HEIDEGGER'S INTERPRETATION OF ARISTOTLE:

DYNAMIS AND EREIGNIS

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ABSTRACT

The essay shows how Heidegger's understanding of physis in Aristotle lays the foundation for his understanding of Ereignis. The essay draws on Heidegger's lecture courses, published and unpublished, particularly "On the Being and Conception of Physis." After introductory remarks on how Heidegger reads Aristotle "phenomenologically" in general, the essay focuses on how Heidegger reads physis as a mode of Being (ousia) by reading kinesis as a mode of Being, specifically as energeia atelēs (incomplete Being). But energeia atelēs is characterized by Heidegger as Wiederholung (retrieve of possibility) and as Eignung (appropriation of dynamis for appearance). On the basis of that crucial reading of physis, the essay goes on to show how physis-as-dynamis is the foundation for Ereignis in Sein und Zeit through the radical transformation of Wiederholung in natural beings into resolve in Dasein.
Heidegger's Interpretation of Aristotle:  
Dynamis and Ereignis

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Note: In referring to Heidegger's works in the footnotes, I cite first the abbreviated title of the German work (following the list of abbreviations in Richardson's Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. xxxi, with the addition of "WEG" to abbreviate Wegmarken, 1967). Then I add the German pagination followed, in parentheses, by the pages in existing English translations.
Foreword

This essay seeks to show that and how Heidegger's understanding of physis lays the foundation for his understanding of Ereignis, specifically how the structure of physis as dynamis is the basis for Ereignis as Wiederholung in the proper sense. The essay draws on Heidegger's lectures, published and unpublished, particularly on "Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis: Aristoteles' Physik B, 1."

The first step towards understanding Heidegger's reading of physis is to clarify how he reads Aristotle: "phenomenologically" (Section II). Heidegger maintains that the Greeks (especially Aristotle) read beings as phainomena, i.e., as showing up in a correlative noein / legein that is the manifestation of their meaningful presentness-as... or "is-ness" (Seiendheit: "Beingness"). The question of first philosophy is about the analogical unity of is-ness (ousia) as such. Heidegger's phenomenological orientation to Aristotle leads him to transform the Aristotelian question about Being by radically investigating logos and working out the analogical unity of its Being as energeia atelës or dynamis ("temporality" in the broadest sense). This provides the horizon for understanding the meaning of Being as pure dynamis. (This section closes with the elaboration of an Aristotelian "phenomenological lexicon" as a tool for understanding Physics B, 1.)

Heidegger's reading of physis in Aristotle (Section III) focuses on the characterization of physis as a mode of Being (ousia) by clarifying how kinesis (Being-moved) is a mode of Being. An investigation of Being-moved in terms of energeia atelës (incomplete appearance / Being) shows that the fundamental meaning of physis is Wiederholung (re-grasping possibility in the sense of letting it remain the hidden source for the appearance of a moving being) and Eignung ("appropriation" of possibility, as hidden source, unto the limited appearance of its instances).

On the basis of that reading of physis, the essay goes on to show (Section IV) how physis-as-dynamis is the basis for Ereignis through a radical transformation of Wiederholung into resolve. This section shows that resolve is the core of Sein und Zeit (resolve as the fully aware repetition / retrieve of existence's possibility as possibility) and that as such it effects the transformation of Wiederholung / Eignung into Ereignis. This essay concludes with a discussion of "rigor" in relation to Ereignis taken as dynamis (Section V).
I. Introduction: 1. The Scope of the Essay

If there is a "revolutionary" quality to the work of Martin Heidegger, we may expect to find it not in the production of something novel, but in his attempt "to win back more originally what has already been." This phrase expresses the structure of Wiederholung: the gaining of authentic presence by re-finding already projected possibility as possibility. And in this essay I will demonstrate (1) that the structure of Wiederholung is the structure of Ereignis, and (2) that the basis for Heidegger's understanding of Ereignis is Aristotle's physis read as dynamis. I am arguing that Wiederholung, properly understood, is "the issue itself" of Heidegger's whole path of thought.

But is not "the issue itself" Being and time, time and Being, where the "and," read as aletheia, expresses the central problem? I will be showing, in effect, that Hölderlin's words apply exactly to Heidegger: "Wie du anfingst, wirst du bleiben." Heidegger's thought has "remained" with its beginnings: with physis read as kinesis read as genesis read as energeia ateles read as dynamis read as Wiederholung read as Ereignis. This very awkward "sorites" expresses the abiding "Aristotelian" base to Heidegger's fulfilled thought and so delineates the development of this essay.

To be sure, one can understand Heidegger without understanding his grounding in and transformation of Aristotle. But if to know something is to know it by its archê, and if that archê, as always returning anew, controls the whole, then to explain the "Aristotelian" base of Heidegger's

1. US 130f. (36): "das Gewesene ursprünglicher zurückzugewinnen."

2. Cf. KM 219 (251): "dass in diesem Titel das 'und' das zentrale problem in sich birgt."


5. US 96 (10): "Herkunft [i.e., ἀρχή] bleibt stets Zukunft [i.e., "coming back to" or "returning"] ."

6. Cf. WP 25 (81): das...was herrscht; WEG 317: beherrscht, Herrschaft, Verfügung.
project is to clarify his entire thought. However, we are not interested here in spelling out the historical (historisch) genesis of Heidegger's work, but simply in grounding that work in the basis from which it continually unfolds. Whereas one could show, from Heidegger's earliest courses after World War I, that his thoughts on the Being of genesis are the "genesis" of his thought on Being, I leave that interesting topic to another time.

The main parts of this essay are three: (1) how Heidegger reads Aristotle "phenomenologically"; (2) how Heidegger reads Aristotle's physis as Wiederholung / Eignung; and (3) how this reading provides the basis for a transformation of Wiederholung / Eignung into "Ereignis." As a whole, the essay argues that the issue of Being and Time is worked out as the retrieve of the time-character of dynamis. To anticipate the outcome: if dynamis is itself a Wiederholung, then the "answer" to the question of the meaning of Being is an ongoing Wiederholung of Wiederholung -- that is, letting possibility remain possibility, letting appearance appear by not appearing. This "answer" is simply "Being-underway," where the only "authority" is the ever retrievable possibilities of possibility itself as retrieval.7

I. 2. The sources for this essay

It has long been known that Heidegger's reading of Aristotle is essential to his entire life's work. William J. Richardson writes that "Aristotle has influenced him more profoundly than any other thinker," and Gadamer, Arendt, Szilasi, Tillich, Spiegelberg, Gründer, and Kaufmann report as much.8 We know that his philosophical objectives are defined in terms of Greek philosophy in the context of Greek poetry and literature, indeed that he has spent an hour a day since he was eighteen reading the


Greek poets and historians. And it is common knowledge that the Aristotelian problem of the analogy of Being, first awakened in him by his 1907 reading of Brentano's book on Aristotle, remained "the ceaseless impetus for the treatise Sein und Zeit which appeared two decades later." This impetus gained momentum in his lectures and seminars from 1919 on, when he seems to have taken to heart Hegel's words, "If philosophy were done in earnest, nothing would be more worthy than to give lectures on Aristotle." It was in these early Freiburg and Marburg lectures that Heidegger tried out "a transformed understanding of Aristotle" that was the basis for his eventual break with Husserl. In 1928 W. R. Boyce Gibson could record Heidegger's position (reported through Oskar Becker and going back at least to the 1923-24 lecture, Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung) that "Aristotle was really in De Anima phenomenological (without the explicit Reduction)." His further evaluation: "Husserl is the Plato to Heidegger's Aristotle."


11 Heidegger cites this sentence from Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (WW XIV, 314) in "Hegel und die Griechen," WEG 266.

12 SD 86 (78). Note: not "a seminar" as in the English translation, but "the seminar."


14 This winter semester course, which the forthcoming Gesamtausgabe lists as "Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Philosophie" and which the Marburg catalogue (cf. Richardson, 665) subtites "(Descartes Interpretation)," was recorded by Heidegger's students as "Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung" and dealt at length in its opening lectures with Aristotle's De Anima B, 7.


16 Gibson, 72.
We know as well that Heidegger projected a book prior to *Sein und Zeit* that was to summarize his Aristotle interpretations, and that Paul Natorp had Heidegger hired at Marburg in 1923 on the basis of the introduction to that work.\(^{17}\) And the influence has continued to work even on the later Heidegger. In the 'fifties he told his students, "It is advisable, therefore, that you postpone reading Nietzsche for the time being, and first study Aristotle for ten to fifteen years."\(^{18}\) And to judge by interview that the present writer had with Heidegger in 1971, Heidegger himself continues living out that program to this day.

