the movement of essence, is Kant's thought. Essence itself is variously identified with Schein and reflection, so that its meaning alters; in general, essence is perception or perceptual knowledge. Thus, the question Hegel is concerned with, what is essence?, can be phrased in Kantian language as, what is perception? or what is knowledge? (Perceptual knowledge is the only kind of knowledge Kant admits in the Critique of Pure Reason.) Before we discuss Kant's approach to these questions, we will explain some of Hegel's conclusions in this language.

Hegel has shown that (1) Schein is a determination of essence and that Schein is sublated in it, and that (2) reflection is the reflection of Schein. These are equivalent to the claims that (1) intuition is a component of knowledge and that (2) thought has no validity beyond a possible intuition. We can understand these translations by recalling some of the arguments for Hegel's conclusions and phrasing them in Kantian language. 'What is knowledge?' is the guiding consideration. Knowledge (perceptual knowledge) is the knowledge of an intuition. But the intuition which is known is more than the intuition. The former, the known intuition, is just knowledge itself. Rather than say that intuition is a determination of knowledge, it makes more sense in this terminology to say that intuition is a component of knowledge. Perceptual knowledge is the known intuition, but it is also what is beyond intuition. Knowledge is the negation of intuition, and likewise intuition is the negation of knowledge. But how is intuition to be defined? There is a problem in the definition of intuition because the intuitive element of experience is distinguished from the discursive element by not being capable of linguistic expression. We cannot, then, describe a category of elements which are intuitive elements without discursively locating that category. Thus, we have nothing more to describe intuition other than the fact that it cannot be discursively described: intuition is the unthought element of experience. Intuition is, then, defined as the negation of thought; it is then also the negation of knowledge. We have shown above that intuition is also the other and negative of knowledge. Hence, it is the nega-
tion of knowledge which is the negation of knowledge; the
negation as negation. This is precisely the definition of
Schein.

Knowledge explains intuition but is not the same thing as
it. Thus, knowledge is the knowledge of an intuition, the
known intuition, but the known intuition is not merely an
intuition but knowledge itself. The movement from knowledge
to intuition and back to knowledge is reflection or thought.

The relation of thought to intuition is similar to that
of knowledge and intuition. Thought is the movement between
intuition and knowledge. Thought is then the negating of
intuition. But thought (reflection) also explains intu­
tion and is thus a return to it. Thought is, then, for (für)
the intuition it explains. As such, thought is the negation
of negation which returns to intuition. For example, suppose
we are presented with an intuition and we think it as "chair."
The thought is other than the intuition and hence the negation
of it, but this thought expresses what the intuition is.
Empirical thought returns to intuition and negates itself.
We think "chair" and thereby negate the intuition, but we
do so in order to explain the intuition. The determination
"chair" is a negation which negates itself. Hegel is con­
sidering abstract thought and intuition, not the specific
determination we have used as an illustration. But the idea
is the same. Abstract thought (reflection) is the negation
of negation which is immediacy or intuition. Thus, thought
is not defined beyond intuition.

These two conclusions, that intuition is a necessary
element of knowledge and that thought does not validly
extend beyond intuition, are easily recognizable as Kantian
conclusions. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant analyzes
knowledge into two independent components, thought and
intuition. If these components are independent, the ques­
tion arises by what right are they united, by what right
are intuitions thought? Kant's answer to this question
is the section of Critique titled the "Transcendental
Deduction of the Categories." There Kant argues that
both intuitions and thoughts must be a part of a single
experience. Since knowledge is a relation of intuition
and thought, it presupposes the identity of the knower
in each, or the unity of experience. This unity is then

72 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 16, B 133.

73 Kant, B 133.
transcendental in making knowledge possible. As a condition of knowledge, it requires that we bring our representations to the unity, and the manner in which we unite our representations is by thinking them. Thus, all representations, including intuitions, must be capable of thought. And since thought is the means whereby the representations are brought to unity, it presupposes some representation and thus ultimately some intuition. Thought does not, then, validly extend beyond possible intuition.

The preceding paragraph is a sketch of a difficult section in a difficult work. The point is that the uniting of thought and intuition, thinking an intuition, is justified by a third, the transcendental unity of apperception. Because intuitions must be capable of being brought to this unity they must be capable of being thought, the latter being the means whereby they are brought to the unity.

