"SAID OF" AND "PREDICATED OF" IN THE CATEGORIES

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Anyone with more than casual interest in Aristotle's Categories knows the convention that "predicated of" \("κατηγορεῖται\) marks a general relation of predication while "said of" \("λέγεται\) is reserved for essential predication. By "convention" I simply mean to underscore that the view in question ranks as the conventional or received interpretation. Ackrill, for example, follows the received view in holding that only items within the same category (not arbitrarily, of course) can stand in the being-said-of relation and, thus, that only secondary substances can be said of primary substances. Despite its long received status the convention has never received a fully comprehensive examination and defense. In fact such an account is needed because, while enjoying considerable textual support, certain passages of the Categories appear to clash with the convention. My aim in this paper is, first, to develop and defend the standard interpretation, as I shall call it. Since the standard interpretation has lately been challenged in a closely argued article by Russell Dancy, my defense will proceed partly with an eye to his criticisms. Having met these, I go on to raise some difficulties with the rather unorthodox reading Dancy gives the Categories. The crucial point here turns out to be what Aristotle understands by a paronym.
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I

What, then, are the convention's interpretive credentials? For a start, Aristotle's examples in the four-fold classification of τῶν ὅντων at lα20-lb10 support the convention. There he reports that man is said of the individual man and knowledge of a particular sort of (grammatical) knowledge. So one thing said of a second seems to be an essential property of the second. The other half of the convention, the distinction between "said of" and "predicated of," emerges from the following passages.

lb10-15: Whenever one thing is predicated of [κατηγορεῖται] another, as of a subject [ὅς καθ' ὕποκειμένου], all that is said of [λέγεται] the predicate will be


applied to [όηνοεταί] the subject. E.g., man is predicated of the particular man, and animal of man; therefore animal will also be predicated of the particular man.

2a27-34: Of the things that are in a subject, in most cases neither the word nor the definition is predicated of the subject; in some cases, nothing prevents the name from being predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be. For example, white, which is in a subject, a body, is predicated of the subject (for a body is said to be white), but the definition of white is never predicated of a body.

2b37-3a6: Again, primary substances are most properly called substances because they are subjects for everything else; but the species and genera of primary substances relate to all the rest as the primary substances do to everything else: for of them all the rest are predicated. For should you call a particular man literate, you would accordingly call man and animal literate; and it works the same way in the other cases.

1b10-15 is generally agreed to state the transitivity of the said of relation. This squares with the assumption (justified by Aristotle's examples) that being-said-of relates terms of essential predications only. For "Socrates is [a] man" and "Man is [an] animal" do intuitively yield "Socrates is [an] animal." 2b37-3a6, on the other hand, holds substances to be subjects for everything else because all else is predicated of them. So there must be a difference between "said of" and "predicated of." Otherwise, 1b10-15 would license moving from true

1. Socrates is white

and

2. White is a color

to the patently false

3. Socrates is a color.

Further, 2a19-21 appears to define "said of" in terms of "predicated of:" A is said of B if, and only if, both the name of A and its definition are necessarily predicated of B. So being-predicated-of appears to be a wider relation than being-said-of. Indeed if (as Dancy himself admits) 2a19-21 is meant to contain a definition, then "predicated of" must signify a

3Dancy, p. 354.
wider notion than "said of." This becomes explicit at 2a27-34, for that passage can now be taken to deny that (1) could be a case of something being said of a subject.

It is clear, then, that the convention has textual basis. It will, however, shortly become clear that complications face the standard view. Since these constitute Dancy's justification for seeking a new, non-standard interpretation, it is important to take a look at them. My strategy will be to provide explanations for the relevant complications which are more plausible than Dancy's and which show that Aristotle intended "said of" to be restricted as called for by the convention.

One complication Dancy raises concerns the statement at 1b10-15 of the transitivity of the said-of relation. (I shall refer to this as the "transitivity" statement.) He objects that the standard view cannot provide a coherent account of "applied to" in the transitivity statement. Now, presumably, some such account is required because the transitivity statement actually contains three expressions—"said-of," "predicated-as-of-a-subject," "applied-to"—and we need to know if these are the same or different. Hence, an account of "applied to" is in order. But, Dancy urges, "applied to" can mean neither "said of" nor "predicated of," if the standard interpretation is adopted. Here is his argument for the first part of the refutation. 2b37-3a6 says literacy is predicated of an individual, say Socrates, but by the transitivity statement (1b10-15) what is said of literacy applies to Socrates. So, if (what I shall later deny) no special significance attaches to the qualifier in "predicated-as-of-a-subject," then knowledge (apropos 1b2-3) will indeed apply to Socrates. But now "applied to" obviously cannot be read as the standard interpretation's "said of" because Socrates is neither knowledge nor one of its species. Thus the standard view must find another reading for "applied to."

