KANT ON BEAUTY AS THE SYMBOL OF MORALITY

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Abstract:

The paper attempts to show what Kant means by his claim that "the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good" in Section 59 of the Critique of Judgment. Part I explicates his notion of symbolism in general and includes a subsidiary explication of his notion of analogy. Part II deals with some special problems which arise when he seeks to apply that general notion of symbolism to the particular province of the beautiful. The conclusions drawn are that Kant means the following: that in the very act of appreciating a beautiful object and making judgments of taste thereon, we have some awareness of ourselves as free, supersensible beings, which awareness is analogous to our awareness of ourselves as free moral agents; that any beautiful object can, in this sense, serve as a symbolic presentation of the morally good; but that the symbolic relationship between beauty and moral goodness does not constitute an argument for morality or for the actuality of human freedom, for it rather presupposes our awareness of such, nor should it simply be conflated with the beauty of nature bridging the noumenal and the phenomenal aspects of our selves, which is a further issue.
Kant on Beauty as the Symbol of Morality

In Section 59 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant makes the provocative claim that "the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good."1 This topic of "beauty as the symbol of morality," which gives its name to Section 59 as a whole, is announced only late in the part of the Critique called the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," and for good reason. Kant had, prior to the Critique of Judgment, given his analysis of morality in the Foundations of a Metaphysic of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. Now if he is to work out the relationships between beauty and morality in the third Critique, he clearly has to give a correspondingly complete account of beauty first. His analysis and explanation of the experience of beauty, together with his justification of judgments of taste as a type of a priori judgments which may have "subjective universal" validity, came to include, however, discussions of the sublime as a category of aesthetic experience related to but distinguishable from that of the beautiful, the beauty of fine art as related to but distinguishable in certain important ways from the purely formal beauty of nature, and the nature of artistic creativity.

Kant finally turns then to the problem of the relationship of beauty to morality. It is a topic of some importance to him, for the third Critique is supposed to be the capstone of the whole system of Critical philosophy. As such, it is to be, among other things, the bridge between the Critique of Pure Reason, conceived as a study of cognition, and the Critique of Practical Reason, conceived in large part as a study of morality. Feelings are to somehow be shown as the connecting link between the theoretical and the practical capacities of man; and judgment is to be exhibited as the mental faculty which mediates between understanding and reason. All of these topics are brought together in Kant's aesthetic theory and again in his discussion of teleological judgment in Part II of the Critique. The connection between beauty and morality is thus one of those points which helps to fill out the whole philosophical system. However, the details of Kant's account are frequently obscure, and this is especially the case in regard to his doctrine of

1Critique of Judgment, trans. James Meredith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), Part I, p. 223. For convenience, most references to the Critique will be incorporated into the text and will be indicated according to pages in this translation, followed by the corresponding volume and page number of the text of Kants gesammelte Schriften, (Berlin: der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1908/13). Occasional references to Part II of the Critique, the "Critique of Teleological Judgment," as well as occasional references to or quotations from J.H. Bernard's translation, (Dublin: 1892), reprinted in the Hafner Library of Classics (New York: 1951), will be specially indicated as such.
beauty being a symbol for something else, namely, for the morally good.

Commentators on the third Critique have been notably unhelpful on this particular point. Some have simply by-passed the problem. This has been especially true of recent work by Anglo-American philosophers, whose interest in the Critique has tended to focus on the issues of the universality and validity of critical judgments and, to a far lesser extent, on Kant's account of aesthetic experience. And what an older generation of Kant scholars has had to say about the third Critique has not always been helpful either. For instance, H.W. Cassirer, who produced the only would-be complete English commentary on the Critique of Judgment, excused himself from commenting on Section 59, as well as on Section 42, which is closely connected to it, on the grounds that he "[did] not understand them properly." And Edward Caird, who did attempt an explication of the whole of the Critique of Judgment, gave little more than a running paraphrase of Kant's thought, plus his own criticisms of Kantian philosophy.

The present paper, in showing what Kant means by this one rather remarkable claim that "the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good," will be an attempt to fill a part of that gap left by other commentators. Part I will be an explication of his notion of analogy. Part II will deal with some special problems which arise when he seeks to apply that general notion of symbolism to the particular province of the beautiful, and in conclusion it will assess the breadth of the claim which Kant means to be making. While an understanding of this one claim on Kant's part will not, in itself, settle the whole question of what he takes to be the relationship of the aesthetic to the moral, it should make progress in that direction. Furthermore, it should make some contribution to an understanding and appreciation of the Critique of Judgment as a whole, especially as it is supposed to function as a capstone to Kant's Critical philosophy.


4Neglect of this topic may not long remain the case, however, in light of recent book-length treatments of Kant's aesthetics by Donald Crawford (Kant's Aesthetic Theory, U. of Wisconsin Press) and Francis Coleman (The Harmony of Reason, U. of Pittsburgh Press).

5The discussion here will deal only with the first part of his claim, namely, that "beauty is the symbol of the morally good," leaving for another paper the second part of the claim, that "only in this light...does it [beauty] give us pleasure with an attendant claim to the agreement of everyone else." That second part of the claim is, indeed, important to a working out of Kant's overall view of the connections between the realms of the aesthetic and the moral but is not, I believe, essential to an understanding of how he applies his notion of symbolism to the realm of beauty.
I.

Basic to Kant's claim about the symbolic function of beauty is his explicitly announced distinction between "schematic" and "symbolic" presentation of a priori concepts (p. 221; V, 351). These two modes of presentation are supposed to correspond to two different types of a priori concepts. The schematism of a priori concepts of the understanding, i.e., the categories, had, of course, been a very important and a very difficult topic for Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. What is now in question is the "symbolic" presentation of the a priori concepts of reason, which had previously been called Ideas of reason, and which are not supposed to allow of any direct instantiation in the phenomenal realm.

Kant indicates here that such symbolic presentation occurs where the concept is one which only reason can think; but this should not be taken to mean that he would limit symbolic presentation to that situation, as Bernard's translation might suggest. Indeed, his subsequent examples of symbolic treatment within language (p. 223; V, 352) single out concepts which can themselves be schematized, hence, as he would say, can be directly presented in intuition: for example, the concepts of ground, dependence, flowing and substance. Indeed, Kant himself uses an example in which an empirical concept is symbolized by an empirical object, as John Glenn has noted in "Kant's Theory of Symbolism," Tulane Studies in Philosophy, no. 21 (1972), p. 16. Kant's claim, then, must be merely that concepts of reason can be given indirect presentation in intuition even though, as was argued in the Critique of Pure Reason, they cannot be given a direct presentation because they cannot be schematized. His claim is not that symbolism, as defined here, occurs only in this instance of concepts of reason.