But if the influence is undeniable, the "how" and "how far" of it remain one of Heidegger's best-kept secrets. Index enough of the secret is the infrequency with which Heidegger scholarship elaborates the Aristotelian bases of Heidegger's work.\(^{19}\) And this is no fault of the commentators. Heidegger has published only one essay devoted entirely to Aristotle ("Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis: Aristotle's Physik B, 1"\(^{20}\)), and even there the theme is Aristotle and not his influence on

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Husserl wrote Ingarden on December 14, 1922: "In VII [the seventh volume of the *Jahrbuch*] erscheint eine grundlegende gr. Arbeit über Aristot. von Heidegger" (Ingarden, 25), but Prof. Mrs. Malvine Husserl wrote on February 25, 1924, "Der Beitrag von Prof. Heidegger hat sich durch seine Berufung nach Marburg verzögert...." Szilasi says that the introduction was written in the spring of 1923, but Gadamer, on the basis of a 1922 letter from Heidegger, is correct in locating its writing in the year previous. In a conversation with me on January 27, 1975, Gadamer recalled that the work was to cover: Nic. Ethics Z, Metaphysics A and Z, H, TH, De Anima G, and Physics B. Before his death in 1924, Natrop gave his copy of the manuscript -- typewritten with copious handwritten marginalia by Heidegger -- to Gadamer, but this copy, along with Heidegger's letters to Gadamer, was destroyed in the bombings of Leipzig during World War II. Heidegger retains a copy without the marginalia, but it is not announced for publication in the Gesamtausgabe.

\(^{18}\) WD 70 (73).


\(^{20}\) Cf. note 54 below.
Heidegger. Likewise, in Sein und Zeit, where Aristotle appears directly or indirectly on virtually every page, the nature of the influence is concealed behind the language of phenomenology.

The secret lies hidden in Heidegger's courses from 1919 through 1952, and since it is not clear that his Gesamtausgabe will include the early Freiburg courses (1916-1923), the secret may be kept closed until his Nachlass become available. But with the appearance this year of his 1925-26 course, Logik (Aristoteles), the deep influence of the Peri Hermeneias (specifically regarding logos apophantikos) and Metaphysics TH, 10 (aletheia) on Sein und Zeit will be shown. Likewise the publication of Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie will clarify Heidegger's reading of the meaning and transformation of Aristotle's energea with respect to the medieval essentia-existensia and Heidegger's own "ontological difference." Meanwhile there exist works that either grew out of these early courses or extend them or report their contents. Among these is Prof. Helene Weiss' Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles (1942), which Heidegger recommended to his seminar students in 1951 as one of the few good works on the Physics and perhaps on Aristotle's thought as a whole. (That recommendation is perhaps not uninfluenced by the fact that Professor Weiss, a former student of Heidegger's, reports, often in close paraphrase, much of the content of Heidegger's lectures on Aristotle in the twenties.) Among the

Other works that fit this category in greater and lesser degrees:

Cf. Weiss, pp. 6, 52 n., 100 n. Pages 20-29, for instance, follow closely sections of Heidegger's 1922 course (Phänomenologische Interpretationen...") on Physics A.
unpublished seminars and lecture courses that inform what follows, the
seminar of 1928 (summer semester) entitled "Phänomenologische Übungen:
Interpretation von Aristoteles, Physik II," is important, as is the
major Aristotle lecture course given at Freiburg in 1921-22 and 1923. However, since Heidegger's explications of dynamis, energeia, and physis
are generally constant from the early 'twenties up through the winter
semester of 1951-52 ("Übungen im Lesen: Aristoteles, Metaphysik, IV und
IX, 10") and differ only in minor and generally contextual ways from
"Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physik...", we will direct our attention
principally to that latter text.

II. Reading Aristotle "Phenomenologically"

Crucial to the argument we are developing is the "method" according
to which Heidegger reads Aristotle at all. To call this "method"
"phenomenological," as indeed Heidegger does, is not to drag Husserl's
phenomenology back to an epoch where it does not and could not belong.
Rather, Heidegger claims that his phenomenological procedure is no more
than an explicitation of Aristotle's own way of investigation and of the
way of reading beings that was indigenous to Greek thought itself.

23. I have read only the Nachschriften of these courses recorded by
Heidegger's students (Weiss, Becker, Brecht, et al.), which Heidegger
characterizes as "trübe Quellen" in general, US 91 (6).
The 1921-22 and 1922 courses form a unity although they bear separate
titles: WS 1921-22: "Phänomenologische Interpretation (Aristoteles,
Physik)" and SS 1922, "Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter
Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik."

24. I write "method" in inverted commas to indicate Heidegger's self-
distanciation from the method of modern philosophy. Cf. US 178
(74), 197 (91) and FD 79 (102). Heidegger's "method" follows

25. For Heidegger's claim that his work remains "phenomenological"
from beginning to end, cf. SZ 38 (62f.), SD 90 (82), and his "Über das
Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage,"
"Phänomenologie -- lebendig oder tot?, ed. Helmut Gehrig, Karlsruhe:
Badenia Verlag, p. 47.

26. Cf. SZ 28 (51); 213 (256): on ἀυτὸ τὸ πρῶτον (Meta.
A 3, 984 a 18f.). Also, FD 62f. (81f.) and US 134f. (39f.) and
in Symposium Heidegger: OmayITU romanesc lui Martin Heidegger, ed.
George Uscatescu, Madrid: Destin, 1971, p. 44: "...der Terminus
Phänomenologie erhielt eine Auslegung, die mehr an Aristoteles denn
an Husserl anknüpfte." Compare as well Joseph Owens, The Doctrine
of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, second edition, Toronto:
plication led to Heidegger's break with Husserl and the tradition and
to a transformation of Aristotle's problematic. Before spelling out
the concrete shape of the phenomenological correlation in Aristotle, I
will sketch a preliminary idea of phenomenology in Aristotle and the
consequently transformed problematic.

II. 1. Phenomenology: Perspective and Program

In Heidegger's telling, the Greeks were the first to fundamentally
experience being (to on) as phainomenon, that which of itself shows it-
self, that which appears. Professor John H. Finley, Jr., in his informa-
tive Four Stages of Greek Thought, confirms from a classicist's point of
view what Heidegger finds operative in Greek thought from Homer through
Aristotle, namely, that the presence of beings in the world is experienced
as their appearing, where phainesthai means that a being brings itself to
radiant self-manifestation (sich zum Scheinen bringen) and "is" precisely
insofar as it shows itself in that self-manifestation.

In appearing, a being appears as something meaningful in the broadest
sense -- as a shield that the warrior can use or as the ship he can launch
or as the god he can reverence or challenge. This "as"-character bespeaks
the arrival of meaning amongst beings, the "irruption" that occurs only
with the arrival of man. If men can deal with beings only insofar as they
appear as such and so, the philosopher is distinguished by the fact that
he asks the question of their "appearing-as" as such, that is, the question
of their "Being."

To say that much is to indicate two things: (1) Whenever the Greeks
speak of to on, they always imply to on hei....a being in terms of some
modality of meaningful presence, even if the "as" (hei) is not expressly
articulated. This "as"-dimension of beings, which is expressed in the "is"
of apophatic discourse, articulates the Being-dimension of beings. Hence
to on always means "a-being-in-a-modality-of-Being," and Heidegger can
correctly translate to on as das seiend-Sein. To express this unity
Aristotle often uses ousia, which, derived through the participle ousa from

27. On thinking "Greeker than the Greeks" cf. US 134f. (39). Also
Heidegger's "Aus einer Erörterung der Wahrheitsfrage" (a selection
from his course of winter 1937-38, "Grundfragen der Philosophie: Vom
Wesen der Wahrheit: άλήθεια und το青岛市" ), in Zehn Jahre Neske Verlag,


30. US 132 (38), EM 46 (50), 54 (59), 77 (85), 79 (88), 138 (151). WEG 345f.

31. WP 31 (97); cf. EM 24 (25f). Also, "Vorwort" to Richardson, p. xi (x):
das Seiende...hinsichtlich seines Seins. Onto as always "in Being,"
cf. WEG 330, and Gottfried Martin, Introduction to General Metaphysics,
einai, can adequately be translated by the neologism "is-ness" (Seiendheit). Therefore the question that defines first philosophy, "What is to be ?" must be fleshed out to say "What is to be on?" -- that is, it does not seek an ontic answer (a shield or ship or god) but rather an ontological one. The question focuses on the "as-ness" or "is-ness" as such, and so it comes down to the question "What is is-ness?" (tis he ουσία;) indeed, not the is-ness of any delimited region of beings, but of all beings in terms of the analogical unity governing all possible modes of is-ness. Aristotel's aporetic question about ουσία is his formulation of the question of the meaning of Being. (2) To speak of beings as phainomena is to at least imply the locus of their meaningful appearance, the correlative horizon wherein that meaningfulness is articulated. Beings as phainomena are correlative to modes of "awareness" (Vernehmen) in the broadest sense, to a legein or noein that is revelatory of the phainomenon as what and how it is. Without logos, no is-ness. The uniqueness of man as "the living being who has logos" (ζῷον λόγον echon) is that his essence is the locus of meaning and that he has access to beings only in terms of their "appearance-as..." in logos or noein. Aristotle thematizes the function of logos as δήλων (to make visible), ἀποφαίνεσθαι (to show forth), and most importantly as ἀλήθευειν (to uncover or to bring out of hiddenness). For men to on is always on λεγομένου, "read" beings, beings articulated according to the multiplicity of modes of meaningful presence that are expressed in the implicit "as" or the explicit "is" of apophatic discourse.

To summarize these two points: If to on always implies a Being-dimension that is expressed in the "as" (heί), the only locus of this Being-dimension is man's essence as λόγος or ἀλήθευειν. To on and λεγεῖν are apriori correlative; man's very nature is "phenomenological (legein ta phainomena). And if man raises the question of first philosophy (legein to on heί on), then the resultant ontology must be phenomenology.

**Notes:**


34. Cf. SZ 212 (255): "Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist, das heisst die entische Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis, 'gibt es' Sein."