While Kant needs to resort to a third to unite thought and intuition, Hegel shows that both are determinations of perceptual knowledge. Intuition (Schein) is independent of knowledge but insofar as it is independent it is sublated in knowledge. Thus it belongs to the definition of knowledge to be about and explain what is not knowledge, intuition. This explaining of intuition is thinking. Perceptual knowledge is the unity of its two elements, intuition and thought; but these elements must be distinguished in order to understand perceptual knowledge as the thinking of an immediate element itself distinguished from thought. We understand perceptual knowledge in terms of these two distinct elements; but these two elements are united in perceptual knowledge. Insofar as intuition can be distinguished from thought (as the unthought element of knowledge), the two are grasped as the elements of knowledge and thereby united in it. Further, since thought is merely a determination of knowledge, it does not extend beyond (perceptual) knowledge. Thus, for Hegel, a thinking of an intuition is explained as knowledge determining itself as both immediacy and negation. Hegel explains how thought and intuition arise out of the idea of perceptual know-

74 Kant, B 132.
75 Kant, B 131-132.
76 Kant, 20, B 143.
77 Kant, B 132.
78 Kant, 27, B 165-166.
ledge. Kant explains how thought and intuition are united to form knowledge. For Kant, "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." For Hegel, thought without intuition is inconceivable, for the two are united in the very idea of knowledge.

V

Hegel's analysis has yielded two Kantian solutions: we are justified in thinking intuition, and thought has no validity beyond a possible experience. However, it must be remembered that thought, in Hegel's terms, is reflection and knowledge essence. The terms thought and knowledge are used by Hegel himself but in a broader sense. Thus, Kant's conclusions about the relation of knowledge and intuition are affirmed by Hegel, but only insofar as knowledge is perceptual knowledge. Hegel recognizes and argues for the Kantian conclusions, but limits their relevance to the realm of perceptual experience. By recognizing other kinds of thought and knowledge, Hegel negates the significance of these conclusions. Kant wanted to show that the categories of the understanding can provide no knowledge of the world when they are employed beyond any possible experience. Hegel accepts this claim with the stipulation that knowledge (essence) be perceptual knowledge. This alteration reduces Kant's claims to the innocuous truism that we can have no perceptual knowledge of the world beyond what can be a part of a possible experience. In short, Hegel taking a different approach from Kant, argues for some of his conclusions, but by recognizing their limitations, he negates their significance.

Hegel's genesis of the categories is entirely different in approach from Kant's consideration of the categories. Hegel is interested in defining the categories, while Kant is interested in discovering the limits of reason. From a Hegelian perspective, Kant's project itself involves a contradiction. Kant seems to be reasoning about the limits of reason. In other words, Kant is thinking about the use of thought. We can express the paradox with Hegelian-style puns: Kant thought that thought can only be employed validly in intuition; Kant claims to know that knowledge can only be of a possible experience. First, if Kant has knowledge about knowledge, then he must already have known what knowledge is and does not need to consider that question.

Kant, B 75.
Second, in knowing about all knowledge, Kant negates his own conclusion that knowledge can only be about a possible experience, for Kant is claiming knowledge of something which is not a possible experience, all knowledge. Or in thinking thought Kant is thinking something which is not an intuition, thought.

Thus, Hegel's criticisms of Kant are that the Kantian analysis is self-negating, and that it presupposes that which it purports to prove. Kant treats of thought and knowledge, yet he employs thought in the treatment; and the attainment of knowledge of knowledge presupposes some idea of knowledge to start with. Hegel's remedy for both of these criticisms is the genesis of the categories by means of self-relation. Kant's analysis is self-contradictory because it presupposes what it proves. Hegel sees the necessity of a self-related thinking about thinking, and he develops this insight by defining the categories by means of each other, by the self-exposition of the categories. As we have seen, self-relation plays an important role in the determination of many categories. It is not until the end of the Logic that this self-relation succeeds in avoiding self-contradiction.

After this consideration of Hegel's criticisms of Kant, it is only just to consider how Kant might have responded to Hegel. Kant tries to show in The Critique that it is not valid to infer the existence of an object from a concept. It might be argued, from a Kantian perspective, that the Hegelian procedure violates just this Kantian conclusion. In order to inquire into the relation of thought and intuition, Hegel considers the nature of knowledge. From the definition of knowledge he concludes that intuitions can be validly thought and that we have no perceptual knowledge beyond a possible experience. Is not Hegel arriving at conclusions about the objects - intuition and thought - based upon their ideas? If the ideas of intuition and thought are mutually presupposing, are we then to conclude that the objects, intuition and thought, presuppose each other? Does not this inference violate Kant's conclusion by deducing relations of objects from relations of ideas? If Hegel's very procedure already involves the denial of a Kantian conclusion, it is not valid to use that procedure to infer that Kant's conclusions are not correct.