It is, admittedly, a little strange to talk about concepts as being a priori, for Kant generally uses the phrase "a priori" adverbially to modify the cognitive process, i.e., how we arrive at a particular judgment. See R. P. Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 113, ft. nt. 34. In the present context Kant does speak of "pure" concepts of the understanding, in contrast to "empirical" concepts (p. 221; V, 351). But he also makes the very odd remark: "Alle Anschauungen, die man Begriffen a priori, uterlegt, sind..." (V, 352). Since it is not clear what it would mean to "supply Intuitions to concepts a priori," as Bernard would have it (Bernard trans., p. 197), Meredith's rendering in terms of "Intuitions by which a priori concepts are given a foothold" (Meredith trans., p. 222) would be the plausible reading.
Kant tells us that in the case of a schematic "rendering in terms of sense" of concepts given a priori, an intuition corresponding to the concept is given; in the case of a symbolic rendering of such concepts, on the other hand,

...the concept is supplied with an intuition such that the procedure of judgment in dealing with it [the intuition] is merely analogous to that which it observes in schematism. In other words, what agrees with the concept is merely the rule of this procedure, and not the intuition itself. Hence the agreement is merely in the form of reflection, and not in the content. (pp. 221-22; V, 351)

Unfortunately, Kant does not make himself very clear. In this passage he seems to indicate that there is an analogy which obtains between the way judgment proceeds in schematizing a concept and the way it proceeds in symbolizing one. But further down the page, when he asserts that in symbolic presentation judgment performs a "double function," he seems to indicate that the analogy is rather to be found between reflective judging of the symbolic object and reflection on the concept being symbolized.

Schemata contain direct, symbols indirect, presentations of the concept. Schemata effect this presentation [of an a priori concept] demonstratively, symbols by the aid of an analogy (for which recourse is had even to empirical intuitions), in which analogy judgement performs a double function: first in applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then, secondly, in applying the mere rule of its reflection upon that intuition to quite another object, of which the former is but the symbol. (p. 222, bottom; V, 352)

We must assume that the former passages merely states loosely and

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8The very important notion of reflection will be clarified in the course of this paper.

The complete paragraph in the German reads as follows: "Alle Hypotypose (Darstellung, subjection sub adspectum) als Versinnlichung ist zweifach: entweder schematisch, da einem Begriffe, den der Verstand fagt, die correspondinge Anschauung a priori gegeben wird; oder symbolisch, da einem Begriffe, den nur die Vernunft denken, und dem keine sinnliche Anschauung angemessen sein kann, eine solche utergelegt wird, mit welcher das Verfahren der Urteilskraft demjenigen, was sie im Schematisieren beobachtet, bloss analogisch ist, d.i. mit ihm bloss der Regel dieses Verfahrens, nicht der Anschauung selbst, mithin bloss der Form der Reflexion, nicht dem Inhalte nach übereinkommt."

9The passage in German reads as follows: "Alle Anschauungen, die man Begriffen a priori unterlegt, sind also entweder Schemata oder Symbole,
somewhat inaccurately the theme of the similarities and differences between schematic and symbolic presentations of concepts. For immediately after that passage, Kant proceeds to contrast both of these modes of presentation to what might be called arbitrary symbolism: the use of mere "marks" (Characterismen) which are associated by convention and habit with that for which they stand (p. 222, middle; V, 351-52). Only then does he proceed, in the latter passage, to elaborate on the process which he calls symbolic presentation.

Clearly, we need to know what Kant means by "analogy" if we are to appreciate what he means by "symbolic presentation." He himself, as we have just seen, explicates the notion of a symbol in terms of the notion of analogy. Furthermore, he elaborates on his claim about the symbolic function of beauty by actually working out, in the paragraph following that claim, an analogy between moral goodness and the appreciation of beauty (pp. 224-25; V, 353-54).

In general, Kant means by "analogy" a "similarity of the relations between dissimilar terms." In the Critique of Pure Reason he had defined the notion of analogy, in contrast to the more specialized notion of...
mathematical analogy, as follows: "in philosophy the analogy is not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations" (A179= B222).11 What is added to this notion of analogy by the Critique of Judgment in general is the notion of "reflective" judgment, the special function of our judgmental faculty characterized in the Critique of Judgment but not in the Critique of Pure Reason, and a function to which we must turn our attention in a moment. Such reflection, or reflective judging, is alluded to in both of the seemingly contrary passages which we have examined above. What Kant later calls his "ultimate analysis of taste" also locates the analogy in question as holding between the "reflection" on both the moral idea, which would be an a priori concept of reason, and something sensory (p. 227; V, 356).

Thus, the clue to disentangling Kant's meaning here is his remark that in the symbolic presentation of a concept, use is made of an analogy, "...in which analogy judgement performs a double function: first in applying the concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then, secondly, in applying the mere rule of its reflection upon that intuition to quite another object, of which the former is but the symbol." (p.222, V, 352)

11 Norman Kemp Smith's translation, second impression (London: Macmillan and Company, 1933). In the "Analogies of Experience" of the first Critique the notion of analogy was used as a means of explaining the schematization of certain a priori concepts, namely, the "Categories of Relation." There, an analogy consisted of the same relationships holding among otherwise different experiences or appearances. For example, each quality encountered in experience must be the quality of something permanent, each change in the quality of an object must stand in causal relationship to some other change which is its cause, and each permanent thing perceived to co-exist with another in space must stand in thoroughgoing reciprocity with it. Kant denied in that context that the use of analogy will actually give us knowledge of an unknown term, i.e., of what the substance itself is like, or what the cause of a change is. This he contrasted to the use of analogy in mathematics, where it enables us to know the missing term, and where the analogy is in a sense "constitutive" of that term, but where the mathematical term is not an existent object. Kant retains this restriction on the notion of analogy in the third Critique, where it is supposed that the terms related to one another in an analogy are understood and it is just the relationships between them which are of interest. What I shall be arguing, however, is that in the third Critique analogy is taken to be the basis for further reflection, aimed at discovering a more general pattern or formulation, i.e., a way of unifying two different things in our thought. Thus the notion of analogy is here a means of explaining how we move to ever more inclusive concepts, rather than a means of explaining the instantiation of general concepts of experience. Late in Part II of the third Critique (pp. 135-37; V, 463-65) Kant puts similar restrictions on the use of analogy by denying it as a proper basis of inference for establishing the existence or actual nature of God. In this case, though, he admits that analogies help us to form a conception of God, i.e., to think of God, in terms of a likeness to the human mind and its abilities to cause or produce order in the world. Again the point is that analogies enable us to bring together in our thought two otherwise different objects of thought.
The passage does still leave two things unclear about such symbolic presentation:

(1) just what "concept" is supposed to be "applied to" that sensible object of intuition?
(2) what is the "rule of reflection" which is supposed to be applied to both the symbolic object and the object symbolized?

However, these are fairly easily clarified once we have the clue that it is reflective judgment which furnishes the analogy in question.

