CANS AND CAN'TS

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January 25, 1977
Abstract:

What has been has been; what is is; what will be will be. Where in this solidity is there room for the alternative paths seemingly demanded by "can"s and "could"s? What is the relation of that which can be, could be, or could have been to that which is, was or will be? The suggestions that "can" is ambiguous and that it is implicitly conditional are rejected. It is argued instead that "can't" is the affirmative, asserting the existence of one or more "preventers" of the event in question. "Can," its contradictory, is then actually the negative, denying the existence of a limited set of preventers generally specified more or less clearly and delimited more or less sharply by the context in question. This eliminates one, illegitimate, class of deterministic worries over responsibility, praise and blame, but merely intensifies those of another, genuine, kind.
Cans and Can'ts

Cans and coulds seem to be a metaphysical wart on the smooth face of being itself. It is not just a matter of their apparent inconsistency with determinism as a well-defined doctrine or set of doctrines about the comprehensiveness of specific forms of scientific laws and explanations. It is not even just a matter of their apparent inconsistency with something at once broader and more basic like a principle of sufficient reason. The seeming conflict begins at a still deeper and more primitive level. The world is everything that is the case. What has been has been, what is is, what will be will be. Where then in the solidity of this adamantine reality is there room, is there space, for the alternative paths seemingly demanded by cans and coulds? What is the relation of that which can be, could be or could have been to that which is, was or will be?

The problematic nature of responsibility, praise and blame has then seemed but a corollary of that of cans and coulds. Responsibility and praise or blame presumably adhere or adhere justly only to agents who can do or could have done otherwise. Questionable status for the former trio thus appears no more than a logical consequence of that of the latter pair.

Small wonder, then, that, as J. L. Austin inimitably phrased it, "In philosophy it is can in particular that we seem so often to uncover, just when we had thought some problem settled, grinning residually up at us like the frog at the bottom of the beer mug."\(^{1}\)

I shall argue in this paper that both of these seemings are in part well and in part ill founded. In section II

I shall attempt to show that, while previous attempts to solve the general problem of "can"s and "could"s are less than completely satisfactory, a rather more promising alternative is available. In section III I shall then briefly indicate how this analysis does indeed help to resolve one sort of deterministic worry, but leaves others even more worrisome than before.

II

One popular approach to "can"s and "could"s has been to regard the terms as radically ambiguous. Thus "A can X" might mean "A has the ability (whatever that is) to X," or "A has the opportunity (whatever that is) to X," or "A's Xing is logically consistent," or "A's Xing would violate no law of nature," or "A's Xing would not be immoral," and so on. But here "and so on" does not mean "in the same way," for there is not supposed here to be any such way, pattern or principle.²

Now there is clearly something correct in this approach. These differences do obtain. If anyone wants to use the term "ambiguous" to signalize them, I do not see any overwhelming objection. But at the same time we must recognize that the mere fact that there are variables certainly does not exclude the possibility of a general principle uniting them.

One could on the same ground call "I" ambiguous since it refers sometimes to one person and sometimes to another, or "now" ambiguous because it refers to a different time whenever used, or, to take a case where the claim has actually been made, that "good" is ambiguous because a good strawberry is large, red, sweet and juicy while a good person is wise, temperate, courageous and just.

²See, for examples, Austin, op. cit. 178 and F. V. Raab, "Free Will and the Ambiguity of Could," The Philosophical Review, 64 (1955), 60-77.
In each of these cases the differences are there, but so too is a common principle which explains them. "I" refers on some occasions to Smith and on others to Jones because it refers always to the speaker or writer, and this is on some occasions Smith and on others Jones. "Now" refers to the time of utterance, and this waits for no one. "Good" is a grading label, an adjective of commendation, and different things will inevitably be graded for different purposes, commended on different grounds. Surely it is not unreasonable to suppose that there may be some such common principle lurking in the background also in the case of our also admittedly different uses of "can" and "could." I shall therefore take the "ambiguity doctrine" as the stronger thesis that no such unifying principle exists.

Virtually the sole form taken by attempts to enunciate such a principle, to solve together the twin problems of reconciling "can" with "is" while at the same time discerning identity in difference, has been to treat "can"s and "could"s as implicit conditionals. This is the view of cans as, in Austin's phrase, "constitutionally iffy."

