John Duns Scotus teaches that God is an immediate, efficient cause of created volitions. He comes to this conclusion as an outcome of his logically prior commitments to the absolute contingency of God's relationship to the world and to the doctrine of God's certain, determinate foreknowledge of future, contingent events. On a first consideration, the doctrine of God's immediate causality would seem to imply determinism of the created will. If that were so, then this determinism would conflict with what is generally taken to be a hallmark of Scotistic thought, namely, the radically indeterminist freedom of the created will.

In what follows we shall first establish the fact and rationale of Scotus's teaching on God's immediate causality of created volitions. Second, we shall examine how Scotus understands this immediate causality so as to avoid the entailment of determinism, which he accomplishes through a remarkable application of his theory of partial, essentially ordered co-causes. In the third part we shall attend to two recent interpretations of Scotus that, contrary to our thesis, accept the entailment of determinism of created wills. Our engagement of these “revisionist” interpretations of Scotus's voluntarism will help
to bring out something of the subtle and remarkable character of the cooperative unity of divine and created wills. Finally, we shall conclude with some observations on Scotus's regard for the element of mystery in our knowledge of God.

THE TEACHING OF IMMEDIATE DIVINE CAUSALITY

Duns Scotus introduces the thesis of God's immediate causality in *Ordinatio* 2.37.2 as an objection targeting the claim that a created will is the total, immediate cause of its volitions. The fundamental assumption supporting the targeted thesis is that freedom of will necessarily entails being the total, immediate cause of one's own volitional acts. Under this assumption, the denial of the


2. Two key terms in *Ordinatio* 2.37.2 are "total" and "immediate" cause. A cause is said to be immediate when the exercise of its causality is not the effect of its participating in the prior causal action of another agent. Take, for example, the theory of generation whereby a bull exercises his generative powers only by a participation in the generating power exercised by the celestial bodies. In this case, the bull exercises mediate efficient causality. To say that a cause is immediate is to deny any such hierarchial or vertical dependency. But this is not to deny dependency altogether. First of all, the immediate cause may be a dependent being in that it was created, and is continuously conserved in existence, by another—the main thing is that, now in existence, the exercise of its causality is not caused by another. And second, an
conditions of totality and immediacy amounts to a denial of freedom of will. Accordingly, if the objection is sustained, it would count also as a denial of created, free will—unless, of course, either totality or immediacy is not a condition of freedom. This will be the key issue of the second part. The crucial thesis concerning divine causality is established with the following argument.

(1) God knows with certitude future contingents only because God knows the determinations of God's own (immutable and unimpeachable) will with respect to these future contingents. But (2) if the created will were the total, immediate cause of its own volition bearing itself contingently toward that volition, then the created will would be able to will otherwise than what the divine will has determined in its immediate volition. (That is, the created will might will b rather than a when the divine will has already willed a rather than b.) Consequently, (3) God's determinate foreknowledge could never be certain. However, given that (4) God has certain foreknowledge of future contingents, it follows that (5) the created will cannot be the total, immediate, efficient cause of its volitions.

immediate cause in order to be effective may depend laterally upon another cause causing. In other words, an immediate cause need not be a total cause. Take, for instance, the case of two mules pulling a barge. Let us say that neither is sufficient by itself to move the barge, though with each pulling its own weight, they can do the job together. Each is a partial cause. Note, however, that the dependency is lateral in the sense that each mule pulls its own load and in doing so does not derive that causal power from the other. Hence it is possible to have a partial, immediate cause: In order for one cause (C₁) to bring about an effect (E) it depends upon another cause (C₂) bringing about the same effect (E), but C₂ does not cause C₁'s causing. These concepts will be developed later in reference to Scotus's texts, especially in the second section below.


4. One must not read too much into this proposition. It should be understood to imply only that the divine volition of future contingents is a necessary condition for the certain knowledge of the event. It does not imply that the divine volition suffices for the causal efficacy of such events, nor does it suggest any explanation of how God knows future contingents. The fourth section below develops the significance of properly understanding the nature of the knowledge Scotus claims we have of God's knowledge of future contingents.
Therefore, (6) God must be an immediate, efficient cause of the created volition.\(^5\)

The voluntarist account of divine foreknowledge expressed in premises (1) and (4) is simply invoked in the argument in *Ordinatio* 2.37.2. The position itself Scotus develops in conjunction with *Sentences* 1.38–40.\(^6\) There Scotus first argues to the fact of divine foreknowledge and then explains how such a fact could be true of a God whose relationship to the world is radically contingent.

We can approach the first part of the doctrine\(^7\)—the fact of divine foreknowledge—by concretely imagining that either tomorrow Adam

\(^5\) Statements (1)–(6) are my reconstruction of one of the arguments Scotus deploys to defeat the proposition that the created will is the total and immediate cause of its own volition (as in Wolter p. 394, no. 96; Vivés 13:373–374).