(1) "The concept" which is "applied to the object of a sensible intuition" must be the concept of the kind of thing which that phenomenal object is. It cannot, of course, be the symbolized concept itself, for if that were possible, we would already have an instance of schematism, and symbolisation would then not even be required. Furthermore, Kant has already stipulated that the a priori concept being symbolised is one which cannot be schematised or otherwise directly applied to an intuition. So "the concept" which is "applied to the object" has to be the plain old empirical concept which we use in our cognition of that sensible object. It is true that Kant has not previously in this paragraph referred to any such empirical concept; and his use of the definite article "der" to talk familiarly of "the concept" does seem to be a reference to the only concept previously mentioned, namely, the a priori concept which is being symbolised. Nevertheless, this must be merely a careless expression on his part; he cannot, for the reason just given, mean to be referring here to the symbolised concept. Then what he must mean by our "applying the concept to the object of sensible intuition" is that we make what he has elsewhere in the third Critique called a "determinant" or "determining" judgment. That is, we subsume the object under a concept and thereby determine that it is a certain kind of object. In terms of Kant's own example of a hand-mill symbolizing a monarchical state governed by an absolute will (pp. 222-23; V, 352): the object of intuition would thus first be determined to be machine, more specifically, a hand-mill. Unless it were first recognized or identified as a definite type of thing, it could not serve as a symbol for anything else.

(2) What Kant calls "reflective judgment," or the "reflective function" of judgment, proceeds, we might say, in the other direction from the aforementioned "determinant judgment," and its "rule" must be understood in terms of the way it proceeds. In the third Critique Kant characterizes reflective judgment as the function of seeking the more general under which a given particular can be subsumed, or, as he sometimes puts it,

"the general of which the particular is the specific." The assumption is that that universal which is sought, the concept which is adequate to the object of reflection, is not yet a hand, i.e., is not a working concept in the mind of the subject; if it were, it could simply be applied in that instance.

Kant makes various uses of this notion of reflective judgment (Urteilskraft), which is the capacity of discovering or creating concepts adequate to the given object, and of reflective judging (Beurteilen), which is the exercise of that capacity, the actual mental activity of seeking the appropriate universal. In the realm of perception, such reflective judging is then supposed to be the seeking of a concept which is adequate to a given sensory manifold. And, as Kant implies in the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, such reflective judging would be the activity responsible for the formation or acquisition of our empirical concepts. In his aesthetic theory, reflective judging is taken to be the activity of seeking order, in terms of a "rule," among the formal features of a sensory presentation. As a contributing

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13See First Introduction, pp. 14-16 (XX, 208-211). Cassirer, in his Commentary, pp. 109ff. and 113ff., gives a helpful discussion of Kant's development of the notion of judgment in the third Critique, as does Genova in his article "Kant's Complex Problem of Reflective Judgment."

14"Object of reflection" must always in this discussion be taken in a broad enough sense to include phenomenal objects of perception, concepts of such phenomenal objects apart from their application in cases of actual perception, or a priori concepts. For, as I am arguing here, Kant supposes that reflective judgment can operate either on sensory intuitions or on concepts.

15First Introduction, p. 16 (XX, 211).

16See Critique of Judgment, General Remark, pp. 87-89 (V, 242-44). Here Kant sums up his analysis of the experience of beauty and gives examples of the sorts of objects which are conducive to aesthetic experience in that they stimulate our imagination to synthesizing activity on the given sensory manifold without, on the one hand, thwarting the imagination by being overly complex and irregular; or, on the other hand, being easily exhausted by the imagination because they are too simple and regular. Rather, those objects are supposed to provide an on-going "entertainment" (Unterhaltung) of the imaginative faculty, with a sustained feeling of pleasure in the successful exercise of that faculty as it contributes to the mind's reflective activity of moving toward the formulation of a rule, i.e., a concept. See Neville, Kant's Theory of Aesthetic Pleasure, Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, (Baltimore: 1970), pp. 144-50, and "Kant's Characterization of Aesthetic Experience," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXXIII, no. 2 (Winter, 1974).
factor in the attaining of knowledge in general, reflective judging is
the activity of seeking regularity among phenomenal objects and events,
and, when that regularity has been discovered in the form of empirical
laws, of then seeking ever more general laws under which those can be
subsumed. In these ways, reflective judgment is supposed to be able
to operate either: on the given sensory intuitions, in seeking concepts
adequate to them; on objects which have already been characterized con­
ceptually, in seeking broader, more inclusive concepts of which they
are only specifications; or on scientific laws, in subsuming them under
ever more general laws or principles.17

What all of this would mean in terms of reflecting upon a phenomenal
object which has already been characterized conceptually - the case with
which we are concerned - is that one would therein be trying to move be­
yond the level of generality which has been already attained in one's un­
derstanding of the object, rather than trying to specify in greater de­
tail what that particular object is like. Certainly in the first classi­
fication of an object, i.e., in the making of a determinant judgment a­
bout it, not everything is included which is true of that particular
given object. A great many empirical judgments could yet be made, such
as -- to continue using Kant's example -- that the hand-mill is made of
metal, is black, and costs a certain number of dollars. But each of these
synthetic judgments would be the product of further determinant judgment;
each would succeed in classifying the object in greater detail -- e.g.,
not just as a hand-mill, but as a black metallic hand-mill worth so many
dollars -- and thereby including it in a smaller but more highly delimited
class of entities. On the other hand, reflecting upon that hand-mill as
a hand-mill would involve searching for a more universal pattern, a more
general concept, under which that mill, together with the very concept
by which it is classified as a mill, can itself be found to fall. One is

17It is just because reflective judgment is supposed to be operant on
all of these levels that the third Critique as a whole is called the
Critique of Judgment and encompasses both Kant's aesthetic theory, where
it is a certain type of perception of particular sensory objects which
is in question, as well as discussion of the nature and limits of scien­
tific explanation, where it is the appropriate way of explaining whole
classes of natural phenomena which is in question. There are, of course,
significant differences as to how reflective judgment works on these
different levels. In reflecting on what is given in the sensory field
and attempting to find a concept which is adequate to it, one need not
be comparing two different sensory presentations. One need merely seek
a concept, i.e., a pattern or rule, which would apply to any such sensory
presentation in the future. But in reflecting upon objects which have
already been characterized conceptually or on laws of nature, i.e.,
patterns of causal regularity which have been discovered to hold among
phenomenal objects, reflection would seem to require at least two instances
from which to proceed. They must be similar enough that it seems they
could be united under a common concept or a higher law; but they must not
be identical or even essentially the same, for then they would be merely
a pair of instances of the "same thing" and reflection would not have
anything left to move toward.
not merely attempting to make further empirical judgments which will fill out the details of the particular object and increase our knowledge of the empirical facts of the world.18

In applying this notion of reflective judging to the topic of symbolic presentation, Kant must, then, suppose that such reflection can be carried out on both the object which is the symbol and the object which is symbolized — that is, on both the "object of a sensible intuition" and the object of thought, whether that object of thought can be presented in phenomenal experience through the schematization of its concept, as could the institution of monarchy which Kant uses in his example, or whether that object of thought cannot be presented in phenomenal experience through the schematization of its concept, as is the case with moral goodness. In his example, it is a hand-mill which symbolizes a monarchical state governed by an individual absolute will. Presumably the similarity between the two objects is that a hand-mill, as a mechanical device, moves rigidly and allows of no alternative means to attaining its end, while a monarchical state is governed by an individual absolute will and moves inflexibly toward an end determined by the monarch, not by its constituents; a hand-mill has one point from which a force drives its parts, while a monarchical state has power concentrated in one man's hands. Other similarities could perhaps be spelled out. Of course, the motions of a mill are not the "motions" of a person, and the function of the mill are not directly comparable to the ends of a human being. These are just the differences

This is rather different from the application of the notion of reflective judging in the case of aesthetic experience itself. Kant seems to mean that in such pure aesthetic experience, reflection proceeds by incorporating more and more of the particular given sensory features of the object, seeking a pattern which will include all of the discoverable formal features. Here, in the type of analogical thinking which underlies symbolic presentations, he is holding that reflection moves toward a pattern or general structure, but it is a pattern or structure obtained between two distinguishable objects. A further difference is that in the present case of symbolic presentation the reflection takes as its object the concept according to which the symbolic object has already been conceptualized. The process is then not one of analyzing that concept but rather of seeking to generalize from it.