Two familiar examples of such analyses are the construals of "He can do X" as He will do X if he wants to," on the one hand, and "He will do X if he tries," on the others. 3 It is true that even if one or the other of these particular analyses were otherwise suitable as a resolution of the tension with being, neither, clearly, would resolve the problem of general principle. Neither seems highly suitable for, for example, "Summer nights can be chilly in the Sonoran desert," or "The great white shark can grow to a length of 30 feet." Surely we are not saying either of the nights or of the sharks either that they will if they want to or that they will if they try. But this problem in turn might be resolved by regarding the two analyses as instances of a general conditional form. "A can do X" would then be analyzed as "A will do

3 For examples, G. E. Moore, Ethics and P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics.
Against this sort of analysis a number of objections of greater or lesser subtlety might be raised. Some of these, especially in the area of inadequacy of positive support for the position, have already been considered in the literature by Austin and others. Over most of these objections, however, I shall not tarry, since they pale to insignificance before the completely unsubtle, but at the same time completely fatal fact that this sort of analysis simply does not, and cannot, correctly characterize our actual uses of "can"s and "could"s.

Let us consider, with some care for a change, one example of such a use. Suppose I call a random travel agent on the telephone. "Can I fly to Winnipeg on Saturday next?" I ask. She checks the airline schedules and the computer for reservations. "Yes," she then replies, "you can." What has happened?

Is there in this situation any Y whatsoever such that this travel agent is in a position to say that if Y, I will fly to Winnipeg on Saturday? Is she saying that I will if I want to? For all she knows I may have no money. Is she saying I will if I try? For all she knows I may be irremediably confined to the state hospital for the criminally insane. If such backgrounds are supposedly somehow assumed out of existence, how is she to know that I won't simply oversleep on the projected day of departure? Clearly none of this will do. The employer of "can" simply does not have the information which would be required for even the most casual and everyday "will if..." If he did have such information on the other hand, that, rather than "can" is precisely what he would say.

It is also worthy of note in passing that the ambiguity

\[ X \text{ if } Y \]\n
with "Y" as well as "A" and "X" awaiting specification in or by the particular context.\(^4\)

doctrine is not merely to be faulted as premature defeatism, but is by examples of this kind also positively counterindicated. On first obtaining her position our travel agent had to learn to read the schedules and to communicate with the reservations computer. But she did not have to learn a special travel agent's sense of "can". Nor is this because she is automatically employing some one of various generic senses. Her ignorance of my situation also rules out her asserting my ability or opportunity or the legality or morality of my trip. Checking the reservations is hardly either necessary or sufficient to assure her of its compatibility with the laws of nature or of logic. What then is going on in these uses of "can"s and "could"s?

Austin has called to our attention the fact that pairs of terms such that one is in surface grammar a positive or affirmative and the other its negative may in their actual usage function in precisely the opposite way, and that our difficulties in analysis of such terms may result from mistaking this surface for that depth. His chief example was "real". In saying that something is not real we are asserting that there is some special basis for challenge. Thus the goldfinch might be stuffed, but there is no suggestion that it is a mirage; the oasis might be a mirage, but there is no suggestion that it is stuffed. When we say, then, that something is real, we are denying the existence of just such a special basis, rather than asserting, as philosophers have so often supposed, the occurrence of some arcane property possessed in common by real watches and real cream, but unfortunately lacked by toy watches and non-dairy whiteners. Whether or not this is a satisfactory analysis of "real", it does seem quite accurately to characterize "can"s and "can't"s.

With respect to virtually any event the occurrence or non-occurrence of which may concern us there will be a

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5Philosophical Papers, 54-57. See also Sense and Sensibilia (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 68-77.
large, often indefinitely large, class of what I shall call "preventers". Those are factors such that there is, we believe, a rule or lawlike condition to the effect that if one obtains, the event in question will not occur. "Can't," while looking negative, actually affirms the existence of one or more of these preventers. It of course implies "will not," but does so by asserting its ground, and thus assurance. This is the difference between "cannot" and merely "will not". "Can", while looking affirmative, is still indubitably the contradictory of "can't". Thus since the latter affirms, the former denies. It denies, moreover, precisely what the other affirms: not the existence of the entire class of preventers, but of a limited subclass. "Can"s and "could"s, then, serve to deny the existence of a limited class of preventers generally specified more or less clearly and delimited more or less sharply by the context in question. They do this either by denying that the preventer in question actually obtains, or by denying that it is a preventer--"can anyway".

