SARTRE ON LYING TO ONESELF

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ABSTRACT

How, if at all, could a person intentionally persuade himself into believing something he knew to be false? Acting upon his intention would apparently require that he knowingly use his grasp of some truth in the very act of concealing that truth and in getting himself to believe the opposite falsehood. Sartre's elaboration of this problem as well as his examples of self-deception are widely acclaimed, yet too often the remainder of his account has been dismissed as hopelessly riddled with paradox and obscure jargon. I first provide an exegesis of the account that displays its coherence and rich suggestiveness. Next I argue that the account falls short of fully resolving the problems to which it is addressed, but that nevertheless a satisfactory resolution of the problems does emerge from a close examination of Sartre's examples.
How, if at all, could a person intentionally persuade himself into believing something he knew to be false? Acting upon his intention would apparently require that he knowingly use his grasp of some truth in the very act of concealing that truth and also in getting himself to believe the opposite falsehood. Even if such a project were conceivable, wouldn't it be thwarted by the very presence of a knowledge of the truth, or, failing this, by the knowledge of the attempt to create a false belief?

Although Sartre was the first philosopher to fully confront this problem, his response to it has been given relatively little detailed attention in spite of a recent upsurge of interest in the topic of self-deception. All too often his descriptions of examples and statements of problems have been treated as self-contained vignettes circumscribed by a forbidding labyrinth of paradox and obscure jargon. This neglect is unwarranted. In Part I of this paper I begin by introducing two key technical distinctions used by Sartre and then set forth his statement of the conceptual problems surrounding self-deception. In Part II I seek to display the subtle structure and coherence of his response to these problems in the first part of Being and Nothingness, and thereby to correct several recent misinterpretations of his views. I argue in Part III that despite its rich suggestiveness this response does not resolve the problems. Nevertheless, Sartre's examples when taken together with his remarks toward the end of Being and Nothingness do provide the foundation for a satisfactory resolution. Part IV is devoted to examining the notion of "non-positional consciousness." I contend that the vagueness of this concept undermines much of Sartre's objection to using the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious, and this opens the door to a partial reconciliation of his phenomenological account of mauvaise foi with Freud's psychological account of unconscious defense mechanisms.

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Two important distinctions enter into both Sartre's statement of the problems of self-deception and his response to them. The first concerns the defining properties of conscious acts: each act of consciousness is both a positional consciousness of an object and a non-positional consciousness of the act itself. On the one hand, to be conscious is to "posit," or to direct one's act of thought, feeling, or intention on to some object distinct from that act itself (11). The same object may be posited in different ways or "thetic" modes: I can see, imagine, know about, and like the same painting. On the other hand, a person always has a non-positional (or non-positing or non-thetic) consciousness of his act itself (11-14). It would be an interruption here to enter into a full explication of this important concept of non-positional consciousness, and for this reason I postpone the examination until Part IV. There I argue that in spite of Sartre's apparent denials, non-positional consciousness is a form of knowledge of the occurrence and nature of one's present conscious activities. It is a tacit and unarticulated knowledge that must be sharply contrasted with the explicitly-conscious knowledge obtained by what Sartre calls "reflection." This leads us to the second distinction.

All conscious acts can be roughly divided into two general types: reflective and prereflective (or non-reflective). In a reflective act the object of thought, feeling, or action is regarded by an individual as an aspect of himself or as something intimately related to himself. Most commonly, a person in reflecting posits (i.e., takes as an object of consciousness) some other act of his consciousness: "In the act of reflecting I pass judgment on the consciousness reflected-on; I am ashamed of it, I am proud of it, I will it, I deny it, etc." (12; cf. 218-21). Acts of "impure" reflection take such things as one's mental dispositions and states as objects (224-9; 606). By contrast, in a pre-reflective act the object can be anything else--physical objects, mathematical equations, other persons, and so on. Pre-reflective consciousness is not, as some have said, a rough equivalent of the psychoanalytic unconsciousness, for it is simply the everyday consciousness in which for the most part we conduct our lives without explicitly thinking about ourselves. It is the "consciousness of man in action" (74). An example will help to clarify and relate these two distinctions.

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Example 1: As one of his most familiar Existentialist doctrines, Sartre holds that if a person engages in honest reflection upon his current conscious activity he will apprehend himself as being fully free, and this apprehension will generate an anguished sense of responsibility for the ways in which that freedom is exercised. Yet in a variety of specific ways people seek to evade this profoundly disturbing sense of freedom and responsibility by entering into self-deception. Consider, for instance, the situation where I am reflectively choosing a course of action, or selecting "my possibility" from among a range of alternative courses of action available (67). Such a selection presupposes that at some point I posit these alternatives and thereby have a non-positional knowledge of myself as possessing options. But in my deliberations or reflection upon my situation "I force myself at the same time to be distracted" from them, inconsistently attempting to regard my chosen conduct as the only course of action open to me (80). By reflecting in bad faith I come to view them not as live options, but instead as mere "external possibilities" which other persons in my situation might select as their actions. When I thus apprehend my chosen line of conduct while "avoiding considering all other possibles," my choice takes on an air of inevitability, and this serves to mute the anguish that would be involved in a fully-explicit, reflective apprehension of my freedom. The activity of self-deceiving reasoning carries with it a non-positional knowledge of that activity, but as long as the person continues to deceive himself he will not reflect upon that activity so as to obtain reflective knowledge. His knowledge of himself both as possessing options and as a self-deceiver will remain tacit, inexplicit, non-positional.

The problems of self-deception arise from a comparison between deceiving oneself and deceiving others, and it is important to identify at the outset Sartre's attitude toward using interpersonal deception as a model for understanding self-deception. Some philosophers have embraced this model enthusiastically, finding inspiration in its suggestive wealth of metaphor. Kant, for example, took seriously the image of two persons existing disharmoniously within one body and hinted that his distinction between noumenal and phenomenal selves could give substance to the image.3 In

striking contrast, several recent philosophers have spurned the model as a fountainhead of confusions. Sartre rejects both of these approaches and begins on a middleground: always keeping attention focused on detailed descriptions of examples, he proceeds to critically examine the similarities and dissimilarities of the two forms of deception. The examination reveals that there are forms of purposive self-deception which involve an "intention and a project of bad faith" (89). It is with such cases alone that Sartre is interested, and not with the innumerable forms of unintentional self-deception, bearing little resemblance to deceiving others, in which a person through stupidity, carelessness, or emotional upset has a hand in causing his own ignorance. Deceiving oneself, like deceiving others, involves somehow knowing or suspecting a truth that one purposefully or intentionally seeks to conceal. Both of the problems concern this intention and project. The first derives from the relation between the project and the knowledge of the truth concealed, while the second concerns the relation between the project and the cognizance of the project. It must be emphasized that Sartre regards both problems as identifying genuine, albeit puzzling, features of the form of self-deception he is discussing--they are not superficial puzzles to be explained away.

