KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTIONS: AN OUTLINE OF THEIR STRATEGY AND EXECUTION

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ABSTRACT

To understand Kant's transcendental deduction of categories we must distinguish between Kant's strategy for constructing such a deduction and the manner in which this strategy is executed. I argue that both versions of the deduction contain similar strategies in which categories are identified with transcendental conditions of experience. Where the versions differ substantially is in the manner Kant executes the various stages of this strategy. It is pointed out, for instance, that in the objective deduction in A Kant introduces 'understanding' as a defined term (A119), whereas in B Kant postulates understanding as the fundamental activity of synthesis in terms of which he formulates the arguments of each stage of the deduction. Once the distinction between strategy and execution is accepted, much of Vaihinger's evidence for the "patchwork thesis" dissolves. But I also argue that in neither version of the deduction does Kant execute the identificatory strategy with convincing success.
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I. Introduction: The Problem of Strategy

Failure to understand Kant's strategy for constructing a transcendental deduction of categories has led to extravagant theses about the composition of the deduction chapter in A.¹ Following Adickes, who found no less than seven deductions in this chapter alone, Vaihinger argued that the chapter is a loose collection of inconsistent thoughts lacking "internal interpenetration and unity" that Kant wrote at different times during the arduous development of the Critique.² No one, of course, would deny that the deduction in A is composed of (perhaps inconsistent) ideas developed by Kant in various stages from 1772 to 1781. But Vaihinger never addressed the question whether there might be an overall plan that would have dictated at least the organization of the strands of the argument he identified. It would seem prima facie likely that Kant would have executed a general strategy for constructing a transcendental deduction in putting together for publication those materials composed during the Critique's development. If this is the case, then the deduction in A is not merely a random patchwork, even though, as it will turn out, the materials used to execute the strategy were not perfectly suited for the task.

But what this strategy is has been a topic of dispute even among those


scholars who maintain that the deduction chapter in A presents an identifiable argument. It seems unlikely that Kant would have conceived of the deduction as a straightforward piece of deductive reasoning. Textual support for this interpretation is difficult to find. Robert Paul Wolff, for instance, is forced to accept a "modified version" of the patchwork thesis in which he (i) transforms the temporal strata identified by Vaihinger into logical phases of the deduction, and (ii) interprets each phase as containing a different deductive version of the argument. But where the patchwork thesis refuses even to look for a strategy, the deductive interpretation cannot do justice to its complexity or, as in Wolff's case, to the unity of the text.

Yet without knowing this strategy, one cannot assess the validity of either version of the deduction. More particularly, one cannot determine whether in B Kant effects substantial changes in the logical structure of the argument or, as he himself thought, merely changes in the manner of presenting essentially the same argument. I shall show that there is a sense in which we can say that Kant makes substantial changes within the same argument. We can say this because Kant employs one and the same strategy for constructing a deduction of categories in both editions of the Critique. Where the versions of the deduction differ substantially is in the execution of this strategy. Its execution in A, however, is hopelessly confused, and this confusion is one reason why Kant sought a simpler execution in B. This simpler execution is principally accomplished through the logical technique of making a term formerly introduced by definition a basic -- in effect, a primitive, though interpreted -- term of the new deduction. This term is the concept of understanding. Nonetheless, we shall discover that the logical elegance of the B deduction sacrifices intelligibility regarding the mental apparatus which underlies the application of categories to sensibility. Thus I shall argue that both versions of the deduction are unsatisfactory.

II. The General Strategy of a Transcendental Deduction. 4


4We may assume that the transcendental deduction has parts which may be expressed deductively. T. E. Wilkerson has raised the question whether the inferences that constitute a transcendental argument are logically necessary or, in some special sense, synthetically necessary; see his "Transcendental Arguments," Philosophical Quarterly (Vol. 20, 1970, pp. 200-212). Of course we may preserve the deduc-
A. In the transcendental deduction Kant proposes to prove the a priori objective validity of the categories with the restriction that this validity holds only for appearances. Appearances are what is given in an empirical intuition. In the Aesthetic (vide the Fourth Paralogism in A) Kant argues that from a transcendental perspective appearances are not things in themselves but representations in the mind. This is so because the space and time in which appearances are given, according to Kant, must exist a priori in the mind as conditions of sensibility (A26/B42). Objects could appear to us as they are in themselves only if space and time were characteristics of objects as things in themselves. But all representations must be representations of something; thus we must be able to think something as an object for the spatio-temporally structured appearances of our sensibility. This object would be an object of experience. In the deduction Kant argues that categories are objectively valid if and only if they are the sole conditions under which this object is thought (A111).

The deduction, however, is misinterpreted if it is construed merely epistemologically as an argument about the limits of our knowledge or about the conceptual conditions of our knowledge of objects, for it is also an argument about the structure of a particular kind of object. In broadest terms this argument is (a) the experience of appearances is possible only if it is subject to the conditions of a transcendental synthesis, (b) we must think the object of experience as corresponding to the structure of this synthesis, for this object must be amenable to the modes in which our experience of it is possible; therefore, (c) the transcendental conditions to which experience is subject are also the conditions for the objects that are thought in that experience. Since, as Kant argues, the transcendental conditions of experience must be of a categorial structure, the fact that the experience of appearances must fall under this kind of synthesis implies that we must think objects for appearances as possessing categorial structure. It follows that the

tive character of any transcendental argument that employs synthetic inferences by transposing that inference into a synthetically necessary, hypothetical proposition. But I shall not discuss the status of the propositions that enter into the deductions as premises. It is likely that Kant would have seen them as involving no more than the standard semantic categories, see below, p. 6.

5Kant states this point explicitly in a passage occurring in the Paralogisms: "We must assign to things, necessarily and a priori, all the properties that constitute the conditions under which alone we think them" (A347/B405).
categories are objectively valid in that they are predicates of objects of experience. At B161 Kant concludes the deduction in B by saying, "... the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience" (emphasis added). Consequently, the problem of objectivity in the Critique is not simply a matter of epistemology; it is rather a problem of the metaphysical constitution of the objects we must think for appearances.⁶

To prove the objective validity of categories, then, Kant must show that the experience of appearances would be impossible unless it were subject to a transcendental synthesis that is categorial. The demonstration of this thesis requires an especially conceived strategy.

B. Kant gives us few clues as to this strategy, and some of these are misleading. In sec. 12 of the Prolegomena, for instance, Kant refers to the argument regarding space and time as a "transcendental deduction of these two notions." This argument, however, is a precursor of the transcendental expositions that occur in the B Aesthetic, and for this reason cannot serve as a model for the deduction of categories. A transcendental exposition, Kant tells us, explains how a given body of synthetic a priori knowledge can possess those features (B40). But in the Critique Kant wants to avoid granting that humans possess synthetic a priori knowledge by means of categories prior to the deduction of the categories.⁷ Nevertheless, at A87 Kant also refers to the argument of the Aesthetic in the same manner. Here he distinguishes the deduction of categories from the Aesthetic argument only on grounds that a deduction of categories is indispensable, whereas geometry itself is alone sufficient to secure the legitimacy of the concept of space. Since Kant does not distinguish types of arguments in the Aesthetic of A, the referent of A87 must be the general argument of the Aesthetic regarding the status of space and time.

⁶H. - J. de Vleeschauwer puts this point precisely in The Development of Kantian Thought, trans. A. R. C. Duncan (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd, 1962), p. 94: "[Categories] are therefore not only the ratio cognoscendi but at the same time their ratio fiendi or structural principle." However, we demur de Vleeschauwer's interpretation of the B deduction (p. 93) insofar as we hold that in B Kant's principal aim is still to establish this same conclusion, vide B161.