Note how precisely this describes, and how completely it demystifies, the transaction between the travel agent and myself. What was there at issue was not the discovery of the presence of factors such that if they were to obtain I would fly to Winnipeg either absolutely or on any specifiable further condition. It was rather the discovery of the absence of factors such that if they were to obtain, I would not fly to Winnipeg. Nor was it even a question of some kind of complete survey of these.

With respect to my flying to Winnipeg the class of preventers is very large. It includes lack of motivation, lack of money, lack of time, fear of flying, absence of scheduled flights, lack of space on these flights, and many many others. In asking the travel agent "Can I fly to Winnipeg on Saturday?" I was asking her only whether a limited subset of these conditions, more or less clearly specified by the context, did in fact obtain. Her reply "You can" informed me, but informed me only, that these particular preventers did not.
This, then, is the way the game is actually played, the way the words are used. This is the meaning of "can" and "could". Once this is seen, once we stop trying to look at the matter backwards, the other factors fall effortlessly into place.

Notice first that the data which prompted the ambiguity doctrine are on the present thesis accommodated nicely without the further presumption of any ambiguity at all. We do not need to assume different meanings of "can". We are using it the same way in every case. What is always at issue is that certain preventers do not obtain. But there are differences still. In different cases different preventers will be at issue. Thus the preventers may be logical as in "We can validly infer this from that." They may be physical as in "The sump can be drained by removing the plug." They may be psychological as in "I could have jumped for joy." They may be legal as in "All citizens over 18 can vote." They may be moral as in "We can certainly break a trivial promise where keeping it would endanger human life." They may be mere matters of social procedure as in "An appointment was cancelled so I can see you this afternoon." And so on and on. Of preventers, and even of varying classifications of preventers, there is no end.

There is, as a matter of fact, a class of cases handled easily by the present thesis which seems flatly inconsistent with the ambiguity doctrine. These are the cases in which we use a single "can" or "could", but do so with very different sorts of preventer in view. Take "Let's go inside where we can talk," for example. Here the factors preventing conversation outdoors but presumed to be absent indoors might be intense traffic noise, a physical preventer, and the necessity of standing, a psychological one. If the ambiguity doctrine were correct, we might expect to have to use two cans in such a case: "...where we can talk and can talk," while actually a single one does it nicely. Nor could one argue that all such cases are to be handled as falling under the same generic type, the "can of opportunity" for example, without revealing the arbitrariness of such classifications,
and their consequent unsuitability for distinguishing or identifying meanings. Thus why should we not say of one or the other or both of these preventers that what is involved is not a "can of opportunity" but a "can of ability"? Had we stronger voices the traffic noise would pose no problem. Had we a peripatetic propensity, or even a stoic indifference, to standing, neither would the absence of seating matter in the least.

At the same time the widely varying kinds of preventers available makes it clear how we must construe our dictum about preventers being factors such that should they obtain the event in question will not occur. This should have been clear even from our initial example. Some people charter or even purchase airplanes to take them where and when regularly scheduled airlines will not, or bribe officials or stow away. The travel agent knows this. So the "will not" which would be grounded by absence of flights or space on them is a will not within the normal procedures. So too, on a specific occasion is the "will not" of "can't infer this from that", a "will not logically", the "will not", of "can't vote", a "will not legally", the "will not" of "can't break a promise", a "will not morally", and so on.

This leads in turn to the matter of the specification of such varying preventers by context. It is undeniable that some "can"s are perfectly consistent with some "can't"s. This is another of the properties of the ambiguity doctrine handled even more gracefully on the present thesis without the assumption of ambiguity. Consider the old joke in which the character smoking directly beneath a "No Smoking" sign is told, "You can't smoke here," and retorts, "I not merely can, I am." This is a joke, or an attempt at a joke, precisely because what is in surface grammar a contradiction is in depth grammar even worse than a complete irrelevance. The preventers involved in the initial statement were legal and moral as was made entirely clear by its being the very act of smoking which provoked the statement. The use of that same act to ground the denial of entirely irrelevant
physical preventers is thus doubly flagrant. Nor would the coach who proudly averred "Smith can clean and jerk 300 pounds now," be refuted by someone's pointing out that since Smith is asleep he can't lift anything at all. Nor would the allergist who informed his patient, "You can eat anything made of chocolate so long as it doesn't have nuts in it," be dismayed or inclined to retract by the information that the patient's poverty and the high cost of chocolate meant that she could not eat anything made of chocolate. The preventer in the former context was lack of neuro-muscular development, in the latter allergic reaction. Sleep and personal economics are as irrelevant here as we observed them to be in our travel agent example.