This criticism is, I believe, a misapprehension of Hegel's approach. Hegel is inquiring into intuition and thought by considering the character of the idea of perceptual knowledge. The mistake is in presuming that these conclusions concern the objects, intuition and thought. Again,
logic is the self-exposition of the categories; thus, it treats only of the categories. Whether there are objects which correspond to these categories is of no concern to Hegel's Logic. Furthermore the idea that there is a distinction between an object and its concept itself involves a distinction among categories, and this distinction, in fact, happens to be the category treated in the section of "Essence." Therefore, the Hegelian inquiry into thought and intuition does not tell us about the objects these terms denote but about the ideas themselves.

Pursuing this line, we might wonder, what is the consequence of demonstrating the collapse of the sphere of being, or of the categories of essence? The correct answer to this question is that, in each case, we pass to a new category. However, we are tempted, in answering the question, to consider the collapse of a category in relation to our use of that category. Does the collapse of a category preclude using the category? A quick glance at the Logic is sufficient to show that the answer to this question is in the negative. We continue to use the categories of mathematics, of measure, and of science even though they collapse when we think them and we are forced to pass to higher categories. The Encyclopedia illustrates many categories by showing how we use them. The fact that these categories collapse does not preclude their use. Does it even affect the use of a category? We would think that a logical contradiction contained in a category would have repercussions; but, as regards our ordinary use of a category, I have not yet discovered any.

Again, we have concluded that not only is Hegel's analysis in the Logic not about objects denoted by the ideas, but that analysis is not concerned with our use of the categories (except perhaps in the sense that we do use the categories). Therefore, Hegel is not subject to Kant's criticism. But if Hegel is not dealing with our use of the categories, how can he then criticize Kant who is? (The question treated in the "Deduction" is, by what right are the categories used in experience?) In other words, if Hegel is merely concerned with the self-exposition of the categories, and this exposition does not affect the use of the categories, how can he criticize Kant's analysis of our use of the cate-

categories? As we have seen, Kant maintains that we use the categories as modes of bringing an intuition to the unity of apperception and this function does not depend on the content of the category.

Hegel seems to presume that his analysis of the meaning of a category will provide a basis for criticizing Kant's notion of the use of a category, and thus that the meaning of a category does relate to the use. Apparently, the presumption is that we must understand the meaning of a category before we can use it. But if we must understand the meaning of a category before we can use it, and understanding the meaning of a category does not tell us anything about the use, we have fallen into an impossible contradiction.

This contradiction is only illusory. If I interpret Hegel correctly, he might argue that Kant's discussion of our use of the categories is really a treatment of their meaning. The category, Kant claims, is the formal element of knowledge. It is a logical function of judgement with respect to a manifold in general; i.e., a mode of bringing representations to the unity of apperception. This description of the use of a category amounts to a definition of "category." In effect, Kant defines "category" by its use. Further, from Hegel's perspective, any attempt such as Kant's to arrive at an understanding of the use of categories is a treatment of the meaning of category. It requires us to think about thinking, to subject the categories of thought to the categories of thought. The reflexivity of thinking about thinking is intrinsically involved in Kant's program despite his declamations. It is for this reason that Hegel's analysis of the meaning of the categories can examine and criticize Kant's analysis of the use of the categories. Hegel is not explaining how we should use the categories; he is criticizing what he regards as Kant's definition of a category. Thus, there is no contradiction in Hegel's arguments against Kant.

That Kant's categories are defined by their use with respect to objects points up their contrast with Hegel's categories. Hegel's categories are defined in terms of each other; the Logic is the self-exposition of the categories. While for Kant the categories are mere forms the material of which is intuition, the Hegelian categories have as their material other categories or themselves. The possibility that the categories can be material as well as formal rests upon the self-relation of the categories, for the Hegelian category is defined by its application to itself just as the Kantian category is defined.
by its application to intuition. The self-relation of the category enables Hegel to define it without bringing in its reference. The content of the Hegelian category is either other categories or itself, and since the categories have evolved out of being and nothing, the ultimate content of the categories is being and nothing and their relations.

