Notes by C. I. Lewis on Empirical Knowledge, Phenomenology, and Related Topics

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ABSTRACT: NOTES BY C. I. LEWIS ON EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND RELATED TOPICS

The C. I. Lewis Collection at Special Collections, Stanford University, contains papers and letters which update or expand upon topics discussed by C. I. Lewis during his professional career. This edition of Lewis' reflections on topics related to empirical knowledge and phenomenology is intended to make those materials readily available to scholars and philosophers interested in the philosophy of C. I. Lewis or in those topics represented here. (Also included are two significant references to and revisions of his early works.)

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INTRODUCTION TO: NOTES BY C. I. LEWIS ON EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND RELATED TOPICS

With the permission of Mr. Andrew Lewis, son and literary executor of the late Clarence Irving Lewis, Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University, and with the cooperation of the Manuscripts Division of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries (which subsequently renewed the permission), I have been able to prepare this edition of Prof. Lewis' unpublished notes and letters on a variety of topics related to the concept of empirical knowledge. In addition, the inclusion of Lewis' excellent note on the phenomenology of empirical cognition was made possible by the permission of Paul Arthur Schilpp and Open Court Press. Previously that note was available only in The Philosophy of C. I. Lewis, edited by Prof. Schilpp and published by Open Court (LaSalle, Illinois, 1968).

With the exception of brief titles (which in a few cases suggest an interpretation of the material) and occasional minor corrections and emendations in the texts, the notes were transcribed as they appeared. The order of presentation is chronological, but only roughly so. All personal greetings and references have been left out of the texts.

A few items seem to me to be particularly noteworthy even couched as they are among such fine neighbors:

a) Lewis' contrast of the found and the given (3/28/53),
b) the note on the phenomenology of empirical cognition (4/27/58),
c) the insightful suggestions for the philosophical understanding of Kant's deduction of the categories (2/7/58, 6/9/62, 6/27/63, 9/18/63)
d) the articulate expression of concern with the phenomenological use of language (no date), and
e) the injection of the concept of imperatives into epistemological discussion (12/9/63, 1/8/64).

I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to Mr. Andrew K. Lewis and Mrs. C. I. Lewis of Concord, Mass., to Florian J. Shasky, Patricia Palmer, and Sara Timbly of Stanford University Libraries, to Arlene R. Molina, and to Mrs. Carole Wenthen of the Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University.

Permission to quote any material transcribed from the C. I. Lewis Collection in this paper should be addressed to the Manuscripts Division, Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California 94305.

In some cases I may be able to help those seeking the location of particular items on the microfilms. Send your inquiries to me c/o Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. 13210.

FERNANDO R. MOLINA

E-5
THE FOUND AND THE GIVEN
(March 28, 1953)
On the subject of the given:
....I want to speak of anything--any element or aspect--phenomenologically capable of being discovered directly in experience as 'found.' For example, I have used that word in "Analysis [of Knowledge and Valuation]" in referring to immediate value qualities of particular passages of experience....I take it that pain or anger-ness or feeling of conation, etc., are all alike 'found' in experience, and no differently found than visual redness or tactual hardness.
....any 'found' datum may function cognitively. It would be more logical to call it given when and only when it so functions...

...[In contrast to the 'found' content of remembering or imagining, for example,] I take it that the main differentia are such as mark the significance of the particular species-character of the found for normally assigned objective reference. Does this item 'represent' or have the phenomenological quality normally called 'presentation'? Does it exhibit the quality of normal merely imagining? Does it exhibit the character normally distinguishing sensing? This, too, is a question to be answered by direct inspection of the quality as found. But by the same token, it is not validly determinative of the question of valid objective reference, since the directly found quality of 'sensing' deceives our judgment when we are really subject to any illusion.

...I have restricted 'given' to that which directly exhibits the phenomenological qualities usually accepted as sanctioning objective reference marking those experiences to which cognitive significance is normally assigned...