A natural suggestion at this point is that, given just the transitivity statement and 2b37-3a6, the standard interpreter might simply read "applied to" as the general "predicated of." Thus "Knowledge applies to Socrates" would be cashed as "Knowledge is predicated of Socrates." The suggestion itself is ambiguous. It could be either (i) a recommendation for the naturalness of "Socrates is [such and such] knowledge" or (ii) a description of the semantics of "Socrates is literate." (i) is too bizarre even for an interpretation as non-standard as Dancy's. (ii) is plausible if it means that one who says that Socrates is literate is predicating a certain kind of knowledge of him. Nevertheless, Dancy argues, (ii) provides no help for the standard view because of 2a27-34 which supposedly shows that in any case "applied to" cannot be read as "predicated of." Here is his argument.

So by the principle that anything said of something predicated of a subject is applied to the subject [i.e., 1b10-15], "color" or color is applied to the subject Socrates (or his body): in fact, "penetrative color" or penetrative color is applied to
We have already seen that "applied to" cannot mean "said of," but now, neither can it mean the purportedly more general "predicated of." For the next thing Aristotle says is that "the definition of white is never predicated of" the subject, and "penetrative color" or penetrative color is the definition for "white."

The point simply is that since definitions are invariably said of what they define, by lb10-15 they should also apply to the subject of definition. But 2a27-34 says they are not predicated of the subject in some cases at least. Hence, "applied to" cannot mean "predicated of." Thus the standard interpretation appears to be vulnerable, in particular the door is now open to denying that lb10-15 concerns transitivity of just the said-of relation.

Obviously proponents of the standard interpretation will want to answer the argument of the last paragraph. One response is that while "predicated of" sometimes takes a linguistic item as its first term, "said of" rarely does. And since in 2a27-34 Aristotle is talking about words, what he says there cannot go against lb10-15 where he is not talking about words. Dancy counters this maneuver by arguing that it leads to paradox. By 2b37-3a6 and elsewhere whatever is in Socrates is predicated of him. So white is predicated of Socrates. Further, since penetrative color is also in Socrates, if white is, penetrative color is predicated of him. But now although penetrative color is predicated of Socrates, "penetrative color" is not. Thus the paradox. Dancy adds that even if others do not find the paradox alarming, it at least violates one standard piece of Aristotelian doctrine, namely, that "to overthrow a definition it is enough to show that it does not apply (my emphasis) when the word it is supposed to define does." For this he cites Topics H, 5, 154a37-bl: "the definition has to be predicated of whatever the word is predicated of."

Here are some things to say about Dancy's counter argument. First, the standard view need not hold that 2a27-34 is about the linguistic use only of "predicated of." It is enough that Aristotle have in mind the general relation being-predicated-of which includes this use. Dancy gives the impression that Aristotle is talking about names and definitions of names. Better I think to take 2a27-34 as saying in certain cases where A is in B, the name of A may be predicated of B but the definition of A (not "A") cannot be predicated. So what are these cases and why, as Dancy himself admits, does Aristotle regard them as special cases? They are, I think, sentences whose grammatical predicates are suitable on their own for naming whatever it is that is in the (non-grammatical) subject. "Socrates is white" is just such a sentence. This is obscured somewhat in translation because, given the truth of the sentence, it is "whiteness," properly speaking, rather than "white" that names what is in him. But, as almost everyone knows, the Greek "λευκόν" may name the quality whiteness as well as occur as the predicate in "Σωκράτης ἐστι λευκόν." This is not usually true of predicates in Greek.
The fact that 2a27-34 concerns a special case provides easy escape from Dancy's paradox. We need only consider non-special cases such as "just." Surely there is nothing paradoxical in asserting, on the one hand, that justice is predicated of Socrates but denying, on the other hand, that "justice" (not "just") is. Notice also that the paradigm cases of sentences whose grammatical predicates are fit to serve as names of some non-particular are essential predications such as "Socrates is man," for "man" does well as a name for the secondary substance. Now immediately before introducing the special case under discussion, Aristotle considered the case where man is said of the individual man. Here both name and definition are predicated of the individual. 2a27-34 is, then, a concession to a somewhat special feature of Greek usage which deserves mention precisely because ordinarily, as the cited Topics passage says, "the definition has to be predicated of whatever the word is predicated." So, pace Dancy, this passage gives us a nice explanation of why "λεγόμενον" is a special case. A final point here. Dancy characterizes the Topics' test for definitional inadequacy as requiring that the definition not apply when the word it supposedly defines does apply. But if "apply" bears the same weight here as in lb10-15, then, against Dancy, 2a27-34 supports the standard view that in lb10-15 only the transitivity of "said of" is at issue.