Kant's use of the notion of reflective judging in the present instance is very similar to his use of that notion in his theory of fine art, even though that theory of art must be clearly distinguished from his theory of pure beauty, i.e., the beauty of non-representational forms. His account of the appreciation of art is that we not only enjoy reflecting on the formal (i.e., spatio/temporal, relational) features of the object, but that we find in the art work representations (Vorstellungen) of things, which representations serve as presentations (Darstellungen) of concepts which cannot themselves be directly instantiated within the work (p. 174; V, 312). The art object also "induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. concept, being adequate to it" (pp. 175-76; V, 314).
which Kant has allowed for by saying that in such analogous reflection "it is not the intuitions themselves which must agree with the same concept," not the "content," but the "rule of the procedure," the "form of the reflection" (p. 222 top; V, 351). Yet he would say that between these two objects, the mill and the monarchy, we feel that there is a similarity which should lend itself to conceptualization; each object seems to be a particular case of a more general object of thought.

If this really is Kant's meaning, then the reflection about which he is talking takes place not just on each of the objects individually but rather on the similarity between them. While one could perhaps reflect on either object by itself, one would have no particular reason or motive to do so unless there seemed to be a possibility of establishing a connection between that object and something else, i.e., finding a larger pattern of which it is just one instance. For reflection, on this level of whole phenomenal objects and on the level of the laws of nature, is always an exploration of apparent similarities in an attempt to formulate those similarities conceptually.

Even after seeing how Kant would apply the notion of reflective judgment, and in particular, how he means reflective judgment to be exercised on both objects, the difficulty remains of saying just what he means by the "rule" or the "form" of reflection.\footnote{Insofar as its "rule" is the principle according to which reflection proceeds, Kant might be talking about the "transcendental principle of reflective judgment" referred to in the Introduction (pp. 18-19; V, 180). However, that would be too vague, since that a priori rule is supposed to underlie all reflective judging, regardless of the objects of such judging; it could say nothing in particular about the specific objects to be reflected upon. That is, an appeal to that rule would not help Kant to explain how one object could be a symbol for a second object and yet not be a symbol for a third. Yet such is the situation which he means to be explaining, for he takes it that a hand-mill is the symbol appropriate to a monarchy but not to a state governed by constitutional laws, and he holds that beauty is the symbol of the morally good but that not just everything is a symbol for such moral goodness.} Is it simply a function of the reflection as an activity, such that "the rule" can depend upon the subject's directing of his attention and upon his own subjective tendencies and interests? Or is "the rule" a function of the objects reflected upon, such that the subject merely discovers it in the objects? And if the latter, why is the "rule" or the "form" of reflective judgment not itself just another conceptualizable feature of the object?

Kant is at least committed to the following account: certain elements in the one object can be found to stand in relationship to each other similar to the way certain rather different elements in a second object also stand to each other. Judgment aims to formulate a rule such as the following: "a is to b in object X as c is to d in object Y." In seeking to find the general pattern of which the relationship of a to b in X is only
a particular case, we are doing the same thing as we are doing in trying to find the general pattern of which c to d in Y is also only a particular case; that is, we are seeking the same over-arching concept in both cases. However, this raises the further question of whether the similarity is supposed to reside in the objects themselves or whether it is supposed to reside in the process of finding, which must be construed as a mental activity?

It would seem that Kant must give the "rule of reflection" a somewhat objective designation. That rule cannot just be the way in which the mind works subjectively in terms of the shifting of attention from one feature of the object to another, i.e., the order in which one apprehends the features of the object. If it were only that, Kant would have no reason for supposing that symbolic presentations could be recognized by all men, and that symbolic presentations thus have a sort of universal validity about them. Yet he does operate on that assumption. On the other hand, he is committed to a view of reflective judging as a process or activity which does involve the various representations (Vorstellungen) of the features of the object coming to our attention sequentially. For example, our attention may move from feature a to feature b of object X, or it may move from feature b to feature a. Yet the relationship between those features, since it is a relationship between parts or features of an object, must remain what it is, apart from our subjective apprehension of it.

The problem here is rather similar to that with which Kant had had to wrestle in the section on schematization if the first Critique. His solution there had turned on the recognition of the difference between the subjective sequence of the occurrence of the representations and the objective sequence constituted by the qualitative content of those representations. While he does not in the third Critique rework that topic in light of his new-found distinction between "determinant" and "reflective" judgment, it must be that he supposes the relationships among the features of the object reflected upon to have whatever objectivity the object itself has. That is, they have the degree of objectivity possessed by phenomenal objects if they are given in sensation; they have the objectivity which concepts are supposed to have if they are merely thought about. This would mean that the relationship between the terms a and b of object X in the analogy is thereby conceptualizable; the same holds for the relationship between c and d in object Y. Those structural relationships just are themselves essential to the objects X and Y being the kinds of objects they are. However, that those internal structural relationships are themselves conceptualizable — indeed, that they may have already been conceived conceptually — poses no special problem for Kant's doctrine, for it is just the similarity between the inner structure of the one object and the inner structure of the other which is to be exploited in reflective judging on the level with which Kant is concerned in this portion of the Critique. Then as one reflects on that similarity, attempting to formulate it conceptually, one's mental activity has a certain "direction," toward a greater generality in one's understanding.

The underlying problem here is whether we are to speak of the one
object being like the other object in that its elements stand in the
same structural relationship to one another, or whether we should speak
of our judging of the one object to be like our judging of the other, i.e.,
our reflection on the one to be like our reflection on the other. Kantian
philosophy is necessarily somewhat ambivalent at this point when it is
two phenomenal objects which are in question, for it allows of no talk
about a phenomenal object except insofar as that object is an object of
judgment. While Kant's reference to the "rule of reflection" is couched
in terms of the mental activity of judging, it might well be that his
point could be made just in terms of the objects upon which such reflec-
tion takes place. However, when he is dealing with an empirical object
and an Idea, i.e., a concept of reason, the latter of which provides us
with only a non-phenomenal object of reflection, it may be more appro-
priate for him to speak of the similarity as holding between the reflecting
and not between the objects reflected upon. But whichever way the point
is formulated, the analogy, strictly speaking, involves only the reflec-
tion on what is thought in the two concepts involved, and for this the
sensuous presentation of the one concept would not be needed at all.20
In other words, such analogical thinking could proceed without the con-
crete exemplification of the one concept.21 If however, there is to be
a case of symbolic presentation, then the one concept must be given a
particular instantiation which can be the symbol of the other, and that
means some instantiation in the phenomenal realm, i.e., some involvement
in the sensuous. But such an instantiation always requires determinant
judgment, the other function of judgment, for its initial apprehension.