Problem 1: "[In lying to myself] the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person, which means that I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived. Better yet I must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more carefully--and this not at two different moments, which at a pinch would allow us to re-establish a semblance of duality--but in the unitary structure of a single project. How then can the lie subsist if the duality which conditions it is suppressed?" (89).

By itself the first sentence in this passage would suggest that Sartre is interested in a purely cognitive paradox, and in fact he has been interpreted as saying that "bad faith involves the contradictory supposition that a man can know and be ignorant of the same thing at the same time." But


Sartre never suggests that the relevant form of hiding knowledge from oneself involves making oneself ignorant. As the remainder of the passage makes clear, the real problem has to do with the relation between the knowledge of the truth one is hiding and the activity of hiding that truth: "I must know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it more carefully." That is, the intentional act of concealing some truth involves acting upon knowledge of that truth, and in this way the knowledge and the concealing are fused together within "the unitary structure of a single project." But if the knowledge is such an intimate part of the project, how can the project possibly be effective? It is obvious how in the case of interpersonal deception my knowledge coheres with my project of hiding a truth from another person. But when I am seeking to deceive myself, why doesn't the presence of my knowledge frustrate my project and render my intention to conceal the truth self-defeating?

Problem 2: "To this [first] difficulty is added another which is derived from the total translucency of consciousness. That which affects itself with bad faith must be conscious (of) its bad faith since the being of consciousness is consciousness of being. It appears then that I must be in good faith, at least to the extent that I am conscious of my bad faith. But then this whole psychic system is annihilated" (89).

Like all activities of consciousness, the intention and project of bad faith must (on Sartre's analysis of consciousness) carry with it a non-positional or inexplicitly-conscious knowledge of the project. But if I am conscious of, or know about, my project of deceiving myself, in what way am I really deceiving myself about anything? Paradoxically, "it appears then that I must be in good faith, at least to the extent that I am conscious of my bad faith." If follows that I must somehow obscure my understanding of my project of bad faith: the "whole psychic system"--i.e., the project of bad faith--needs to be "annihilated" or hidden. The problem is to clarify what this involves.

One thing is obvious: a self-deceiver cannot undertake his project with a reflective, self-attentive consciousness: "if I deliberately and cynically attempt to lie to myself, I fail completely in this undertaking; the lie falls back and collapses beneath my look" (89). The project of bad faith is pre-reflective and involves only a non-positional, non-attentive apprehension of the project. But even this much is deeply puzzling. Innumerable everyday intentions remain pre-reflective in the sense of being unattended to, but they are not thereby hidden or concealed from the person. All
pre-reflective projects carry with them a non-positional self-consciousness, and hence the problem: isn't this form of consciousness enough to prevent an entrance into bad faith? Evidently the project must itself be "hidden" along with the truth one is deceiving oneself about. But how?

The two problems posed by Sartre are closely related and, in summary, may be formulated as questions having a similar form: (1) Given that my project of hiding the truth from myself involves acting upon my knowledge of the truth, why doesn't this knowledge prevent me from hiding the truth? (2) Given that my project of hiding the truth from myself involves a contemporaneous knowledge of the project, why doesn't this knowledge prevent me from hiding the truth? It is time to set forth Sartre's answer to these questions.

II.

Sartre's solution can be viewed as having the following six main stages. (i) Examination of examples of self-deception reveals that hiding a truth from oneself is accomplished by getting oneself to believe at least partially the denial of the truth one knows all along. (ii) The resulting knowledge-belief or belief-belief conflicts can be characterized using ontological concepts which identify certain basic dualities of human life. (iii) Undergirding these belief conflicts is equivocal reasoning involving two senses in which a property might be ascribed to a person, and much that ordinarily passes for sincerity is really a disguised version of bad faith involving this same equivocation. (iv) In light of Stage (i), the two initial problems can be reformulated so as to reduce them both to a single problem about beliefs: how can beliefs be formed by acting on the knowledge that the beliefs are false? (v) The key to solving this problem lies in specifying the self-deceiver's attitude toward evidence relevant to his beliefs, an attitude set by his spontaneous decision to rest content with inadequate grounds for what he wants to believe and to refuse to be fully persuaded by contrary evidence. (vi) This attitude can be redescribed as the choice to use to one's advantage the fact that no beliefs are grounded in conclusive evidence.

(i) By the time Sartre begins to elaborate the first stage of his solution he has presented the following two important examples.

Example 2: The psychiatrist Wilhelm Stekel described women who believe themselves to be frigid even though in fact they experience sexual pleasure (95-6). They fear this
pleasure, perhaps out of feelings of guilt for their marital infidelity or fears of committing infidelity in the future. As in the preceding example, these women display "a pattern of distraction": they "apply themselves to becoming distracted in advance from the pleasure which they dread; many for example at the time of the sexual act, turn their thoughts away toward their daily occupations, make up their household accounts." The 'frigid' woman "distracts her consciousness from the pleasure which she experiences," but she does so "by no means cynically and in full agreement with herself; it is in order to prove to herself that she is frigid."

Example 3: A woman consents to a first date with a man who she "knows very well" intends to seduce her (96-9). She knows she will have to make a decision about whether to accede to the man's wishes, but she dreads this decision out of a deep ambivalence about sexual desire: "the desire cruel and naked would humiliate and horrify her," yet she would find no "charm" in a Platonic respect untinged with physical attraction. She seeks to postpone this decision by refusing while on the date to apprehend the sexual overtones in the man's words and gestures, construing them instead as expressions of pure respect for her "personality." Because "she does not want to see" his words as an overture to a future sexual liaison, she attaches only the most literal, "immediate meanings" to the man's conversation and behavior, and treats his sincerity and respectfulness as "fixed in a permanence like that of things." Finally, by initiating and sustaining an intense conversation of "sentimental speculation" her attention becomes removed altogether from her bodily presence and desires. When the man takes her hand "she does not notice" she is leaving her hand in his.