35. Cf. Politics A 2, 1253 a 9-12; Nic. Ethics A 13, 1102 a 30; Z 1, 1139 a 5.

36. SZ 32f. (56f.) and footnote thereto. Heidegger's reading of λόγος is grounded in texts such as: De Interpretatione. 4 and 5, esp. 17 a 15f. (ἀποφαίνεσθαι λόγος = δήλων); cf. Meta. G 2, 1003 b 31f. (δήλοι ). Nic. Ethics Z 4, 1140 a 10f. and 21f. (μετά λόγον νοέσθαι), Z 5, 1140 b 6ff and 20ff. ἀλήθη μετὰ λόγου. Z 6, 1141 a 4 ( καὶ δεῦρος) Z 7 1141 a 17f. (ἀλήθευεν).
Before moving on, let us ask whether this "explicitation" of the bases of Aristotle's philosophical framework is not an unjustifiable importation of contemporary (specifically Husserlian) perspectives into Greek thought. What is ultimately at stake here is the question whether any interpretation of Greek thought, whether performed by Thomas Aquinas, Werner Jaeger, or William David Ross, can hope to be without presuppositions. And Heidegger's justification of his own phenomenological reading of Aristotle is grounded in the ineluctability of the phenomenological nature of man himself: all knowing, including the knowing of an Aristotelian text, is knowing in and through the interpretative "as"-structure of a legein. But rather than unfolding the important issue of the hermeneutical "fore"-structure, let me simply let Heidegger speak for himself, and so leave open the question that he himself poses here. (I cite at some length because this paragraph reveals the broad context within which Heidegger's reading of Greek philosophy moves.)

The totality of beings is the field from which the positive sciences always acquire their regions of objects.... Directed straight at beings, these sciences in their totality undertake the investigation of everything that is. Thus there seems to be no field left over for philosophy, that science which from antiquity has been considered the foundational science. But has not Greek philosophy, ever since its decisive origins, made "beings" the very object of its questioning? To be sure -- but not in order to determine this or that being, but rather to understand beings as being als Seiendes, that is, with regard to their Being [Sein]. The posing of the question, and hence the answers, remained for a long time entangled in obscurities. Nevertheless, already in the origins of Greek thought something remarkable appears. Philosophy seeks the elucidation of Being by way of reflecting on the thinking of beings (Parmenides). Plato's discovery of the Ideas takes its bearing from the monologue (Logos) of the soul with itself. The Aristotelian categories originate with regard to the predicative knowing of reason. .... Is this turning of the gaze from beings to consciousness accidental? or is it ultimately demanded by that which is constantly sought for under the name "Being" as the problem-area of philosophy?37

The last question, which echoes Aristotle's aei zétoumenon kai aei aporoumenon, Meta. Z 1, 1028 b 2f., serves as Heidegger's starting point for a radicalization of the Aristotelian question about the analogical unity of all "is"-predication. We may now proceed to show how the "explicitation" of phenomenological method in Aristotle entails the transformation of the Aristotelian problematic.

Man has access to beings only in terms of their meaning in the broadest sense, that is, only in terms of some form of presentness-as in logos.

This presentness-as in terms of which beings are articulated (legetai) has many modalities. Thus: to on legetai pollachōs,38 "beings are revealed in their presentness-as in many modes." Aristotle gives an unsystematized list of the four ways beings are revealed: (1) beings-in-their-Being as "accidental," (2) as "true" or "false," (3) as in dynamis or energēia, and (4) according to the schema of the categories.39 But all such modes are related to an analogical common denominator (pros hen) insofar as each one is a modality of presentness-as in which beings are revealed as such and so. If there were a science that could reveal that analogical unity, it would be the science of all beings in terms of their is-ness as such -- the science of on heī on.40

In carrying out the search for the common meaning that analogically unifies the many meanings of beings, one either presumes or thematically reinvestigates the meaning of the very locus of any and all meaning: logos as the "faculty" of revealing. That insight is the basis for Heidegger's transformation of Aristotle's problematic. If beings are present in logos in many ways, those "many ways" are themselves modifications of logos, and hence logos itself appears in many ways. If logos in its alētheuein-function has Being in a variety of ways, then the first and foundational step towards clarifying the meaning of Being (the unity of modes in which beings appear) becomes the questioning of the unity of the many modes in which logos appears. Logos must, as it were, turn on itself and carry out an alētheuein of the alētheia-process itself in its unity. And since the modifications of logos are correlative to the modes of appearance of beings, the discovery of the unity of the modes of appearance of logos provides the philosopher with the a priori horizon

38. Cf. also Meta. G2, 1003 a 33; E 2, 1026 a 33ff.; Z 1, 1028 a 10; TH 1, 1045 b 33ff. Heidegger translates the Greek variously: WP 31 (97): "Das seiend-Sein kommt vielfältig zum Scheinen." "Vorwort" to Richardson: "Das Seiende wird (nämlich hinsichtlich seines Seins) in vielfacher Weise offenkundig." Cf. SZ 28 (51): "Seiendes kann sich nun in verschiedener Weise, je nach der Zugangsart zu ihm, von ihm selbst her zeigen." EM 69 (76): "...brenzt das 'ist', d.h. das Sein in sich selbst die Vielfalt, deren Faltung es ermöglicht, dass wir überhaupt mannigfaltiges Seiendes in dem, wie es jeweils ist, uns zugänglich machen? ...das 'ist' bekundet im Sagen eine reiche Mannigfaltigkeit der Bedeutungen." Cf. also Heidegger's redaction of the phenomenology article (previous footnote): "Dieses [i.e., Erlebnis] stellt sich vielmehr in der Wahrnehmung durch mannigfaltige 'Erscheinungsweisen' dar," p. 259.


for working out the analogical unity of all modes of appearance of being, that is, the meaning of Being itself.

In summary fashion: (1) if every on is on ἥει..., that is, a being-in-a-mode-of-Being, and (2) if the "ground" of the ἥει is logos as αἰλθέοεοιν, and further (3) if there is a correlation between on legomenon pollachὸς and logos legomenos pollachὸς, and finally (4) if the "first" task of philosophy (πρῶτος philosophia) is to seek the ἥει on as such in its unity, then in working out the unified Being of logos, philosophy has secured the ground of the unified meaning of Being as such.

We see here in an Aristotelian formulation the program announced in Sein und Zeit. And indirectly we may see how this program is possible not on Aristotelian grounds but only on the condition of a transformation of the Aristotelian problematic. First of all, against popular misunderstandings of Heidegger's claim about the forgottenness of Being in Aristotle, we must reaffirm with Heidegger that Being is questioned in Aristotle's formulation of the task of first philosophy: "What is is-ness?" What Heidegger is claiming is that the question is misplaced insofar as, in Heidegger's telling, Aristotle does not question the Being of logos deeply enough. Aristotle gets no further than the thematization of the Being of beings as is-ness (ousia), this seen as the constant presentness-as of beings in a logos whose basic Being is the constant revelation of beings in their presentness. Given Aristotle's understanding of the αἰλθέοεοιν-function of logos as categorial-assertive "making present," for him the analogical unity of the many modes of the presentness of beings is "pure presentness as such," pure energeia or eidos correlative to apophantic logos. If Heidegger hopes to justify any claim that such a formulation is not revelatory of the authentic meaning of Being, he will have to critically reformulate the fundamental meaning of logos at a level deeper than the categorial-assertive level of synthesis-dihairesis at which Aristotle stopped. If it could be shown -- as the course Logik (Aristoteles) attempts to do in terms of Aristotelian texts and as Sein und Zeit attempts to do by a hermeneutic of "factical life" -- if it could be shown that the apophantic logos of Aristotle is a derived form of a more basic "dynamic" temporal unity of αἰλθέοεοιν, then the way would be opened to answering the question of the unified meaning of Being in a more fundamental way that was possible to Aristotle. Indeed, if the unified meaning of the Being of logos were dynamis, then the answer to Aristotle's primary philosophical question would be revolutionized. Tis ἡ ousia; -- not pure energeia, but energeia ateleς as such, that is, pure dynamis. In a non-Aristotelian formulation of the same proposition: the meaning of Being would be "time."

I state these matters programmatically and in Aristotelian terms in accordance with the very limited aim that I stated at the beginning of this section, namely, to show how in general and with what programmatic consequences Heidegger reads Aristotle phenomenologically. Let me say in passing that I also find it illuminating to state Heidegger's program in the Aristotelian terms in which it was originally conceived, if only because such statement has for me the salutary effect of de-mystifying (and therefore grounding and justifying) much of the unique and difficult
language in which Heidegger formulates his own project of thought. For example, as we shall see later, if an accurate translation of dynamis were Eignung (tentatively, "appropriation"), then one might be able to understand the justification for calling the meaning of Being (dynamis hei dynamis) by the name Ereignis, without having to chase the word down the dubious paths of German etymologies. But that is only a personal preference. We may now take up the second topic of this section, namely, the concrete "shape" of the phenomenological correlation as Heidegger sees this articulated in the key terms of the Aristotelian lexicon.