COMMENT ON TYPESCRIPT OF PAPER BY V. LOWE, "BELIEF IN UNOBSERVED CONTEMPORARY REALITY" (JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, L. #18, Aug. 27, 1953)
(April 5, 1958)
[I] About contrary-to-fact conditionals, I think that Chisholm, Goodman, etc., overlook the obvious interpretation. "If I should do A, then E" is equivalent in force to; "The premise 'I do A' plus other premises of the (actual or hypothetical) case, are sufficient for the inductive conclusion, "E will follow." Such matters should be taken common-sensibly as to further presumed premise, and include relevant and observable facts as well as laws of nature, like gravitation.

The case is no different if the hypothesis concerns the past and is contrary to fact. I know what would have happened only in that manner in which I know what inductive conclusions are justified by
presumption of the contrary-to-fact-condition and the other pertinent presumptions (actual or hypothetical). If there is any possibility of valid inductive conclusions, then whatever makes these conclusions valid to infer from their premises, makes them valid to infer independently of the question whether the premises are true or false. Most of those who have gone into print on this topic are trying to make the matter amenable to a truth-value logic. Their trouble is due to the fact that no principles of valid inference are capable of statement in terms of a truth-value logic.

This last is a separate matter. But consider this: Knowing that the truth-value relation \( p \supset q (\sim(p \sim q)) \) holds, allows me to 'infer' \( q \) from \( p \) in three cases only; (1) If I know \( p \) is false, (2) if I know \( q \) is true, (3) If I know that regardless of the truth is fact of \( p \) or \( q \), if \( p \) were true then \( q \) must be true. But if (1) I know \( p \supset q \) because I know \( p \) is false, I don't draw the conclusion, \( q \), or any other from it. If (2) I know \( p \supset q \) because I know \( q \) is true, I don't draw the conclusion, \( q \), from \( p \); because I know \( q \) already. I only draw conclusions from premise in cases of kind (3), when the corresponding strict implication, \( p \supset q \), holds. And in that case, \( q \) is validly a consequence of \( p \), regardless of the truth or falsity of \( p \). On just this point, the case of inductive inference of probable and warranted consequences of assumptions, is strictly parallel. Contrary-to-factness of premises has nothing to do with the validity of inferring the consequent from the premises. If \( p \) be true (or were true), the consequences will be (or would be) probable and justified to predict.

About images and picture-taking, I said something at Baltimore. There is a trouble over generality--just the difficulty over 'triangle in general' which nominalists have exploited time out of mind. What I feel sure of is that any verification in experience requires that we be able to say in advance what empirical eventualities will falsify a prediction and what will verify it. Apart from some envisagement of what will verify, I just don't see how we could be thus prepared to recognize positive and negative evidence of a hypothesis. One general remark that may be in point (various points) of your discussion is that if we did not know certain modes of persisting of things, we could have no knowledge of objects at all. Elephants in Africa will remain elephants--or become bones of elephants--through the time it will take me to travel to Africa. Known modes of persistence and of changing are essential to knowing any kind of object. What looks like a piece of chalk but flies away or squeals when touched is presumably an illusion and certainly does not satisfy criteria of being chalk. It is so that we can infer treeferns antedating man from observation of coal. Known modes of persistence and of changing are essential to knowing any kind of object. It is also in point that whatever is essential to being X is definitive of X-ness, and a priori. The criteria of being chalk are timeless and unchanging. A confirmation that so and so is chalk, by test, is a temporal process but dependent for interpretation of its result on those modes of persisting which are of the essence of chalk.

[II] There are two senses of 'possible' (at least two):
(1) logically possible. \( p \) is logically possible if and only if \( p \) is non-contradictory. This is 'absolute' possibility. (2) empirically possible, possible on empirical premises--actual or themselves similarly possible. There are a wide variety of senses of such possibility, depending on the sense we are attacking to the assumptions on which anything is called possible. I discussed the general
case briefly on p. 161 of Symbolic Logic. Perhaps the widest sense of 'empirically possible' is 'imaginable'. It is in my mind that a 'plan of action' may be of the sort $A_1$ or $A_2$ or $A_3$.... Since in fact no concrete act can be planned down to the last detail, perhaps all plans of action are such as could be further specified, and certain details are inessential to the plan, while others are essential.