So far we have been discussing Dancy's criticism of the alleged inability of the standard view to account for "applied to" in lb10-15. That criticism proceeded on the assumption that no special significance attaches to the emphasized portion of "predicated as of a subject." For only on this assumption does the transitivity statement entail that knowledge applies to Socrates. If, on the other hand, the standard view can construe lb10-15 to say only that what is said of a predicate said of a subject applies to that subject, then although literacy is one of Socrates' predicates it is not one that is said of him and, so, it does not follow by the transitivity statement that knowledge applies to Socrates. Accordingly, the standard interpreter will hold that lb10-15 contains the phrase "as of a subject" expressly to restrict being-predicated-of to the being-said-of relation. Dancy glosses this: "The phrase must restrict the relation, or the longer phrase 'predicated as of a subject' would be pleonastic." So what are his arguments against this maneuver by friends of the standard view.

First, he asserts that the phrase would not be pleonastic because (he claims to have shown) "subject" does not mean for Aristotle "subject of a sentence." The point of this objection is not entirely clear. It presumably means that "predicated of" sometimes takes a linguistic item as its first term (Dancy accepts this) and that Aristotle wants to avoid this construal in lb10-15. But even under its linguistic reading "predicated of" takes as second terms genuine subjects rather than linguistic items. So the phrase "as of a subject" looks to be irrelevant after all, unless it does other work in the sentence.

Second, although this is the only occurrence of the phrase "predicated of something as of a subject," similar phrases at 2a34-35 and
2b3-5 are to be translated in like fashion: "said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects." But here, Dancy argues, there could be no question of restricting "predicated of" to "said of" because the restrictive "as of a subject" is attached to "said of" itself. This does not strike me as a telling point. In fact, it might equally be urged that 2a34-35 and 2b3-5 establish an association of "said of" with "as of a subject" and so tend to support the stand view.

Dancy's third objection is that it is simply difficult to suppose that the demands of a single passage justify a distinction between being predicated of a subject (an idiom repeatedly used in 2a27-34) and being predicated of something as of a subject. Now if we conceive Aristotle's project as concerned mainly or only with the distinction in that very form, then the demand in question may seem excessive. But if we take the expression as playing a role in the development or explanation of a technical distinction, namely the distinction between "said of" and "predicated of," then its infrequent occurrence is unsurprising and even has a plausible explanation courtesy of the standard view.

The fourth and final objection looks most menacing. At 3b4-5 Aristotle reiterates the 1b10-15 principle without the restrictive "as of a subject:" "whatever is said of what is predicated will be applied to the subject as well." This, Dancy would likely argue, narrows, possibly closes, the gap between "said of" and "predicated of." But the objection can be met. Recall that the 1b10-15 statement of the transitivity principle occurs at the outset of Chapter 3 before any discussion of substance. Here it is natural, the standard theorist would say necessary, that the restriction be made explicit. At 3b4-5, on the other hand, Aristotle is well into a discussion of substance. In particular, at 3a33-3b10 he is talking about lines of predication within the category. So it is obvious, defenders of the standard view may reply, that he is talking about a restricted sense of "predicated of" and there is no need to report that fact.

Dancy's specific criticisms do not, then, seem to me sufficiently strong to retire the standard view. There is, additionally, a general feature of Dancy's method of argument which strikes me as quite curious. This is his inclination to read Aristotle against, or at least independently of, his own examples. Consider, as a case in point, 1b10-15 where Aristotle both states his transitivity principle and illustrates it with cases of essential predication. One could hold, with Dancy, that Aristotle merely happens to employ those examples and could have used others, in particular cases of accidental predication. Now this is sound policy only if we assume that the principle is precisely and unambiguously given. But it is common knowledge that this is not Aristotle's typical procedure. A sounder attitude, I would urge, is to read the principle in light of the examples. So read, the examples provide additional clarification or explanation of the principle in question. They are not merely examples of it but part of its account. Those who share this attitude will, of course, also share an inclination toward the standard
view. Finally, it is worth remarking on Dancy's claim (p. 349) that extension of the said-of relation beyond Aristotle's examples squares better with Aristotle's practice, in particular with the "troubles Aristotle actually tried to face." The fact, however, that Aristotle explicitly recognizes differentiae only as an exception to the said-of relation and dismisses white as a genuine instance of the relation is solid evidence that he intends the said-of relation to link items from the same category only. Given that the transitivity statement can be restricted to the said-of relation only, the standard interpretation is free to read "applied to" as "said of" in lb10-15.