⁷See the Prolegomena, "Introduction," for the distinction between the analytic and synthetic procedures which distinguished the methodology of the Critique from that of the Prolegomena.
In the Aesthetic Kant argues, "Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us" (A26/B42). In German this is one sentence connected by das ist. Why should showing space to be the form of appearances show that it is a subjective condition of sensibility? The initial framework for an answer to this question is given in the introductory paragraphs of the Aesthetic (§ 1 in B), where Kant argues that the form of appearances "must lie ready for sensations a priori in the mind" (A20/B34). In this way Kant attempts to introduce the form of appearances as the subjective condition of sensibility. The problem he then sets for himself in the body of the Aesthetic is to discover what these forms actually are, in particular, to identify space and time with them: "In the course of this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of appearances..., namely space and time" (A22/B36).

The argument of the Aesthetic, then, is identificatory: having introduced an appropriate notion of the form of appearance, Kant proceeds to identify space and time with this form. In the transcendental deduction Kant argues that experience of appearances would be impossible unless the transcendental synthesis to which this experience is subject is categorial. Similarly, this argument is identificatory: it proceeds by identifying categories with transcendental conditions of experience. But executing this argument in the deduction of categories turns out to be a more complicated affair than the relatively simple argument of the Aesthetic. Kant's strategy must involve the following stages:

Stage (1): Kant must define a notion of category independently of the conditions of possible experience so not to beg the question in proving the identity of categories with transcendental conditions of experience.

Stage (2): He must discover an argument to show that there are transcendental conditions of experience.\(^8\) Kant's intention, in particular, is to show that the experience of appearances would be impossible unless it were conditioned by a transcendental unity of apperception. This stage corresponds to Kant's introduction of the form of appearances in the Aesthetic argument.

Stage (3): He must discover a further argument for identifying the

\(^8\)A95-96: "If, therefore, we seek to discover how pure concepts of understanding are possible, we must enquire what are the a priori conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests..."
categories as defined in Stage (1) with the transcendental conditions of experience introduced in Stage (2). This argument constitutes the deduction proper.

Comments. Stage (2), as I have said, corresponds to the initial phase of the Aesthetic argument; but Kant encounters special difficulties in the case of the deduction. Kant, in the first place, must avoid begging any questions against a Humean analysis of experience which admits no transcendental conditions of experience but considers all conditions of experience to be merely psychological, and therefore empirical. Secondly, by having already introduced the term 'appearance', Kant was able in the Aesthetic to introduce 'form of appearance' as a corollary to that notion. But no similar procedure is available for introducing transcendental conditions of experience. Since the notion of an object of experience can be justified only through the construction of a deduction of categories, the form of this object cannot be admitted as an element in the proof simply as a corollary of that notion. The introduction of 'appearance' is legitimate because it is tied to the concept of intuition (A20/B34), but the anti-sceptical claim that an object of knowledge is tied to our experience of appearances raises a philosophical quandry. Therefore, the form of an object of experience must be ascertained, if it can be ascertained at all, only through an analysis of the conditions of experience. This comment leads to an observation on the nature of a transcendental analysis of experience: In A, Kant seems unsure of how to proceed with this analysis, and in B, where the argument is worked out more successfully, he claims that its (sole) premise is a tautology. Thus Kant's conception of such an analysis did not follow one, direct line from the first, and, contrary to some contemporary views on transcendental arguments (see fn. 4 above), Kant, in the end, probably would not have wanted to propose an argument whose premises fall under semantic categories beyond those of standard logic.

Finally, regarding Stage (3), it must be noted that the identification of categories with conditions of experience is not as straightforward as the identification of space and time with the form of appearances. The latter simply are the forms of appearances. However, the conditions of experience, in falling under the transcendental unity of apperception, are modes of synthesis, or schematic unities, within experience, whereas categories are concepts. To speak precisely, Kant identifies categories with concepts that are necessary components of these modes. Nonetheless, bridging the gap between categories and conditions of experience results in a nettlesome problem of accounting for the content of categories -- roughly, the level of synthesis that is thought by means of them -- in a manner that would facilitate this identification.
Stages (1) through (3), however, do not exhaust the strategy of the deduction, for they can show only that if categories are conditions of possible experience, they are objectively valid. This leaves open the possibility that the categories may be valid in some other way for things in themselves. Since Kant wants to restrict the validity of the categories to objects of experience, he also must show that if the categories are not conditions of possible experience, they are not objectively valid. That is, Kant must show that the objective validity of the categories is equivalent to their being conditions of experience. One way of doing this would be through an additional stage:

Stage (4): Kant might argue that no other deduction of categories is possible unless it proceeds through Stages (1) - (3).

In A Kant places this meta-claim at the end of the deduction chapter; he entitles its final paragraph, "Summary Representation of the Correctness of this Deduction...and of its being the only Deduction possible" (A128, emphasis added). In B, however, Kant executes Stages (1) and (3) in such a way that the restriction of categories to objects of experience can be obtained as a corollary of the initial stages of the deduction (see below, Part V. B).

The principal sections of the Analytic of Concepts in A neatly fall into these initial three stages. Thus section 3 of the chapter on the "clue" to discovering categories, the so-called metaphysical deduction, fulfills Stage (1). Correspondingly, section 2 of the deduction chapter itself, which contains the theory of the three-fold synthesis, fulfills Stage (2), and the deduction proper takes place where Kant indicates, in section 3 of that chapter. Kant acknowledges the identificatory nature of his argument where we would expect him: in subsection 4 of section 2, the "Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Cate-

It is interesting to note that the Aesthetic argument, likewise, has been criticized for failing to show that space and time are not also properties of things in themselves. For discussions of this criticism, see Kemp Smith, Commentary, pp. 113-114, and Henry E. Allison, The Kant-Eberhard Controversy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 34-36. Allison defends the Aesthetic argument in "The Non-spatiality of Things in Themselves for Kant," Journal of the History of Philosophy (Vol. XIV, 1976). However, it should be clear that in the case of the transcendental deduction of categories, Kant could not avail himself of the same kind of argument that Allison develops in defending the Aesthetic's restriction of space and time to appearances.
gories...", which functions as a transition between Stages (2) and (3). Kant writes,

The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience. Now I maintain that the categories...are nothing but the conditions of thought in a possible experience.... This is exactly what we desired to prove (A111).

The last sentence does not indicate a completed argument; rather it indicates a task to be completed. In Parts III & IV, I shall examine Kant's execution of Stages (1) through (3) in A. In Part V, I shall argue that in B Kant retains the same identificatory strategy but radically alters the execution of each of these stages. However, I shall argue also that the deduction still does not constitute a successful argument.

III. Stages (1) and (2) in A

A. Stage (1): The Definition of 'Category'

Kant's move from the table of judgments to the table of categories is one of the most notoriously obscure moves in the Critique. For our purposes we may separate the initial five paragraphs of section 3 (§ 10 in B), where Kant introduces the interrelated concepts of imagination, synthesis, and categorial unity, from the table of categories. The former is pivotal for the deduction in A. Unfortunately, the discussion lacks precision: synthesis, for instance, is introduced by means of a metaphor (A77/B103). Nevertheless, a clear conception of the different connections between synthesis and imagination and synthesis and understanding does emerge (A78/B103). "Synthesis in general," Kant tells us, "is a mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul." Understanding, on the other hand, is said "to bring this synthesis to concepts." Vaihinger and others have charged Kant's notion of synthesis in A with ambiguity in being sometimes treated as a function of imagination and then again as a function of understanding.10 In fact, Kant's position in A is unambiguously that

10 In Gram, pp. 33-34. The passages in which Kant allegedly assigns synthesis to understanding are A77 and A97-98. The simplest response is to deny the claim made by Kant's critics. In A77 Kant says merely that "the spontaneity of our thought requires that [the manifold of pure intuition be synthesized]." This is compatible with the thesis that a
synthesis is a function of imagination. Understanding supplies concepts by which we conceive in a unified consciousness the particular kind of synthesis that has been effected by imagination.