Thus the "two functions" of judgment must both be involved if there is
to be not just analogy but also symbolism: determinant judgment to re-
late to the concrete sensible object the concept which is to provide one
part of the analogy, reflective judgment to actually provide the analogy
by acting analogously upon the two concepts.

II.

The difficulty in applying in Section 59 this notion of a symbolic pre-
sentation, together with the analogical reflection which such symbolic
presentation presupposes, is that the notion of a symbol is introduced in
terms of a sensible intuition, a phenomenal object. But beauty, it has
been argued in the Critique, is not an object or even a property of an
object; it is not an objective feature of anything, but rather a relation-
ship between certain features of an object and the affective experience
of the percipient of that object. Thus the beauty of a phenomenal object

20That such is the location of the analogy in question is born out by
Kant's example from the realm of linguistic usage (p. 223; V, 352). The
word "ground" means something which could be given a concrete sensuous
instantiation, but need not be given one for the analogical function to
hold.

21John Glenn, in "Kant's Theory of Symbolism," p. 17, recognizes this
point but does not go on to the implications it has for Kant's doctrine
of beauty and morality because his concern lies instead with Kant's con-
tribution to the development of modern theories of symbolism per se.
is not a feature of the object which can be conceptualized.  

However, Kant has developed for us in the opening sections of the Critique the concept of beauty in general. That is, he has, as the basis of his aesthetic theory, developed the concept of this complex relationship between a phenomenal object and a peripient subject, which concept covers what is commonly called an experience of beauty. He might then be holding that the analogy involved in a symbolic presentation of the concept of moral goodness is supposed to hold between, on the one hand, the relationships among the factors which constitute that complex situation called the experience of beauty and, on the other hand, the relationships among the factors which constitute the equally complex situation called moral goodness, the latter of which he had already characterized prior to the third Critique. Then his point would be that as we think about the one, we will find it similar to the other. That is, as we reflect on the experience of beauty in general, we will recognize its similarity to moral goodness. And in part this is what Kant means, as we can see from two different considerations.

The first consideration is that what is supposed to be given symbolic presentation here is sometimes characterized as a "rational idea" or a "rational concept." Back in Section 57, Remark I, Kant has asserted that, "...the rational concept of the supersensible substrate of all phenomena in general, or even of that which must be placed at the basis of our arbitrary will in respect of the moral law, viz. of transcendental freedom, is already, in kind, an indemonstrable concept and a rational idea, while virtue is so in degree." (Bernard trans. p. 188; V, 343) That discussion prepares the reader for Section 59, where it is to be shown how that concept of freedom, which can be entertained in thought but cannot be presented directly in sensory experience, i.e., schematized, can yet be presented symbolically. This is a continuation of the doctrine from the Critique of Pure Reason that the Ideas of reason can be thought and that the noumenal can be thought about, even though those Ideas, strictly speaking, do not give knowledge and the noumenal cannot be known. That they cannot be schematized in experience is one of the main features distinguishing Ideas of reason from other a priori concepts, such as the categories of understanding. The rational concept of freedom would be, for Kant, the concept of a being which is the cause of its own actions, i.e., which is autonomous. Negatively, this entails that such a being is not determined in its actions by forces from outside itself. Positively, it entails that such a being is

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22 Section 6, p. 51 (V, 211); also Section 32, p. 136 (V, 281-82), and Section 58, p. 215 (V, 346).

23 I am assuming here that the "rational concept" of "transcendental freedom" which is at stake is the same as the Idea of freedom which is a postulate of practical reason in the second Critique, which in turn is one of the Ideas of reason which in the first Critique were declared to give us no knowledge, and that Kant deals with his underlying notion of freedom in different terms as the Critical philosophy develops and as various problems become the focus of his attention. However, he does specifically identify "rational concepts" with "ideas" in Section 59, p. 221 (V, 351), as well as in the next passage to be considered.
determined in its actions by something which is intrinsically a part of that being itself, which for Kant means, of course, being determined by reason itself. Thus the concept of freedom, which is the very heart of Kant's notion of morality, is a very complex concept, involving relationships between causes and effects, intrinsic powers and external forces. It is this concept which Kant thinks can be given symbolic presentation by the beautiful.

The second consideration is that Kant does draw out for us in Section 59 the analogy between judgments of taste and moral judgments. As he does so, he is in fact showing the similarities between the very concept of aesthetic experience, which concept he had developed earlier in the third Critique, and that concept of moral goodness which we have just seen him to be concerned about. The four points which he produces (pp. 224-34; V, 353-54) bring out some of the similarities between such appreciation of beauty and such moral goodness, though the list is admittedly not meant to be exhaustive.

(1) The beautiful pleases immediately (but only in intuition, not like morality, its concept).

The immediacy of the pleasure means that we enjoy the activity of reflecting on the perceptual object not as a means to some other end which is good but as an activity which is good in itself. This is parallel to the immediacy of the satisfaction felt in moral action, which action is a good in itself and not just a means to another end. It is an "intrinsic" interest of the human being which is in each of these cases being satisfied.

(2) It pleases apart from all interest (pleasure in the morally good is no doubt necessarily bound up with an interest, but not with one of the kind that are antecedent to the judgement upon the delight, but with one that judgement itself for the first time calls into existence).

There may seem to be a problem here in that the making of moral judgments is not always the same thing as being moral, i.e., being the sort of being which is autonomous in that through reason it governs its own actions. Probably this is another case where Kant casts his discussion into the terminology currently at hand for dealing with a particular set of problems. He need not speak here of our moral action, i.e., our doing of the good, because that had been the central problem in the Critique of Practical Reason, namely, to show how reason could in itself be the motivating factor underlying a certain kind of action. In the Critique of Judgment it would then be sufficient for Kant's purposes to refer to our moral capacity in terms of "judgment," which involves our making judgments as to what one ought to do in any situation of a given type.

This "intrinsic" interest is the kind of interest which I have in my article "The Notion of Interest in Kant's Critique of Judgment" called "non-practical" because it does not directly involve our acting upon the world so as to produce a change in it. It stands in contrast to "practical interest," which is the kind disallowed by Kant in his account of aesthetic experience and referred to in point (2) of the analogy which he is here developing.
The type of interest disallowed in Kant's account of aesthetic experience is that type which is based on sensuous gratification; it is the same type which is disallowed in his account of what it is for a person to be morally autonomous. However, the "interests" of imagination and understanding, as they underlie aesthetic experience, are intrinsic to the human being, just as the "interest" of reason in determining one's willing and action is intrinsic. Kant does not mean to deny their role in either of these cases.