\(^6\) There are four versions of Scotus’s opinion on the issue of divine foreknowledge of future contingents as it is taken up in Peter Lombard’s *Sentences* 1.38–40. None of them represents the final determination of the question. When it came time to treat the topic in his *Ordinatio*, Scotus left blank a section corresponding to the second part of distinction 38 and all of distinction 39. Presumably he intended to return to it after determining other issues. The three extant versions are: (1) his early lectures (*Lectura* 1.39.1–5 [Vatican 17:481–510]); (2) an “examined report” of Scotus’s Paris lectures on the *Sentences* (*Reportatio examinata* iA.38–40 [as in Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek lat. 1453, ff. 113rb–117vb]); (3) a text probably put together by disciples or associates from (1) and (2) and some other source(s) in order to fill the lacuna Scotus left in the *Ordinatio* (as in Vatican 6:401–444); (4) what appears to be an abridgement of (2) by Scotus’s secretary, William Alnwick, now known as the *Additiones magne*. On the nature and authenticity of (3), see the editors’ “Adnotationes,” Vatican 6:26*–30*, and Wolter, “Scotus’ Paris Lectures,” pp. 285–287. An edition of (4) was mistakenly offered by Wadding as a Parisian report (Vivés 22:468–478); on its correct attribution, see Vatican 7:4*, and Wolter, *John Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings, A Selection*, 2d ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), pp. xxv–xxvi. Comparative studies of the different versions are available in Hermann Schwamm, *Das göttliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinem Anhängern* (Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1934), pp. 5–60; and Wolter, “Scotus’ Paris Lectures.” See also William Lane Craig, “John Duns Scotus on God’s Foreknowledge and Future Contingents,” *Franciscan Studies* 47 (1987): 98–112, which focuses on (3). Since (2) appears to represent Scotus’s latest teaching on the matter, it will be the chief source for this study.

\(^7\) Scotus *Reportatio examinata* iA.38, f. 114ra: “Respondeo ergo ad quaestionem quod Deus novit determinate et infallibiliter eventum omnem contingentem, non solum in generali quod futura evenient, sed in speciali quod hoc futurum eveniet. Quare autem ita sit hoc potest sic declarari: Deus potest scire alteram partem contradictionis determinate, quam etiam hoc possum certo scire cum altera pars evenit. Sed
will consent to eat the forbidden fruit or he will refuse it. But today the fact of the matter is undetermined, and we cannot say with any certitude what will be so. Yet by the end of tomorrow we could know certainly one of the contradictory parts to be true. This knowledge we could have tomorrow of the determinate, contingent event will come as something new. Now if a finite person were to have certain, determinate knowledge of this fact, then so also must God know this. But in contrast to the finite knowers, God does not come to the knowledge as something new. Indeed, God must always already have known this contingent reality. In other words, God has certain foreknowledge of the future contingent, "Adam will consent to eat the forbidden fruit." In the next step, in fathoming the rationale of such knowledge, Scotus introduces divine voluntarism.

Indeed, Scotus posits at the source of the contingent act to be known an act of the divine will. When God knows anything not coeval with the uncreated Godhead, God knows it either by seeing the determination of God's own will or through knowing God's own essence inasmuch as it includes God's free and contingent volition of created realities. To put it concretely, both Adam consents and

---

Deus non potest scire hoc de novo, quia nihil est in eo novum; alias mutaretur; ergo ab aeterno novit vel alteram partem contradictionis vel utrumque. Non utrumque, quia hoc nihil est noscere, quia tunc nosceretur idem esse hoc et non esse hoc, quae formaliter repugnant; ergo determinate novit alteram partem contradictionis cuiuslibet, et per consequens infallibiliter."

8. Scotus Reportatio examinata 1A.38, f. 114rb: "ita quaelibet talis contingens est vera, quia veritas eius est primo causata per actum voluntatis divinae, et non quia vera, ideo voluntas vult eam esse veram, sed econtra; et ideo veritate causata in complexione talium terminorum determinata per actum voluntatis, intellectus divinus tunc primo novit unam partem contradictionem contingentium esse veram."

9. Scotus entertains two possible ways that the prior divine volition is known posteriorly in an act of the divine intellect. An actual determination of the issue, however, is irrelevant to the immediate issue. Thus Reportatio examinata 1A.38, f. 114rb: "Sive ergo dicatur primo modo vel secundo, quod scilicet intellectus determinet ad unam partem contradictionis ex essentia sola sicut ex ratione cognoscendi, sive ex determinatione voluntatis acceptantis unam partem et non aliam et omnipotentia eius non impedibili, sequitur statim ex his duobus quod intellectus divinus habet: notitiam certam determinatam et infallibiliter unius partis contradictionis futuri contingentiae." In fact, Scotus seems to favor the second account (i.e., the divine essence as the basis for knowing); see Wolter, "Scotus' Paris Lectures," pp. 289–292. The first account, which Scotus sees as less probable, represents the position
God immediately wills Adam's consent, and by knowing God's own immutable and unimpeded volition God knows the created reality. More generally, the idea here is that God knows these things through knowing God's own creative volition of a rather than not-\textit{a}. In other words, what God knows is what God freely determines by an act of will. Within the larger scheme of Scotus's thought, of course, the reason for this voluntaristic account is that only thus does he think it possible to avoid some vilification of divine freedom.