[III] We know how to make interminably many separate tests of what we believe; but we know only a finite number of ways of testing. Some ways of testing depend on time-space relation of tester to fact or thing tested. But all these details affecting and affected by time-space relation being spelled out, the kind of test is one any tester can start making at any time (given essential conditioning of any test or of this kind of test.)

CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS
(May 28, 1957)
....I have indeed had only two main ideas [on the subject of categories] in mind; the obvious one that there is no ascription of actual or non-actual without some such determination. Concepts are actual or non-actual according as they are mentally instanced; symbols according as they are both mentally and physically instanced; trees if they are physically. I have indeed some doubt whether there would be anything an sich which could be thought except in relation to categories of a mind, but I don't know how to express this thought.

The second idea concerns the use of 'not'. It is false that the fixed stars are blind—or it is meaningless. And being round is not being colored. But being green is not-being-red; is being not-red.

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE PERCEPTUAL
(April 27, 1958)
....A principle thought I would offer to critics is that epistemology requires one to elicit by attention factors in cognition; but that what is so elicited must be there, and the eliciting of it need be neither invention nor prevarication.

I quote myself—an old unpublished note:

Since publication of Mind and the World-Order and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation any number of discussions of perception have appeared, in some of which notice has been taken--usually adverse notice--of my views expressed in terms of "the given." Since I would be brief here, let me be dogmatic. I rely heavily--and with some confidence--upon the reader's recognizing the intent of what is said.

An experience is presentational insofar as there are identifiable aspects or characters or items constituent in it which are as they are, incorrigibly to us, and for which there are correlative expectancies, established by past experience, such that, in the instance in question, they could be verified or falsified by further experience. Such established expectancies, correlative with identifiable constituents in presentational experience, are too evident to require argument—not only in the case of man but in other of the higher animals also. They are, plainly, the root of empirical knowledge.

Insofar as such correlative expectations could be elicited by attention, any presentational experience is cognitive. Where they are merely implicit, though operative in the determination of behavior, they could be called precognitive. A cognitive presentational
experience is a perception provided the correlated expectations which find their cues in constituents of it are testable but entertained with confidence in advance of test.

For any perceptual experience, there will be such verifiable or falsifiable expectations, elicitable by attention to it, and there will be identifiable aspects, characters, or items of it as presentational which operate as cues to such expectation or perceptual belief. The identifiable cue, or cues, I would call the given element of the perceptual experience; and the expectation which goes with it I would call an interpretation of it with respect to the given cue or cues.

The explicit identification of such given elements in experience and recognition of the correlative expectancies as being such, is always the work of abstractive attention (analysis?) directed upon the perceptual experience, whether in common-sense knowing or in any philosophic examination of knowledge.

The common-sense identification of the visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, and other cues operative in instigating perceptual beliefs, is as old as homo sapiens himself. They are the "data of sense" which did not wait upon any philosophic sophistication for their recognition. There is no verifiable content of any perceptual belief except expectations thus common-sensibly correlated with such given cues. Also, the distinction of veridical from erroneous perceptual beliefs, so cued, did not wait upon epistemological sophistication for its recognition and critical attention.

Philosophic examination of perception may go further, in variety of directions; but if it belies these outstanding features of presentational experience, then I think it will fare worse.