So far, then, I see no convincing reason for abandoning the standard interpretation's convention governing "said of" and "predicated of." On the other hand, I have a number of misgivings about Dancy's positive interpretation and would like to turn to these now.

II

Denial of the standard view has rather far reaching consequences. lb10-15 no longer contains an account of the transitivity of the being-said-of relation only. It still contains an account of a transitivity relation, but now of predication in general. Thus, consider again

1. Socrates is white

and

2. White is a color

adding

4. Socrates is man

and

5. Man is animal.

In each of the above Dancy holds that what is signified by the predicate is said of the subject. In (2), (4), and (5) this occasions no deviation from the standard view. In (1) what is so signified is also said of the subject and here divergence occurs. Since the "predicated of" - "said of" distinction has been denied currency, the only way to avoid moving from (1) and (2) to

3. Socrates is a color

is to deny that what is signified by the predicate of (1) is the same as the subject of (2). This is Dancy's maneuver and I want to take a closer look at it.
According to Dancy what is signified by the predicate of (1) is not the quality whiteness but a paronym derived from the quality. Thus, what is said of Socrates is the paronym [a] white [thing]. Thus, from (1) and (2) we do not move to the patently false (3) but, presumably (he does not say), to the true

3'. Socrates is [a] colored [thing].

In this way the transitivity principle of lb10-15 remains general without generating absurd results.

Unfortunately, there are difficulties with this neat picture. I shall mention four of them. (i) By la12-15 it is things that are paronymous. In fact, typically it is just primary substances variously described that are paronyms. Thus, if (3') is true, then the paronym in question is none other than Socrates. But on Dancy's theory the paronym is said of the subject. So it turns out that, if (3') is true, a thing is said of itself. And this is surely unacceptable as an account of (3'). At best it would cover identity statements such as

3''. Socrates is the white thing.

So unless (what is unlikely) it can be argued that (3') is really a disguised identity statement, Dancy's theory seems committed to a completely implausible interpretation of (3').

(ii) If paronyms are said of subjects, then sometimes individuals will be predicated of subjects. This goes against the (accepted) fact that for Aristotle what is predicated is by its nature general in application. Of course, the unorthodox may reply so much the worse for accepted fact. Nevertheless, 3b10-23 locates the key difference between the subject and predicate of (4) in the predicate's being said of many things and seems (at b18-20) to extend this to case (1) as well.

(iii) Dancy's theory is difficult to square with the four-fold division of τὸν ὅντον at la20ff. Although paronyms are primary substances in some sense or other, as items that are said of a subject they do not fit into the space allotted primary substances. Neither are they items that are in a subject. Here fall what Dancy calls abstractions or properties correlated with predicates. So they are items that are said of but not in a subject. Thus, they are on a par with secondary substances. It is at least prima facie odd that Aristotle fails to mention this interesting case but sticks with the standard example of man being said of the individual man. While this is another case of reading Aristotle against this examples, Dancy might simply reply that imprudent practice is not inconsistent practice. But Dancy's theory is stretched to the breaking point in light of lb7-9 which unambiguously asserts that without exception nothing individual and numerically one is said of any subject. For paronyms are individual and numerically one. This last also gives added point to criticism (ii).
(iv) Dancy's theory also seems to go against 4a10-13 which asserts that of things numerically one and the same only substances are able to receive contraries. Presumably, this is to say that they alone remain one and the same while undergoing change between contrary properties. Now although paronyms are numerically one and the same, they are not, we saw above, to count as substances. Yet, nothing prevents a white thing's changing from, say, short to tall. Thus, if Dancy is right, 4a10-13 is a mistake of major proportion.

It should be clear that the above criticism relies much on interpreting paronyms as primary substances. This point deserves emphasis not only because of its crucial role in the case for the defense but also because of its widely misunderstood status. Consider, for example, the following objection to my interpretation: "While it is correct that paronyms are things, they are not primary substances. Indeed, for Aristotle all the categories, accidents as well as substances, are of things (see la20ff) and the examples of paronyms at la14-15 pair γραμματική with γραμματικός and ἄνδρεια with ἄνδρειος, none of which is an example of a primary substance. And neither γραμματική nor ἄνδρεια is an example even of substance."