Yet a deterministic understanding of the created will may seem an inevitable outcome of such a theory. Under these terms, can a created will be the originative, efficient source for its volition of a rather than not-\textit{a}? When Adam consented to eat the forbidden fruit, could he have not consented or even refused? By the argument of \textit{Reportatio} 1A.38, Scotus has come to think that God has immutably and unimpededly willed, by a volition coeval with God's original, creative act, Adam's consent to eat the fruit. So when in the course of time Adam consents to the deed, what sense would it make to say that Adam could have done otherwise?

Scotus could not have been unaware of the deterministic implication. First of all, the doctrine of divine foreknowledge is called upon by Scotus as a premise in an argument deployed in refutation of a thesis that makes freedom of the created will co-implicant with the created will's being a total, immediate cause of its volition. And so, one might argue, to take away the created will's total domination over its acts is to take away its freedom.

Second, the doctrine of God's immediate causality occurs in a question situated within a set of distinctions devoted to the issue of sin.\textsuperscript{10} At \textit{Ordinatio} 2.37.2 the development is brought to the point

---

\textsuperscript{10} Most immediately, with the unit comprising \textit{Ordinatio} 2.34. (whether sin originates from something good as from a cause), 2.35 (whether sin is essentially the privation of the good), 2.36 (whether sin is a punishment for sin), 2.37.1 (whether sin can be from God), and 2.37.2 (whether the created will is the total and immediate cause of its own volition in such a way that God has no immediate, but only mediate, efficiency with respect to that volition). For these, see \textit{Vives} 13:335–392. The broader context is the last half of book 2, distinctions 21–44 (\textit{Vives} 13:132–498).
of explaining what responsibility God bears for the evil of God's creatures' sin. In the first part of *Ordinatio* 2.37.2 Scotus has explained how God would be exempt from culpability if created wills were total and immediate causes for their own volitions. But, as we have just seen, Scotus thinks the antecedent cannot be true. In the next phase of the question, then, Scotus is constrained to explain how God is not culpable for the evil of an act that God immediately causes. Since evil acts are morally imputable and since an act is morally imputable only to a free agent, it follows that if the created will acts deterministically then it would seem that God is responsible for the evil of sin. Scotus goes to some length to avoid this consequence, and, as we shall see, his strategy entails a denial of any determinism of the created will.

**IMMEDIATE DIVINE CAUSALITY AND DETERMINISM**

Scotus’s account of sin in *Ordinatio* 2.37.2 presupposes an indeterminist freedom of the created will. The basic idea goes like this: (1) There are two distinct factors in the composition of a sinful act, namely, its matter and its form. (2) The specific evil of sin lies in the formal factor. (3) The formal factor must necessarily be the effect of a free agent. (4) Only created wills are immediately responsible for the formal aspect of sin. Therefore, (5) if there is sin, then there must be freedom of the will on the part of the created will. What this means, then, is not only does the created will

exercise an indeterminist free will in its act of sinning, but the created will is an immediate, efficient cause of this act; yet God also is an immediate, efficient cause for the same act, which raises the question: How can there be two immediate, efficient causes for the same act and in such a way that one is not responsible for the evil of the act whereas the other is? In what follows we shall first of all elaborate Scotus's concept of sin and then, second, answer the question through an explication of his theory of partial, essentially ordered co-causes.

ON SIN

Scotus explains that sin has both a material and a formal cause. The "matter" of sin is the material performance, the positive act (or omission) that we could describe in nonevaluative terms. For instance, in the case of a lie, the material performance consists of a person's saying something untrue to a neighbor under particular circumstances of motivation, manner, place, and time. The "form" of sin is the privation of justice due to such a concrete, material performance. In other words, in the act of will resulting in the material performance, the agent was aware that the intended act was not in conformity with the dictate of the agent's right reason. Accordingly, when the will thus wills, its act is deprived of due justice.

Notice here that a person sins by performing an act whose very generation and meaning includes a rejection of an alternative act projected in the face of the same material elements but in which the alternative act possesses a form as dictated by the agent's right reason. This is to say, then, that sin is always a case of an act that could have been otherwise. The "other" not willed is possessed of a becoming harmony reflective of due justice. By contrast, the sin appears as sin precisely in the privation of such moral beauty.

As regards this privation, Scotus invokes a traditional, Augustinian account in explaining that there is no efficient cause, but rather a "de-ficient" cause. Because Scotus considers the will-as-such a pure perfection, univocally predicable of God and creature, he takes pains to insist that it is the will-as-somehow-deficient that causes sin. In and of itself, apart from accidental deficiencies, the will possesses no innate limitations or imperfections. Indeed the infinite will necessarily acts perfectly, and finite wills can act perfectly or not. Only finite wills are liable to cause efficiently an entity deprived of due justice.

But if God must be an immediate co-cause of the sin, how does one explain God's lack of responsibility? In reply, Scotus explains that where essentially ordered causes concur to produce a common deficient effect, the defect can result wholly from the failure on the part of one cause. He cites as an example his doctrine of the intellect and will's co-causality of a volition. In this case, the intellect may operate perfectly within the limits of its nature, but because its co-cause, the will, functions deficiently, their common effect is imperfect. Similarly, Scotus thinks God's contribution to the common effect is a perfect instance of divine volition, but the outcome is still a sin, due, however, to the failure of the creaturely partner.

