AUGUSTINE AND THE EARLY CHURCH

Although there were early disagreements over the right understanding of original sin and its consequences, a consensus gradually emerged in the Western Church as the outcome of the debates between St. Augustine and the followers of Pelagius early in the fifth century. Pelagius's disciple Celestius was condemned for the view that Adam's sin affected only Adam, not the entire human race. Other Pelagians (or semi-Pelagians) reasonably inferred that "If sin is natural, it is not voluntary; if it is voluntary, it is not inborn. These two definitions are as mutually contrary as are necessity and [free] will."¹ Since the Pelagians insisted on the voluntary character of sin, it seemed to them impossible that one might be born with sin. Augustine, on the other hand, affirms that original sin is both voluntary and free for Adam, while it is natural and necessary for us. In part this view stems from Augustine's efforts to safeguard the practice of infant

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baptism in the Church, which certainly makes sense if there is some inherited sin of which infants must be cleansed. In part it stems from his reading of one Vulgate version of Romans 5.12, which identifies Adam as the one through whom sin and death have entered the world, the one in whom all have sinned. Because all humanity has participated in the sin of the first man, Augustine avers, all human-kind constitutes now a massa perditionis or a massa damnata, a single lump of sin, a lump of filth.

Augustine insists that every person participates in and inherits Adam's sin and its consequences but is not very clear about precisely how this sin is transmitted to subsequent generations or to the whole of human nature. Augustine had often been asked to explain the origin of the soul and the transmission of original sin. In reply, he eliminates the views of the Pythagoreans and the Origenists, who claim that the soul fell from heaven and entered a body as a punishment for previous sins. He refutes also the Stoics, Manichaeans, and Priscillianists, who argue that the soul is an emanation from the divine substance. Finally, he attacks Tertullian's view that the individual soul is produced from a material seed or rootstock (tradux) of the parent. But Augustine himself is unable to decide between two remaining options: creationism and spiritual traducianism. Creationism, a view Augustine attributes to Jerome, maintains that God creates ex nihilo each new individual soul and infuses it in the body...


3. Augustine Enchiridion 27.

4. Augustine De diversis quaest. ad Simpl. 1.2.16.

5. Augustine De diversis quaest. ad Simpl. 83.68.3.


generated from sexual intercourse. This infusion occurs either at the
moment of conception or forty days later, in the womb. Spiritual
traducianism maintains that the individual soul is generated from a
parent soul or spiritual principle: "As light is kindled from light and
from it a second flame comes into existence without loss to the first, so
a soul comes into existence in a child from the soul of the parent, or is
transferred to the child." Both positions, Augustine maintains, can
be defended by an appeal to the canonical scriptures.

In a letter addressed to Jerome, Augustine reveals his uncertainty,
but seems to follow Jerome’s preference for the creationist solution. Still,
Augustine elsewhere confesses that so long as we are agreed that
all suffer from original sin and require God’s grace in order to be freed
from this sin and its consequences, the question of the origin of the
soul and the transmission of original sin can remain undecided without
danger. "Someone once fell into a well where the water was deep
enough to hold him up so that he did not drown, but not deep enough
to choke him so that he could not speak. A bystander came over when
he saw him and asked sympathetically: ‘How did you fall in?’ He
answered: ‘Please find some way of getting me out and never mind
how I fell in.’" So it is not as important to know how we fell into the
well of sin as it is to find the way out.

Later Christian tradition, at least until the thirteenth century,
reflected Augustine’s uncertainty when reviewing the creationist and
traducianist alternatives. Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville, Pru-
dentius, Cassiodorus, Rabanus Maurus, Agobard of Lyon, and