This objection embodies a widespread but, nonetheless, mistaken view. When things get their name from something with difference of ending, reports Aristotle at la12-13, they are paronyms. Now obviously ἄνδρεια and ἄνδρειος are not a pair of paronyms at all. For from what with change of ending would ἄνδρεια get its meaning? Clearly it is things, say a and b (or a singly), each of which gets its name "ἄνδρειος" from "ἄνδρεια" with change of ending. Equally clear, then, is that typically a and/or b will be primary substances, for a gets the name "courageous" only if "a is courageous" is true and ordinarily the subject of this sentence is a primary substance. Thus, the concept of paronymy is connected with what is traditionally but loosely called accidental predication in that it groups items under a single heading not on the basis of natural or species kinds but on the basis of what accidental properties hold of the items. Thus a, paronymous under the heading "F," cannot be essentially F. But a is no less a primary substance for this than is the subject of "Socrates is courageous."

It might be objected that the claim that paronyms are primary substances needs qualification in light of Categories 6b11-14 where, to paraphrase one critic, the position of being seated is said to be a paronym from sitting. It is worth noting, first, that the text says rather that to be sitting [perhaps, to be seated: καθοθησθαι] is not itself a position but is named paronymously from the position of sitting:

Lying, standing, and sitting are certain positions; and position is one of the relatives. To be lying, to be standing, or to be sitting are not themselves positions but are called paronymously from the mentioned positions.

Although I am not aware of a printed version of this criticism, it has been expressed informally with some frequency.
To be sitting, then, is not itself a position but rather it is to be in a certain position, namely the position of sitting. This makes sense only if it means that for someone or something to be sitting is for someone or something to be in a certain position. And this person or thing will be the paronym because the expression that applies to him, καθησομαι or a variant, is derived from or paronymous from the name of the position itself. So although the word may be derived from another, καθεσομαι, with change of ending, it is what the word applies to that is the paronym. And this will be a primary substance.

What disposes commentators against rating paronyms as primary substances is, I believe, the fact that they are primary substances qua falling under a non-substantial description. Suppose that Socrates and Callias are courageous. They are, then, paronymous with respect to courage and so fall under the description "the courageous." But since one or the other may have been late in acquiring this virtue, it is clear that "the courageous" is a non-essential description. This in turn encourages the view that what the description applies to must be something accidental and so not a substance. The mistake here is to conflate non-substantial modes of referring to a subject with referring to non-substantial subjects. Dancy, of course, is guilty of no such conflation. In fact, he is quite clear on the point that paronyms are primary substances qua falling under some non-substantial description. The problem with his view is that he holds both (a) that what is signified by the predicate of sentences like (1) are paronyms and (b) that paronyms are, in some sense, primary substances. For (a) and (b) seem to imply that a sentence like (3'), "Socrates is [a] colored [thing]," are identity statements of a sort.

Although I have already said a good deal to discourage attachment to this view, I would like to close by mentioning another aspect of the issue which has gained some prominence recently. It concerns the range of objects we are committed to by (3') and the like. If a sentence such as "Socrates is white" is true, then certain conditions must be satisfied. One is that something exist which is identical with Socrates. Another is that this thing be white. It is the second condition that is of immediate interest, for it could involve holding any of (at least) three theses: (i) that a certain universal is instantiated by Socrates, (ii) that there exists a (non-recurrent) quality particular that is present in Socrates, (iii) that there exists a white thing that, for a while, is identical with Socrates. Each alternative commits us, in Aristotle's terms, to the existence of a different range of things. These are not mutually exclusive alternatives. If one holds, with Owen, that the universals of (i) are determinate universals and that they occupy the not-said-of but present-in-a-subject division of the fourfold classification

5See Dancy, pp. 361-68.

of τῶν ἀρτον, then one will deny alternative (ii) but may still adopt (iii). On the other hand, if the universals in (i) are taken as items said-of and present-in-a-subject, then one could regard alternative (ii) as giving the items these universals are said of. On this view one kind of thing that will be called by the general name "white" will be white quality particulars. In terms of Categories 1 they will be synonymous with respect to white. Another sort of thing that will be called by the general name "white" are ordinary substance particulars such as Socrates. These things will, of course, be so called paronymously.