If God never acts unjustly, where is the justice in the sinful acts God co-causes? Perhaps Scotus could answer: There is no justice, for the creature's deficiency deprived God of an opportunity to be the co-cause of some just volition. Yet in this there is no culpable injustice either, for God is not bound in justice to God's creatures, and so there can never be on God's part the privation of a justice due a creature by God.

16. Ordinatio 2.37.2.9 (Wolter, p. 326, no. 103; Vivès 13:375).
19. Ordinatio 2.37.2.14. On the doctrine of the will/intellect co-causality and its development within Scotus's works see Bonansea, "Duns Scotus' Voluntarism."
Nevertheless, there is a great loss, for out of sheer generosity God would unfailingly give rectitude if the created will were, for its part, to will justly. For its part the created will can and is bound to do this. In sinning, the creature does not do what it is bound to do, thereby depriving God of the opportunity to do what God would do but is not bound to do. As Scotus puts it in scholastic terms: by God's antecedent will God gives rectitude to every created volition God co-causes. God does this in making the original gift of free will to the creature, for as part of the gift God gives the created will the inviolable power and obligation to act in rectitude. Furthermore, by God's consequent will God will give rectitude to each actual volition unless some impediment rooted in the co-cause precludes this.22

Scotus offers a helpful clarification when he warns against a false conceit concerning the interrelationship between God's antecedent will and the creature's cooperation. He says it is not a case of the creature obliterating or canceling what God had posited in a prior act.23 This false conceit envisions two distinct effects, somewhat after the fashion of a contract originally struck and subsequently broken, or a word originally written and in a second moment erased, or a rod first wrought straight and later bent. In reality there is ever only one effect. The privation appears as the absence of a counterfactual, of what God would have co-caused had the creature done otherwise. God's antecedent will is evident not as a prior act subsequently eliminated, but more subtly as the background of what would have been (namely, God's consequent cooperation if God had been given the opportunity) and what could have been (since God endowed created wills with the power of liberty).

This account of sin makes two things evident. First, Scotus clearly holds the created will fully responsible for the absence of due justice—the evil—of sin. The created will by its very nature has the ability

---

to act in accordance with the dictates of its right reason. It sins only because it exercises an option for the less perfect of opposite acts: at the instant of its act it could have done otherwise. The sin is therefore a contingent act, and the created will is an origination source of its contingency. In short, the will acts out of an indeterminist freedom. Second, Scotus evidently presumes God and the created will to be immediate, but partial, co-efficient causes of the created volition. The next step is to examine the nature of this co-causality.

ON CO-CAUSALITY

The doctrine of partial, efficient causes employed in the solution of *Ordinatio* 2.37.2 had been worked out by Scotus in other contexts.\(^{24}\) We find it chiefly in his account of the origin of intellect through the co-causality of both intellect and object.\(^{25}\) This original doctrine then served as a model for his account of volition as the effect of the co-causality of both intellect and will.\(^{26}\) As a third application, Scotus now invokes the theory in *Ordinatio* 2.37.2 to explain the form of God’s causal partnership with created wills.

The basic idea is that two causes concur in the causation of a single effect. Each cause’s contribution is necessary, but not sufficient, for the effect. Furthermore, the two cohere in such a way as to constitute a total cause. Scotus then refines this broad description by means of a classification. He first divides co-causes into those that exercise natures or powers of the same sort and those of a different sort. As an example of the first dividing part we can imagine two mules pulling


\(^{26}\) Scotus’s development on this issue is evident in the various versions of his commentary on *Sentences* 2.25. See Bonansea, “Duns Scotus’ Voluntarism”; and the editors “Praefatio” to Scotus’s Lectura 2 (Vatican 18:xi–xii).
a load. There is nothing qualitatively different about the power that each mule exercises in pulling its load: each contributes to the effect in virtue of the same generic power. Although neither mule is sufficient on its own to pull the common load, it is conceivable that an intensification of the power already present in one mule would enable it to pull the whole load by itself. The distinction between the two mules combined in their union as a team expresses accidental differences of quantity. Accordingly, Scotus calls such ordered causes accidental.

Opposed to such accidentally ordered causes are essentially ordered causes. In this, the concurrent causes unite in virtue of a distinction expressive of different natures. Although neither cause in fact suffices to bring about the effect, no increase in accidental features of either cause suffices to overcome the limitation of essence that is overcome only by the holistic integration of the two natures. The concurrence of male and female in begetting offspring is an example Scotus frequently uses. Neither mother nor father suffice independently of the other, and, further, the necessary contribution of each is rooted in an essential difference between their generative powers.