Let us consider an example. Imagination is the faculty of creating an image of an object that is not present (B151). Synthesis arises when the components of such an image are created by imagination in connection with one another. In perceiving a house we may see only the front, yet we must imagine sides and a back in order to apply the concept of house to what we perceive. This concept specifies the synthesis as a particular kind and so as belonging to a particular kind of object.

But the synthesis involved in the recognition of a house is merely empirical. In the Aesthetic Kant had introduced a manifold of pure intuition as part of human cognition; thus there must be also a pure, or transcendental, synthesis of this manifold. Kant says, "Transcendental logic... has lying before it a manifold of a priori sensibility, presented by transcendental aesthetic, as material for the concepts of pure understanding" (A76-77/B102). The concepts "which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity" are categories (A79/B104). These concepts, then, specify the synthesis of the pure manifold as a particular kind. Consequently, we may define a category as a concept that represents a kind of synthetic unity to be found in the synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition. This definition may appear to beg the question by defining 'category' in terms of the synthetic conditions of experience. However, this is not the case, for Kant has still to show that the synthetic unities represented by categories are indeed conditions of any possible experience and that they are required for a transcendental unity of apperception with whose structure the categories are identified. Establishing these theses is a matter for the deduction proper: see especially the objective deduction of A (below, Part IV).

According to this definition, categories possess a content through synthesis effected by imagination is a necessary condition of the spontaneity of understanding, which only then applies a concept to that synthesis. Concepts require something to which they apply. In A97 Kant claims that spontaneity "is the ground of a threefold synthesis." This statement may mean nothing more than that synthesis is a "blind" function that must be "guided" throughout by a spontaneous understanding. But the vagueness of this passage lies not only with the word 'ground'; in III, B we shall see that the notion of the "threefold synthesis" itself is highly suspect.
which they represent the unity of a particular kind of pure synthesis. Kant maintains this definition consistently throughout the deduction in A. At A119, in rehearsing the definition of 'category' in terms of the conclusion of the objective deduction, Kant says that categories "contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in respect of all possible appearances," and at A125 he implies that the formal unity in the transcendental synthesis of imagination is conceptualized through categories.

Note. It is not exactly clear what Kant intends to accomplish in the metaphysical deduction. His characterizations of its purpose range from showing the a priori origin of categories, that is, legitimizing a possibly already given list of concepts for certain theoretical purposes in the critical ontology (B159), to discovering that list itself by drawing categories from forms of judgment (A321/B378), to proving the completeness of a list of categories by systematically interconnecting them (A64/B89). But Kant also intends the argument to show the indispensability of categories for our thought about objects (A80/B106). To this extent the categories would be only subjective conditions of thought, and, hence, still require a transcendental deduction to prove their objective validity. Since appearances owe their existence in sensibility only to "the mode in which we are affected by objects" (A19/B33), it cannot follow from the concept of appearance alone that the subjective conditions of our thought, which are not conditions of how we are sensibly affected, have application to appearances (see A89ff/B122f). Without a deduction of the categories with respect to appearances, what we must think about objects may be disjointed from our sensibility. Thus, Kant does not confuse indispensability for thought with objective validity.** The source of the problem to which the deduction is addressed is the need to show that the subjective conditions

**In an obvious way, the distinction between indispensability and objectivity is a function of Kant's uncompromising separation of thought from intuition. (By blurring the distinction between investigating the structure of sensibility and ascertaining the presuppositions of our conceptual scheme, P. F. Strawson, for instance, especially seems in danger of confusing indispensability with objective validity; see his Individuals (London: Methuen & Co., 1959), esp. Part One, I, sec. 3.) Nevertheless, it is undeniable that in the metaphysical deduction Kant failed to grasp the actual difficulties in showing a set of concepts to be indispensable. The simplistic strategy of aligning concepts with forms of judgment is totally unconvincing; see, e.g., Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), §§ 25-26.
thought are objectively valid (A89-90/B122). Kant deploys the massive apparatus of the various transcendental, pre-conscious mental activities in an attempt to show how the object we think for appearances can be "generated" in our sensibility. (The notion of transcendental activity, however, occasions difficulties for the program of the deduction, difficulties that we shall need to touch upon in the course of our reconstruction of the principal sections of the deduction.)

B. A Critical Discussion of Stage (2)

Kant's introduction of transcendental unity of apperception as a necessary condition of experience might be construed as an argument that proceeds from experience to the unity of apperception. Kant uses the term 'experience' in two senses to mean either the consciousness of given sensations or empirical knowledge. Certainly Kant's argument shows that experience in the first sense constitutes the possibility of experience in the second. This is shown on the psychological level, for instance, in the identity of each phase of the threefold synthesis with each other: apprehension in intuition, the awareness of sensation, is recognition in a concept, i.e. empirical knowledge. Thus, to proceed from experience to transcendental apperception need not ab initio beg any questions against Hume, for, as an empiricist, Hume is committed at least to the thesis that man is sometimes conscious of given sensations. That more is involved in this experience than Hume realized would seem to be, for Kant, a matter of one's psychology of experience and transcendental analysis. But Kant simply employs a rival psychology without addressing himself to the validity of Hume's psychology. Kant's procedure, then, is logically suspect; moreover, it violates his own methodological principles of eschewing all "hypotheses" (Axv). However, as we shall discover, Kant's principal argument for introducing transcendental apperception does not require a psychological basis.

That Kant employs the psychology of N. Tetens' Philosophische Versuche über Menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung (1776-77) is now well known. Tetens analyzed cognition into three empirical processes: apprehension in intuition, reproduction in imagination, and recognition is a concept. In a confusing move Kant assigns the title "synthesis" to each of these (A97) -- confusing because this psychological sense of synthesis is unrelated to the sense of synthesis that is tied to imagination and was defined in Stage (1). The former is merely the unity of a psychological activity, and there is no compelling reason to assign this activity exclusively to imagination. The psychological sense of 'synthesis' discussed in this section of the deduction represents an extraneous use of the concept that was not even retained in the deduction pro-
per in A. Kant claims that the members of the psychological triad "point to three subjective sources of knowledge which make possible the understanding itself" (A97), but we shall discover, moreover, that Kant confuses the subjective sources of knowledge to which these psychological processes "point" with those that actually underlie the deduction of categories.

To say that Kant begins from a psychology of experience is not to say that this psychology is a premise in a deductive argument. In A, Kant effects the transcendental analysis of experience roughly by extrapolating from the mechanisms of an empirical psychology to transcendental conditions of experience through supplementing this psychology with features of human cognition that already have been delineated in the critical philosophy. Thus he argues (A99-100) that there must be a "transcendental synthesis" of apprehension in intuition because (i) there is, as was shown in the Aesthetic, a manifold of pure intuition, and (ii) since a pure manifold cannot be an object of sensible perception, its synthesis must be transcendental. The argument for introducing a transcendental synthesis of reproduction in imagination, however, is probably hopelessly confused: Kant asserts (A100), with apparently no justification, that the psychological process of reproduction presupposes that appearances themselves are subject to a rule, which rule justifies our looking for a ground of its necessity in a transcendental condition of experience. A Humean might agree that empirical reproduction makes no such presupposition, but can be wholly reduced to a mere psychological propensity of the human mind. Kant seems on surer grounds in the passage beginning: "[If] we can show that even our purest a priori intuitions yield no knowledge..." (A101). But it is not clear what role either of these arguments plays in Kant's deduction, for he never returns to the transcendental synthesis of apprehension, and he contradicts himself on the transcendental status of reproductive imagination, describing it only as an empirical process (A118). In his only reference to these processes in the deduction proper (A124-25), he treats them as empirical and therefore as merely psychological. If Kant's intention in entitling these processes "syntheses" was to formulate their transcendental counterparts in a vocabulary suitable for integrating into the deduction, the move was otiose. Clearly, though, what

\[^{12}\text{Dieter Henrich is correct in pointing out that Kant employs the Aesthetic material in a similar way in § 26 of B; see his "The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction," }\textit{Review of Metaphysics} (Vol. XXII, 1969), pp. 655-56. According to our interpretation, then, Kant transfers this material from Stage (2), where we shall see that it serves no real purpose, to Stage (3) of the deduction in B.\]
is pivotal is the introduction of transcendental apperception from the psychological process of conceptual recognition.