II. 2. Phenomenology: An Aristotelian Lexicon

We have seen that all human knowing, as phenomenological, is knowing a being in a mode of its presence—as in logos, that is, in a mode of its Being. In Aristotle these modes of Being are expressed in terms of eidos, the "appearance" of a being, where this appearance is revelatory of what and how the being is. That Aristotle's thematication of the modes of Being as modes of visibility (eidos: "the seen," derived from horao, "I see") carries over aspects of the Platonic emphasis on seeing, is not our concern here. Rather what is important is Aristotle's ontological transformation of Plato's eidos. So differently does Aristotle experience beings from the way Plato does, that he radically changes the phenomenological correlativity of eidos and logos (already known by Plato) and so achieves a more adequate ontological formulation. Aristotle's eidos, as the Being of a being, cannot be some "thing" existing off by itself apart from logos (ou choriston on), but rather is eidos only in logos (all e kata ton logon — Physics B, 1, 193 b 5). Both the Platonic eidos and the Aristotelian eidos are formulations of Being, and both are correlative to some kind of logos. But in Aristotle's unique formulation of that correlativity, Heidegger finds a more "adequate" phenomenological formulation that is at the same time a more "adequate" ontological formulation. Insofar as Plato's eidos (at least as Aristotle reads it) can stand off on its own, it tends towards optical characterization (i.e., as a being), whereas insofar as Aristotle's eidos appears only in the apophatic declaration about a being (i.e., in a legein of an on), it is a properly onto-logical characterization, that is, it names Being. We see here again how ontology is controlled by phenomenology. If Aristotle's ontology is more to the point (zur Sache) than Plato's, it is because his phenomenology is more properly formulated. And indeed, if Heidegger's "onto-logy" is to lay claim to more originality than Aristotle's, it can only be because its thematization of logos would supposedly issue in a formulation of phenomeno-logy that is more to the point.

But back to the lexicon. If the phenomenological correlativity can be articulated as eidos — logos, the eidos as the presentness of a being in what and how it is has the element of stability about it, and this stability is expressed in energeia and entelecheia. Aristotle often speaks of ta onta (beings) equally as synhestota (Physics B, 1, 192 b 13) and synhistamena

41. For Heidegger's "apologia" on his use of language, cf. SZ 38f. (63) and VA 27f. / I, 19f.
42. For Heidegger's claim that the word "Ereignis" is not arbitrary but demanded by the "issue": "Vorwort" to Richardson, p. xxi f. (xx f.).
These participial forms are from the verb \textit{histēmi}, "I stand" or "I make to stand." With this clue Heidegger claims that the Greeks experienced beings as "the constant" (das \textit{ständige}) with the twofold meaning of (1) "that which has its stand in and of itself and therefore stands 'there'" and (2) that which is constant in the sense of enduring and lasting.\footnote{WEG 316.} Another word that equally expresses the element of stability is \textit{hypokeimenon} from the verb \textit{hypokeimai}, "I lie before." A being, understood as \textit{hypokeimenon}, "that which lies present," (cf. the Latin \textit{subjectum}), can equally be called \textit{hypostasis}, "that which stands of itself" (cf. the Latin \textit{substantia}). Heidegger says that the "standing" and the "lying" indicate a common Greek viewpoint on beings, namely, as "that which is constantly present of itself."\footnote{WEG 331.} There is yet another designation for the element of stability in Being: \textit{ousia}. In popular Greek usage before being taken up as a philosophical term, \textit{ousia} designated one's present possessions, one's property or real estate. Those connotations are continued in the philosophical use of the term, and the correct German translation of \textit{ousia} as das \textit{Anwesen} ("present holdings") captures the sense of stable presentness that for the Greeks characterized the Being of a being.\footnote{WEG 330; EM 47 (50), 148 (162). Cf. Gottfried Martin, \textit{op. cit.} (note 31 supra), p. 112f. and Joseph Owens, p. 152 n. 63.}

These words connoting stability can now be read in terms of \textit{energeia} and \textit{entelecheia}.\footnote{For what follows: $πέρας$ and $τέλος$: EM 46 (49), 48 (52), 87 (96), 100 (110). FD 63 (81). VA 17 / I, 9. WEG 321, 339, 349, 354, N II, 405. "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1960), 96 ff. (83f.). For "das Gesprochene" as $άστέλος$ of "Sprechen": US 16 (194). Confirmation of the fact that the verb $πέρασ$ does not mean "cessation" might be found in the verb $τεραίνω$ "I bring to perfection." $\textit{Entelecheia}$ ($\epsilonντελεχεία$) and $\textit{entelecheia}$: EM 46 (50), 146 (150). HW 68 (81). WP 15f. (55). VA 50 / I, 42. N I, 77: N II, 404f. WEG 352-356; 361.} A being that stands there, lies there, or is held in presence (\textit{synhestēta}, \textit{hypostasis}, \textit{hypokeimenon}, \textit{ousia}) and shows itself as what it is (\textit{eidos}) is seen as having "gathered itself up" into stability. The words \textit{telos} and \textit{peras} point to this stable in-gathering. \textit{Telos} does not mean primarily "aim" or "purpose" or "cessation," but rather "completion, fulfillment, accomplishment," and only in that sense "end." (Cf. the Latin translation of \textit{teleion} as \textit{perfectum}.) Likewise \textit{peras} does...
not mean "limitation" in the sense of an externally imposed restraint, hence a kind of deficiency. Rather peras means self-limitation in the sense of a "holding of itself together" such that a being can stand of itself and so be. To express the unity of all these modes of stability as modes of Being we may say: A being, standing or lying present (ousia etc.) in its self-limitation (peras) and shining forth as what it is (eidos), "has itself" (cf. echein) "in its fulfillment" (en telei): en-tel-echeia. Likewise, if all these meanings be equally expressed by the Greek ergon -- not in the sense of the end-product of technical making but primarily in the sense of what has been placed into the self-manifestation of its own eidos -- then en-erg-eia says the same as en-tel-echeia. All these terms express a being-in-its-Being, and as such are correlative with logos.

Two final lexical entries: morphe and aei. Heidegger reads morphe as saying the "same" as eidos (appearance) with the added nuance of a being's "placing itself into the appearance" (die Gestellung in das Aussehen). What this nuance achieves is a delineation of the difference of Aristotelian eidos from the Platonic. "Overwhelmed as it were by the essence of eidos," Heidegger writes, "Plato grasped eidos itself in turn as something present for itself and thus as something common (koinon) to the individual 'beings' 'which stand in such an appearance'; thereby the individual, as subordinate to idea as the real being, was displaced into the role of non-being." As over against that, Aristotle grasps the individual as a real being, that is, something that is insofar as it places itself into its own eidos which appears in logos. Conversely: "The clue by which eidos -- and thereby also morphe -- are graspable is logos."  "Morphe must be understood from eidos, and eidos must be understood from logos." In summary: "With this translation of morphe, 'placement into the appearance,' we mean to express chiefly two things that are equal in the Greek sense of the word and that are lacking in the word 'form.' First: placement into the appearance as a mode of presence: ousia; morphe is not an ontic property present in material, but a mode of Being. Second: 'placement into the appearance' as movement, kinesis, which 'moment' is radically lacking in the concept of form."  

Finally a word about aei. From a close reading of Physics 193 a 21- 8 where aidion ("eternal" from aei) and apeirakis ("without limit", compare a + peras and the Latin translation infinites) appear, Heidegger

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49. WEG 345.

50. WEG 345f.

51. WEG 345.

52. WEG 346.

53. WEG 338-340.
argues that aeì is to be understood not in terms of "limitless duration" (that would be the apeirakis that is the very opposite of aeì) but rather in terms of presentness in peras. A being that is "eternal" (aidion) is not a being that is "always going on without ceasing" but rather one that is authentically there for the time being. When Aeschylus' Prometheus speaks of ho aeì kratôn (Prometheus, 1. 937) he does not mean "the eternal king" but "whoever is king at the time." If aeì names an ontological characteristic of beings-in-Being (cf. the highest being as aeì on), it designates not chronological permanence but rather primarily stability within peras—and for that reason perhaps permanence. Again, the focus of the Greek understanding of Being is on presentness in unhiddenness (alētheia).

Here we stop our preliminary sketch of how Heidegger reads Aristotle phenomenologically. What may seem like a complex journey through Aristotle and his lexicon can be briefly summarized as follows. The uniqueness of man among the animals is that with him there arrives meaning, indeed that he has access to beings only in terms of their articulated presence in logos. Man's very Being is logos, whose alētheia-function is that whereby and wherein the is-ness of beings becomes manifest. This is-ness is expressed equally as eidos, ousia, entelecheia and energeia. Furthermore, the primary philosophical task is the determination of is-ness as such, the analogical unity that governs all possible modes of presentness of beings. The question about the unified meaning of ousia rests on a prior (thematic or unthematic) understanding of the analogical unity of Being of logos itself. Heidegger's radically different thematization of the Being of logos is the basis of his claim that the authentic meaning of Being remains forgotten in Aristotle, and it is as well the starting point for his own question about the meaning of Being as pure dynamis.

III. Heidegger's Reading of PHYSIS in Aristotle

The preceding is prologue to the present task of understanding how Heidegger reads the meaning of Aristotle's physis as dynamis. The final goal of this paper is to understand how such a reading provides Heidegger with the "model" for understanding the meaning of Being as such as Ereignis. Briefly: the discovery that physis as dynamis is the meaning of the Being of one particular region of beings (Aristotle's physei on or natural beings) raises the question of whether the heretofore undiscovered analogical unity of all the modes of Being of all regions of beings is not itself dynamis. To raise that question is to enter upon the project of Sein und Zeit.

held in Freiburg in the first trimester of 1940. In form this sixty-page essay is a translation (hence interpretation) of and running commentary on Physics B, 1 with the exception of 193 b 9 (dio kai) through 193 b 12 (ex anthropou anthropos).