Scotus also holds that where there are two different essences or natures they can be ranked or ordered as prior and posterior. The idea here is that one nature is greater or more perfect than the other relative to some hierarchial scheme. When united with another in a co-causal relationship, the greater manifests its superiority by “giving more” to the effect, even if it gives only mediately through

27. Quodlibet 15.33: “Dico quod causae concurrentes quandoque sunt eiusdem rationis et ordinis, ut plures trahentes navem”; parallel idea at Ordinatio 1.3.3.2.495-496 (Vatican 3:293), and at Lectura 2.25, published by Charles Balić as secundae additiones in “Une question inédite de J. Duns Scot sur la volonté,” RTAM 3 (1931): 191-208.

the instrumentality of another. Indeed, Scotus insists that the lesser, posterior co-cause can be the total, immediate cause of its effect without contradicting its inferior status. For example, in the case of God and the created will, Scotus thinks that even if God were only a mediate, efficient cause of the created volition, the divine will would be the superior efficient cause because it "gives more"—it exercises greater influence insofar as God creates and conserves the created will with its power for independent action.²⁹ What is important to observe here is that Scotus separates this issue of causal immediacy and independence from excellence of causal nature.

Essentially ordered co-causes are subsequently divided into what I shall call "participative" and "autonomous."³⁰ In the case of participative, essentially ordered causes, the superior cause moves the inferior. More precisely, the inferior only exercises its causality by participating in the causality being exercised simultaneously by the superior. In one example, Scotus speaks of the hand moving the stick to move the ball. In a second example, he refers to the father's exercise of his generative powers by participating in the universal, generative powers of the sun moving along its celestial path, thereby perpetuating the cycle of generation and corruption among animate things.³¹ The definitive feature of such participative, concurrent causes is that the inferior exercises its proper causality only by sharing in the fuller possession of causal power being exercised by the superior.

Opposed to participative, essentially ordered causes are autonomous, partial co-causes. Although the two causes are ordered as superior to inferior according to their essential natures as active powers, the inferior's dependence on the superior in its act of causing is not a matter of participating in the other's fuller causality, nor does the superior otherwise move the inferior to exercise its causality. Rather,

²⁹. Against the claim that an essentially inferior cause could not be a more immediate cause of an effect than the relevant superior cause of the same effect, see Scotus's reply at Ordinatio 2.37.2.7 (Wolter, p. 323, no. 95; Vivès 13:373). On the distinction of the order of dependence from the order of eminence, see De primo 1.6–9 and 2.44–49.

³⁰. Compare Effler’s division of the same into “dependent” and “independent” in Scotus and the Principle, p. 157.

³¹. Quodlibet 15.33, Ordinatio 1.3.3.2.496 (Vatican 3:293–294), Lectura 2.25 (Balcić, p. 203).
both superior and inferior causes act on behalf of the common effect with an independent, self-moving exercise of causality. To be sure, neither on its own effort suffices to cause the effect: neither is the total cause. In short, each cause independently exercises its own causality, but only in cooperation do they bring about the effect.

To illustrate autonomous co-causes Scotus cites the examples of mother and father with respect to their common offspring, the interdependence of nib and quill in the act of writing, and the cooperation of husband and wife in the regulation of a household. He develops the first example somewhat: although the mother in her capacity as generative cause is inferior to the father, she nevertheless contributes to the total, generative act a necessary, positive aspect absent from the father’s contribution. In order to make her contribution, to exercise her essential, generative efficiency, the mother is dependent on the father’s simultaneous exercise of his generative efficacy. Yet this dependence is not a case of the mother receiving her causality from the more perfect father, nor does the more perfect father in any way possess the total causality in an eminent fashion. Each cause provides the other the opportunity for the exercise of their separate, but coordinated and complementary, lines of efficient causality.32

Such then is the general form of autonomous, essentially ordered causality. It combines aspects of the other two kinds of concurrent causality. Like the participative, one cause is superior in nature to the other; yet unlike it, the superior does not cause the inferior’s causing. In this latter respect, the autonomous is like accidentally ordered concurrent causes, where each cause independently pulls its own load, so to speak. But unlike the accidental, each autonomous co-cause has something distinctive from the other and proper to its own essence from which it derives its causal efficacy.33

As mentioned before, Scotus exploits the possibilities of this form of concurrent causality in three important philosophical issues: how the intellect and the intelligible object cause intellection; how the will and the intellect cause volition; and how God and the created will cause created volitions. In each case Scotus argues that the two

32. Ibid.
33. To arrive at this notion of a distinctive operative difference in essentially ordered co-causes I have extrapolated from Scotus's examples, emphasizing that the order of the two must respond to qualitative differences in the causes compared.
cooperate as autonomous, essentially ordered, partial causes. The first two topics are well considered in Scotus studies; the third is the subject of this study.

Now let us bring the doctrine to bear on the issue of determinism raised at the end of the first part. Recall the determinist argument: If God from all eternity is an immediate, efficient cause of Adam’s volition, then at the time Adam willed he could not have done otherwise, and hence Adam exercises his will deterministically. In line with the above account, Scotus’s reply would be that Adam also is an immediate, efficient cause. Indeed, both God and Adam are autonomous, essentially ordered, partial co-causes of the single effect, namely, Adam’s consent. Both agents operate independently, yet simultaneously, with respect to the same intentional object. Each gives the other the opportunity to act without either causing the other’s causing. With respect to the common effect, each is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. Furthermore, each acts in accordance with its own nature, which means freely and contingently. In the order of eminence, God’s will, identical with God’s essence, is a nature superior to Adam’s created will. Because of their independent lines of causality, deficiency on the part of one co-cause suffices to explain imperfection in the effect without entailing deficiency on the part of the other co-cause.