But Kant abruptly and without explanation says, "At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression 'an object of representation'" (A104). In fact, Kant faces an impasse in the execution of Stage (2) at this point. Kant has not yet introduced appropriate mechanisms at the conceptual level that would insure a transition to a "transcendental synthesis" of recognition in a concept. Indeed, what would such a transcendental synthesis be like? The notion of recognizing an object under the concept of object is vacuous, for one recognizes objects by differentiating them from other objects. And Kant is prohibited by the logic of his argument from introducing transcendental recognition as conceiving objects under categories. In order not to beg the question at this point, Kant must avoid all mention of the categories when introducing the transcendental conditions of experience with which categories are to be identified through a separate argument in Stage (3). If Kant invoked categories in the introduction of transcendental apperception, the deduction proper would be circular. It is ironic, therefore, that Vaihinger, in dating A104ff as the earliest passage of the deduction, observed, quite correctly, that the entire passage can be read without making reference to the categories. Vaihinger took this fact as showing that Kant had composed the section when he had not yet raised the problem of a priori concepts. But such a time never existed for Kant. If I am correct about the strategy of the deduction, then Kant must present an argument at this point that does not refer to categories; otherwise the deduction becomes circular. It follows, too, that Wolff is incorrect in interpreting A104ff as a "proof sketch" of the transcendental deduction itself, a sketch that needs only to be fleshed out by interpolating the notion of category.

13 In Gram, pp. 43-44. Concerning A104ff, Vaihinger claims, "Kant probably had the insight...that the 'object' of sensuous representations owes its origin to the unity of the ego; but the insight was still lacking that the categories are the functions of unity of this ego"; in Gram, p. 46.

14 Commenting on Vaihinger's method of dating A104ff, Paton says, "If this passage is to be so interpreted, it must indeed have been written early; it must, in fact, have been composed in the cradle." In "Is the Transcendental Deduction a Patchwork?" in Gram, p. 85.

15 Mental Activity, p. 117.
This discussion of 'object of representation' is important in the critical philosophy, but Kant was apparently at a loss to know where and how to incorporate it into A. Its logical inappropriateness at this point is attested to by the breakdown between it and the procedure of the preceding two arguments. Not only does the critical philosophy lack a means of introducing transcendental recognition at this point even if some categorically independent sense could be made of this notion, but empirical apperception itself is not a manifest psychological component of conceptual recognition. Kant, therefore, must introduce both the empirical notion of apperception as a component of the psychological process as well as its transcendental counterpart (see A106-7). But the argument through A107 does not even make the pretense of showing that empirical apperception is a component of conceptual recognition, though Kant later seems to think that he has shown this (in A115).

Nevertheless, Kant's motivation for incorporating the discussion at this point is at least understandable, for empirical concepts are the means by which we first can represent to ourselves an object, e.g., a house. The psychology has its point: It stresses the fact that the consciousness involved in experience is always the consciousness of an object, of something represented in a concept. But the problem from which this discussion arises is not confined simply to the level of psychology. Its source lies in the philosophical problem of what it means to say that consciousness is always consciousness of something. Since human consciousness is essentially intuitional and conceptual, the discussion of 'object of representation' vis-à-vis the conscious use of concepts may stand on its own. Kant, in fact, integrates an abbreviated treatment of this problem more successfully into Stage (2) of the B deduction (B137), where (i) he disentangles this problem from that of introducing transcendental apperception as a condition of experience, and (ii) he can eliminate the dubious concept of the transcendental object = x in terms of which he originally formulated the answer to the problem in A (A109ff) -- see Part V.A.

The obscurity of A104ff is partly owing to Kant's doing two things at

16 The problem raised at A104 is essentially that which Kant raised in the famous letter to Marcus Herz of 21 February 1772. Kant wrote, 'I asked myself... on what basis rests the relation to the object of that which in ourselves, we call representation?' In Kant: Selected Pre-Critical Writings, ed. G. B. Kerferd & D. E. Walford (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968), p. 112. Hence, the question lies at the heart of the critical philosophy. De Vleeschauwer (p. 70) connects the discussion of A104ff with the Duisburg'sche Nachlass (about 1775).
once: on the one hand, to introduce transcendental unity of apperception as a necessary condition of experience (A104 through A107), and, on the other, to answer the initial question regarding the meaning of 'object of representation' (A104 through A110). The latter, which is wholly superseded in B, will not concern us here. To show that the consciousness of an object by means of concepts presupposes (i.e. implies) a transcendental unity of self-consciousness, Kant claims that insofar as representations relate to an object, they must constitute a unity that is made necessary through the concept of that object. The argument then proceeds: Since this object is "nothing to us," the unity that the concept makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in a synthesis of the given manifold of intuition (A105). This formal unity of consciousness, Kant argues, must be a transcendental unity of apperception because (i) "All necessity... is grounded in a transcendental condition" (A106, but unsupported), and (ii) I must be conscious of this ground as depending upon my apperception (unstated!). We cannot evaluate Kant's highly compressed and convoluted argument here (it is replaced by a more elegant argument in B); rather, I want to examine several corollaries that are relevant to our reconstruction of both versions of the deduction.

First, Kant argues that we are directly aware of the transcendental unity of apperception only in the synthetic unity of the manifold of representations which we effect in our experience by means of empirical concepts (A108). Because Kant ties the introduction of transcendental apperception in A to the facts of conceptually representing an object, transcendental apperception is defined initially as a condition merely for the use of empirical concepts in conceptualizing the objective, synthetic unity in which appearances stand to one another. (Any being that employs empirical concepts over the range of its experience must possess transcendental apperception.) We conceptualize the unity of appearances through a coherent system of thought that we appropriate as ours; hence, this system must be referred to a unity of apperception and, moreover, to one that is not empirical. (Kant calls the synthetic unity in which appearances stand the affinity of the manifold (A113-114 & A122). This affinity functions as the objective correlate in appearances of the conceptual unity the consciousness of which constitutes the consciousness of an identical, non-empirical self in experience.) But because of the restriction to concepts that is built into transcendental apperception as a result of its manner of being introduced in A, Kant must extend transcendental apperception to intuitions in order to execute Stage (3). This extension of transcendental apperception provides the key to the objective deduction in A (see Part IV), but, as we shall see, Kant treats the introduction of transcendental apperception in such a way in the B deduction that he has no more need of extending it to in-
tuitions.

Secondly, the objective validity of the structure of transcendental apperception is insured through the use of empirical concepts in experience. The point is that the structure of the object of experience can be ascertained through an elaboration of the structure of transcendental apperception (vide A117n & A122), which structure is shown in Stage (3) to be categorical. Vaihinger was essentially correct when he observed that the epistemological problem of objectivity is "solved" here without reference to categories and simply in terms of the function of empirical concepts in relation to transcendental apperception. If my interpretation of the strategy of the deduction is correct, then A104ff must contain a solution to the problem of objectivity that is independent of the categories. If Kant had attempted to construct a proof of the objective validity of categories at this point, which would have been a hopeless procedure, the identificatory strategy of the deduction could be dispensed with; and had he not constructed a proof of the objective validity of transcendental apperception prior to executing Stage (3), attempting to prove the validity of categories by identifying them with the unity of transcendental apperception would have missed its mark. Kant's procedure, if successfully executed, would show that the subjective conditions of understanding, the categories, are indeed objectively valid (see A89/B122), for the former are identical with the structure of that which is objectively valid. We shall see in Part V.A that Kant follows the same steps in executing the deduction in B.