Taken together with Example 1, these illustrations make it plain that hiding a truth from oneself involves attempting (with some success) to convince oneself of something that nevertheless one knows or believes is false. The self-deceiver


7 Here Sartre is no doubt speaking with the same irony Byron used in describing Donna Julia in Don Juan, the probable prototype for his example: while Julia pondered her virtue and high resolve, "One hand on Juan's carelessly was thrown, / Quite my mistake--she thought it was her own" (CIX.871-2). The woman is not wholly ignorant of the location of her hand, but keeps her attention intensely focused away from it.
exercises "a certain art of forming contradictory concepts which unite in themselves both an idea and the negation of that idea" (98). Since words like "see" and "apprehend" generally function in Sartre's descriptions as rough synonyms for "believe" and "come to believe," the examples might be condensed as follows. (1) The person avoiding a fully anguished confrontation with his own freedom and responsibility (partially) persuades himself that he has only one live option, even though all along he knows otherwise. (2) The woman who refuses to admit to herself her sexual pleasure seeks (with some success) to "prove to herself" that she is not capable of such pleasure, although she knows she is. (3) The woman postponing a painful decision has (partially) persuaded herself that the man she is dating is not attempting to seduce her, in spite of her knowledge to the contrary. Moreover, while obviously knowing otherwise, for a brief moment she comes to think of herself as virtually disembodied: "while sensing profoundly the presence of her own body--to the degree of being disturbed perhaps--she realizes herself as not being her own body" (98).

I parenthetically added qualifying expressions like "partially" since it would be misleading to say that a person who all along knows the truth has fully persuaded himself into believing the opposite falsehood. Genuine full conviction suggests single-minded belief, and it is just this which Sartre views as absent in the self-deceiver. This is the point of his remark that "bad faith does not succeed in believing [fully] what it wishes to believe" (115).

(ii) The belief conflicts constituting the self-deceiver's contradictory or "two-faced" concepts can be categorized using terms which refer to fundamental dualities inherent in human existence. Sartre's concern here is not merely to identify certain general patterns of self-deception, but to further develop his ontology by providing an answer to the question, "What must be the being of man if he is to be capable of bad faith?" (96). Anything approaching a full discussion of this stage is out of the question, since it would involve probing many of the central themes of Being and Nothingness. In any case, this part of Sartre's discussion has been made familiar, and indeed overemphasized, by commentators, and I therefore confine myself to two brief illustrations.

A human being can be viewed as being "at once a facticity and a transcendence" (98). He is "a facticity" in the sense of being constantly confronted with a set of facts which to a large extent are not of his choosing and which specify his "situation"--facts such as his existence as a bodily creature, living at a certain time, having a certain fixed past, and
being continually confronted with options among various courses of action (131, 623f.). He is a "transcendence" in the sense of continually giving meaning or value to his situation by forming intentions and choosing from among possible courses of action and ranges of thought and emotion (564, 596, 640). One basic pattern of self-deception involves contradictory beliefs formed by affirming "facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being facticity, in such a way that at the instant when a person apprehends the one, he can find himself abruptly faced with the other" (98).

The woman in Example 3 displays this pattern with respect to the intentions ("transcendence") of the man she is dating as well as with respect to her own body ("facticity"). First, while on the date she views the man's actions as expressions of pure respect for her "personality" by refusing to think beyond the "immediate meanings" of his conduct to the wider context of what she knows is his sexual interest. By concentrating solely on his present respectful behavior, she manages to see his respect and sincerity as something permanent, rather than as the temporary overture to a future love affair. In this sense, she "arrests" the man's transcendence; "she glues it down with all the facticity of the present" (99), reducing his intentions to the way they are now, as a matter of fact, being manifested. Second, recall that the woman becomes so intensely distracted from her body that she fails to attend at all to the man's act of taking her hand. She contemplates her body "from above as a passive object to which events can happen but which can neither provoke them nor avoid them" (98). When she apprehends her bodily presence she does not view it as an aspect of her facticity, but instead finds herself "abruptly faced" with her transcendence--she views herself as a pure consciousness unidentified with a body.

A second general category of contradictory belief sets concerns the self-deceiver who seeks to escape what is revealed to him through his non-positional self-consciousness by using to his advantage the way in which another person might look at him and his situation. This is a permanent possibility, since "upon any one of my conduct it is always possible to converge two looks, mine and that of the Other" (100). Example 1 is an illustration of this.

8At least these facts are not "chosen" in any ordinary sense. In Sartre's technical sense of "choosing" as "bestowing significance upon," one's situation is chosen--including one's birth (710).
pattern of bad faith: an individual avoids an anguished vision of his free choice by coming to view all options except his chosen one "as purely conceivable eventualities; that is, fundamentally, conceivable by another or as possibles of another who might find himself in the same situation" (80). Although all along he knows these are live options, he manages in this way to apprehend them as mere "external possibilities" of no real concern to him.

Underlying the use of all such two-faced concepts is a purposive equivocation on two senses in which a person can be said to exist or to be something. This leads to the next stage of Sartre's account.

(iii) Sartre embarks on his examination of bad faith with the expressed aim of uncovering the fundamental structure of pre-reflective consciousness which renders bad faith possible (85). The eventual discovery is shocking: consciousness "must be what it is not and not be what it is" (112). Two intermediate discoveries are equally jolting: sincerity, on one ordinary conception of it, is "a phenomenon of bad faith" (107), and "bad faith is possible only because sincerity is conscious of missing its goal inevitably, due to its very nature" (111). Although here again discussion must be somewhat truncated, I hope to say enough to remove the surface appearance of incoherence in Sartre's frequently misunderstood remarks.

It would be wrong to seek a simple interpretation of the conundrum that "consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is." This claim takes on differing connotations within several different contexts in which it is presented in Being and Nothingness, and operates something like a general motto with a set of interrelated uses. Two interpretations, however, are especially germane here. First, it can be construed as a word play on what Sartre views as two senses in which something may be said to be or to exist, corresponding to two radically-different types of beings. Since each conscious act involves a non-positional consciousness of itself, a conscious being may be said to exist "for-itself" or "in the mode of being-for-itself." By contrast, a non-conscious being does not in this way "refer to itself" and can therefore be spoken of as an "in-itself" or as existing "in the mode of being-in-itself" (28). With this in mind the conundrum unravels as, "consciousness is as-for-itself what it is not as-in-itself, and it is not as-in-itself what it is as-for-itself."