One might wonder, however, whether this account does not imply some imperfection in God by the fact that in order to be an efficient cause of a created volition God must depend on the contingent exercise of a created will. Perhaps the objection could be sustained either if the created will were to cause the divine volition or if God were somehow needful of the effect. But the first is not so, for the whole idea of autonomous, partial co-causes avoids such caused causing. Nor is the second so, for the prior demonstration of God’s infinite perfection makes it clear that God is not needful.

34. If one were to systematize these three doctrines, a simple human volition would have as its total cause the integration of four essentially ordered partial co-causes: (1) divine will and (2) human will, which in turn operates only as a co-cause with (3) human intellect, which in its turn co-causes intellection with (4) the intellect’s object.

35. On Scotus’s concept of the infinite see Quodlibet 5.5–11; for his treatment of God’s infinity see Ordinatio 1.2.1.1–2.74–146 (Vatican 2:174–214) and parallel
A second objection might start from the requirement of the simultaneity of God and Adam's co-causality. Did not this issue arise in the first place by the requirement of God's foreknowledge of Adam's consent, a knowledge God could have, so the theory insisted, only because God immediately willed this consent in a moment coeval with the original, creative act? Scotus would reply that God's willing of Adam's consent takes place in the eternal now, whereas Adam's willing takes place in a temporal now. Granting that the eternal now is prior to the temporal now, Scotus nevertheless carefully explains that the precedence is not similar to the way some earlier temporal now precedes a later temporal now. Therefore it can be true: (1) that the divine will's immediate causing of Adam's volition is in the eternal now, and (2) that the eternal now is coincident with a temporal now temporally prior to the temporal now in which Adam is the immediate cause of his volition. But it does not follow (3) that God's volition is temporally prior to Adam's act.

Scotus's idea is that the eternal now is coincident with every temporal now. But to think of the eternal now as coincident with a sequence of time misleads, for a sequence of time has no temporal now. Indeed, Scotus observes that such a mis-thought derives from a false imagination. Because God's act is in the eternal now we incline

treatment in Lectura 1.2.1.1–2.64–86 (Vatican 16:134–142); Reportatio 1A.2.1 (281–307); and De primo 4.46–70. Also see the corresponding commentaries on De primo by Kluxen, Prentice, and Wolter, as well as the latter's “Oxford Dialogue on Language and Metaphysics,” Review of Metaphysics 32 (1978): 323–348.

36. Ordinatio 1.40.9 (Vatican 6:311–312). The parallel in Reportatio 1A.39–40, fol.117va, says: "quod actus iste divinus secundum causalitatem suam non transit in praeteritum, sed solum secundum modum suum significandi. Actus enim huius verbi 'praedestinavit' est ita praesens modo sicut fuit ab aeterno, sed dicitur 'praesens' inquantum nunc aeternitatis in quo Deus cuncta facit, coexistit nostro presenti et praeteritum inquantum coexistit nostro praeterito et ita de futuro quae non differunt in Deo nisi tantum secundum nostrum modum significandi, quia secundum Augustinum super Ioannem, quare de Christo idem est in Deo, audiet, audit et audivit. Actus tamen qui, secundum realitatem suam transit in praeteritum, est necessarius et propositio scita de eo vera est necessaria absque praeteritione reali actus vel obiecti. Iste igitur imaginatur Deum dermisive usque hucusque et Deum praeconsiliari et tunc potest determinare se ad actum praedestinationis. Dico ergo quod quodlibet est sibi ita novum hodie sicut ab aeterno, quia numquam fuit aliquid sibi novum. Unde si voluntas mea haberet actum suum in instanti, non magis accipit necessitatem ex illo. Sic nec actus divinus nihil necessitatis accipit ex instanti aeternitatis."
to think of it as past, no doubt because the eternal now was coincident with any past now.

But this imagined situation is false. For that now of eternity in which this act exists is always present. And concerning the divine will or his volition, one ought to understand it... just as if, per impossible, God were now to begin to have the volition in this temporal now. (Ordinatio 1.40.8)

Regarding the argument for determinism, then, Scotus would deny that determinism follows from the fact of God's immediate causality. His theory of partial, essentially ordered co-causes exposes a more flexible logical space. There are sound reasons for insisting on the immediate and free causality of both Adam and God. And Scotus's causal theory allows him to integrate both.