BELIEF
(March 5, 1960)

....Like many such words, 'belief' may denote the believing, or it may denote that which is believed; in the first sense of a believing, a belief is a mental event, and the 'same belief' cannot occur twice or occur in two different minds....Like any assessment of any actual believing from the logical point of view, there are those respects in which this represents the comparison of it with a kind of ideality which is somewhat distant from any psychological or even phenomenological description of it as a psychological state or event.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR KNOWING
Lewis later notes that]...we are responsible for the 'knowing,' the cognitive belief on the basis of which we commit ourselves to do, as well as for this choice of doing itself.

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING
(March 7, 1960)

We bring our concepts with us. If we did not, we should never understand anything. 'Understanding' is subsuming under concepts. We apply them or refuse to apply them. The criterion by reference to which we apply and refuse to apply [,grant,] 'status,' unchanging concepts to [the] squirming, streaming flux of the passing show, we also bring with us. Cosmology is making sense of the passing show by applying fixed concepts to the Heraclitean flux,—putting the logos into the cosmos. Ontology is staying at home with our fixed
concepts, in the Platonic heaven when we contemplate the unchanging 'ideas' in their necessary relations.

Rules of ontology, deductive logic.
Rules of cosmology, inductive logic.

Philosophy is that part of the problem of understanding things in general which arises as [a] result of [a] realization that in large measure such understanding is to be got by critical self-examination...

TIME; REFERENCE TO "PHENOMENOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS"
(October 9, 1960)

...We cannot imagine time-in-experience without its arrow, even in a world in which we could always recover what is past. The recovery would not be a re-covery--this same thing again--if experienced time did not have an arrow. Spatial interval is, in terms of our experience, constituted out of time interval, not vice versa....

Kant was right that time is inexorably the form of intuition in which alone anything is for us; and Whitehead is right: without happenings there would be nothing. And an object is something that can be again--for a creature with a past and a future endowed with memory and the will to do. The ultimate form of reality is passage--from remembered past to anticipatable future. Space is constituted out of items which persist or are recoverable in time's passage. Without time and its arrow--nothing.

But enough of phenomenological metaphysics; it is a weariness to the very small gods who have only a tiny corner and so short a time in which to be creative. [This last Par. was circled.]

OBJECTS AND CONCEPTS
(July 6, 1963)

"Suggestion--off the cuff Analytic and Synthetic"

'Attributes' arise by recognition of presentationally characters. 'Objects' represent congelation of characters which arise by association together on a sufficient number of different occasions of observation so that presentation of a partial colligation of this total congelation arouses expectation of others as to be disclosed--usually upon condition of some governable way of behaving on occasion of the presentation of this partial colligation. [Marginal note: We see 'one side of a house'--expect others if we walk around it.]

An object is, thus, some syndrome of the presentational...

As such a space-time localizable syndrome of observable perspectives (Russell) [B. Russell,] an object is a Whiteheadian event. As a syndrome which is observable in different cases, it represents or answers to an association-complex; a classification, a concept.... When humans learn to govern their own thinking and be choosy about their choosable signals of expectation--or so far as they do--it becomes their critical and criticizable knowing. As such, it may be recognized as 'induction.'

With a concept as a vehicle of expectancy in application, we always have a choice if experience crosses us up we can say, "Sorry, my mistake, not a potato," or we can 'modify our concept of 'potato'--literally exchange it for a new and at least partly different one.... But in order to be either applicable or applied, any concept we use is and must be frozen for the time being.... Explication of frozen concepts is deduction.
CONCEIVING OF THE ACTUAL

Representing, thinking-of, without crediting as actual is frequent and may be labeled imagining. Much obscurity attaches to 'conceiving'—e.g., conceiving triangle in general, by reason of taking 'representing' to be simply imagining, and forgetting what the frequently essential condition of verifying or confirming as conditional upon satisfying some condition of 'experimental' action.

ANIMAL BEHAVIOR, THE GIVEN, THE FUTURE

Animal behavior is governed by the affective tone of an association established in previous experience, or nature as a genetically determined mode of response, between a stimulus and an apprehension or feeling significant of what follows upon stimuli having the character of the presently given when an initiative of action of the sort presently aroused is taken.