Yet the matter is not quite so simple. It is true that the travel agent did not have to inquire into the state of my health. But this is not because her "You can" just meant flights and scheduled space available. If she had known, for example, of a tornado's having completely blown away the Winnipeg airport, it would have been incumbent on her to say "You can't". For this sort of preventer, unlike my institutional commitment, is within her sphere. So too would our allergist be undeterred by the knowledge that the patient's children inevitably ate up all the chocolate in the house before she ever had a chance at it, but not simply because this is not an affair of allergies. If he knew that her peculiar physiology with chocolate would produce a strong toxin he would surely have then to say, "You can't" even though this reaction could not in any sense be classified as allergic. This is because the latter, but not the former, is within the scope of the physician's responsibility.

Suppose I say, "When we get these two screws out we can lift off the cover plate." We get the screws out but are called away before we have a chance to remove the plate. I was not proved wrong. If, on the other hand, on getting the two screws out we find the plate still held by a third which was previously hidden, then I was wrong. The call was as effective a preventer as the hidden screw, but was not, as the latter was, the sort of
preventer here at issue. Thus preventers are specified by context, but in subtle, complex and various ways often incomplete enough so that we should hardly expect always to know precisely which preventers are or are not at issue in every case.

In addition to these central factors the present thesis explains, as one would hope it would, more peripheral aspects of our use of "can"s and "could"s. It explains, for example, why doing sometimes grounds "can" and sometimes does not.

The preventers involved must, to begin with, be the relevant ones. Thus the mere fact that our smoker is smoking does by no means establish that he is not thereby violating the city ordinance, the preventer involved in his critic's "can't". Nor would the actual consumption of however great quantities of nuts by our allergist's patient void his "can't", provided the predicted allergic reaction occured.

Granted the relevance of the preventers there is also the question of their stability. Yes, you did stand on your head once, but perhaps it was an accident. Perhaps the preventers were but in a momentary state of relaxation and are now returned to their accustomed vigilance. Do it again. Do it two or three times. Then we will be in a better position to say "You can." Yes, you could stand on your head twenty years ago, as shown by the fact that you did repeatedly do it twenty years ago. But you are now twenty years older and stiffer, so we cannot, without more current data, say "You can".

Granted the relevance and stability of the preventers, however, there will be no better ground possible for "A can X" than A's Xing. The basis of "can't" on the present thesis is the conjunction of the rule (if p then not q) and p. That q is true thus implies that either the rule or the antecedent or both fail, that "can't" is therefore not applicable, and that its denial, "can", thus is applicable. So we say that desert nights can be cool in
summer because they have been. This shows that the general factors such as moisture and soil composition and ground cover which in the Fiji Islands, say, prevent such temperature fluctuations do not here obtain. We say that the great white shark can grow to thirty feet because specimens of that species have. This shows that the genetic, nutritional, predator-parasite factors which prevent such growth in the goldfish are not universally present with the shark.

Even wider ranging data than these are by the present thesis nicely accounted for. We see, for example, why children have to be corrected over permissions. "Can I go out and play stick ball?" they ask.

"You mean, 'May I'," their mentors reply, "It's clear that you can." But for the child the lack of permission is as good a preventer as a broken leg, perhaps better. This is not to say that the linguistic community is somehow wrong in treating a special class of preventers specially. But it does explain why the child, accepting the simplest rule here, just as he does in saying, "drinked" rather than "drank", will need special tuition in regard to this complication.

The sole remaining potential source of resistance to the thesis I am advancing would seem to be the feeling some might have that in holding that "cans" deny a limited class of preventers I am not doing justice to that "all out sense" of "can" the existence of which has been claimed by Austin and others. I have thus tried very hard to find examples in which such an "all outness" might plausibly be claimed. I have found none. The nearest I can come to anything which even looks as though it might do is the rather esoteric example of quantum mechanics with its "no hidden parameters" dictum.