(3) The freedom of the imagination (consequently of our faculty in respect of its sensibility) is, in estimating the beautiful, represented as in accord with the understanding's conformity to law (in moral judgements the freedom of the will is thought as the harmony of the latter with itself according to universal laws of Reason).

In aesthetic experience imagination is supposed to be freer than in cognition, for in reflective judging imagination is not bound by understanding as it is in situations where the application of previously attained concepts is the task at hand. Yet such imaginatively activity is supposed to be "in accord with the understanding's conformity to law" in that it seems to the observer at each moment of the experience that a concept, i.e., a general rule of synthesis, can be attained but simply has not yet been found. In moral judgments, of course, it is the will which is free; but that does not mean lawless. Rather, the rational will is itself supposed to give the law. In each of these cases there is freedom in the sense of a lack of prior determination and also freedom in the sense of an opportunity for self-fulfillment; but such self-fulfillment is always necessarily in terms of an intrinsic nature of the human being, such that freedom is prevented from becoming lawlessness.

(4) The subjective principle of the estimate of the beautiful is represented as universal, i.e. valid for every man, but as incognizable by means of any universal concept (the objective principle of morality is set forth as also universal, i.e. for all individuals, and, at the same time, for all actions of the same individual, and, besides, as cognizable by means of a universal concept).

The principle underlying the judgment of the beautiful is "subjective" because the judgments actually arrived at are based on feelings in the subject and not, as moral judgments are, on concepts. Judgments in each realm, however, are universal in that they extend to all men.\footnote{Section 8, p. 54 (V, 217), where Kant attributes to such judgments "general validity," even though that "validity" is subjective rather than objective.}

Thus we see from this extended analogy that Kant is not claiming that the so-called beautiful object, as a phenomenal object, stands by itself in a symbolic relationship either to moral ideas or to our moral being, but rather that there is a close analogy to be drawn between our judging of the object, i.e., the activity of appreciation, and our being moral,
i.e., the self-determination of our rational will. He is talking about
the beautiful as an object of our judging, which, on his account, is the
interactivity of our imagination, understanding, and feeling capacities
in their relation to the given sensory intuitions. In each point of
the analogy, it is some one element or feature of such experience of the
beautiful which is likened to the corresponding element or feature of
moral judgment. More specifically, it is the relationship of pleasure to
interest which is found similar, or the freedom of the subject from the
charms of the sensuous, or the universality with which one is justified
in attributing to others the judgment which he himself makes. These
relationships are built into Kant's very concepts of beauty and morality
respectively. And they will be detected, he would say, whenever we think
correctly about beauty and morality, even though we are not actually hav­
ing an experience of something beautiful or making moral judgments as we
are thinking about such.

However, the foregoing cannot be the whole story or Kant would be deal­
ing only with an analogy and not with a case of symbolic presentation.
For while aesthetic experience in general is reflected upon and compared
to morality in this passage of the Critique, such reflection, based merely
on the concepts of those two dimensions of human being, does not in itself
constitute an instance of symbolization. What is lacking is the partic­
ularity of any given object of intuition as well as some involvement in
the sensuous, which, for Kant, is the mode in which particulars are al­
ways presented to us human beings. There is, however, a way in which Kant
can still, in his own terms, be making the claim that beauty is the sym­
bol of the morally good. To see how he can be doing that, we must bring
into focus what in general it is that he is talking about in the third
Critique.

Much of the unclarity which surrounds the Critique of Judgment arises
from Kant's failure to point out just when he is talking about what actu­
ally goes on that we can ourselves be aware of in our judging of a per­
ceptual object, i.e., in aesthetic experience, and when he is talking
about what is supposed to be going on "behind the scene," i.e., that of
which we can not be aware but which we must suppose to take place if we
are to understand the experience itself from a philosophical, or "trans­
cendental," point of view. Kant's view may well seem to be that as we

27 That it is in this light that he means to consider beauty is confirmed
by his use for the word "Beurteilung" in points (3) and (4). This word
puts the emphasis on our activity of judging or seeking an "estimate,"
which for Kant constitutes the act of aesthetic appreciation, as opposed
to the judgment which is finally arrived at and which could be uttered
publicly, i.e., the judgment of taste.

28 This problem is not unique to his analysis and explanation of aesthetic
experience. It is merely a continuation of the problem raised by the first
Critique as to how we are to take the notion of "mental activity" in gen­
appreciate a beautiful object we are simply involved in the perceptual judging of it and are most immediately aware of that object, and that it is only as we think, from a philosophical perspective, about that activity of reflection and its prerequisites that we are concerned, for instance, about the reality of the beauty which we claim to find in the object, or that we employ some view or other about our own mental capacities of imagination and understanding and the roles they play in the experience. To read Kant's account in this way would be to say that his formulations about the "free play of imagination" and "the harmonious interaction of imagination and understanding" are theoretical constructs, perhaps drawn metaphorically from the realm of experience, but themselves used in a purely explanatory way and without any counterparts within the aesthetic experience itself of which they could be descriptive.

However, Kant is also committed to the doctrine that within an aesthetic experience itself, even if not within a cognitive experience, we have some intimation of our own mental powers and their purposive functioning. There are a number of passages in which he indicates that in aesthetic experience we have an awareness of our mental activity itself in a way that we do not have in cognitive experience. Furthermore, Kant's language in Section 59 reflects this commitment when he goes on to say that in aesthetic experience "the mind becomes conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above mere sensibility..." (p. 224; V, 353). He clearly

29Kant means to be talking about the same powers of imagination and understanding being at work in aesthetic experience (as that experience is characterized in the third Critique) which are at work in cognitive experience (as that experience had been accounted for in the first Critique). The difference is that in aesthetic experience we are supposed to be more aware of the exercise of our own cognitive powers, even though this is an occasion when they are not actually giving us knowledge about phenomenal objects but are in "free play," whereas in cognitive perceptual experience we are not directly aware of our own mental activity and presumable could not know of it directly, yet that is an occasion when those powers actually give us knowledge about phenomenal objects. The reason that Kant will not call such awareness of our own mental activity "knowledge" seems to be his rather strict characterization of knowledge as objective and potentially communicable. However, we could only "know" that we have a capacity through the actual exercise of such a capacity, and that is something which each person must do for himself.