Heidegger divides the text into nineteen sections, on which he comments individually, but for our purposes the movement of the essay can be divided as follows.

(1) An introduction that establishes the importance of the Physics as a whole and that reveals, via Physics A, 2, 185 a 12ff., that the clue to understanding physis is movement. (WEG 309-315)

(2) The delineation of that group of moved beings which makes up natural beings (physei onta) as over against that group which comprises man-made beings (technai onta). (WEG 315-329; Physics 192 b 8 -- 32)

(3) The decisive statement that physis is a kind of Beingness (ousia). (WEG 329-332; Physics 192 b 32 -- 193 a 2)

(4) The ontological characterization of physis in terms of movement (specifically genesis) and the interpretation of the unified "twofoldness" of physis. (WEG 332-371; Physics 193 a 3 -- 193 b 20).

The first three divisions can be summarized briefly, more or less in thesis form. It is the last division that forms the major task of the essay and so will require more attention.

III. 1. Introduction: The Optic

For Heidegger, Aristotle's Physics remains the hidden basis on which is constructed the entire metaphysical tradition. Indeed, the Physics is itself a metaphysical work. Not at all a book about what we call physics today, it is a regional ontology that inquires into the Beingness (ousia) of a particular group of beings, "natural beings." But more than that, insofar as Aristotle's physis is a regional narrowing of the originally broader understanding of physis as Being as such, the work preserves an echo of those meditations on Being that characterize the origin of Greek thinking in Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. We may expect, therefore, that in interpreting physis in Aristotle's narrower sense, Heidegger will attempt as well to recall the original meaning of physis. (We know, of course, that even such a "retrieve" of the "pre-Socratic" meaning of physis is not the goal of Heidegger's thinking, but that it only sets the stage for a thinking about Being that is even more original.

55. For this paragraph: WEG 312. Cf. HW 298f., 305; EM 14f. (14f.).
The decisive orientation in the determination of the meaning of physis in Aristotle is twofold: (1) Physis is a kind of Beingness, and so the inquiry into physis is an ontological one; and (2) the clue to the ontological characterization of physis is kinesis (cf. Physics A, 2, 185 a 12ff: ta physei [onta] kinoumena einai). These two issues present one task: the discernment of kinesis as a kind of Beingness. We catch a glimpse here of the overarching problematic that controls all of Heidegger's thinking: Being and time, or in Aristotelian terms, ousia and kinesis, where the "and" expresses the central problem. (To anticipate for a moment, we may say that the problem of the relation between each of the two will be worked out in terms of the time-character of energeia, specifically energeia atelês.)

The crucial guidelines are established. The determination of the essence of kinesis becomes the basis for determining Aristotle's physis, indeed for determining the original meaning of physis and ultimately Ereignis itself. Although kinesis was surely investigated by Greek thinkers before Aristotle, what makes his treatment of kinesis decisive for all philosophy is the fact that he first elevated movement to a new level of questioning by grasping it as a mode of Being, that is, not just as the movement of beings but as their state of Being-moved. To designate such an understanding of kinesis, Heidegger uses the word Bewegtheit in the sense of Bewegtsein. We shall translate it as "movedness" or "Being-moved," these words designating the essence of movement.

The optic: If physis is the Being of natural beings, and if all natural beings are moving beings (kinoumena), then the Being of natural beings (their physis) is the Being of moved beings (their kinesis as movedness). To understand physis ontologically we must understand movedness ontologically. And that of course means: as a kind of energeia.

III. 2. Which moved beings are natural beings?

 Whereas originally physis designated the Being of all beings, both those by nature and those by human technē, Aristotle's use of the word limits physis to the Being of only a certain group of beings, natural beings as opposed against artifacts. Thus prior to the main task of understanding Aristotle's physis as "kinetic Beingness" (i.e., as a mode of ousia read in terms of kinesis), there comes the preliminary task of discerning which region of moved beings are natural beings.


57. WEG 313f.

Briefly stated, natural beings are those moved beings that have the origin and ordering (archē) of their movedness in themselves, in fact not accidentally but of themselves (kath hauto).^59

The words "of themselves" are decisive for distinguishing natural beings from artifacts. The origin and ordering of artifacts is their maker's provision (eidos prohaireton) of the finished product. As a guiding principle, this provision stands outside of the product, with the result that the product cannot "place itself back into its archē."60 The natural being, on the other hand, "roots" in the sense of going back into and preserving its own archē.61 The supreme importance of this dimension of returning to or staying with the origin of movedness (which ultimately is Wiederholung as the basic characteristic of Being as such) emerges below.

III. 3. PHYSIS is a kind of Beingness

The crucial sentence of this chapter of the Physics reads: "Everything with an archē of the kind described has physis. And all these things are (i.e., have Being) of the specific kind: ousia."62

The previous issues in the chapter have all been directed towards this ontological characterization of physis as a mode of Beingness. The major task of the essay can now be broached. If physis is a kind of Beingness and if the clue to defining physis is kinesis, how is kinesis to be characterized ontologically and how does this lead to and effect  

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60. WEG 328.


the ontological characterization of physis? The remainder of Heidegger’s commentary is devoted to showing that Aristotle reveals that physis is read in terms of kinesis and therefore that the essence of physis is a unified twofoldness of presence-absence.

III. 4. The kinetic-ontological characterization of PHYSIS

Heidegger’s argument here is at once very complex and very simple. It is of the utmost importance that one constantly keep in view the goal of the demonstration. I call this goal the "kinetic-ontological characterization of physis," that is, the exhibition of the Being-structure of physis by exhibiting the Being-structure of kinesis. The argument has the following formal structure: (1) Beingness for Aristotle is always entelecheia or energeia. (2) But Aristotle reads the energeia that is physis in terms of kinesis as energeia ateles. (3) Therefore, Aristotle reads the Beingness that is physis in terms of energeia ateles. Clearly the central issue is the meaning of energeia ateles, and it is there that we concentrate our attention.

III. 4. A. PHYSIS as DYNAMIS: "Wiederholung"

Since man has no access to beings except in terms of their Being, i.e., their meaningful presence in logos, and since Being for Aristotle is expressed as energeia, then man has no access to beings except insofar as they are in energeia. But because the telos of entelecheia and the ergon of energeia express the element of stability, it is clear that man has access to beings only insofar as they have stability about them. Although that does not preclude—especially in Aristotle—that movement (as non-stability) be a mode of Being, it does inform us how moving beings must show up in logos if they are to show up at all. They must appear in the aspect of rest or constancy in being present. But if rest or stability means being en telei (in completion) and if the very nature of a moving being is to be atelēs (not in completion), then the movement of moving beings would indeed seem to be excluded from Being (cf. mē on, Physics G, 2, 201 b 20f.). However, the genius of Aristotle consists in the fact that he grasps movement precisely as a kind of Being, hence as a kind of energeia (cf. energeia tis, Physics G, 2, 201 b 30f.). If a being can show up in logos only as en telei, and if a moving being as moving is atelēs, then the movement of a moving being is energeia ateles. A moving being as moving is present in logos as standing in its telos but as not yet having come into its telos.\(^{63}\)

To take a growing thing as what it fundamentally and authentically is, namely, as growing, means to take it as appearing (en endoi), but appearing in such a way that the appearing brings with it into the eidos a non-appearing. Moreover, the non-appearing is not simply absence from

\(^{63}\) WEG 355f.: "Die Bewegung zeigt sich zwar als so etwas wie Im-Werk-Stehen, aber als ein noch nicht in sein Ende gekommen"—translating Physics G 2, 201 b 31f.: ἡ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν τίς δόκει, ἄτελης δὲ.
appearance. Rather "the wonder of it" is that the non-appearance itself shows up and is present in logos. The presentness in logos of the non-appearance of the plant is the condition for the possibility of the presentness of logos of the plant as plant, that is, as moving/growing—in Aristotelian terms, as on dynamei. If logos does not "see" the Being-absent of the plant, it does not "see" the plant as what it fundamentally and authentically is, namely, a being whose Being is dynamis.

We can readily see the appearance of that green leafy thing over there; but as what do we make present to ourselves the non-appearance, in order that we see it as a plant? The non-appearance is present as an "An-sich-Halten," as an "Abwesung" that is an "In-sich-Zurückgehen." The plant's "withdrawing into itself" express the fact that it constantly maintains itself in the non-appearing source of its appearing. Such withholding from presence as the very condition for coming to presence as what it is is what is meant by dynamis, the mode of Being of those beings that "hide" themselves as the condition for presenting themselves. This interplay of appearing by hiding bespeaks a twofoldness: (1) The hiding is the source of the possibility of appearing, and (2) the appearing happens only by keeping the source of its appearance hidden, in such a way that the hidden source always remains source for appearing. A contrast of natural beings with artifacts highlights this unique ontological character of physis.