COGNITION AS A TYPE OF EXPERIENTIAL EVENT IN RELATION TO ACTION

(August 2, 1948)

Our comprehension of objective things and objective facts, as distinguished from the given data of sense merely, will be found upon analysis to consist in the apprehension [understanding] that when certain specific and recognizable items are sense-presented, the initiation of particular modes of action will lead to the realization of certain further items in experience, now envisaged in imagination. This holds not merely for the kind of knowledge called prediction but for all knowledge of the objectively real. Such cognition of reality consists in apprehending not only what is directly sensed but that which, though not now presented to sense, verifiably is the case.

KANT ON THE EXPERIENTIALLY SIGNIFIED

(October 4, 1962)

...Kant said, that concepts without percepts are empty, percepts without concepts are blind. We find his saying suggestive; and we know what he means; if what greets us in present experience did not signify something beyond this experience but thought of by reason of it, what so greets us would mean nothing; it would convey nothing of an actual world beyond.... But Kant did not use quite the right words in this sententious statement. Within the perceptual experience itself, there is this something which meets the eye or ear, and also that which is beyond it but thought-of, signified. There is the obvious sense in which we do not 'see' these black marks on paper, what we see is a newspaper, a book....

"OUR" BODY

(November 14, 1962)

...We might even consider whether our body is, phenomenologically considered, that movable (sic) locus within which the sense-presentational, the affectively felt, and the volitionally determinable have their community of reference, their temporal correlations, their discoverable modes of association and 'effect' on one another. But let us not, wax too metaphysical, and simply say that our own body is the place from which we look and hear and we, at one and the same time, see ourselves....
BELIEF COMPARED TO VOLITION

Believing is a kind of accepting, [a] committing to, which, whenever corrigible, is something like volition.

NOTES

"Logic, March 15, 1909"

[Double underscore] You cannot get your logical categories out of any analysis of perception.

"Concept of cardinal number is derived from the ordinal."

ROLE OF MEMORY IN EXPERIENCE

...To have a mind is to be reminded. If the present as present should, instant to instant, merely register clean-cut and with no fringes, there could be no recognition, nothing subject to label 'you-again'; every moment's experience would be brand new and significant of nothing but itself....

PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE

(December 26, 1963)

That topic [, "the data of experience which come to figure as the experiential basis of empirical cognition,"]...belongs to phenomenology; direct examination of experience.

IDEAL OF PURE REASON IN SCIENCE

(October 28, 1963)

...The scientific infinite regress of required grounds for what we put confidence in, is a Kantian ideal of pure reason.... The ultimate reality, projected to emerge from all future critical investigations, and presently knowable in its entirety to God alone, is [also] an ideal of pure reason. Like all such ideal projections it is incomplete, and subject to paradoxes of the infinite--the totality of what is incompletable by any step-wise processes.

RECOGNITION AND KANT'S DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

(February 7, 1958)

...And by the same token there would be in this world [, "a world in which there should be no valid anticipations on the basis of observable clues to them,"] no recognizable objects; nothing presentable which would be subject to classification in any manner whatever. Of course, we but repeat here fundamental considerations advanced in Kant's deduction of the categories--his attempted tabulation of the major classifications of predictabilities according to a rule which must hold in any world of identifiable objects, intelligible to human beings.

[ Goes on to phen. of objects. ]

KANT ON EXPERIENCE

(June 9, 1962)

A Kantian 'experience,' as spoken of in the Deduction, is experience of objects. Any who do not read Kant so should read again. Perhaps he forgot to add that the experience of dreams and illusion are understood by being categorized as visions of the non-actual and unverifiable.
"ANALYTIC"
(April 28, 1963)

In this present sense of the word, any view which involves discrimination of 'features,' 'factors,' elements,' to be discerned by abstraction may be spoken of as 'analytic.'