Second, Sartre believes that the differences between these two types of beings lie not merely in the characteristics ascribable to them, but also in the logical relation holding
between them and their characteristics. He suggests, in fact, that there are two different senses of the copula, "is," used in ascribing properties, and the conundrum can alternatively be viewed as a pun on these senses. A non-conscious object is reducible to, or identical with, the sum of its properties, and ascribing a property to it consists in asserting that the property is among the set of characteristics which fully describe it. But a person is not reducible to his or her physical characteristics, past actions, attitudes, social roles, etc., for always a person is a consciousness of these things, whether reflectively or non-positionally. On the one hand, in reflectively "representing" himself as having a certain characteristic, a person posits the characteristic as an object before his consciousness, and since a conscious act is distinct from its object he thereby becomes "separated" from this aspect of his identity (102-3). On the other hand, through his non-positional self-consciousness he gives meaning to his conduct in light of his most fundamental project and thereby becomes responsible for it (594-7). Since in this way he is a continually free and creative source of his personal identity or "essence" he is not merely reducible to his past and projected future identity (68,70), nor to his present identity: "from within, the waiter in the cafe cannot be immediately [i.e., without a 'mediating' non-positional self-consciousness] a cafe waiter in the sense that this inkwell is [identical to] an inkwell" (102). In short, as a presently-active consciousness he is not reducible to what he identifies himself with: "consciousness is not [identical to] what it is [identified with]," and vice versa.

Sartre views equivocation on these dual senses of "exist" and "is" as underpinning much or all self-deceptive reasoning and belief formation. The self-deceiver purposefully misconstrues the sense in which he exists and has certain properties in order to avoid a full grasp of his responsibility for those properties. Consider a man who in bad faith denies his homosexuality, marshaling a variety of excuses for his homosexual behavior (107-8). Behind his struggles against the label "paederast" is a genuine insight that he is free to alter his conduct in the future: he is not a mere thing destined to homosexuality by forces overriding his free choice. He would grasp this insight clearly "if he understood the phrase 'I am not a paederast' in the sense of 'I am not what I am,'" and was thereby willing to affirm his identity as a homosexual and accept responsibility for it. However, "he plays on the word being" and "slides surreptitiously" into using "not being" in the sense of "not-being-in-itself." "He lays claim to 'not being a paederast' in the sense in which this table is not an inkwell"--i.e., he treats himself as one determined thing different from another (homosexual) thing. Ironically, in continually seeking
excuses for his behavior the man who began with an inarticulate
sense of his freedom comes to treat himself as lacking freedom
in order to escape responsibility for having exercised that
freedom.

A closely-related pattern lies hidden beneath a good deal
of what is ordinarily called "sincerity" or "being what one
is." An authentic individual fully recognizes his responsi-
bility for his wrongdoing and accepts this responsibility in
the way he approaches the future. But the 'sincere' man seeks
first to view himself as identical to an evil thing in order
thereby to embrace an irresponsible form of freedom. In
anxiously avowing his every misdeed, he thinks of himself as
fully reduced to his present identity: "he is evil, he clings
to himself, he is what he is" (109). This enables him
immediately to disavow his evil by viewing it as unrelated
to his new self which emerges purged through confession. He
comes to think of himself as lacking responsibility for his
past evil and in possession of a "virgin future" unrelated to
his past. Furthermore, demanding 'sincerity' of another
person can be a disguised attempt to treat him as a mere thing
in order to gain a certain sense of power over him. The
"champion of sincerity" who demands that the man in the
previous example confess his homosexuality may be seeking
ultimately to degrade him by treating him as a determined
thing, whose past "mistakes constitute for him a destiny"
(107). He regards him as free only on the corrupt view of
action as fully determined by one's past, and hence bestows
upon him a counterfeit gift of freedom "like a suzerain to
his vassal."

The 'sincerity' paradoxes unravel as follows. Inauthentic
'sincerity' can be viewed in two ways. It is "the antithesis
of bad faith" (100) in that it is the ideal of accurately and
fully avowing at least some of one's character traits, desires,
and intentions. It is "a phenomenon of bad faith" (107) in
that it involves the same sort of equivocation on "is" used
to escape responsibility for various aspects of one's
personal identity. Both denials and many so-called sincere
affirmations of aspects of one's personal identity depend upon
this purposive equivocation. The element of purposiveness
presupposes that the self-deceiver has some sort of under-
standing of the two senses in which he is and is not his
personal identity. He has, Sartre says, a non-positional,
"vague prejudicative comprehension" that he could never
achieve the goal of 'sincerity' of becoming reducible to his
personal identity (110). Hence, "bad faith is possible only
because sincerity is conscious of missing its goal inevitably."
I will round out this discussion by responding to three criticisms. First, Sartre goes on to say that bad faith, including 'sincerity,' has the same basic ontological structure as all consciousness: "the ontological characteristic of the world of bad faith with which the subject suddenly surrounds himself is this: that here being is what it is not, and is not what it is" (113). This has led some readers to think that Sartre is committed to the absurdities that all conscious acts are performed in bad faith and that in principle there could be no genuine sincerity, or what he calls "authenticity." But this is not so. From the claim that all conscious acts and projects, including those of bad faith and so-called sincerity, have the same basic structure, it simply does not follow that all conscious acts share the further differentia of bad faith. The self-deceiver "surrounds himself" with this structure in the sense of using equivocal predication, and this very equivocation is one of several features setting apart bad faith from other projects of consciousness. Sartre is consistent when, in several footnotes and asides, he alludes to the possibility of achieving authenticity by obtaining a non-equivocal reflective understanding of consciousness and responsible freedom.