Before considering the relevance of this example to the limited class aspect of my thesis, however, note that the case is not merely consistent with the denial aspect of that thesis, but virtually requires it. Thus suppose
we have a particle emitter and a detection screen. An emitted particle strikes the screen. "It could have gone here rather than there," the quantum mechanician tells us. The ambiguity doctrine is, of course, here ruled out on much the same grounds that disqualified it in the travel agent case. It is thus of great significance to realize that this sort of example simply cannot be handled at all, even implausibly, by the conditional view, or, more generally, on any view of "can" as affirmative. The quantum mechanician not merely does not wish to assert, but explicitly denies that there is any Y such that if Y had obtained the particle would have struck the second point. There are no hidden parameters. There is then simply nothing left for him to mean save what my thesis would have him mean: preventers do not, or did not, obtain.

Nor is this case actually inconsistent even with the second facet of my thesis, that the preventers at issue in a given use form a limited subclass of all preventers. It is true that the quantum mechanician is in a most unusual, not to say unique, situation. Which of the rest of us, in which fields of our endeavor, is ever in a position to say, "There are no hidden parameters," and only thus, on the unlimited class view, to say "can" or "could"? It is just for this reason that so esoteric an example as quantum mechanics is necessary. Some physicists, indeed, like Einstein, would deny that even of quantum mechanical phenomena is this true.

It is thus all the more significant to see that even in this extreme case it is still a limited class of preventers that is at issue. The only preventers here involved are physical, deterministically, not probabilistically, causal ones. Even the quantum mechanician would not, for example, wish to hold that the laws of his domain are a priori. He would thus have to admit that it could be otherwise.

Or suppose our quantum mechanician is also a compulsive gambler. He has staked his life's savings, such as
they are, that the next particle will strike the bottom rather than the top half of the detection screen. He knows, as quantum mechanician, that it can strike the top half, and in fact that the probabilities are equal. But now, while anxiously awaiting the fateful event, the full implications of his financial ruin begin to strike home to him and he murmurs, "It simply can't hit the top."

III

With "can"s and "can't"s in general moderately well under control let us turn at least briefly to the implications of this understanding for responsibility, praise and blame, free will and determinism. For the correct ascription of responsibility and distribution of praise or blame to a subject "He could have done otherwise" must be true of him. I shall call general worries about the truth of this expression, "deterministic worries."

One sub-class of deterministic worries I shall call the "metaphysical". This is simply the application to human affairs of the general concern with which we began, the concern that "can"s and "could"s are somehow inconsistent with the solidity of reality whether this is represented by the foreknowledge of God, the universality of scientific law, or otherwise. Since the hardness involved in our time usually takes the form of causal/indeterministic mechanism, I shall for specificity deal with it here in these terms.

Let us then suppose for purposes of argument that the human being is a complex biochemical machine, a "meat machine" in Kurt Vonnegut's nice phrase. Each of its events is the product of prior causes, or, perhaps to some extent at least, indeterminate in the quantum mechanical sense. The latter, of course, is indifferent to the present issue. Careful thinkers since Plato have realized that equally with necessity does chance seem the enemy of freedom. How then can we apply to human action the "could have done otherwise" necessary for responsibility and justified praise or blame, reward or
punishment?

The answer to this question provided by the thesis I have been proposing is clear. "Can" denies a limited class of preventers. Some uses of "could" are thus entirely compatible with some uses of "could not" even when the very same event remains under discussion. The "could have done otherwise" which grounds responsibility denies, not all preventers, but only the select class of those that diminish or destroy responsibility. Thus that you could not have done otherwise since your elbow was joggling limits your responsibility, and excuses; that you could not have done otherwise since you have a vicious character does not so limit, and does not so excuse.

The answer to this question, however, leads naturally to a second. Why do some preventers thus limit responsibility while others do not?

One kind of answer to this question very popular since Wittgenstein has been that these distinctions simply define the institution of morality, responsibility, praise and blame. This is the way the game is played. Morality is not a device we have constructed to attain some further end. It is itself a source, a presuppositional matrix, of evaluations. Thus to expect justification of its fundamental distinctions is somewhat comparable to expecting a snake to swallow itself. All this is true and important, but more can be said. This game has not merely rules but also a point.

Some machines, sometimes, do things others don't. A number of us have found the example of the chess playing computer suggestive here. Such a machine is far more simple minded than a human being. Nor is all of life

quite like chess. But we do find, even with such a machine, that, while it is indubitably a mechanical/electrical contrivance firmly wedged within the causal/indeterministic network, this is not the whole story. Some of its mechanical/electrical events or states in their contexts are describable as the entertaining of ends, others as beliefs about the world, still others as actions to realize those ends in the context of those beliefs.