COGNITIVE INTERPRETATION
(January 30, 1963)

This factor of the represented is, if you believe in it--your cognitive interpretation of the given in perception. And if you have a doubt, it is still thought-of, represented. (...Perhaps we should say that it is an interpretation, but not an adopted interpretation.) Perceptual believing is, in any case, believing in something you don't see.

THE FOUND VS. THE GIVEN
(January 30, 1963)

...The representation [interpretation,] and the crediting [, belief,] are to be found in the experience but to be found as not having the character we here label 'given.' All discernible factors in any actual experience are to be found in it.

But let us not confuse the datum called 'given' in any perceptual experience with the total data about any perceptual experience...

THE GIVEN
[The given as real ]...Correctly understood, what is given is always veridical. There can be no doubt concerning the actuality of the experienced qualia. But that my thought, my experience in the other sense contains error is obvious. Error exists only in minds.

NOTE ON PRAGMATISM

One further kind of significance of pragmatism; facing questions that baffle any "metaphysical" solution.

Kant--'pragmatism'; we are rationally compelled to belief. We are rationally obliged to face life and act as if so and [so] were true.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRESENT
(March 17, 1963)

...What is called 'one experience' is never limited to 'an instant';...and any experience, however short and 'immediately all there at once' has some duration, and--by stop-watch at least--contains some essentially sequential progression.

...[yet] this whole content of the perceptual experience is likely to occur all one bundle; and it all may come and pass with no more than an instant's notice...

(April 29, 1963)

...Perception is in fact a quite complex process, even if, by lifelong habituation, we do it all in a second.

FACTORS IN EXPERIENCE
(April 30, 1963)

...there must be a truth about all the factors constituent in any experience in question. And it must be possible to identify, to find, these factors as constituent in it, if the account is correct.
MODIFICATION BY RECOGNITION  
(April 30, 1963)  
...we must give attention of ['to'? Ed.] another broad and general consideration affecting any 'whole' of experience within which any kind of factors or constituents are discriminable; namely, the sense in which any such factors may be said to be 'modified' or 'qualified' by their context in this whole.... [We may, for example, be] hearing a rumble which might be a truck or a distant railroad train, or airplane, or only an electric refrigerator in poor order. Suddenly... [we] recognize what is heard; and, after that, we cannot...hear it without this 'meaning.' The before and after experiences are 'qualitatively different.'

NOTE ON CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE  
"The technically right" (no date)  
...Kant was immensely right in saying that the question is not whether there can be such a thing as knowledge, but how. Perhaps he did not perfectly indicate the significance of his own observation, in saying that there is no question whether mathematics and physics are valid because we have mathematics and physics. It would have been more final to point out that if there be no knowledge, nobody will ever find it out, because such finding out would be a piece of knowledge; knowledge of a transcendentally important kind...

A DISCUSSION OF THE GIVEN AND ITS INTERPRETATION  
(March 8, 1963)  
The interpretation of any perceptual given may well be called the meaning which it has for the perceiver.... We do not see patches of color but rocks and pencils; we do not hear sounds but train whistles and sonic booms. Some meaning is there with the presentation; though if we so say, we must be aware that, just occasionally we do see 'something' altogether baffling of interpretation, and often hear something without conviction of any interpretation.

BELIEF  
(March 8, 1963)  
...the credence [, belief that,]--far more often than not--is a matter of habituation; it spontaneously supervenes upon the sensing and association [, the thought-of].

KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING, BELIEF  
(June 14, 1962)  
Empirically to know is not only to see but to understand. To understand is to bring under a concept. And to subsume under a concept is to believe, to hazard prediction of the future verifiable. It takes both seeing and believing to constitute that simplest mode of empirical knowing which is the recognition of the presented as a kind of real object.