The house under construction has in itself no source for its appearance as house-under-construction (on dynamei). That source is the architect or constructor, and specifically his provision (eidos prohairesis) of what the completed house will look like. Unlike the technēi on hei dynaton (the house as under-construction), the plant again and again draws up from its hidden source the possibility of its appearance as growing. The plant keeps its arche within itself. Moreover, when the house under construction comes to full appearance as what it is (that is, when logos can articulate the apophansis, "Now it's a house") then the energēia is teleia, then the house has left behind all the not-yet-ness of dynamis/energēia atelēs, or better, "has precisely brought it forth along with itself into the fulfilling of the ful-filled appearance." But natural beings, insofar as they remain natural and therefore in movement, can never bring their not-yet-ness completely into telos. They must "let" their dynamis remain as dynamis if the

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64. WEG 367: ihr Erstaunliches.
66. WEG 369.
67. For the following remarks, cf. WEG 320ff.
68. WEG 357.
natural being is indeed to remain an on dynamei. By "letting" possibility remain possibility (i.e., hidden source), the being appears as what it is, a being as moving, that is, as appearing by not fully appearing. We may hazard a word to describe this fact of "allowing" possibility to remain possibility. We may say that the natural being—unlike the artifact—keeps on repeating its possibility (re-petere: to grasp again and again). Yet in "grasping" possibility again and again, the natural being does not bring the hidden source out of hiddenness into full appearance. The re-grasping of possibility as possibility is the re-trieving (re-finding) of possibility as what it is: hidden source for incomplete appearance of the moving being. The "finding" is not a bringing of possibility into completion and full appearance, but a bringing forth again and again (a Wiederholung) of possibility as possibility. Such words as "repetition" and "retrieve" are Heidegger's halting attempts to enunciate the unique form of Being that is dynamis, presence by absence. The continual returning to, staying with, or repeating-retrieving of absence as the hidden source for presence--Wiederholung--is that mode of Being that characterizes the physis of the physei on. Presence-by-absence is the unified twofold-ness of physis.69

III. 4. B. PHYSIS as DYNAMIS: "Eignung"

How Heidegger translates dynamis and the justification he gives for that translation are important to our argument that physis-as-dynamis is the "model" for Heidegger's understanding of Ereignis. We have seen that crucial to the understanding of physis is the ontological clarification of kinēsis as energeia atelēs. (incomplete Being). Natural beings have their Being as Being-underway-to-telos—in Greek, as genesis. A contrast of the generation of natural beings with that of artifacts will explain Heidegger's translation of dynamis as Eignung ("appropriation").70

All kinēsis is metabolē, the change-over of something into something, such that the very act of change itself comes to appearance as what it is, namely as genesis. Let us take the example of the construction of a table. Lying around the carpenter shop is plenty of "material" with the eidos "wood." But as simply lying there this wood is not yet considered hylē for, say, a table. For the wood to be read as hylē, the carpenter must have in mind (cf. eidos prohaireton) a new function for it, namely, as wood for a table. Precisely in its being ordered to a new eidos, the wood that just lies there becomes wood for..., or appropriated wood. Thus in a similar example, Aristotle distinguishes (Physics G, 1, 201 a 30ff.) between bronze simply as bronze (hē tou chalkou entelecheia hēi chalkos) and bronze seen as appropriate for making a statue (ho chalkos dynamei andrias). The latter is controlled by the provision and prescription (cf. kata ton logon, ibid. 33f.) of a new eidos for the bronze.


With that we now ask: How does one see the table's genesis as genesis? In the shop we certainly see various movements (the car- , penter hammers, saws, carves), but our question is about the movement of the wood itself into the e  i  d  o  s "table." We cannot actually see the table yet (although we might envision it), and if we are looking for generation, we do not merely see wood as wood. What we see is the appropriation of the wood into a table; we see the wood as appropriated unto, as underway to, a table. The generation of the table as generation is the on-going appropriation-unto-a-new-telos, wherein the wood changes from mere wood to wood that is appropriated for.... The kind of kinesis that we call genesis is he tox dynatou he dynaton entelecheia (Physics G, 1, 201 b 4f.). In generation the wood is read from the telos "table" (entelecheia) but as not yet fully there (he dynatou). Its very Being is seen as the process of Being-appropriated (on he dynaton = on dynamai). When one says that much, the mention of entelecheia, because tautological, becomes superfluous: dynamis says entelecheia ateles. "Appropriation" (Eignung) suffices to define the Being of a being that is in process of generation.

If we move from the generation of an artifact to that of a natural being, we find the same structure with an important addition. The eidos that controls the Being-status of the table-under-construction as on dynamai is from outside that which is being produced: it is the carpenter's eidos prohaireton. Because external, that eidos of itself does not provide from out of itself the "appropriate material" for the table. Rather, it sends the carpenter into the woods in search of it. However, in the generation of a natural being ("man generates man"—Physics 193 b 8f.), the controlling eidos is within the very generation itself, and hence the process of generation is self-provision of what is "appropriate for...". The "from which" (McDermott Sr.) and the "to which" (McDermott Jr.) have the same eidos ("Man"). The process of generation as a Being-underway from Senior to Junior (genesis as physeos hodos eis phisin -- cf. 193 b 12f.) never has to go outside of itself, but rather consists simply in deriving from one instantiation of the eidos (McDermott Sr.) the second instantiation of the same eidos (McDermott Jr.) Yet, as a Being-underway of physis to more of the same, natural generation is never a simple circling back on itself (McDermott Sr. does not generate McDermott Sr.) but is always the production of a new and unique instantiation that never exhausts the power for yet more generation. The inexhaustibility of physis as power of generation (genesis) can be expressed as "a going back into itself and towards itself, one that remains a [power for ever more] emerging." Physis remains physis, ever repeatable-retrievable hidden-present source of possibility for the appearance of a

71. Cf. James Joyce, Ulysses, New York: Modern Library, 1961, p. 731: "...he is always the last term of a preceding series even if the first term of a succeeding one, each imagining himself to be first, last, only and alone, whereas he is neither first nor last nor only nor alone in a series originating in and repeated to infinity."

72. WEG 367.
physei on. Again: Wiederholung. But as such it is "self"-appropriation of that inexhaustible hidden source unto the limited appearance of its instances. Hence: E i g n u n g. Wiederholung = Eignung.

III. 5. Summary and Transition

We saw (section II) that a "phenomenological" reading of Aristotle awakened the possibility of a radical restatement of the question "What is the analogically unified meaning of the various modes in which beings appear in logos?" by calling forth the prior, foundational question "What is the unified meaning of the modes of Being of logos itself?" Our explication (section III) of Heidegger's reading of physis in Aristotle, although it did not deal directly with logos, has taken us a few steps in the direction of that foundational question.

The Being of a delimited region of beings is a unique mode of appearance in logos, a unified twofoldness of presence and absence where the absence too is a mode of presence and indeed the very condition for presentness. At least this much is clear: If logos is the delotic-revelatory horizon (deloun -- aletheuein) correlative to at least natural beings, then one of the modes of Being of logos must be a bringing-to-presence by a revelation of absence as the condition for presence. Logos itself, at least in one of its modes of Being, is energeia atelēs.

But Heidegger goes further. If Metaphysics G, 3, maintains the same position as Physics B, 1, namely that physis is only one kind of ousia (cf. 1005 a 34f.), Metaphysics G, 1, reverses the perspective and says that ousia is a kind of physis (1003 a 27). Heidegger claims that this latter text in Aristotle is an echo of the original understanding of physis as "the Being of beings as such and in totality," of which the properly Aristotelian physis is only a "late derivative." Fragment 123 of Heraclitus, for instance, says physis kryptesthai philei, "Being loves to hide itself." Heidegger interprets the maxim to say not that Being is hard to get at and so requires great effort in order to be pulled forth

74. WEG 369.
75. WEG 370.
from and purged of its concealment, but rather that self-hiding is of
the essence of Being and is the basis for its limited emergence into
appearance. "And therefore the kryptesthai of physis is not to be
overcome, not to be stripped from physis; rather the task is the much
more difficult one of allowing physis, in all the purity of its essence,
the kryptesthai that belongs to it."77

Against such a background as this Heidegger projects the twofold
program of Sein und Zeit. (1) Let phenomenology take logos itself as
its theme, let logos "reflectively" turn on itself and read its own
constitutive alētheuein-function as phenomenon. Let phenomenology
exhibit that logos is "noch immer unterwegs,"78 that it "always exists
in just such a manner that its 'not-yet' belongs to it,"79 further,
that logos' authentic self-appropriation (die Eigentlichkeit) of that
"not-yet" as a Being-towards-possibility "is what constitutes its outer-
most possibility of Being,"80 and that this self-appropriation is achieved
when possibility "is cultivated as possibility" and "endured as possi-
bility"81 -- that is, in a Wiederholung of possibility. (2) On the
basis of that, let phenomenology read (Sein und Zeit, zweiter Teil) the
history of philosophy backwards to Aristotle in order to exhibit that
the concealed meaning of Being is physis in the original sense noted
above, and let it use the time-character of energeia as its clue in this
"destruction-appropriation" of the tradition.

In short: Sein und Zeit projects a twofold Wiederholung (of existence,
of the tradition) grounded in the paradigmatic meaning of physis as
Wiederholung and issuing in an appropriation of physis as appropriation,
indeed as Ereignis.

IV. DYNAMIS as DYNAMIS: Resolve and "Ereignis"

Sein und Zeit carries out a legein of logos: it lets logos appear in
logos as what it is in order to clarify the meaning of appearance as
such as the analogical unity of all the various modes of appearance. As
a legein of logos, Sein und Zeit is an alētheuein of the alētheia-
process itself as such. It seeks to understand Being not as the Being of
beings, but rather Being as Being.