30Our feeling of pleasure — most often "Gefühl" but occasionally "Lust" or "Empfindung" in Kant's text — either is supposed to be our awareness of the harmonious functioning of our cognitive faculties, or is supposed to be the means of that awareness. See for example, the following passages in the Critique: p. 58 (V, 217); p. 64 (V, 222); p. 105 (V, 256); p. 106 (V, 257-58); p. 143 (V, 287); p. 154 (V, 296); pp. 191-92 (V, 326); p. 220 (V, 350). Cf. the definition of "Lust" as "the idea [Vorstellung] of the agreement of an object or an action with the subjective conditions of life...", Critique of Practical Reason, Lewis White Beck translation, (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts Press, 1956), p. 9, ft. nt. 7, (V, 9), where Kant is referring to the pleasurable awareness we have of our desires being satisfied.
means that the subject becomes aware of his own higher powers, and those presumably would include the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding, which stand in contrast to mere sensibility, which latter ability he always construes as passive rather than active, a "capacity" in contrast to a "faculty." Thus Kant is holding that we are not merely aware of the object of the aesthetic experience but that we are also to some extent aware of ourselves in relationship to that object. He sometimes puts it in terms of our being aware that the object is well suited to our faculties, as though it were purposefully adapted to them.

Then in saying that "the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good" Kant is, in effect, saying the following: not just that beauty, as a feature commonly but somewhat inaccurately ascribed to the phenomenal object itself, is somehow an expression of moral goodness; not just that as we think philosophically about the experience of appreciating beauty, we find it to be analogous to moral goodness; but rather that in the very act of appreciating beauty and making judgments of taste thereon, we have some awareness of ourselves as free, supersensible beings, which awareness relates directly to our awareness of ourselves as free moral agents. What we are aware of is not just beauty as a property of an object, but beauty as a relationship which obtains between that object and ourselves, who are beings of a special kind. This then parallels the awareness which Kant must suppose us to have of our own moral freedom in those moments where we are faced with a choice between allowing inclina-

31 This passage bears comparison with what Kant elsewhere says about the experience of sublimity (as in Section 26, p. 105 top; V, 256). Kant's whole analysis and explanation of that latter experience turns on our having an awareness of our potentially moral nature and our ultimate worth, which enables the experience to be one of delightful and exciting perception rather than one of fearful response to the seemingly overwhelming forms of nature. The passage on page 224 (V, 353) may be an attempt to link up the "elevation" which is a prerequisite for an experience of the sublime with the "elevation" which Kant thinks we attain in the experience of beauty.

32 Another reason for believing this to be his position is that his argument for the "subjective universality" of judgments of taste requires it. He has taken as an element of his basic data in the Critique the fact that in our judgments of taste we do expect concurrence. There is a difference, recognized and employed by even the non-philosophical man, between judging that an object is "agreeable" and judging that it is "beautiful" (see Section 6, 7, and 8). Thus Kant is committed to the view that the experience itself, which underlies the expression of such a judgment, involves, along with the feeling of pleasure, some feeling of universality or shareability of that affective experience. And this would involve some awareness of the object as suitable to those mental capacities which all human beings have. Kant's "Deduction of Judgments of Taste" is then an attempt to justify
tion to determine our willing (Willkün) and allowing our rational will (Wille) to be the determinant, i.e., between doing what we are inclined to do and doing our duty.

This interpretation of Kant's position finds confirmation in his remark that "even common understanding is wont to pay regard to this analogy" (Sec. 59, p. 225; V, 354), i.e., the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good. One need not first understand beauty and moral goodness philosophically to realize the similarity between them. Furthermore, he takes our applying of predicates such as "majestic," "stately," "modest" and "innocent" to beautiful objects to be a sign of our awareness of the analogy. In other words, Kant thinks that we find those terms, which literally apply in the moral realm, to be somehow appropriate in the realm of beauty, and that we use them in particular instances simply on the basis of aesthetic and moral experience, not on the basis of having thought about what must be the connection between beauty and moral goodness while reading Critical philosophy and then drawing the inference that certain of those terms are properly applicable in certain situations of perceptual experience.

Kant seems to be saying, then, that it is natural to reflect on our potential for being moral, even while we are involved in the act of aesthetic appreciation of a beautiful object, where many of the same factors about our innermost nature come to the fore. However, two further

philosophically such a feeling (intimation) as we have in the experience itself and which we express in our formulation and utterance of particular judgments of taste.

33 However, that it is "natural" and, in Kant's eyes, good, does not necessarily make it a common occurrence. While Kant seems to hold in this context that such is a frequent occurrence, his remarks in Section 42 (p. 160; V, 301) make it sound as though the actual conjunction of moral interest with aesthetic experience is somewhat rare, for even those who appreciate pure beauty, as exemplified in nature, do not necessarily see its moral implications. See Neville, "The Notion of Interest in Kant's Critique of Judgment," Part II. However, in Section 59 the point is that whether or not one actually takes delight in nature's being beautiful and whether or not one couples that pure aesthetic delight with and interest in one's own moral being, one has the ability to do so and one becomes most fully and satisfyingly human in doing so.
points deserve to be made here about the scope and application of this doctrine of beauty as a symbolic presentation.

(I) It is any beautiful object which is supposed to be able to serve as a symbolic presentation of the morally good. While aesthetic experience is a matter of apprehending a particular sensory presentation, the relation of that experience to morality turns on that experience being one of a certain kind, one which can be had in the presence of a great variety of phenomenal objects.

This point may, however, seem to conflict with another line of Kant's thought, for he does hold that particular sensory presentations may be correlated with particular ideas, and at a number of places in the Critique he begins to lay the basis for an expression theory of aesthetics. In Section 42, for example, he admits color back into the realm of the beautiful (pp. 161-62; V, 302). He had earlier ruled out colors as merely something charming or agreeable, since they did not in themselves constitute formal features of a perceptual object. He readmits them with the proviso that they are not just apprehended passively, as are those features of objects which are merely agreeable, but that they are in some sense reflected upon. Various colors are supposed to "dispose the mind to ideas" (das Gemuth zu Ideen...zu stimmen), ideas of qualities such as innocence, sublimity, courage, candor, amiability, modesty, constancy, and tenderness. Kant does not explicitly say that these sensory qualities are "symbols" for the ideas of virtue which he couples to them. Yet they are supposed to "have the semblance of higher meaning"; and the fact that he appeals to our "reflecting" on them indicates that he is...
claiming more than a mere conventional association between various colors and the ideas of virtue. He is careful in this context to limit our interpretation of these sensory qualities to those instances in which they occur as natural beauty, for the whole thrust of Section 42 is that we can take a moral interest in natural beauty in a way that we cannot take the same in art. While this doctrine of the meanings of various colors is only stated in passing, it does point up for us an attempt on Kant's part to encompass within his system a scheme by which particular sensory givens can be presentations of various moral ideas and not just of the idea of morality in general.36

At the very end of Section 59 the doctrine of the expressiveness of aesthetic features is applied to objects of both nature and art. Here the qualities attributed to the beautiful objects are majesty and statelessness, laughter and gaiety, innocence, modesty, softness -- some of which are more clearly moral qualities than are the others.