Critical Evaluation. It is well known that Kant gives different accounts of the subjective sources of knowledge: one account invokes a psychological triad consisting of apprehension, imagination, and recognition; the other invokes an epistemological triad consisting of sense, imagination, and apperception, each of which has an empirical and transcendental aspect (A94). Only the transcendental mechanisms of the latter triad actually underlie the deduction proper, though Kant seems to think that the psychological triad can "point to" the mechanisms of the deduction. This argument, however, is hopelessly misguided. Empirical apperception, for instance, is not the same as

17 In Gram, p. 45. Of course, it is illegitimate to use this observation, as Vaihinger attempted to do, to justify an early date for the composition of the argument; see also above fn. 13.

18 Kant attempts to align the two triads in the so-called Third Table, A115. This attempt is a notorious failure; for further critical discussions, see Vaihinger, in Gram, pp. 53-54 & 56; Kemp Smith, Commen-
the psychological process of conceptual recognition even if Kant's argument in A104ff could show that it is a component of this process; what is more, apprehension in intuition is not the same as receptivity in sensibility (to which a synopsis ≠ synthesis is supposed to correspond, A97), and reproductive imagination is only a specific form of imagination as this faculty occurs in the epistemological triad. Thus, not even in their empirical aspects do the members of the epistemological triad correspond to the processes of the psychological triad. What emerges is a perverted argument: Kant attempts to introduce transcendental counterparts of members of a psychological triad instead of introducing the corresponding aspects of the empirical members of the epistemological triad. As a result, Kant's execution of Stage (2) yields transcendental counterparts of the psychological processes that are useless (at best), or the psychological process turns out to be strictly unnecessary for introducing the transcendental member of the epistemological triad. Kant's proposed method of executing Stage (2) in A is, consequently, a failure. Because Kant was misled into accepting Tetens' psychology, he failed to provide what is required for the execution of Stage (3); namely, some form of justifying the empirical aspects of the epistemological triad in an account of knowledge. Nevertheless, the torturous discussion of A104ff remains relevant for the deduction proper, even though its relevance lies only in its restricted manner of introducing transcendental apperception and in its proof of the objective validity of the structure of this apperception.

IV. Comments on the Deduction in A

In the Preface of A, Kant tells us that the transcendental deduction has both an objective and a subjective side (A xvi-ii). Roughly, the objective side proves the validity of the categories as a fact, whereas the subjective side establishes their relation to the cognitive faculties that are necessary for their objective employment. The distinction between the two sides corresponds, respectively, to the distinction between showing that and how the categories are objectively valid (see A56/B80). It has always been assumed that the subjective deduction occurs in the numbered subsections of section 2 of the chapter; however, if I am correct regarding the role of this section in the strategy of Kant's argument, then no deduction at all is taking place in these subsections. Rather, we should expect Kant to invoke the notion of category in section 3 twice, each time at the conclusion of an argument in which the categories are identified with the transcendental unity of apperception.

Secondary, p. 228; Wolff, Mental Activity, p. 175; and Bennett, § 34, p. 137.
And, indeed, this happens at A119 and at A124-125. I wish to suggest that the objective side of the deduction runs from A119 through A119, while the much longer argument from A119 through A125, beginning with "We will now, starting from below...", constitutes its subjective side. Kant considers these arguments to be "two sides" of one argument probably because he thinks of mental activity as being describable either in its relation to its object or in its relation to the subject; thus he attempts to prove the identity of categories with transcendental conditions vis-à-vis both ways of describing consciousness. Nevertheless, the arguments are linked in that the subjective deduction must assume that appearances can be objects of knowledge (A120), whereas this thesis is proven in the objective deduction (A119). While the text of the deduction in A, then, presents a continuous discussion, the objective deduction remains "essential" for Kant's purposes (A1xvii).

Contra interpretations such as Wolff's, there is no one premise that is the premise of the deduction in A; nor does Kant adopt one particular procedure for executing Stage (3). The premise of the objective deduction is that knowledge is possible only if intuitions are taken up into one consciousness that is aware of its identity in all of its representations (A116). Though Kant does not discuss the status of this important premise, he treats a similar proposition as a tautology in B. But in B, as we shall see, Kant employs this proposition to a much different end, namely, for the execution of Stage (2). In A, this proposition can function as a premise of the deduction precisely because transcendental apperception was introduced in Stage (2) as a condition for the use of empirical concepts in experience. Thus the objective deduction proceeds by careful definition of the conditions that make possible the synthesis in imagination that is required to bring the manifold of intuitions into a synthetic unity under the transcendental unity of apperception. On the other hand, the subjective deduction begins with the premise that man has perceptions, consciousness of appearances, which is a general fact about human nature, and proceeds by regressively ascertaining the mental faculties and conditions of their employment that are necessary for obtaining a unified experience, or knowledge of an object, on the basis of perception.

19 The objective deduction begins with the third paragraph of section 3; the initial two paragraphs belong to Stage (2).

20 According to Wolff, the transcendental deduction ultimately rests just on the premise that consciousness is a unity from which the objective validity of the categories can be logically deduced; Mental Activity, pp. 111-112.
Since these arguments are superseded in B by a more logically elegant execution of Stage (3), we shall not consider them in detail here. Nonetheless, the following point is noteworthy regarding the objective deduction. Kant introduces the synthesis of pure imagination as that which effects the formal unity in the manifold of intuition. Categories are then identified with transcendental conditions of experience through the necessary relationship of this synthesis to transcendental apperception. This relationship, Kant asserts, constitutes understanding: "The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding" (A119). This is so because the categories, as a priori concepts of understanding, are concepts of the unity of the pure synthesis of imagination (see Stage (1)). Thus, the need to postulate a relationship between the pure synthesis of imagination and transcendental apperception just is the need to postulate various means of conceptualizing that synthesis. Categories, therefore, are objectively valid in virtue of the fact that understanding is what is generated in the relationship between the pure synthesis of imagination and transcendental apperception (whose objective validity we have already shown). Thus, the validity of categories is shown in A by showing the necessity of introducing 'understanding' - - and with it, its pure concepts - - as a defined term in the deduction.

That 'understanding' is a derivative concept in the objective deduction explains why Kant sometimes would present a trichotomy of sense, imagination, and apperception, and at other times, a dichotomy between sense and understanding. Rather than employing a trichotomy of sense, imagination, and understanding or just a dichotomy between sense and understanding, Kant uses a distinction between imagination and apperception for constructing the deduction in order to postulate fundamental pre-conscious activities in terms of which the conscious mental activity of understanding can be defined. The dichotomy between sense and understanding lies, so to speak, on the surface of consciousness, and in A, Kant cuts deeply into a theory of mental activity by offering us a trichotomy in order to explain the surface activities via transcendental faculties. Perhaps more than any other argument in the A deduction, the objective deduction, which Kant formulates in terms of transcendental mental "activities," can be translated into a purely logical mode, into a series of definitions of transcendental conditions of experience formulated in terms of the members of the epistemological triad.21 Thus, Kant's explanation of the "generation" of

21 The notion of transcendental activity is suspect, of course, because it must lie outside time. Several recent philosophers have attempted to expunge the theory of mental activity from their interpretations of the
understanding in terms of these conditions is a logical analysis of our concept of understanding. (Kant sometimes abbreviates -- or perhaps ignores -- this analysis by speaking of imagination as "mediating" sense and understanding: this "mediation" takes place only in conjunction with transcendental apperception.) It follows, moreover, that Vaihinger was mistaken in using Kant's juxtaposition of the dichotomy between sense and understanding with the epistemological trichotomy of sense, imagination, and apperception as evidence for Kant's "inconsistent" thinking regarding the subjective sources of knowledge. The latter functions as a basis for defining the former.