In contrast to the Hegelian treatment of the content of a category, we should note the tendency of modern philosophy to treat the categories in terms of their reference or of the use that we make of them. Since such categories as "cause," "truth," etc. have no particular reference, they are treated in terms of their use. As I interpret him, Wittgenstein argued against ideas on the grounds that ideas are supposed to be what enable us to use a word, but we can use a word without an idea. Therefore, ideas are not necessary.

Hegel, as we have presented him, argues that the meaning of an idea does not affect its use. Thus, he agrees with Wittgenstein that we use words (and ideas) without knowing the idea. Yet, Wittgenstein concludes that we need not discuss ideas, while Hegel treats ideas in the Logic, which is wisdom itself. Both Hegel and Wittgenstein agree that a treatment of the ideas can be of no use to us. Why, then, does Hegel devote the Logic to them? This question strikes at the root of all metaphysics. On the one hand, metaphysics is the most valuable of sciences; on the other hand, by its very nature it has no use. From Hegel's point of view its value is internally defined. Reasoning is itself metaphysics. When we reason about something we are using ideas about ideas. Reasoning is inherently self-referential. Much that is usually taken to be the result of empirical investigation is shown to emerge from the analysis of ideas. The path whereby these things emerge, the reasoning, is knowledge. And knowledge is something which is valuable for its own sake.

Through this analysis we can understand the meaning of the famous Hegelian slogan, 'the real is rational.' The idea is that reasoning is self-contained and self-sufficient. As we have noted, through self-reference the categories can be defined without reference to externals. The real is rational because the ideas can be understood only in terms of other ideas. With this Hegel is rejecting two kinds of externals, the material world and transcendent objects. As we have seen, "being" is itself an idea in the Logic. The material world is treated only insofar as it can be thought; i.e., as the categories of the sphere of being. On the other hand, we need not go beyond the ideas either.
As we saw in the discussion of essence, the idea of this latter can be defined in terms of other categories, even though "essence" is supposed to be something beyond being. The self-relation of the categories permits the self-exposition of the categories, the explanation of the categories only in terms of each other.

VI

In this paper we have explained the function of self-relation in various ways. First, we have examined some of the categories of being and showed how they are determined by means of themselves, the meaning of self-determination, and why the self-determination leads to a contradiction. Next, we have examined how the contradictions of the sphere of being between the an and für moments of a category are resolved in essence because the category is an und für sich. This resolution is accomplished by means of a new form of self-relation; the categories of essence are not self-predicated as those of being, but contain their self-relation in themselves. But the self-relation of essence is self-related negation and thus contains within itself its negation. The determination of essence is the first fruit of the Hegelian approach, for essence is thereby seen in terms of other categories and not as something beyond, not in terms of an immediacy. Finally, we have considered how self-relation is at the basis of Hegel's criticisms of Kant, and then tried to show how Hegel might defend himself from a Kantian criticism by pointing to the self-relation of categories. As we might expect of such a central topic much more could be said about it. Clearly it plays a significant role in the Logic. We have considered the topic in terms of the Hegelian approach. While I think that this paper has explained that approach, I am still not certain about the ultimate value of that approach.

In conclusion, let us take note of some of the ways the topic of the self-relation of the categories has appeared. First, the categories are defined in terms of each other and themselves. Second, in a self-predication, the content of the category is identified with the relation of the category to its moments. There is an interplay between the category and its relation to its moments; the relation of the category to its moments is a part of the content and can contradict the other parts. Third, (in consequence of the second) the category is what it does. The being of the category is identified with its activity, for the category relates itself to other categories; it determines itself. Fourth, the self-relation of the categories is their self-
exposition; i.e., the self-relation is the development which is the Logic. In this latter sense, self-relation is the identity of theoretical and practical in the 'Absolute Idea': being is as it manifests itself, and this manifestation is the self-relation of being. Finally, in a negative sense, self-relation serves to exclude defining an idea in terms of what is not an idea, either a material or a transcendent object.

Thus, we end where we began, with the assertion that the Logic is the self-exposition of the categories. Now, though, we can understand the meaning of "self-exposition" as the self-relation of the categories (point four above), and why and how the meaning of "self-exposition" alters from being to essence. And this understanding is only a part of understanding the self-exposition of "self-exposition" which is Hegel's Science of Logic.

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