Second, in everyday discourse, the expression "being what one is" means something like "meaning what one says" or "living what one professes." Sartre has been charged with arbitrarily and cavalierly jerking this expression from its natural habitat and giving it a new meaning within his technical philosophy, generating an equivocation which vitiates his argument.9 This charge, however, rests on the false presupposition that the technical sense Sartre gives to the expression "being what one is" has no connection with anything ordinarily meant by it. Sartre is seeking to identify a subtle form of bad faith which commonly masquerades under certain ordinary views of sincerity. In the tradition of Molière, Hegel, and Nietzsche, he is attacking the Pharisaical motives of vanity, irresponsibility, and cruelty so often underlying the banner cry of sincerity. The 'champion of sincerity' does mean what he says," but his words are spoken self-deceivingly as part of "that battle to the death of consciousness which Hegel calls 'the relation of the master and the slave'" (109). Moreover, on one level the person anxious to avow his every misdeed

is making an effort "to live what he professes" (or not to profess to less evil than he is guilty of); but his effort is in bad faith insofar as it is motivated by a hidden desire to escape responsibility, and this gives substance and bite to Sartre's ironical use of the word "sincere."

Third, it is reasonable to object to Sartre's postulation of different senses of the words "being" and "is," and to point out that a person is not reducible to his identity only given a purely rhetorical refusal to count free conscious activity as an essential aspect of that identity. Nevertheless, Sartre's fundamental point remains sound. People often do ascribe properties to themselves and others with the unacknowledged aims of escaping personal responsibility and of degrading others, and Sartre's specific diagnoses of some of the psychological maneuvers involved are suggestive. No doubt it is a considerable overstatement to say that all present-tense sincere avowals and demands for sincerity involve self-deception. But perhaps here, as elsewhere, Sartre's resort to the literary devices of hyperbole, paradox, and irony can be understood, in his words, as an effort "to shock the [complacent] mind and discountenance it by enigma" (99).

Although it was necessary to keep the discussion of the previous two stages brief, the sacrifice carries with it a compensation. Preoccupation with these stages of Sartre's account could lead one to overlook the primary importance of the brief concluding section entitled "The 'Faith' of Bad Faith." Sartre begins that section by indicating that he had not yet resolved the problems of bad faith, and the question remains, "How can we believe by bad faith in the concepts which we forge expressly to persuade ourselves?" (112).

(iv) In light of the new focus in Stage (i) on the self-deceiver's belief, the initial problems must be reformulated: "the true problem of bad faith stems evidently from the fact that bad faith is faith" (112). Sartre does not explicitly set forth the reformulations I will give, but he clearly indicates he has them in mind.

The first problem, it will be recalled, arose from the intuition that the self-deceiver must not only know the truth he is hiding, but somehow use this knowledge in hiding the truth. How is this possible without the knowledge preventing

10 This occurred, for example, in Phyllis Morris' valuable paper, "Self-Deception: Sartre's Resolution of the Paradox," read at the Pacific Division APA meetings, March 26, 1976.
the accomplishment of the project of hiding the truth? Since it was made explicit at Stage (i) that hiding a truth involves persuading oneself into believing the opposite falsehood, the problem can be rendered as follows. Getting myself to believe in bad faith something I know to be false is an intentional activity in which I act upon my knowledge in creating the false belief. But where this knowledge is so closely related to my intention, why doesn’t it prevent me from coming to believe the falsehood?

The second problem arose from Sartre’s view that all projects involve non-positional self-consciousness or knowledge. If the self-deceiver knows of his project, how can he manage to conceal it from himself so that this knowledge does not thwart it? Now that "hiding a truth" has been explained in terms of getting oneself to believe the opposite falsehood, it emerges that hiding one's project of self-deception involves deceiving oneself into believing that one is not deceiving oneself: "the project of bad faith must be itself in bad faith . . . And at the very moment when I was disposed to put myself in bad faith, I of necessity was in bad faith with respect to this same disposition" (112). There arises, then, a second-order knowledge-belief or belief-belief conflict: the self-deceiver comes to believe he is not engaged in bad faith in spite of his knowing all along that he is. This is the point made in the following sentence, reading "does not believe [p]" as "disbelieves [p]" (i.e., "believes not-p"): "The decision to be in bad faith does not dare to speak its name; it believes itself and does not believe itself in good faith" (113). The problem is to understand why the self-deceiver's knowledge of his project does not prevent him from coming to believe that he is not engaged in bad faith.

This double ordering of the knowledge-belief conflicts would appear to complicate matters, but it actually simplifies them. The two problems now reduce to one: Given that all along the self-deceiver has and uses knowledge of the truth he is deceiving himself about and his project of bad faith, how is it possible for him to come to believe falsehoods which directly contradict this knowledge?

(v) Self-deception begins with the adoption of a certain basic attitude toward, or "project" with respect to, the evidence for beliefs. This "primitive project" of bad faith is a pre-reflective refusal to base certain of one's beliefs on the evidence in one's possession. A person in bad faith "does not hold the norms and criteria of truth as they are accepted by the critical thought of good faith," and while he "apprehends evidence" contrary to what he wants to believe, he is "resigned in advance to not being fulfilled by this
evidence, to not being persuaded and transformed into good faith" (113). Bad faith "stands forth in the firm resolution not to demand too much" by way of evidence for the favored beliefs, "to count itself satisfied when it is barely persuaded" by some evidence for the favored beliefs, "to force itself to adhere to uncertain truths" (113).

There are two possible interpretations of the important claim that the self-deceiver "apprehends evidence" which he is resigned in advance to be unpersuaded by. This might mean that the self-deceiver encounters what is in fact good evidence against what he wants to believe, but he has somehow previously set himself to be entirely oblivious to the truth or implications of the evidence. But this interpretation is not supported by the rest of Sartre's account. A second, more plausible interpretation is suggested by Sartre's examples which portray the self-deceiver as knowing that he is confronting good or conclusive evidence against what he wants to believe but also somehow refusing to fully accept this evidence. He is refusing to be persuaded by the evidence, in spite of the fact he is not oblivious to its import. Sartre's answer to how this is possible will be discussed shortly as Stage (vi) but first several further matters require comment.

To begin with, in this section Sartre uses the expression "good faith" in the same ironical way he uses "sincerity"--'good faith' is a special case of inauthenticity. This means that when he speaks of "the norms and criteria of truth as they are accepted by the critical thought of good faith" he must intend to exclude some of the standards of rationality required for attaining full authenticity. The norms for 'good faith' presumably apply only to rational beliefs about the specific constitution of situations and personal identities --such things as character traits, emotions, desires, and environment. They do not cover the more stringent standards for acquiring a full grasp of the general ontological truths about consciousness and freedom. Meeting these latter standards, Sartre says in unelaborated asides, will require undergoing a "radical conversion" made possible through the use of the disciplines of ontology and existential psychoanalysis (116n. 534n. 797).