The failure to see the complete consistency of this rational agency level of discourse with the causal/mechanical requires an out and out category mistake. It requires an assumption much like, to continue with a chess analogy, that basing Bruce Hayden's claim to have a chess style showing "marked similarity to that of Morphy--Bishops moving along diagonals, Rooks along files, Knight's one hop, and so on."7 Of course one has to have a causal/mechanical basis for rational agency, just as one has to have bishops moving along the diagonals to have a chess style at all. The latter in both cases is even, if you will, "only" the former. But if it is only the former, it is at the same time, and with equal indubitability in both cases, a very special form of the former only.

Should we then say that the computer is not "really" trying to dislodge my knight, but simply clicking transistors? But what is "not really trying to dislodge my knight" supposed to mean here if not something like "engaged in a feint to disguise some deep combination"? And could we not say at least equally well that it is really the attempt to dislodge my knight that is basic? I do not know or care about its mechanical basis. That could be quite indifferently any number of things. That would be very different with a human opponent. The threat

would remain the same.

Such a chess playing machine, then, has already, and without the slightest conflict with its causal/mechanical machinehood, to some degree the character of rational agent. So too may we. And this fact is the presupposition of the categories of responsibility, praise and blame.

Insofar, but only insofar, as we are such rational agents the institutions of responsibility, praise and blame, reward and punishment can then themselves serve as causes, controllers, of behavior. Thus, but only thus, can we act, for example, from fear of flogging or from fear of failing to live up to our ideals. It is on this ground that we have the class of responsibility limiting preventers which excuse. They will be just those, like the juggled elbow, which do not fit within these categories of rational action.

At the same time in order for the institutions to maintain their credibility and thus causal efficacy it is necessary that they be applicable and be applied. It is on this ground that we have the class of preventers which do not so limit responsibility and which do not so excuse. They will be just those, like the base character, which, while no less efficacious as causes, do fit within the categories of rational action.

Most of the structure I have just been sketching is of course hardly novel. It is simply a version of the "compatibilism" or "soft determinism" by now familiar to most. What my analysis of "can"s and "could"s has supplied thus far is simply a heretofore missing foundation block of that structure. But this analysis actually provides more. It helps also to indicate something of the limitations of this sort of conceptual analysis vis-a-vis deterministic worries.

Too many philosophers have supposed that with the dissolution through conceptual analysis of the
metaphysical concerns all deterministic worries have been eliminated. Once we are aware of the criteria relative character of "can"s and "could"s, however, we should instead be led to see other worries which, unlike the metaphysical, are not dispelled but strengthened by that very analysis itself. Although they are usually thoroughly confused with one another and with the metaphysical in the minds of actual deterministic worriers, it is clear that there are several perfectly legitimate sources of concern under this rubric. One example is whether there may not be broad classes of behavior which, while generally assumed to be subsumable under the categories of rational action, are not actually so. Another is the question of the effectiveness of supposed rewards and punishments. A third is whether social circumstances are not too often such that wrong things are done by those who could not have done otherwise not only as rational agents but as moral agents.

Take a determinist such as B. F. Skinner. He certainly seems to suffer at times from the metaphysical confusions. But we need not. And once we realize that his causal notions are not, and cannot be incompatible with responsibility, we can see that many of his suggestions can and should be viewed, not as threats somehow to overthrow the conceptual structure of rational agency, responsibility, morality, but rather as urgings to employ that structure in an intelligent, informed, effective and humane manner rather than a stupid, ignorant, ineffective and inhumane one.

The American system of criminal "justice", to cite but one example of Skinner's targets, is indeed a mess. We offer people "rewards" that are either not really available or not really rewarding to them. We offer punishments that do cause suffering and brutalization, but do not deter. The idea that so to do is to treat

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8 As in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1971) for example.
people as sacred ends in themselves while to proceed otherwise would be to treat them as mere objects is as absurd as the idea that causality is incompatible with freedom and dignity.

These genuine deterministic worries, then, unlike the metaphysical, cannot be resolved simply by conceptual analysis including even a correct understanding of "can"s and "can't"s. But enabling us to see more clearly what these problems are and that they are real problems is perhaps in itself a result sufficiently substantial not to be entirely distained.

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