Now if one looks, for example, at Metaphysics Z, 6, the above two uses of "white" seem accommodated. 1030b22-25 makes clear that non-substantial descriptions such as "τὸ λευκὸν" signify either the accidental quality itself or what has the quality [ὁ συμβεβηκὼς]. The latter must be a primary substance because, qua paronym, the white thing would be a compound such as the white Socrates or the white log and these do not have the accident. Otherwise, as Aristotle is fond of saying, we will have a white white Socrates on our hands. So Aristotle seems committed to holding that the extension of the term "τὸ λευκὸν" will be either certain primary substances or the accidental quality itself. And although it is left open whether the latter is to include quality particulars, determine universal(s) or both, paronyms, as a third sort of entity, seem excluded. But if one opts for alternative (iii), as (3'') requires, then there must be a way of specifying a third sort of entity to constitute the extension of expressions such as "the white..." In terms of Metaphysics Δ, 7, this is to say that paronyms have no place among the kinds of καθ' ἀπὸ τὸ being. For there substances and accidents are counted cases of καθ' ἀπὸ τὸ being and are distinguished from accidental compounds, such as the white musical, which enjoy only κατὰ συμβεβηκὼς being. So, as Categories 1 suggests, talk about paronymy is talk about how we refer to things and whether a thing is a paronym depends on how it is referred to and not on its having a distinctive ontological status. Thus it is unsurprising that the Categories' fourfold ontological classification at 1a20ff lacks special provision for paronyms for they do not constitute an ontologically distinct class of things.

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7 This seems to be Dancy's view, p. 345.

8 This view, which I favor, has been strongly attacked by Owen, ("Inherence").

It is worth mentioning the following difficulty with the Owen thesis that items present-in but not said-of-a-subject are determinate universals rather than accident particulars. The problem is this. By 2a34-b6
categories other than substance are dependent in point of existence on
the category of substance. Since the said-of relation also expresses
some kind of relation of ontological dependence the thesis of ontological
primacy of primary substance concerns how items present-in a subject are
ontologically dependent on items neither said of nor present in. Now if
U is a determinate universal and a a primary substance, we get the fol-
lower sort of relationship

1) If U is a determinate universal, then there is a primary substance
   x such that U is present-in x

and

1*) If a is a primary substance, then there is a determinate universal
   x such that x is present-in a.

Both show a specific to general dependence: a specific primary substance
or determinate universal will be dependent on the existence of some, but
not any given, determinate universal or primary substance, respectively.
If, on the other hand, items not said-of but present-in-a-subject are
accident particulars, we have

2) If A is an accident particular, then there is a primary substance
   x such that A is present-in x and,
   if A is present-in anything else
   y, then y=x

and

2*) If a is a primary substance, then there is an accident particular
   x such that x is present-in a.

Like its counterpart (1*) (2*) expresses a specific to general dependence
of primary substance on accidents: a specific primary substance will
have some accident particular(s). (2), on the other hand, expresses a
specific to specific dependence of accidents on primary particulars. An
accident particular can exist only if it is present-in one and only one
primary substance. The advantage of (2) and (2*) is obvious for they
provide an account of the asymmetry between substance and accident in
precisely the sense required by Aristotle's account. (1) and (1*) do not.
Consequently, if we take the thesis of asymmetry seriously, it seems that
items not said-of but present-in a subject cannot be determinate univer-
sals.

A final point here. 3a33 says that there is no predicate from a pri-
mary substance because it is said-of no subject. Now this suggests that
a necessary condition of "Ø" being a predicate or, perhaps, yielding a
predicate is that "Ø" be said of something. So nothing that is present-
in but not said-of a subject could count as a predicate. Yet if such
items are or include determinate universals, surely these must be capable
of serving as predicates. Thus, it again seems as if determinate universals cannot comprise the class of things present-in but not said-of a subject. Although accident particulars are not subject to this difficulty, it might be thought that they flout Aristotle's rule that predicates or what is predicated must be a universal. This is easily disposed of. Accident particulars are, we have seen, not said-of anything; neither, however, are they predicates. What is predicated of Socrates when the accident particular z is present-in Socrates is (among other things) the lowest level universal that is said-of z. It will then, for example, be white or whiteness that gets predicated of Socrates.

9Alan Code, "Aristotle's Responses to Quine's Objections to Modal Logic," Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1976), pp. 159-86, suggests a worm theoretic account on which the white thing in question is a spatio-temporal part of the spatio-temporal worm that is Socrates. The suggestion seems to me to fail for reasons I discuss in "Singular Statements and Essentialism in Aristotle."

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