9. Augustine Epistle 190.15 (PL 33:862): “Tamquam lucerna de lucerna accen-
datur et sine detrimento alterius alter inde ignis existat, sic anima de anima parentis
fiat in prole, vel traducatur in prolem.”
10. Augustine Epistle 166.8.26 (PL 33:731).
11. Augustine Epistle 167.1.2 (PL 33:733): “Cum quidem ruisset in puteum, ubi
aqua tanta erat, ut eum magis exciperet ne moreretur, quam suffocaret ne loqueretur;
accessit alius, et eo viso admirans ait: Quomodo hoc cecidisti? At ille: Obscuro,
inquit, cogita quomodo hinc me liberes; non quomodo hoc ceciderim, queras.” For
this translation, I have relied on Augustine’s Letters, vol. 4 (letters 165–203), trans-
13. Tractatus de anima 2 (PL 110:1112C). Rabanus Maurus does not share Au-
gustine’s hesitancy but declares himself strongly in favor of creationism. See also his
Liber de corpore et sanguine Domini 3.3.
others generally preferred the creationist solution but often hesitated to condemn traducianism altogether.\textsuperscript{15} In the eleventh century, Odorannus of Sens defended creationism, after reviewing the views of Gregory, Prudentius, and Isidore.\textsuperscript{16} He was joined by Werner of St. Blaise.\textsuperscript{17} In the twelfth century, Hugh de Ribemont took up the defense of creationism.\textsuperscript{18} In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, traducianism began to appear not only as a less probable solution but also as false, impious, and, ultimately, heretical one. This change appeared in Peter Lombard,\textsuperscript{19} Thomas Aquinas,\textsuperscript{20} Robert Pullen,\textsuperscript{21} and others. Finally, the Fifth Lateran Council, under Pope Leo X, defined as Catholic doctrine the infusion of a soul—created from nothing—to each new body.\textsuperscript{22}

THE ELEVENTH- AND TWELFTH-CENTURY DEBATE

It is especially in the eleventh and twelfth centuries that one finds new interest expressed in the origin of the soul and the transmission of original sin. The reasons behind this new interest are difficult to determine. Perhaps popular religious movements during the eleventh century, which contemporary critics associated with Manichaeanism,\textsuperscript{23} revive the emanationist theory of the soul's origin, a view that Augustine had condemned in his own century. Perhaps renewed encounters with a Neoplatonic explanation of the origin of

\textsuperscript{15} For additional citations, see especially Michel, "Traducianisme," pp. 1355–1358.
\textsuperscript{17} Dei glorificationis SS. Patrum 2: De origine animae (PL 157:1161–1162).
\textsuperscript{18} Epistola ad G. Andegavensem (PL 166:833–836).
\textsuperscript{19} Sententiae 18.8, 31.2.
\textsuperscript{21} Sententiarum libri octo 2.8 (PL 186:731A).
\textsuperscript{22} See Michel, "Traducianisme," p. 1358.
\textsuperscript{23} For example, Adhemar of Chabannes. For a translation of some of the relevant texts, see especially R. I. Moore, Birth of Popular Heresy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), pp. 9–10, 93–94.
the soul, conveyed to the twelfth century especially by Macrobius, contribute as well to this new interest.²⁴ Perhaps the appearance of a nominalist challenge to Christian Platonism can explain the resurgence of debate.²⁵ Perhaps encounters with the Jewish community in northern Europe encourage it; or, perhaps the development of the quaestio from the lectio in the schools may help explain the new efforts directed toward a systematic examination of the problem of original sin.²⁶ Whatever the causes, there is a new willingness among Christian theologians to appeal to philosophy in order to examine this question, together with a confidence that dialectic could treat it with some success.

Anselm is perhaps the best-known example of an orthodox dialectician from the late eleventh century. He discusses the reception and consequences of original sin in his De conceptu virginali et originali peccato.²⁷ In the process, he employs a philosophical vocabulary that will become common in these discussions—a vocabulary that distinguishes nature from person, and natural sin from personal sin. He fails to decide between the virtues of traducianism or creationism, how-

²⁴. Macrobius defends the view that there is single World-Soul that is the source of all other souls. See his Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis 1.6.20, edited by Jacob Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970). For complaints against those who have received the Platonic doctrine from Macrobius in the late eleventh century, see Manegold of Lautenbach, Contra Wolfelmum Colonensem, edited by Wilfried Hartmann, MGH Quellen 8 (Weimar: 1972), pp. 1–2. For a study of Manegold’s work, see Wilfried Hartmann, “Manegold von Lautenbach und die Anfänge der Frühscholastik,” Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters 26 (1970): 47–149.

²⁵. See especially Joseph Reiners, Der Nominalismus in der Frühscholastik, BGPM 8 (Münster, 1910). This work includes the Latin text of the letters of Abelard and Roscelin. For Roscelin of Compiegne, see François Picavet, Roscelin: Philosophe et théologien (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1911).