To let something appear in logos is to appropriate it into its
appearance as what it is. But in Sein und Zeit, logos seeks to appropriate

77. WEG 371.

78. Cited from a transcript of Heidegger's lecture, "Der Begriff der

79. SZ 243 (287).

80. "Der Begriff der Zeit."

81. SZ 261 (306).
itself into appearance, it aims at a self-appropriation that only the individual person can perform for himself. The work therefore functions as a protreptic to self-appropriation. As a hermeneutic in which "the authentic meaning of Being, and also those basic structures of Being which existence itself possesses, are announced to existence's understanding of Being," 82 Sein und Zeit functions as an "attestation to existence of existence's ownmost Being-possible." 83 It functions as a "call of conscience" unto self-appropriation or resolve.

As such, Sein und Zeit functions as a call of existence to authentic time. The central chapters of the work (Division Two, chapters 2 and 3) bear a footnote that says, "These observations and those which follow after were communicated as theses on the occasion of a public lecture on the concept of time, which was given at Marburg in July 1924." 84 That lecture, entitled "Der Begriff der Zeit," is "the Urform of Sein und Zeit," 85 and ends by transforming the question "Was ist die Zeit?" into the protreptic question, "Bin ich die Zeit? oder noch näher, bin ich meine Zeit?" Clearly the apex of Sein und Zeit is the call to resolve. And in resolve, as self-appropriation of the dynamis that one is, authentic time breaks forth as a self-repetition/retrieve of possibility as possibility. In that moment of insight (Augenblick 86) one has not merely "understood" the analogically unified meaning of Being in a disinterested and detached way, but has been called into it as the very meaning of one's own Being. In authentically appropriating one's own temporality, one is appropriated into Being itself as time. The unity of temporality + time is what Heidegger calls the event of appropriation, Ereignis. 87

In what follows I will show: (1) that resolve is the core of Sein und Zeit, (2) how resolve is a Wiederholung, and (3) how resolve is the entrance into Ereignis.

82. SZ 37 (62).

83. SZ 279 (324).

84. SZ 268 n. (495).

85. Gadamer, 169.

86. SZ 328 (376), 338 (387), 385 (437), etc.

IV. 1. Resolve: The Unifying Center of Sein und Zeit

The published portion of Sein und Zeit is divided into two equal parts, the first exhibiting the unified structure of logos (existence) as disclosure/concern/truth, the second demonstrating that the meaning of that unified structure as a whole is temporality. Together these show that the fundamental structure of logos is disclosure possibilized by temporality. That structure is the horizon for reading the meaning of Being as the analogical unity of the many ways beings can be disclosed in a temporally determined logos. Let us take up temporality and disclosure in order to see their unity.

The word "temporality" could be misleading if one were to forget that by "time" Heidegger means not Aristotle's arithmos kinéseos, the numbering of ontic movement, but rather kinéseis itself, movedness as the Being of the unique moving being that is man. Thus: "The Being-as-moved [Bewegtheit] of existence is not the motion [Bewegung] of something present-at-hand."88 As early as his 1921-22 course, Phänomenologische Interpretation (Aristotles Physik) Heidegger sets his task as the phenomenological clarification of Leben as the Grundbewegtheit whose basic characteristic is Sorge. In the 1922 continuation of that course he says that for the Greeks and particularly for Aristotle, logos is a kinéseis. In Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizität (1923) he reads this Bewegtheit as existence's limited way of "having-itself-there" (Sich-Da-Haben), that is, energeia atelés. In the same course this unique temporality is called "kairologisch" in order to distinguish its ontological character from the ontic "chronological" character of movement. Clearly "temporality" in Sein und Zeit is understood in terms of kinéseis, Being-moved. To say that disclosive existence is primordial temporality is to read logos as energeia atelés.

But what of disclosure in relation to temporality? Logos achieves its proper Being when it actively appropriates itself as what it already is. For the most part, logos functions as disclosure (Erschlossenheit) without being aware of it. The disclosure to logos of the fact that it is itself disclosive as finite possibility (= the call to resolve/Entschlossenheit) is the preeminent mode of disclosure and is revelatory of resolve as the highest possibility of existence.89 In fact, in resolve temporality is for the first time revealed; what is more, resolve is authentic temporality.90 Therefore Richardson is correct in calling resolve "der Kern" and "die Vollendung" of Sein und Zeit.91

88. SZ 374f. (427).
89. SZ 287 (334): "Das Dasein ist rufverstehend hörig seiner eigensten Existenzmöglichkeit."
90. SZ paragraph 65, and 382 (434). SZ paragraph 74.
In fine, we may read the unity of *Sein und Zeit* as that of
*Erschlossenheit* and *Entschlossenheit*. *Logos*'s fundamental structure
as disclosive temporality is the structure of resolve. And resolve
is a unique (because fully "self-aware") mode of *energeia atelēs*.

IV. 2. Resolve as Wiederholung

It is clear from *Sein und Zeit* that existence is through and through
nothing other than Being-possible,⁹² and that this Being-possible, as
opening up a world, is the structure that accounts for the disclosure
of the Being of all encountering beings, including existence itself as
ontic. As Being-possible, existence (even when it does not know it) is
"ahead of itself," where the "itself" designates its inauthentic self.⁹³
This being-possible is first of all not something that existence has
chosen for itself, rather it is already de facto operative. To express
the de-facto-ness of Being-possible, Heidegger speaks of "already pro­
jected possibility" (geworfene Möglīchkeit⁹⁴) or simply "projectedness"
(Geworfenheit⁹⁵). Insofar as projected possibility effects disclosure,
we may equally speak of it as "projecting" or "project" (entwerfen,
Entwurf⁹⁶). But the active voice in no way indicates some dif­
f erent kind of possibility. It merely says that, as already projected
possibility, existence is disclosive (verstehend, erschließend), that
is, grounded in *logos/ Rede* as the meaningful articulation of the arena
opened up by projected possibility.⁹⁸

⁹². *SZ* 143 (183): "es ist primar Möglīchsein."

⁹³. *SZ* 193 (238): "Im Sich-vorweg-sein meint daher das 'Sich' jeweils
das Selbst im Sinne des Man-selbst."

⁹⁴. *SZ* 144 (183). I believe that there is little value in the
translations of "geworfen" and "Geworfenheit" as "thrown" and
"thrownness." Heidegger is attempting to convey, in the various
formations of "werfen," the sense of "Schlag" as his rendering
of the Greek *ballein*, *metabolē*, *ekbolē*, Cf. WEG 319.

⁹⁵. *SZ* 135 (174) and previous footnote.

⁹⁶. *SZ* 145 (185).

⁹⁷. *SZ* loc. cit.: "Und als geworfenes ist das Dasein in die Seinsart
des Entwerfens geworfen." And: "Das Entwerfen...als Dasein hat
es sich je schon entworfen und ist, solange es ist, entwerfend."

⁹⁸. *SZ* paragraph 34, and 133 (172): "gleichursprünglich bestimmt
durch die Rede."
If logos as Rede is underdeveloped in the first division of Sein und Zeit, it is because its proper function emerges as the call to resolve in the second division. As projected-disclosive possibility, existence has first of all been "brought into" possibility, but "not of its own accord," "not as itself," "not through itself," not "understandingly," hence "forgetfully." The preeminent role of logos is to make transparent to existence, as projected and unappropriated possibility, its very nature as possibility. Logos as conscience is "an attestation [to existence] of existence's ownmost Being-possible." As such it is a "calling back" (Rückruf). But that to which it calls existence back is existence's own Being-already-ahead-of-itself. The calling back is in fact a calling forth (vorrufendes Rückruf). More specifically, in calling existence back to its ahead-ness, it summons existence to take over that projectedness understandingly, to seize upon it authentically, to own it as its own. If existence does so, it does not become something different, but rather repeats / retrieves itself and becomes understandingly what it already is. It comes back to its already-projectedness by taking up this "ground" anew so as to authentically be it.

And how is existence [authentically] this already projected ground? Only in that it [understandingly] projects itself [i.e., discloses itself] in terms of possibilities into which it has already been projected.

The moment of self-appropriating insight (Augenblick) that is


100. SZ 279 (324): "...eine im Dasein selbst liegende Bezeugung seines eigensten Seinskönne."

101. Cf. zurückrufen: SZ 277 (322), 280 (325) and the following footnote.

102. SZ 280 (326), 287 (333), 294 (340), etc.

103. SZ 308 (355): Wiederholung ihrer selbst; 339 (388).

104. SZ 326 (373): das verstehende Zurückkommen auf das eigenste Gewesen.

105. SZ 284 (330): "Und wie ist es dieser geworfene Grund? Einzig so, dass es sich auf Möglichkeiten entwirft, in die es geworfen ist."