RECENT DETERMINISTIC INTERPRETATIONS

Recently two scholars have challenged the received view of Scotus's concept of freedom of the created will. In their own fashion each takes Scotus's account of divine foreknowledge to imply that God is the sole source of the contingency of any created volition. But according to the received interpretation, a necessary condition of the will's freedom is its power to operate contingently out of self-determination. More precisely, this means (1) at the instant in which the created will acts it could have acted otherwise; (2) prior to its action the effect to be brought about is ontologically undetermined; and (3) the responsibility for the effect being or not being such as it becomes is nonreductively rooted in the will's exercise of its power to act for either of opposite effects. In accord with contemporary usage we might call this sort of freedom "indeterminist," or we might say


38. See note 13, above.
Scotus has a "libertarian" concept of free will. The main basis for the challenge to this view is the inference that if God is necessarily an immediate cause of any created volition, then God is its sufficient cause. Therefore, if a volition is contingent or could have been otherwise, the total cause of its being one thing rather than its opposite lies in the operation of the divine will.  

Let us first consider Douglas Langston's interpretation. In light of a reading of *Ordinatio* 1.38–39, Langston observes that "the price paid for this knowledge" of future contingents "seems to be a loss of freedom: Human beings cannot do other than God wills and hence seem not to be free." The idea, of course, is that God has determined in advance what shall be. On the basis of this conviction, the burden of Langston's subsequent interpretation is to deny the apparent contradiction between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. He does this by imputing to Scotus a "nonlibertarian" account of the will's freedom. To put it simply, the libertarian thinks it inconsistent for the same effect to be the immediate effect of a free agent and simultaneously determined by an agent other than that free agent. A nonlibertarian, then, is either a "pure determinist" who denies any truth to freedom of the will or a "compatibilist" who maintains that the same event can be the result simultaneously of both deterministic and free factors.  

It serves the purposes of our study simply to observe how Langston adapts the terms of the modern debate over free will and determinism.
to a reading of Scotus's text. Langston argues that if Scotus were a libertarian, then he would hold that the created will satisfies three conditions: (1) it always possesses the ability to cause \( x \) rather than non-\( x \), (2) it can always exercise this ability, and (3) when it acts it acts in accordance with its nature. However, for reasons of divine foreknowledge, condition (2) cannot be met: prior to the exercise of its ability, the option between \( x \) and non-\( x \) is predetermined by a higher power who makes the action on behalf of one opposite a part of the created person's nature. This means then that the creature's life of freedom is a matter of unfolding predetermined, contingent events through its life of action.\(^{43}\)

In passing, I should mention that Langston thinks his conditions (1), ability, and (3), acting out of one's nature, suffice for a legitimate, though nonlibertarian, concept of freedom. He accordingly argues that Scotus's fuller voluntaristic teaching is consistent insofar as he employs such an "abbreviated" concept of free will.\(^{44}\)

Our reading of *Ordinatio* 2.37.2 makes it evident that Langston concedes too much to divine causality and too little to the created will, making it rather like an instrument. To use our terms, he seems to treat the created will as a participative, partial cause, whereas Scotus considers it autonomous. For Langston, the reality of \( x \) rather than non-\( x \) is totally determined by God, and the created will is set to the work of unfolding in time what has already been determined.\(^{45}\) This interpretation does not do justice to the subtlety of the God/creature co-causal union that Scotus proposes. Even though they do not have a sufficient, efficient cause, Scotus does not think of created actions as the active unfolding of another's exclusive decision. Rather, by its action the created will shares more fully in responsibility for the contingent reality, the freshness, of things.

Marilyn McCord Adams also draws the deterministic conclusion from Scotus's doctrine on divine foreknowledge. As she puts it: Scotus "has given the impression in distinctions 38–39 that such divine


\(^{45}\) For example, Langston, *God's Willing Knowledge*, p.46: "Scotus assumes that the divine will does determine human wills, but that they are only contingently determined by the divine will"; p. 48: "the higher agent determines the [created] will by determining the will to act according to its nature."
choice is logically sufficient for the creatures' choices."46 And "Scotus
does not make it unambiguously clear whether or not he believes that
divine choice is logically sufficient for creature's choices; but there is
substantial evidence in that direction."47 Similarly, she claims that for
Scotus, God is the "sufficient and unobstructible cause" of the contin-
genent features of creation that are not ontologically determinate.48 And
finally, in her earlier work, Adams wrote that Scotus's voluntaristic
account of divine foreknowledge in *Ordinatio* 1.38–39 means "that
God can have such foreknowledge because He wills one part to be
true and the other part to be false and His willing in some way settles
it that one part rather than the other is determinately true."49 Of
the crucial issue is the phrase "in some way." If it is open to
our *Ordinatio* 2.37.2 autonomous, partial, essential order, we have no
quarrel with this reading. If, however, God's "settling it" means that
creatures do not exercise autonomous responsibility for contingent
volitions, then this reading essentially conforms to a deterministic
account of the creaturely exercise of volitional power. The drift of
all this is that God's choice determines creatures' volitions; Adams
is careful, however, to shy away from any apodictic assertion that
this is Scotus's teaching, for she holds sufficient respect for Scotus's
other commitments to the radically free will. But she does consider
it probable that Scotus is simply inconsistent.50

The critical formulation in Adams's reading is that God's creative
volition is logically sufficient for determining that the created will
wills x rather than non-x. Does this mean that if God wills x, x will
be, and we know this? If so, this leaves us to wonder about the basis
for God's willing. In other words, it is perfectly possible to think of
God's will as a partial cause. Such a nondeterministic reading seems
wholly consistent with *Ordinatio* 2.37.2. But if it means that God's
will makes it so in such a way that the created will shall never have
exercised any determinate, contingent causality, then the proposition
is not harmless and needs to be confronted with the teaching of
*Ordinatio* 2.37.2.