ON REICHENBACH AND THE DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE  
(June 27, 1963)  
The synthetic 'a priori' (necessary presupposition) of empirical knowledge is the presumption that inductive generalization, establishing predictions as probable, is valid. And this presumption admits a pragmatic justification, if no other, by reference to the fact that [without it]...there is no intelligibility of experience, and
all empirical believing and all deliberate doing is silly.
It may not be altogether egregious to observe that the Kantian
'deduction of the categories of empirical knowledge' comes to the
same thing; no experience of objects without predictabilities
grounded in the particularities of given intuitions of sense. (And
we know we have such experience of objects--the presumption without
which this deduction begs the question.) This last consideration
is a little concealed in Kant by his frequent shortening of 'experi­
ence of objects' to 'experience,' omitting the conceivability--if
it be such--of a Jamesian 'buzzing, blooming confusion' such as
may greet the infant mind, and is as yet without meaning.

NOTE FROM OUTLINE OF A COURSE ON THEORY OF MEANING, LECTURE II.
(2.) Cognition in general [i.e., whether valid or invalid], or
the content of it, must have meaning in the sense that there is
something beyond or outside the cognitive experience itself which is
pointed to, believed in or asserted. When valid, [that content]
must correspond to or accord with what is thus meant.

RECOGNIZABLE ORDER AND KANT'S DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES
(September 18, 1963)
...a recognizable thing as experienced is a kind of recognizable
order of an unfolding experiential event, having a recognizable pattern.
[More accurately, a multiplicity of such recognizable patterns which
are correlated with one another in recognizedly 'orderly' (predictably)
ways.].

There is something here which, with a good deal of liberty of
interpretation, may remind us of Kant's "Deduction of the Categories"--
except that Kant thought it was synthetic judgments a priori, instead
of induction concluding which...required in order to elicit the justi­
fication of empirical knowledge. One major strain in his argument
is that without this, we could have no 'experience,' and careful
consideration suggests that, by that word, he here means experience of
objects.... And as we have suggested, there (these?) could not find
recognizable objects instead of the passing play of 'phantoms' on
a chaotic 'stream of consciousness' without this coming to expect on
the basis of passing presentation, and finding such expectations
generally indicative (signs of) what is to come. In brief, without
the habit of induction [relative to the sense presented], you could
not meet the passing show, and either think or act as humans do, and
indeed cannot get out of doing.
[*illegible phrase occurred here: Ed]

NOTE ENTITLED "PEIRCE AND C.L."
(September 26, 1962)
That mode of association called 'expecting' is of peculiar and
fundamental importance for any empirical knowledge, and for what we
call our concepts.

NOTE ON PHENOMENOLOGY OF FOUND CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE (MARKED
"GLANCE IT THROUGH")
[Fragment? ]
...There ('these'? ) are the categories of the directly apprehended;
shape, size, color, pitch, loudness, hardness-softness, roughness­
smoothness. And the categories make (may?) break up into dimensions;
the dimensions into different gamuts. All this categorizing the
dimensionalizing is something learned in the course of experience,
as well as dependent in some part, on acquired linguistic habits.
We cannot express the found content of experience or mark off the
diverse aspects of it, without exercise of intellectual processes
which are over and above what, as directly given or found, we would
express. But we must apprehend them, and do apprehend them, as being
independently as they are and not otherwise, in our experience, before
we have anything to so express. The intellection is something over
and above, and not in, what we could so formulate, to ourselves or
to others.... [But language is] already copyrighted for the des-
cription of actualities external to conscious experience. Such
expressive use is akin to its primary function; and it is character-
istically both inapt and inadequate for delineating what appears as
against those external actualities of which appearances may be cog-
nitively significant.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL USE OF LANGUAGE
(May 1, 1963)

"...it is only by reason of this content of direct awareness that we
have any intimation of, or reason to believe in, these signified
objective factualities [which] we mention in our endeavor to report
this content of experience which is our evidence for them...
We may call the use of language with the intent to convey a content
and character of experience, its phenomenological usage.