The adverse reaction of Kant's contemporaries to the obscurity of the deduction in A is a matter of record. Undoubtedly, one reason for Kant's rewriting the deduction was the sincere intention to compose a simpler, more digestible argument. Another reason was the failure of Stage (2). In the Prolegomena the use of Tetens' psychology is explicitly rejected -- Kant warns the reader that he is not discussing "the origins of experience" (§ 21a) -- and the deduction is constructed on the non-psychological basis of a distinction between subjective judgments of perception and objective judgments of experience. And thirdly, both his (perhaps misguided) desire to counter the criticism that he had obliterated all transcendent existence as well as his own investigations into the metaphysical presuppositions of morals were forcing Kant to revise the definition of 'category' in Stage (1) in order to free categories for "thinking" things in themselves. As defined in A, categories are concepts of a synthesis of imagination, but imagination cannot be an element in thinking a transcendent existence. On the other hand, pure categories (which, contrary to the usual tendency in the secondary literature, are not to be identified with pure concepts of understanding) are simply logical functions, or mere forms, of concepts (A242-243).

transcendental deduction, for example, Bennett, § 30, and P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Methuen & Co., 1966), Part Two, II, § 4. Though Kant deploys less apparatus in the B deduction, a theory of mental activity seems essential to the deduction of categories in order to show how the object of knowledge can be joined with our sensibility, which, of itself, could contain only discrete elements. How well a theory of mental activity can solve this problem, however, will be discussed briefly in Part V.A.

22 In Gram, p. 34.

23 For the background to this criticism, see de Vleeschauwer, pp. 91 & 106.
Without a content a category can represent only a way of using a concept, but cannot specify what concept may be so used. These forms are forms by which concepts are made, and so cannot be used for thinking anything. Thus, as a result of the A deduction, Kant faces a dilemma: one cannot think things in themselves with either contentless forms of concepts or with categories whose content prohibit them from being used beyond the scope of imagination. Clearly, then, Kant has to develop another definition of the categories, one which would free the content of categories for thinking things in themselves. A new definition, of course, would force Kant to revise the deduction accordingly. Unfortunately, as we shall see, Kant's revised definition of category produces a serious problem for the deduction in B.

One final point. The fact that the execution in A is superseded in B does not mean that we can dispense with the earlier version. But our reason for retaining it has nothing especially to do with the logical defense of alleged presuppositions in the new deduction. While the A deduction may provide a kind of practical background for understanding the B deduction, the latter is substantially logically independent of the former deduction. Rather, our reason is that Kant's explanation of the proof structure of synthetic a priori principles is couched in the subjectivistic vocabulary of the A deduction; see, for example, A155/B194 and A158/B197. In light of the substantial revisions Kant effected in the B deduction, these passages must have been virtually unintelligible to a reader unfamiliar with A.

V. Analysis of the Deduction in B

In the revised deduction chapter in B, sections 16 through 18 contain Kant's execution of Stage (2), and, stripped of its explanatory material, the whole of Stage (3) is executed in just three paragraphs: the second paragraph of § 19, § 20, and the third paragraph of § 26. The claim (e.g. by Wolff, fn. 20 above) that the transcendental unity of apperception represents the sole premise of the deduction is mistaken. The thesis that transcendental apperception is a necessary condition of experience is the conclusion of Stage (2), and Stage (3) must proceed on independent premises in order to identify categories with the structure of this transcendental unity.

A. Comments on Stage (2). 24

24 Dieter Henrich argues that §§ 16-18 present a deduction that is both confused and incompatible with the principal deduction of §§ 20 &
Kant now introduces transcendental unity of apperception on the basis of what he considers a tautology; namely, that all representations that I call mine, whether they be conceptual or intuitive, must be ascribable to a unified self-consciousness = me (B131-132 & 138). This thesis is generally thought to be the most plausible contention of Kant's argument. If Kant's premise is correct, it would follow that Hume could not even have spoken of his perceptions unless these were capable of being united in a self-consciousness = him. Thus Hume would have to accept the Kantian premise or remain silent regarding even his perceptions. Of course, Kant goes on to argue that this consciousness must be pure and transcendental, for empirical self-consciousness reveals no abiding self and, furthermore, this self-consciousness must be a source of synthetic a priori knowledge about the structure of the unity found within the combined representations (B132).

26; Henrich, pp. 654-656. This deduction is supposed to be based on a semantic analysis of the word 'mine'. (This interpretation may be misleading, since Kant holds that everyone's representations must be his own; cf. Bennett, p. 103.) According to Henrich, Kant obtains the validity of the categories from the premise that all representations are mine only insofar as they can be bound in a unity of self-consciousness, that is, in a unity according to the categories. However, the argument of §§ 16-18 does not show that the unity of self-consciousness is categorial, and the argument of §§ 20 & 26 does not show that the unity which is made possible through categories has a necessary relationship to a unity of original self-consciousness. (For an analysis of Henrich's claim that the argument of §§ 16-18 is confused, see below, fn. 25).

25 It is endorsed, for instance, by Strawson, Bounds, p. 117, and W. H. Walsh, Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 49ff & 65. Henrich, however, claims that the argument rests on an ambiguity of 'mine': "...if something belongs to me only if I can take it up into consciousness, then as long as it is only available to be taken up into consciousness, it is not at all 'mine'; but only 'in relation to me'" (p. 654). But the protasis here is suspect. Kant's position can be interpreted as saying that intuition can be given prior to the synthesis of the understanding (B132 & 145) -- a situation Kant himself admits is inexplicable. Since, though, intuitions are given prior to synthesis, they already are "mine" and so stand under the 'I think' prior to being combined or taken up by understanding. Henrich equivocates on the word 'consciousness' which here may mean either the 'I think' or, more specifically, the activity of understanding. Henrich's criticism is legitimate only on the latter meaning. But problems remain in Kant's position under this interpretation, see below, p. 25.
In §§ 16-17 of B, Kant adopts the stance of the premise of the objective deduction in A, rather than that of the corresponding introduction of transcendental apperception in A. But Kant does so without treating the application of transcendental apperception to intuitions as an extension of its range. Whereas in A intervening pre-conscious mental activities had to be postulated in order to relate transcendental apperception to intuitions, in B Kant ties transcendental apperception directly to intuitions as the condition of the unity in which intuitions must stand in my experience. The word 'directly' may appear misleading, since, consistent with the new program of the B deduction, the unification of intuitions is effected through understanding by means of which intuitions are combined in one consciousness (B134-135). Our justification for using this expression lies in the significantly different position that the awareness of transcendental apperception occupies in each version of the deduction. In A the extension of transcendental apperception to intuitions is a problem to be solved, for, as we have seen, Kant maintains that we are aware of the transcendental unity of apperception only in the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical concepts (A108). However, in B the application of transcendental apperception to intuitions is a presupposition of the new deduction, for Kant now claims that the unity which is found in a manifold of intuitions is the ground of our awareness of the identity of apperception (B133 & 134). Kant argues that the unity of apperception cannot be thought (i.e. represented) in the absence of the unity in intuition (B135).

Indicative of this new position of transcendental apperception is that in B Kant is able to eliminate one of the more dubious concepts of the deduction in A, that of the transcendental affinity of the manifold. This concept, which Kant required in A as the objective correlate to the systematic unity of our empirical concepts in experience, appears as if from nowhere. In B, on the other hand, Kant guarantees the structure of the manifold of appearances by tying transcendental apperception directly to intuitions through which appearances are immediately represented. (Nevertheless, the unity of intuitions is actually effected by means of understanding, thereby bringing about our awareness of a transcendental unity of apperception in experience.)