Next, Sartre reemphasizes here what he had made clear at the outset: the original move into bad faith is a pre-reflective, spontaneous determination of our being" (113), and is not preceded by reflective deliberation about its appropriateness. The self-deceiver does not say to himself, sotto voce as it were, "I think it best for my peace of mind that I be prepared to refuse to be convinced by any disturbing evidence against what I want to believe." Another way of putting this is that the entry into bad faith is made earlier
than the actual creating of the first-order self-deceptive beliefs: "at the very moment when I was disposed to put myself in bad faith, I of necessity was in bad faith with respect to this same disposition" (112). Since the expression "persuading oneself" may suggest a reflective, deliberative effort, Sartre remarks that strictly speaking the self-deceiver does not persuade himself into believing his two-faced concepts (112).

Finally, in this connection Sartre offers a provocative simile: "One puts oneself in bad faith as one goes to sleep and one is in bad faith as one dreams" (113). In order to work through this simile one must grant that the transition to sleep can be viewed as an act, and not merely something that is passively undergone.¹¹ This rich analogy serves first as a reminder that the entrance into self-deception is not a reflective activity: just as concentrated mental effort to force oneself into sleep usually keeps one's mind churning, reflective attempts to deceive oneself are generally doomed to fail. It also underscores Sartre's portrayal of bad faith as tending to perpetuate itself while at the same time being a somewhat precarious or "metastable psychic structure" which can involve "abrupt awakenings to cynicism and to good faith" (90, 113). In comparing bad faith to an everyday, inevitable occurrence, it is in line with his view that bad faith "is an immediate, permanent threat to every project of the human being" (116). Moreover, the simile can also be applied to the dual-ordered nature of the knowledge-belief conflicts involved in bad faith. Once the entry into sleep has been made, a person can only dream about that entry itself (as, while in a state of sleep, one dreams about everything else). Similarly, at the same time the entry into bad faith is made, beliefs concerning that entry are henceforth formed and held by the same sort of refusal to believe evidence that is manifested with respect to the primary self-deceptive beliefs. The decision not to solidly ground certain of one's beliefs in apprehended evidence covers beliefs concerning the original project of entering into bad faith. The original choice to devalue and overemphasize evidence wherever appropriate to the self-deceiver's favored beliefs includes the choice to devalue any evidence tending to show that he is purposefully refusing to accept evidence.

(vi) In several gratuitously obscure paragraphs, Sartre traces the source of the possibility of not grounding beliefs in apprehended evidence to two defining features of beliefs

¹¹Cf. Sartre's view that fainting in fear is part of a behavior of escape in which there is an intention to modify consciousness to a dream state (574).
Unlike knowing, which involves a self-evident intuition (240), to believe is (a) to have trust (b) in a situation where one lacks conclusive evidence justifying this trust. Even where belief involves a readiness to give in to every impulse to rely upon something, and a correspondingly confident conduct, by definition the belief is not conclusively established by any evidence the believer possesses. Sartre intimates that these two features correspond to the positional and non-positional aspects of the 'act' of belief. When I believe that a friend of mine feels genuine friendship for me, the positional aspect of my belief is my trust, per se, that his friendship is genuine. Having this trust involves a non-positional or non-thetic consciousness of myself as trusting in his friendship while lacking conclusive evidence warranting this trust. These considerations prompt a barrage of paradoxes: "the non-thetic consciousness (of) believing is destructive of belief"; "to believe is to know that one believes, and to know that one believes is no longer to believe"; "to believe is not-to-believe" (114-5). It is important to unravel these paradoxes since they are used to redescribe the primitive project of bad faith as the "utilization" and "willing" of this "self-destructive" nature of belief (115).

The willingness to trust, per se, that Sartre implies is the positional aspect of belief, is referred to as "simple faith" (114). Non-positional consciousness that one's belief is not grounded in a self-evident intuition "alters" belief, as it were, from "simple faith" into "troubled belief": "by the sole fact that my belief is apprehended [non-positionally] as belief, it is no longer only simple belief; . . . it is troubled belief" (121-2). For, "if I know that I believe, the belief appears to me as pure subjective determination without external correlative" (114). This is not to say that knowledge of my belief forces me to view it as an arbitrary creation of my mind, wholly unconnected with any evidence. But to recognize that I merely believe, rather than know, is to recognize that my belief is a "subjective determination" in the sense of being ungrounded in conclusive evidence. This recognition could potentially weaken or destroy my conviction, and all belief is "troubled" by being threatened in this way. Belief is "self-destructive" in that non-positional consciousness of belief creates a constant potential for removing trust. In this sense, every belief is a belief that falls short of unthreatened, simple trust; and to believe is not-to-believe with simple belief "blind and full" (125).

The possibility remains, of course, that any additional knowledge that I have evidence for a given belief will lessen this threat (albeit never remove the threat--so long as beliefs, and not knowledge, are involved). Such knowledge may supplement the way my non-positional consciousness
presents my belief as a pure subjective determination. This is what Sartre means when he says that "science," or the rational, inquiring mind, "escapes" the self-destruction of belief "by searching for evidence" (115). It is precisely this impartial search for evidence that the self-deceiver avoids, and in this sense he can be said to "accept" or rest content with troubled or threatened belief (115). He "wills" the self-destruction of belief, "using" it to provide a kind of unspoken rationale for embracing poorly-grounded beliefs and refusing to accept better-grounded beliefs. Since all beliefs fall short of being supported by the conclusive evident-ness of knowledge, the self-deceiver can refuse to regard any belief as either absolutely mandatory or absolutely prohibited: bad faith "has disarmed all beliefs in advance--those which it would like to take hold of and by the same stroke, the others, those which it wishes to flee"; bad faith "ruins the beliefs which are opposed to it, which reveal themselves as being only [inconclusively-grounded] belief" (115).

III.