FACTORS IN PERCEPTION
(January 30, 1963)

There are three discriminable factors in perception: the
presentation, the element of the thought-of, some representing,
which runs beyond this sense-apprehension; and a belief or confidence
attaching to this thinking of as an expecting of something further,
conditional upon a possible doing—a testing of this expectancy;
a trial of the applicability of this representing [interpreting? Ed.]
to this content of the sensibly presented. [i.e. is interpretation
correct? Ed.] These three have grown together—become associated—
by reason of past experience. [Typically, they are]...all there at
once and undiscriminated in the perceptual experience. But for any
perspicuous account of my perceptual knowing, they have to be dis-
tinguished by abstraction, within this full perceptual experience....

[Lewis then noted that "...perhaps no full experience anybody ever
had was merely cognitive:" "in almost any experience...in any wise
'taken seriously' as signifying some factuality or object, there will
also be some enterprise in mind: some possible doing thought of to
which this moment's experience [is] relevant, and some desirable
sequel of this occasion which we are bent upon furthering, or some
undesirable eventuation of it which we would avoid...]

INTERPRETATION AND BELIEF
(March 22, 1963)

This factor of representation, or conception, 'pencil' or
'skewer' or 'dry wood'—is not incorrigible. It reflects an activity
of thinking, and is [as noted above] amenable to purpose or interest.
The specificity of this factor is governable, and amenable to purpose or interest. And if such representing [were to] have any character of deliberation..., then it is more than so far from being willy-nilly, [and] it may stand as a challenge to thinking, directed to guidance of our doing...

And as this draws to our attention, there is also this factor of believing, crediting, having confidence in; whether the thinking be spontaneous and uncritical or be a conclusion deliberately adopted.

*[nature? Ed.]*

OBJECTIVE QUALITIES
(After notes dated June 19, 1960)

A good deal of philosophizing, both before and after Locke, has consisted in puzzling ourselves by the Lockeian supposition that some perceptible qualities are in the object as in our perception of it and some are not. We must attribute some perceptible qualities of objects; otherwise how shall we predicate anything?

IMPERATIVES RELATIVE TO KNOWLEDGE
(December 29, 1963)

It is in point that we have two works here which apply 'knowledge' and 'cognition.' And of these two, 'knowledge' implies righteousness, correctness; 'cognition' does not. Correlatively, this manner [kind? Ed.] of factual event,* is subject to explanation of the same sort as any other manner of factual event; first, explanation of the causes as a fact of nature by discovery of natural laws of such occurrences.... But psychological laws must relate to cognition at large.... But any epistemological verities to be found out will have a different significance and are to be determined in a different way. They will concern cognition as a part of our behavior for which we can take responsibility, and any 'laws' of it are desirable and even imperative to adhere [to] They will be normative, not descriptive, generalities.... And these can be elicited by reflective, self-conscious and critical consideration.

[*Earlier version 1/6/64) said 'experiential',]*

IMPERATIVES RELATIVE TO KNOWLEDGE
(January 8, 1964)

...But epistemological verities...are imperatives to follow—if we would know, instead of mistakenly believing.

BELIEF, THE SENSE-PRESENTED, AND KNOWLEDGE; PRAGMATISM
(December 13, 1962)

And let us remark in passing that pragmatism [past?] here makes connection with the major thesis of Kant, who was also first to use this term 'pragmatism.' [Critique of Pure Reason, A824/B852] It is his major thesis, in his Deduction (proof of the validity) of the Categories of the Understanding, that there can be no knowledge of objects without the subsumption of percepts under concepts, and though Kant does not specifically emphasize it (and other pragmatists have often failed to do so explicitly), it is obviously to be remarked that the applicability of this representational conception to what is sense-presented, must be credited, believed, if the perceptual
The major point in Reichenbach is his acute analysis of what probability is and what commitment to the probable comes to: the commitment to the probable guarantees nothing; it is a 'posit'. But if acting according to the probabilities does not do you any good, then nothing you can do will do you any good. (You have other alternatives; but no other it is rational to accept.)

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