As in A, Kant follows the introduction of transcendental apperception with a proof of its objective validity (§§ 17-18). Kant's proof is quite simple. Transcendental apperception is objectively valid because it is the unity that is effected in our intuitions by understanding, and because understanding is the faculty of knowledge that contains the representation of an object (B137). Thus, the transcendental unity of apperception is necessarily related to the object of experience: "The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given
in intuition is united in a concept of an object” (B139). What is unique about this argument is the fundamental role accorded understanding. Kant announces the new program of the deduction immediately in § 15 by introducing understanding as that which effects the combination of a manifold. Kant says,

But the combination (conjunctio) of the manifold in general can never come to us through the senses.... For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all combination...is an act of understanding.” (B129-130).

Here understanding is assigned the fundamental activity of the deduction, that "of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception" (B134-135). Gone from the deduction are the mechanisms of the epistemological triad that in the objective deduction in A serve to define the understanding. Indeed, imagination is utilized in B only for explaining how understanding can relate to human intuition (§ 24); but it is no longer a logical component of the argument itself. This new program has two results. First, on the side of Kant's theory of mental activity, it gives to understanding a transcendental function of synthesizing a manifold that understanding did not possess in A, and secondly, on the side of the logic of Kant's argument, it makes the notion of understanding a basis for constructing the proof, in effect, a primitive, though interpreted, concept of the new deduction.

Kant's execution of Stage (2) is simplified in two ways by taking understanding as primitive. First, the proof of the objective validity of transcendental apperception can utilize just one faculty which, because it is the faculty of knowledge, can effect objective unity in the manifold it synthesizes. And because understanding is now considered a transcendental faculty, it can effect objective unity in the combination of intuitions. Secondly, Kant is able to give an independent account -- independent, that is, of the introduction of transcendental apperception -- of the meaning of 'object of representation'. By having available the concept of understanding, interpreted as the faculty of knowledge whereby an object is represented, Kant can define the object as "that in the concept of which the manifold of given intuition is united" (B137).

But the new program of the deduction is not without its difficulties. In B, Kant sometimes speaks, in a manner reminiscent of his position in A, as if the transcendental faculties of synthesis (here understanding alone) originate the structure of a unified manifold of intuition by arranging its material in accordance with the forms of transcendental ap-
perception (B130, esp. B145). But this position involves well known
difficulties insofar as it remains unintelligible how a formless mani­
fold could determine what structure applies to it. The solution would
seem to be to maintain that the arrangement of the manifold is a result
of a (noumenal) choice of the transcendental ego. On the other hand,
in other passages, Kant apparently moves to solve this problem along
another line. He holds that the manifold of intuition is subject to trans­
cendental apperception insofar as it allows "of being combined" (B136–
137). He contends, "The thought that the representations given in in­
tuition one and all belong to me, is therefore equivalent to the thought
that I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite
them..." (B134, emphasis added, cf. B132). According to this position,
a manifold of intuition is already subject to the structure of transcen­
dental apperception prior to its actual combination through understand­
ing (see fn. 25 above). Understanding merely actualizes the structure
that is contained in a manifold insofar as that manifold already falls
under transcendental apperception in being mine. But Kant gives no
sense to the claim that a manifold of intuition can possess a structure,
even a potential structure, prior to its being combined by understanding.
Thus this "solution" does not go far in alleviating the original problem,
for it remains a mystery how a manifold could acquire a potential for a
structure simply by being in relation to me -- unless, of course, Kant
considered it to be an analytical assumption of the deduction that only a
manifold that possesses such a potential can be in relation to, or belong
to, me.

This problem infects the notion of transcendental mental "activity,"
Hence, if we interpret Kant's theory of mental activity as I have sugges­
ted, as a theory that explains how the object of knowledge is possible in
conjunction with our intuitive sensibility, then either it is unclear how
to ascribe responsibility for the structure of a synthesized manifold of
intuition, or the theory reduces to the dogmatic claim that no manifold
could belong to me unless it had at least the potential of being combined
in a (categorial) unity.

A second serious problem raised by the new program originates:
from Kant's assigning a function of synthesis to understanding (B130).
I have argued that in A synthesis is primarily a function of imagination,
and I have implied that understanding, since it is only a derivative no­
tion, has no fundamental synthesizing role to perform. Kant's new

This drastic position is adopted by R. P. Wolff in The Autonomy of
problem is connected with that of noumenal free will in Kant.
deduction, however, ambiguates the notion of synthesis. He is forced to employ both an intellectual synthesis that pertains to the relationship between the understanding and categories insofar as the latter are pure concepts of understanding plus a figurative synthesis which, like synthesis in A, pertains to imagination (B150-151). Understanding, as we shall see, introduces an intellectual synthesis as the special content of categories. This content enables Kant to free the categories for thinking about supersensibilia; but it also creates new problems within the deduction itself, problems to which we must now turn.

B. Analysis and Evaluation of Stage (3)

The new program of using understanding as a primitive concept in the deduction has yet a further result: Kant can execute Stage (3) simply by analyzing the nature of judgment as the basic activity of understanding through which the combination of a sensible manifold is articulated. The realization that a transcendental deduction could be constructed on this meagre basis evidently developed while Kant was working on the Prolegomena, where he employs a distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience in order to illustrate the objectifying role of categories in experience (§§ 18ff). Kant's idea was that in bringing categories to bear on the subjective judgments of perception, one could transform these into objective judgments of experience. This idea, however, did not prove advantageous for the version of the deduction in B in which an unambiguous notion of judgment would have to carry the full weight of expressing objectivity. Kant, nevertheless, became so confident of the possibility of constructing a deduction on this basis that he wrote in a footnote in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science that a transcendental deduction could be constructed "from the precisely determined definition of judgment in general (an act by which given representations first become cognitions of an object)."

Aside from the account of judgment in § 19, the deduction proper takes place in two separate steps in §§ 20 and 26. But the relationship between these steps has been a matter of dispute among commenta-

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27 In addition to the senses of 'synthesis' distinguished here, Kant also introduces a "synthesis of apprehension," B160, which pertains to the combination of a manifold in an empirical intuition.

tors. On the one hand, Kant seems to be moving from the applicability of categories to the unity of a given intuition (in § 20) to their universal applicability in any possible experience (in § 26); and, on the other, he seems to be moving from an intellectual synthesis that abstracts from our particular mode of intuition to the specific forms of synthesis that pertain to our sensibility. The first interpretation does not fit the actual argument of § 26, and the second would render this section unnecessary as a step in the argument, which could have ended with § 24. What Kant does need is a proof of the uniqueness of categorical application to the manifold of our intuition. Thus § 20 shows that the categories must apply to any given manifold that is unified in one consciousness, whereas § 26 shows that only the categories can determine the synthesis that gives our intuitions unity.

The identification of categories with the necessary concepts of the conditions of experience is achieved in § 20. Since judging is an activity of understanding by means of which the objective unity of a manifold is articulated (§ 19), and since categories "are just [the logical] functions of judgment, in so far as they are employed in determination of the manifold of given intuition" (B143), judging must utilize categories in articulating the unity of a manifold. "Consequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories" (B143). In § 26 Kant argues that the synthesis which applies to our apprehension of objects can be "no other than" that of the categories. This is so because (i) perception must be subject to an a priori synthesis of space and of time, (ii) since space and time can be represented a priori, the unity of their synthesis must be given a priori, and (iii) only the synthesis contained in the categories "is given a priori as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension" (B161). In this version of the deduction, the restriction of categories to appearances (§ 22) follows as a corollary to their introduction into the deduction via their connection with judgment. Since judgment is restricted to given objects and is, therefore, subject to the conditions of intuition, categories, as func-

29 For further discussion of this dispute, see Henrich, sec. I, pp. 642-644. The interpretation of § 26 offered here differs from that given by Henrich, sec. II, pp. 645-646.