106. SZ 328 (376), 338 (387), 385 (437), etc. This is the kairos of kairologisch temporality mentioned supra.
resolve is described as "the taking over of projectedness"\textsuperscript{107} and as "the understanding coming-back to the already-dimension of one's ownmost Being,"\textsuperscript{108} that is, a self-disclosive retrieve and appropriation of the projected possibility that existence already is. This "retrieving-repeating of itself" is the event whereby existence "discloses... possibility as possibility."\textsuperscript{109}

Such a retrieving-repeating (Wiederholung\textsuperscript{110}) that discloses possibility (Eignung) as possibility is original authentic time -- the first goal towards which Sein und Zeit moves. The Gewesen-dimension of everyday unappropriated existence is its de facto state of being the already projected possibility that discloses beings. This already-projectedness, even in its unappropriated state, has an intrinsic "futural" dimension to it. As projected possibility, existence is never all at once and static, but rather is always on-the-way, not to some goal but simply to more of itself: "...existence, as being, is always coming towards itself..."\textsuperscript{111} Geworfenheit is of itself zukünftig, the unity of the "two" dimensions constituting the presentness of existence as disclosive temporality. But if existence's very structure (geworfen—entwerfend, gewesen—zukünftig) is temporal, its temporality is generally and for the most part closed off from existence. Logos as conscience makes that structure transparent by disclosing disclosive temporality to itself so that, in resolve, existence may take over its own possibility by re-grasping or re-finding it (wiederholen). Resolve frees (cf. Sichüberliefern\textsuperscript{112}) that structure for existence so that existence can take over its own possibility. When it does so, existence does not draw already projected possibility (das dagewesene Dasein) into full present appearance (cf. "nicht, um es abermals zu verwirklichen"\textsuperscript{113}), but brings it into presence by leaving it

\textsuperscript{107}SZ 325 (373); die Übernahme der Geworfenheit.

\textsuperscript{108}SZ 326 (373). Cf. note 104 supra.

\textsuperscript{109}SZ 306 (354): "Das Verlaufen erschliesst diese Möglichkeit [viz., Sein zum Tode] als Möglichkeit."

\textsuperscript{110}SZ 308 (355), 339 (388); cf. 343 (394), 344 (395), 385 (437), etc.

\textsuperscript{111}SZ 325 (373): "...das Dasein als seielndes überhaupt schon immer auf sich zukommt."

\textsuperscript{112}SZ 385f. (435f.). The existing English translation of "Sichüberliefern der Möglichkeiten" as "handing down to oneself possibilities" seems to miss the nuance of "to free possibilities for oneself." "Liefern," derived from the Latin "liberare," has overtones of "to free" that Heidegger means the reader to hear. Cf. WP 8 (35): "Überliefern, delivrer, ist ein Befreien, nämlich in die Freiheit des Gespräches mit dem Gewesenen."

\textsuperscript{113}SZ 385 (437).
possible, i.e., in absence.

In brief: Resolve as authentic time is the self-appropriation of one's own Being as dynamis, it is a self-aware allowing of oneself to appear by not appearing. Existence re-grasps itself as already projected possibility by letting that projected possibility remain the ever repeatable hidden-present source for the appearance of existence as Being-possible. In yet other terms, it is the concrete acceptance of and entrance into the alêtheia-process itself as always grounded in a "alêtheia", an absence that remains absence in allowing presence.

The very use of language here calls for a comparison of resolve with what we saw earlier as the meaning of physis: Wiederholung and Eignung. But comparison reveals that Wiederholung and Eignung have a meaning in Sein und Zeit that goes beyond that of physis in Physics B, 1. When logos reads a moving natural being, it brings it to appearance (appropriates it) as what and how it is: an appearing-present being that repeats its own absence or non-appearance. But when logos reads and resolutely appropriates itself, it appropriates its own appearance-presence as the re-petition of its own absence-from-appearance. In resolved existence, dynamis/Eignung/Wiederholung is on a higher ("self-aware") level than in non-existential natural beings. Eignung resolutely reveals itself to itself as Eignung; Wiederholung resolutely re-grasps itself as Wiederholung. Presence-by-absence allows itself to be presence-by-absence. The "model" for resolve is clearly dynamis, but resolve is a transformation of dynamis into "self-aware" dynamis. This unique "form" of Eignung which resolutely reveals itself to itself as Eignung is what Heidegger in his 1928 seminar calls Ereignis.

IV. 3. Resolve and Ereignis

But beyond mere word-comparisons, we must spell out the issue for itself. The Being of a being is its disclosed presentness in logos. The meaning of Being as such can be had only if logos reads and appropriates the unified meaning of itself as disclosive presenting. Such a disclosure of disclosive presenting is an alêtheuein of the alêtheia-process itself. Since the alêtheia-process is disclosure rooted in possibility, the alêtheuein of alêtheia reveals that the unified meaning of Being is possibility as possibility, disclosure/presence rooted in non-disclosure/absence. But the authentic disclosure of the unified meaning of disclosure is not some disinterested act of knowledge, for example, reading and understanding Sein und Zeit. To read Sein und Zeit "correctly" is to read it as a protreptic, a call to one's own personal, existentiell self-appropriation of the unified meaning of disclosure. Concretely, such self-appropriation is a living in the alêtheia-process, letting oneself be drawn into absence as the condition for all presentness of beings, including one's own. To appropriate alêtheia means to let oneself be appropriated into dynamis as such: it is to re-grasp or come back to one's already projected possibility by letting it remain possible, i.e., hidden-present ever
retrievable source for all presentness of beings. To live in alêtheia is to experience Being (the disclosed presence of beings) as "given" in oneself only by experiencing withdrawal from presence as such. One knows "withdrawal from presence" only as that withdrawal is registered in one's own being drawn out ahead of oneself (early Heidegger: Geworfenheit; later Heidegger, Angezogenheit, etc.). One knows the "giving" of presence only insofar as that givenness (Geschick) is registered in one's presenting of beings in meaning. There is no hypostasization of "something" that withdraws or gives, no objection of "something" that disposes over the movedness of one's temporality as dynamis. There is only the resolute experience of the self as not being ultimately at its own disposal. To say that is not to import some romantic "mystery" into philosophy, but simply to take seriously and rigorously the meaning of Being as dynamis.

From another perspective, if one brings beings "to language" (i.e., to fundamental meaningful presence in logos), one does so precisely by not having language (logos as dynamis) at one's disposal. Not that some "voice" then tells us what beings are. There is no such voice, only the silence (Schweigen) that characterizes the absence that possibilities the meaningful presence of a being in logos. And the most authentic response to such silence is "silence about silence" (Geschwiegen Uber das Schweigen), that is, letting the absence be absence. Such a "stance" towards silence might be called a "hearing," but the message one hears is that there is no message other than the already givenness (Geschick) of meaning in the space of man's absence. Such a "stance" might also be called "reverence," but there is no authority to revere other than "the repeatable possibilities of existence," indeed, the repeatable possibilities of possibility itself as re-petition.

114 SZ 326 (373): Zurückkommen auf das Gewesene; 385 (437): der Rückgang in Möglichkeiten des dagewesenen Daseins; 386 (438): "Die Wiederholung erwidert... die Möglichkeit der dagewesenen Existenz."


117 SZ 391 (443): Ehrfurcht vor der einzigen Autorität, vor den wiederholbaren Möglichkeiten der Existenz.
Phrases like "silence about silence" and "reverent attentiveness" are but halting ways of describing die Sache selbst, that is, ways of describing how, in appropriating one's own Being as dynamis, one is appropriated into the center of meaning, dynamis itself. "The question of existence," Heidegger once wrote, "is never settled except through existing itself." Further: "Every answer keeps its force as answer only so long as it is rooted in questioning." The two sentences say the same thing: only in concrete existentiell appropriation of oneself as the act of questioning does questioning find its answer, namely, that the meaning of Being is questionableness itself. Only in resolve does one enter Ereignis. The meaning of Being is not a doctrine to be learned but a risk to be taken. If one does not take that risk, Heidegger says, "all talk and listening is in vain. And in that case I would urge you to burn your lecture notes, however precise they may be -- and the sooner the better."

V. Conclusion: DYNAMIS and the Question of Rigor

It seems that this essay has accomplished its goal of showing that and how Heidegger's understanding of Wiederholung in his reading of Aristotle's physis lays the foundation for his understanding of the "issue itself," Ereignis. We have seen that Heidegger's work is not a "doctrine" unless that word be taken to mean a teaching about an essentially "unsayable" to which man is opened up "in order that he might spend himself on it without counting the cost" (WEG 109). In that sense Heidegger's writings remain a protreptic: Man is already "at" the issue itself, already "at" the ec-centric center of meaning, but in such a way that he needs to appropriate his own essence if he is to be authentically where he is. To heed that protreptic is to enter upon a path with no goal, for: "Alles ist Weg." For those who finally want more, this is not very much. But philosophy never

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118. SZ 12 (33): "Die Frage der Existenz ist immer nur durch das Existieren selbst ins Reine zu bringen."

119. HW 58 (71): "Jede Antwort bleibt nur als Antwort in Kraft, solange sie im Fragen verwurzelt ist."


121. WD 160 (158).

122. US 198 (92).
accomplishes much. As long as it is philosophy and not some other art or science, it remains a search that does nothing so much as cultivate the search, precisely because Being itself remains a path that leads only to more path: Heraclitus' Ἀγχίβας Ἄριστοτλῆς' ψευδος ὁδος εις ψυχιν, Heidegger's Unterwegssein. Walking along such a path, one may find that he has to say, "I hardly known any more who and what I am" -- only to reflect, "None of us knows that, as soon as we stop fooling ourselves." Is this the defeat of "rigorous science"? Or does the path require more rigor than does science? Rigour, in the words of the poet, means that

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

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