In his summary remarks Sartre emphasizes stages (vi) and (iii) as providing the key elements for understanding bad faith (115). This emphasis seems to me misplaced, for the problem left standing at Stage (v) has yet to be resolved. That problem called for an explanation of how it was possible to "apprehend evidence" while being "resigned in advance to not being fulfilled" by it. According to Stage (vi), this is made possible by "willing the self-destruction of belief," thereby "disarming" or "ruining" beliefs relevant to one's self-deception. These metaphors, however, carry little explanatory force. They seem to amount only to a repetition that the self-deceiver has chosen to rest content with ill-founded beliefs in the teeth of stronger contrary evidence that he somehow knows of. "Disarming a belief" apparently consists in refusing to treat it in the way a reasonable, impartial person would treat it, just as elsewhere Sartre speaks of "disarming" such things as one's options, one's evil, or another person's words in the sense of removing their threatening character by refusing to interpret them properly (80, 109, 96). Similarly, the act of "ruining beliefs" opposed to what one wants to believe is the same as refusing to be fully persuaded by evidence contrary to the favored belief. The problem, in short, has been garnished with fresh metaphor but not resolved. How can a person who "apprehends" the truth and import of evidence manage not to be persuaded by it?
Sartre understood this question as the request for a clarification of the general features of beliefs which render self-deceiving beliefs possible. While his specific comments in this regard prove insufficient, nevertheless underlying these comments is the fruitful insistence that belief formation is not something which always merely happens to us. I suggest that a good deal of puzzlement surrounding self-deception derives ultimately from Hume's picture of belief as "something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters."\(^{12}\) Such a picture omits from consideration the ways in which we are active in forming beliefs. In general, a person often acts intentionally in acquiring his beliefs in two ways: (1) He chooses or refuses to initiate an inquiry into a given topic, or aspects of a topic, and undertakes or refrains from undertaking a reexamination of his beliefs on a given topic; (2) Once an inquiry is under way, he struggles, or fails to struggle, to conduct the inquiry with care and impartiality in the way he collects, examines, and assesses evidence.

Now, while engaging in the activities involved in belief acquisition a perfectly rational person would have the single-minded intention of getting at the truth. The self-deceiver, by contrast, has intermixed with his aim to obtain the truth the intention of avoiding the acknowledgment of a painful truth and reality. This intention itself, of course, goes unacknowledged, and for two reasons. To confess to oneself the intention would threaten the very acknowledgment of the painful reality being evaded. Moreover, the confession of the intention by itself would probably be humiliating since it would involve a recognition of oneself as having cowardly or base intentions.

At this point we can make fresh contact with Sartre's account by noticing that there is a second way to construe the question of what makes it possible to refuse to be persuaded by apprehended evidence. We might view it as the request for a specification of the general psychological capacities which underlie the creation of self-deceiving beliefs and which make it possible to carry out an intention to evade a full recognition of something one knows to be true. It is clear from Sartre's examples and his remarks later in

Being and Nothingness that he would respond to this request by emphasizing the capacities we have for spontaneous ignoring and role-playing.13

The original, pre-reflective project of bad faith involves a decision to engage in a range of behavior designed to help create the self-deceiving beliefs (606-12). One basic "pattern of flight," illustrated by all three of the main examples presented above, is the engagement in a "process of distraction . . . which operates on the very level of reflection" (79, translation corrected). In these examples, the individuals focus their attention away from facts they somehow know and on to less disturbing matters. The first individual ignores his alternative courses of action in favor of fixing his attention on his one chosen act; the women in the second example "apply themselves to becoming distracted in advance from the pleasure which they dread" and "turn their thoughts away toward their daily occupations"; the woman on the date ignores the sexual overtones in the man's words and behavior, and wholly engages her mind in a sentimental conversation. Underscoring this manipulation of attention, so characteristic of self-deception, helps to explain how it is possible to maintain a self-deceiving belief and to refuse to be fully persuaded by evidence against that belief.14 The original decision of the self-deceiver is in part the decision to be resigned in advance to ignore facts and phenomena contrary to the favored belief "in order to prove" to himself what he wants to believe (95).


In saying that distraction "operates on the very level of reflection," Sartre does not, of course, mean that the acts of ignoring are themselves reflected upon. During the time a person is deceiving himself he will avoid reflecting upon his specific acts of ignoring evidence (leaving aside any "abrupt awakenings" from his bad faith). These acts of ignoring will have the same "spontaneity" about them as the original project of becoming predisposed to them. Since they are not preceded by a reflective decision to perform them, and are not subsequently reflected upon, the individual acts of ignoring could themselves be said to be ignored.\(^\text{15}\) Distraction operates on the reflective level only in Sartre's technical sense of "reflection" according to which the acts of ignoring are directed upon some aspect of oneself or something intimately connected with the self.

While Sartre emphasizes the role of ignoring in bad faith, he also indicates how an enormous variety of role-playing behavior may be involved in bolstering a self-deceiving belief. It is obvious enough how acting out the role of a sentimental conversationalist helps the woman in Example 3 to maintain a sense of the reasonableness of her self-deceiving view concerning her date. An intriguing second example is the individual whom Adler would describe as having an inferiority complex (608-10). This person has pre-reflectively chosen to view himself as inferior, while deceiving himself into believing he has made no such choice. His original project includes "a heavy and ill-balanced development of acts, words, and statements designed to offset or to hide" his deep feeling of inferiority. Characteristically his practical deliberations will (seemingly unintentionally) lead him to a field of employment where he will not perform well. He will have "a reflective will to be superior," saying to himself that his honest ambition is to seek greatness. After setting unreasonably high standards for himself, he may even display a "desperate energy" in an apparent effort to reach his goal. If, finally, he goes to a psychoanalyst ostensibly seeking a cure, he will really be acting "in order to persuade himself that he has in vain done everything possible in order to be cured and that therefore he is incurable."

IV.

It is time to return to the notion of "non-positional consciousness." I have treated this reflexive consciousness

as constituting a form of self-knowledge, and this interpre-
tation must be justified in light of Sartre's repeated
insistence that "non-thetic consciousness is not to know"
(114). It will emerge that the vagueness of Sartre's
characterization of this sort of consciousness invites a
partial rapprochement between Existential and Freudian
psychoanalysis.

For the most part non-positional or non-thetic conscious-
ness of a conscious act is described negatively: it does not
involve positing the act as an object before consciousness
(12), nor focusing attention upon the act (515), nor making
a judgment that the act is occurring (12). These acts are
performed only when a person explicitly reflects upon his
own acts of consciousness. For precisely the same reason
it does not amount to knowledge of the act, and it is "an
immediate non-cognitive relation of the self-to-itself" (12).
Sartre works with a technical and highly restricted concept
of knowledge according to which knowing requires the perfor-
man ce of explicit, reflective acts of positing the thing
known: "knowledge posits the object in the face of conscious-
ness" (146). Hence the denial that non-positional conscious-
ness is knowledge amounts to no more than the tautology that
non-positional consciousness is not positional, reflective
consciousness.