Finally in Section 60, the "Methodology of Taste," Kant claims that, "...taste is, in the ultimate analysis, a critical faculty that judges of the rendering of moral ideas in terms of sense (through the intervention of a certain analogy in our reflection on both)...." (p. 227; V, 365). Here we notice again the reference to moral ideas, in the plural. Kant had admitted in Section 57 (p. 211 bottom; V, 343) that the ideas of the various virtues can in part be schematized, that is, presented directly in

36Kant's whole theory of art, too, moves in this direction of an expression theory, though it is difficult to say just what is supposed to be expressed in a work of art. Cf. foot note 18 above. While art works may be formally beautiful in terms of spatial and temporal features, Kant takes it as given that they are representational, with "the beautiful representation [Vorstellung] of an object, which is properly only the form of the presentation [Darstellung] of a concept," serving as "the means by which the latter is universally communicated" (p. 174; V, 312). Such art, when produced by a "genius," contains as well "aesthetic ideas," which are "representations of the imagination which induce much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e., concept, being adequate to it...." (pp. 175-76; V, 314).
experience; presumably that would happen in the acts and character of the persons we encounter. He is now asserting that in particular phenomenal objects which we judge beautiful, we may find analogues for the particular virtues which we also find embodied in particular persons.

In most general terms, Kant is holding that anything beautiful can be a symbol for morality itself, while certain beautiful things can, for some as of yet unexplained reasons, be symbols of particular moral virtues. Just as we could not have and properly use those more particularized notions of virtue without the primal concept of morality in general, i.e., of freedom as autonomy, so those particular phenomenal objects could not be the symbolic presentations of these virtues unless they were at least beautiful in the purely formal sense. Thus it is Section 59 which states the basic doctrine, of which these other passages are only extensions and applications.

There are, however, a number of issues being dealt with at the same time in this troublesome but provocative Section 59. And that fact brings us to the second point, which is a qualification about the extent of Kant's claim about beauty being the symbol of the morally good.

(2) Kant does not suppose that the symbolic relationship between beauty and moral goodness constitutes an argument for morality or for the actuality of human freedom. He is not claiming that one will, from an experience of beauty, correctly arrive at the belief that he is a morally free being. Rather, the very concept of morality, together with an awareness of our own potentially moral nature, is a prerequisite for the occurrence of the kind of symbolic presentation which is here in question. That this really is Kant's position is indicated by his calling the "development of moral ideas and the culture of the moral feeling" the "true propædeutic for laying the foundations of taste" (p. 227; V, 356), a claim he could hardly make if he thought that from an experience of beauty we could first become convinced of our actual capacity for morality. It is indicated as well by his general reservation against supposing that analogies can be used to gain knowledge of the existence of particular types of beings.37 He takes the function of analogies, rather, to be that of helping us to form concep-

37 In Part II of the Critique of Judgment (pp. 135-37; V, 463-65) Kant cautions against using arguments based on analogies to try to establish "the real existence of an original being, regarded as a God...that is to say, regarded as a moral Author of the world..." While discussion in that passage is limited specifically to the teleological argument for the nature and existence of God, it would seem that Kant would also hold that any argument from the freedom of our imagination in aesthetic perception to the freedom of our will in moral choice — i.e., to the existence of a free will — would suffer from comparable difficulties.
tions of those things which we do not understand as well as we understand the things to which they are being likened. That is, analogies are supposed to help us to understand, in the sense of comprehending more thoroughly, what certain things are like, but not to know that those things are at all. That this is indeed the function of the specific analogy between aesthetic experience and moral goodness which Kant begins to work out for us, is made clear when we look at the doctrine of the symbolic relationship between beauty and morality in the context of the Critique of Judgment as a whole.

One underlying task of the Critique is to find a way in which we can think of ourselves as integrated beings, where it is already granted that we have a capacity for knowledge as well as a capacity for action, both prudential and moral, together with a capacity for feelings of various kinds. Reflection on the commonality of our aesthetic and our moral proclivities is then, for Kant, a method for attaining that goal of seeing ourselves as whole selves.

The doctrine of the symbolic relationship between beauty and moral goodness also has a use in the context of aesthetics proper, in that that doctrine is, to the extent that we have examined it, Kant's way of accounting for and justifying a rather vague feeling which we may often have had and which many philosophers have sought to explain in rather different terms, namely, the feeling that the experience of beauty has significance beyond itself, a significance which cannot be done justice by a merely formalistic theory of beauty such as Kant has himself developed in the opening sections of the Critique of Judgment. The significance which he does attribute to beauty, then, is one of enabling us to come to a better understanding of ourselves.

Confusion may well arise for the reader from the fact that much of Kant's argument in Section 59 seems to depend on the beautiful object being natural as opposed to being a human artifact. This emphasis indicates, however, a further concern on Kant's part, namely one of reconciling our understanding of ourselves as free transcendent beings with our understanding of ourselves as creatures in the phenomenal realm of nature. He takes the beauty of nature to be such a point of reconciliation, for beauty is ultimately to be understood as the suitability of given phenomenal objects to our perceptual and cognitive faculties. That nature exhibits beauty where it might have been unpleasing because chaotic -- or might even have been just plain dull to look at -- seems to be a sign of some higher purpose, or of some common ground of both nature and ourselves. While this line of thought is of vital importance to Kant's completing of his Critical system, and while its development had begun in Section 42 and continues in Section 59, it should not be conflated with the doctrine of beauty as the symbol of the morally good. These two rather different concerns as to the way in which beauty, in terms of our aesthetic experience, can have significance beyond itself, are ad-

mittedly, brought together in the middle of Section 59 in the following words:

..both on account of this inner possibility in the subject and of the external possibility of a nature that agrees to it, it [the faculty of judgment] finds itself to be referred to something within the subject as well as without him, something which is neither nature nor freedom, but which yet is connected with the supersensible ground of the latter. In this supersensible ground, therefore, the theoretical faculty is bound together in unity with the practical in a way which, though common, is yet unknown (Bernard trans, p. 199; V, 353)\textsuperscript{39}

Nevertheless, Kant is working with two rather distinct ways in which beauty can have significance beyond itself. The first, with which we have found him concerned, is that the experience of beauty is a point in our experience at which we can be particularly aware of our higher faculties, both the cognitive and the moral — or as he calls them, the theoretical and the practical. The second would be that the beauty of nature relates us to the phenomenal world in a special way. Nature, which is the realm of causal determinism, seems not entirely indifferent to us and our concerns, in that it contains objects which are suitable to various of our highest purposes.

The former of these two points does need to be understood first, in order to fully appreciate the latter. For when the significance of the experience of beauty for our general understanding of ourselves is appreciated, then the fact that nature does provide us with an abundance of beautiful objects which can be the basis of such experiences, becomes for Kant all the more striking. Then nature not only pleases us by delighting our higher faculties, but nature actually provides us with a means of developing our awareness that we ourselves are not merely part of nature.

\textsuperscript{39}"...und sieht sich sowohl wegen dieser innern Möglichkeit im Subjecte, als wegen der äußern Möglichkeit einer damit Übereinstimmenden Natur auf etwas im Subjecte selbst und außer ihm, was nicht Natur, auch nicht Freiheit, doch aber mit dem Grunde der letzteren, nämlich dem Übersinnlichen, verknüpft ist, bezogen, in welchem das theoretische Vermögen mit dem praktischen auf gemeinschaftliche und unbekannte art zur Einheit verbunden wird."