30 Kant signals the emphasis on the givenness of the categories as a premise for the argument in § 26 by dubbing the introduction of the categories via their connection with the logical functions of judgment a "Metaphysical deduction" (B159). In the Aesthetic of B Kant had introduced the notion of a metaphysical exposition as one which "contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori" (B38).
tions of judgment applied to intuition in general, are restricted to ob-
jects of intuition. This argument, as well as the whole of Stage (3) in B, assumes a special connection between forms of judgment and cate-
gories as the only possible means of defining categories for Stage (1). Let us now consider this connection.

We have already seen Kant's personal reasons for revising the definition of categories in the B deduction. In B, where Stage (1) is not accorded its own discussion, Kant defines categories as logical functions of judgment insofar as these "are employed in determination of the manifold" of given intuitions in general. Curiously, Kant retained in B the discussion of 'category' that prefaces the table of categories in A, perhaps because he thought this section displayed the grounds for a connection between forms of judgment and categories. Even in A Kant gives the impression of drawing categories out of logical functions of judgment, as when he claims, "The forms of judgments (converted into a concept of the synthesis of intuition) yielded the categories..." (A321/B378). But Kant never explains how a logical function can be "converted" or how it can "determine" intuitions. Prima facie to apply logical functions to intuitions rather than to concepts is to apply them outside the domain for which they are defined. What is more, the definition of 'category' in B, § 20 imbeds categories with a different kind of content than what they were given in the original execution of Stage (1) in A.

What Kant seems to have in mind in moving from logical functions of judgment to categories is the idea that the categories contain no more than an intellectual synthesis and so can perform only a kind of intellectual function relative to logical forms of judgment. It is plausible, I think, to interpret this function as providing the forms for the kinds of judgments that occur in a possible experience, i.e. in a science. Scientific judgments are not simply universal (All A is B), or hypothetical, etc., but are quantitative (mathematical) and causal, etc.. The concepts that perform this function and so articulate judgments of a categorial kind must be forms of thought for an object of intuition in general (B150). No matter what forms of sensible intuition a finite being may possess, he must articulate his experience by means of judgments of a categorial kind and so think objects of his experience as something quantitative, mutually interrelated, etc.. Such forms of thought, Kant tells us, must contain an "intellectual synthesis," which apparently is

31For critical discussions of the relationship between the table of logical functions and the categories, see Strawson, _Bounds_, pp. 78-82, and Walsh, Chapter 3, § 12.
nothing more than the fact that such concepts provide the formal means of articulating certain kinds of judgments. In contrast to Kant's original definition of 'category' in A, this definition eliminates any specific connection between the definition of 'category' and intuitive structures generated by imagination. The B definition introduces categories relative only to a function of thought. Kant believes that the advantage he obtains with this definition of 'category' is that of freeing the categories for thought of supersensibilia, for even if no intuition undergrids the categories, it follows that they are still thoughts of something in general, but such thoughts as are not the basis of possible knowledge (B146, & 166n).

But here the lacuna in the B deduction occurs. Kant can give no explanation of how to connect intellectual synthesis with the structural counterpart of the object we think for appearances through the manifold of our intuitions. Kant merely introduces another form of synthesis, a figurative synthesis, as the unified structure of the sensible manifold as effected through imagination (B151). As we should expect, this synthesis is called a synthesis speciosa--literally, a synthesis of figure or form, and this synthesis is said to "conform with" the intellectual synthesis thought in the categories (B152). But Kant cannot explain the actual mechanisms by which a figurative synthesis and a given intellectual synthesis are connected. Kant cannot provide this explanation because the two types of syntheses differ in kind and range, the one wholly abstracting from the modes that define the other (see B144). In the B deduction, therefore, the relation that bridges the gap between a category and imagination becomes a matter either of a posteriori discovery or of dogmatic assertion.

Dieter Henrich argues, however, that all Kant intends to accomplish in the B deduction is an explanation of the mere possibility of applying categories to the sensible manifold. According to this interpretation, Kant refrained from giving a subjective deduction in B precisely because the structure of the deduction prohibits him from specifying the mental activities involved in actually applying categories to sensibility. This interpretation is entirely accurate, but it misses the point. Without some idea of the underlying mechanisms that connect intellect and imagination, we have we way of ascertaining a priori what actual synthesis in experience conforms with an intellectual synthesis in a category. What Henrich ignores and Kant apparently forgot is that the deduction must provide a basis for working out the doctrine of the schematism. In B, of course, Kant already had at his disposal a set of propositions about the relationship between the particular categories

\[32\text{ Henrich, pp. 651-652.}\]
and forms of unity in the pure, sensible manifold, but this theory was worked out with the definition of 'category' in A. It is, however, the possibility of this theory that Kant's revised definition of the categories either renders unintelligible or makes a matter of unacceptable alternatives.

(The different programs for constructing the deduction produce different definitions of the schematism. In A, where Kant claims that imagination mediates sense and understanding (A124), schematism is best conceived as a procedure of imagination. In B, however, the doctrine of the schematism has to specify only what (figurative) synthesis corresponds to a category. A schema, therefore, needs to be understood only as a product of imagination. Undoubtedly attesting to the obscurity and ambiguity that permeates the doctrine of synthesis in both editions of the Critique is that both views of the schematism exist side by side in an unrevised chapter.)

Summary of the B Deduction. In B Kant employs the same kind of identificatory argument as he presented in A, but he executes its stages in radically different ways. Even if we ignore the obscurity in the notion of transcendental activity, the revised argument still lacks important explanatory power. This lacuna results from the fact that in writing B, Kant had shifted his attention from the concern to limit ontology to appearances (see A246-247/B303) to ethico-metaphysical investigations and the defense of certain metaphysical presuppositions of A that he thought demanded: one to think of things in themselves by means of categories. To complete these tasks Kant had to free the content of categories from the restriction to the synthesis of imagination that had characterized their definition in A. Kant also wanted a simplified execution of the deduction itself. Kant must have realized that his new concerns as well as his desire for a simplified argument could be made to dovetail by postulating understanding as the basic mental activity for constructing the deduction. By basing Stage (3) on the activity of judg-

33As in A140/B179: "The procedure... in these schemata we shall entitle the schematism..."; A140/B179-80: "This representation of a universal procedure of imagination... I entitle the schema of this concept"; and A141/B180: "The schema... is a rule of synthesis of the imagination....."

34As in A140/B179: "The schema... is a product of imagination"; A 141-42/B181: "...the schema... is a product... of pure a priori imagination..."; and A142/B181: "...the schema of a pure concept of understanding... is a transcendental product of imagination....."
ment and so introducing the categories into the argument through their connection with the forms of judgment, Kant thought he could give the categories an "intellectual" content that would be independent of the synthesis of the sensible manifold which is effected through imagination. Yet this desire to find a means of thinking things in themselves with categories misled Kant into constructing a deduction that could no longer epistemologically ground the connection between categories and sensibility via a doctrine of schematism. The irony is, however, that this desire is probably an aberration of Kant's thinking.  

VI. Conclusions

The execution of the deduction in A clearly requires a reworking of the argument of A104ff. Without a restatement of this argument, Stage (2) of the deduction in A cannot be accepted, for the psychological argument is misguided. In B, however, the deduction flounders on the relationship between categories and sensibility. But because of the shift in the logical position of understanding in each version of the deduction, the execution of Stage (3) in A cannot complement the more successful execution of Stage (2) in B. Nevertheless, the obscurity in the notion of transcendental activity constitutes a problem for both deductions. In both editions of the Critique, therefore, Kant was unable to overcome the unavoidable "obscurities" in an argument that he himself described as being one of "extreme difficulty" (A98).

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^35 See, for example, Walsh; p. 81.

^36 Insofar as Bennett argues that a transcendental self-consciousness must be a condition for using certain kinds of empirical concepts in experience, his interpretation of the deduction is perhaps best construed as a reconstruction of A104ff (see Bennett, Chapter 8). Bennett, however, ignores or dismisses Kant's attempts at executing Stage (3) (cf. Bennett, § 33).