Sartre, we may note, supports his prohibition on construing
non-positional consciousness as self-knowledge with the
following argument: if I know of my conscious act, then since
each act involves non-positional self-consciousness I must
know of my knowledge of my act, and so on ad absurdum (12).
Plainly this argument relies on the technical concept of
knowledge, for it is only a new, separate reflective act that
would initiate an infinite regress. No regress arises if non-
positional consciousness is viewed as knowledge in a more
ordinary sense in which it does not require an attentive,
focused reflection upon what is known.

This interpretation is consistent with Sartre's few
positive remarks characterizing non-positional consciousness.
First, he introduces the notion with an illustration of a
person counting some cigarettes without reflecting upon his
counting, and implies that the person's non-positional
consciousness of his activity gives him the ability to say
upon request what he is doing (13). Sartre stipulates that
in this everyday case the person does not know himself to be
counting. This is trivially true in his technical sense, for
it was specified that no reflection occurred. But in an
ordinary sense the person surely does know that he is counting,
and this knowledge accounts for his ability to say what he is
doing. Second, Sartre claims that a person carries with him
a non-thetic consciousness of a variety of such things as his present possibilities (347), projects (579), values (146), beliefs (121), knowledge (93), freedom (566), body (585), separateness from the Other (378), and immediate past (200-1). It makes sense to say that a person generally knows of all these things, but it would be strange to hold that he continually gives a kind of diffuse ubiquitous attention to all of them. At times, in fact, Sartre is willing to use savoir ("practical knowing") in referring to non-thetic consciousness of the immediate past (579-80, 601). Third, the view squares with Sartre's less-narrow usage of the term "knowledge" in his first book, Imagination. There Sartre distinguished between two kinds of self-knowledge: a reflective knowledge grounded in explicit thought and judgment, and a pre-judgmental, inarticulate knowledge that is inseparable from the conscious act itself. In Being and Nothingness the latter type of self-knowledge is referred to as "non-positional consciousness," and this is apparently a purely verbal change.

This interpretation, it is interesting to note, can fruitfully be applied to elucidate an argument Sartre uses to arouse interest and puzzlement in the idea of hiding from oneself. A physical object can be concealed or disregarded because it exists independently of us and we can simply look away or attend to some other object. Yet "properly speaking" it is impossible to hide or avoid an experience such as anguish which carries with it non-positional self-consciousness: "I can in fact wish 'not to see' a certain aspect of my being only if I am acquainted with the aspect I do not wish to see. This means that in my being I must indicate this aspect in order to be able to turn myself away from it; better yet, I must think of it constantly in order to take care not to think of it" (83). The initial premise here is true enough: ignoring, as opposed to unintentional overlooking, presupposes some sort of acquaintance with what is ignored. But surely it does not follow that in order to ignore an experience of mine "I must think of it constantly in order to take care not to think of it." Acquaintance in the

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relevent sense is simply knowledge, not consciousness, and it does not require incessant thought as the expression "non-positional consciousness" might suggest.\textsuperscript{17}

Interpreting non-positional consciousness as a form of self-knowledge does not by itself shed much light on Sartre's account of self-deception. It remains to be asked whether non-positional consciousness renders a self-deceiver able to articulate his knowledge as readily as the person counting cigarettes in the above illustration. Plainly, Sartre views the person in bad faith as in some sense able, but unwilling, to articulate and to avow what all along he somehow knows. But nowhere does he suggest that non-positional knowledge must be carried on the tip of one's tongue and in all cases enable one to directly and immediately reflect upon what is known. Sartre explicitly denies, in fact, that non-positional self-consciousness of an intentional activity always gives a person the ability to say readily what he is doing. Not only do children sometimes lack this ability (13), but also persons who have not successfully undergone existential psychoanalysis (721-9). An individual's non-positional consciousness of his fundamental life project accounts for the decisiveness of his "final intuition" during therapy (733), but it does not provide by itself the means for "analysis and conceptualization" (729). The possibility, then, is left open that in some cases the decision to move out of bad faith must begin indirectly with a decision to seek special aid, such as that of a psychotherapist, which will eventually enable the self-deceiver to avow his hidden knowledge.

At this point Sartre's account of bad faith merges nicely with Freud's theory of psychological defense. Sartre says that the self-deceiver has a non-positional consciousness of the truth he is hiding and of his project of bad faith, and insists that Freud's concept of unconscious knowledge and intentions is absurd (11). Yet he allows that in some cases this form of knowledge may not give a person the ability to readily articulate his conscious acts without such special aids as psychotherapy, and this is precisely

\textsuperscript{17}Sartre's argument, with the same unwarranted shift from "knowing" to "thinking of," was used more recently by David Pugmire: "[The self-deceiver] can't, it seems, avoid the thought of something without knowing what he is avoiding and so failing to avoid the thought of it; to withdraw or withhold his attention is already to have bestowed it" (op. cit., p. 346).
the central point Freud intended to convey. To be sure, one major difference remains. Sartre entirely rejects Freud's attempt to understand human behavior by appeal to deterministic processes involving exchanges of quotas of energy in some unimaginable substratum.\footnote{Sigmund Freud, The Complete Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1966), p. 554.} But alongside and correlated with such neurophysiological characterizations, Freud described mental defense in terms of knowing and intentional activity,\footnote{See, e.g., "Resistance and Repression," \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 286-302; Cf. Peter Alexander, "Wishes, Symptoms and Actions," Aristotelian Society Proceedings, XLVIII (1974), p. 133.} and on this level there is no substantial disagreement. Sartre holds that prior to psychoanalytic insight a person is conscious of his basic project; however, often only with the aid of psychoanalysis can the results of his reflection progress from an "understanding" which he cannot express to "knowledge" in Sartre's special sense (729). Freud holds that prior to insight a person has an "unconscious knowledge" of the meaning of his dreams; however, often only with the aid of psychoanalysis can his reflections lead him from this unconscious knowledge which he cannot express to "knowledge that he knows."\footnote{Freud, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 101.} Here there is mere verbal disagreement, with each thinker bending ordinary language in different directions in order to identify a kind of knowledge that need not involve the capacity for ready articulation.

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