MYSTERY IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Consideration of Adams and Langston suggests that it is helpful to distinguish two meanings of "created will’s contingent acts." As common ground, both meanings acknowledge that the created will exercises its own causal power. Furthermore, both meanings acknowledge that the effect or the will’s elicited act is contingent, which is to say, at the time it became it could have not become or could have become otherwise. The difference between the two meanings lies in the origin of contingency. (1) Does the contingency derive from the created will itself, from the inner nature of the will’s causal power, such that all things being equal, the created will is necessarily a reason for its being x rather than non-x? Is it perfectly possible that all things remaining equal and up to the very exercise of the created will’s causal power, it could have not willed x, and the basis for the difference lies in the created will’s own mode of exercising its self-determining power? If so, then the created will is an originative source of the contingency of its contingent acts. Or, on the other hand, (2) Is the created will only a "carrier" or "transmitter" of the contingency originating exclusively in the divine will? In accordance with this second meaning, the created will is truly an efficient cause of x, and x contingently exists in opposition to non-x, but the created will's exercise of its efficiency on behalf of x rather than non-x is determined by divine freedom.

What does Scotus mean when he speaks of the contingent acts of created wills? Langston and Adams seem to endorse the second meaning, for it coheres with their deterministic understanding of divine efficacy. Yet on behalf of the first understanding we have the dialectic of Ordinatio 2.37.2 and the clear text of Scotus's Reportatio 1A.39-40:

In us, that is, in the will, there is contingency that stems both from ourselves and from God. In some other things, however, there is necessity of themselves but contingency on the part of God . . . . But in every effect or thing willed by us as such there is no necessity but only contingency.51

51. Reportatio 1A.39-40, fol. 116ra: "in nobis, i.e., in voluntate, a se et a Deo est contingentia. In aliquid autem <aliis> necessitas est a se, sed contingentia ex parte Dei. . . . sed in omnibus in effectibus vel rebus a nobis volitis in quantum huiusmodi, nulla est necessitas sed tantum contingentia." We note that the outright identification
The text clearly affirms a double source of the contingency of effects of created will: the freedom of God and the freedom of the created will. For Scotus, immediate experience teaches us that our will is an immediate source of contingent effects. Theological argument on the issue of divine foreknowledge convinces Scotus that God is an immediate cause of the same effects. And the argument of *Ordinatio* 2.37.2 provides the causal theory to integrate both doctrines without losing anything of the radical truths about freedom of the will, be it the divine will or the created will.

Hence, when Scotus insists in 1.38–40 that God knows created volitions with certain and determined knowledge because God is an immediate, efficient cause of such entities, we must understand that God's causality is sufficient for God's knowledge in an extensional rather than in an intentional sense. This is to say, although God is not its total, immediate cause of the volition (i.e., God's causality does not suffice *de facto* for the existence of the entity), nevertheless, God's causal act is so integrated with the creature's co-causal act that God's knowledge of God's own act suffices for knowledge of the effect.

In its logical structure, Scotus has proffered a *quia* rather than a *propter quid* demonstration. This is to say that he argues that a created volition is the effect of a total cause comprising divine and created wills as partial, essentially ordered, autonomous co-causes; he does not explain how this can be. In a parallel case, Scotus argues that God has certain knowledge for God's own immediate volition of created contingent volitions; he does not explain how this works within the divine psychology.

Yet we might think to look for more light on these issues. For instance, regarding the God/creature co-causality of *Ordinatio* 2.37.2 we might well wonder: How can two agents simultaneously intend the same object? If God is going to will what Adam wills must God not have Adam’s volition as an intentional object? But then, if we are of the two autonomous sources of the contingency in human volitions is not present in the text of Appendix 6 used by both Adams and Langston. Although nothing it says precludes the human will from being an autonomous source of contingency, the text of Appendix 6 seems almost exclusively ordered to affirming the freedom of the divine, first cause at the source of any contingency.

going to consider that Adam wills something, must we not presume that God has in some sense, however subtle, already moved Adam? These queries probe how God's causality cooperates with Adam's; they look to define the relevant explanatory factors. But Scotus does not attempt any such explanations. He seems content to leave in silence what must have appeared to him the mystery of God's inner life.

As has been observed already by others, much of the subsequent history of considerations of the issues of freedom and foreknowledge takes it point of departure from Scotus's doctrine. Indeed, at least as it comes to a crescendo in the Molina, Suarez, Bañez controversy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a portion of this history tries to demystify God's epistemological and causal role in regards to future contingents. For Scotus, it seems to have sufficed to have established the mere fact of those roles consistent with God's radically contingent relationship to the world, God's omniscience, immutability, and omnipotence, and rational creatures' indeterminist freedom of the will. The burden of this study has been to show that a good portion of the project rests on the remarkable doctrine of divine and creaturely co-causality in *Ordinatio* 2.37.2.

*University of Dallas*