²⁷. See especially De conceptu virginali 23.
ever. This failure evidently disturbed him for the rest of his life. Eadmer, in his *Vita Anselmi*, notes that when Anselm was awaiting death, he hoped at the end to have a little more time in this world so that he might solve the problem of the origin of the soul, which he had been turning over and over in his mind and which he feared no one after him would solve.\(^2^8\)

Whether Anselm's ultimate solution would have supported creationism or traducianism is difficult to settle. His works leave an impression of uncertainty.\(^2^9\) Any determination in favor of creationism is complicated by the fact that his student, Gilbert Crispin, supported the traducianist position. It is often assumed that Gilbert was representing his master's view.\(^3^0\) By contrast, the creationist view seems to have been defended by the school of Laon, to judge from some fragments treating original sin that are sometimes attributed to Anselm of Laon.\(^3^1\) The most complete eleventh-century treatment of these questions, however, which discusses both traducianist and creationist alternatives, comes not from Laon or Bec but from Tournai. In a little-known work, *De peccato originali*, Odo of Tournai presents the first theological treatise written expressly on original sin since Augustine.\(^3^2\) This work represents, then, an important part of a long theological struggle that was moving to define the origin of the soul and the transmission of original sin.

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31. For a translation of some of these, see A. Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, edited by Eugene R. Fairweather (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), pp. 261–266.

32. For this claim, see also da Cruz Pontes, "Le problème de l'origine de l'âme," p. 191.
ODO OF TOURNAI
AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE

Since it is often assumed that toward the end of his life Odo abandoned philosophy after he entered a monastery, it may be useful to provide a few biographical details in order to establish the position that his *De peccato originali* enjoys in his literary corpus. Odo was born about the middle of the eleventh century. During the 1080s he became a popular master at the cathedral school of Notre Dame at Tournai. There Odo’s reputation as a dialectician and master of the liberal arts attracted students from Flanders, Normandy, Saxony, Burgundy, and Italy. Unfortunately, Odo’s earliest, and perhaps most philosophical, works—*Sophistem*; *Liber complexionum*; and *De re et ente*—have not survived.

Odo’s extant works must be dated from after his conversion to the religious life—a conversion precipitated by a reading of Augustine’s *De libero arbitrio*. His biographer, Herman, explains that Odo was overcome with grief when, attempting to explicate the fourth book of Boethius’s *Consolation of Philosophy* for his students, “he came to read the third book [of *De libero arbitrio*] in which the aforementioned Doctor [Augustine] compares sinful souls to a slave struck down from his prior dignity for his crimes and [compares these souls] to the filth of this world, who have lost celestial glory for their crimes.” Almost immediately, Odo took a small group of disciples, departed the cathedral school of Notre Dame, and established an eremitic community at the abandoned abbey of St. Martin of Tournai in 1092. Odo became the first abbot of this new foundation. He ended his life (d. 1113) as bishop of Cambrai.

Before this abrupt renunciation of the life of the secular scholar,

34. Herman Liber *de restaurazione monasterii sancti Martini Tomacensis* 1, MGH Scriptores 14 (reprint, 1963), p. 274.
35. Herman Liber *de restaurazione* 4, p. 276: “Cum ecce legendo ad tercium librum pervenit, in quo prefatus doctor servo criminibus suis de priori dignitate pulso et mundande cloace deputato comparat peccatrices animas, que celestem quidem gloriam pro sceleribus suis perdunt.”
Herman remarks that Odo had taken more pleasure in the works of Plato than the writings of the Fathers. Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* was only one text that communicated to the Middle Ages Platonic doctrines of participation and the hierarchy of being. Odo may have owed his understanding of universals to this text. His philosophical realism distinguished him from more innovative masters in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries—such as Roscelin of Compiègne and Raimbet of Lille—who began treating universals as a mere *flatum vocis*. Yet Odo did not shrink from defending his view.

Odo's commitment to a realist doctrine of universals is visible in his principal work, *De peccato originali*. It was written sometime between 1095 and 1110. Even the earlier date, however, establishes that this work was written after Odo had abandoned the cathedral school at Tournai for the monastery in Tournai that had been rededicated to St. Martin. Odo may have left the school, but he did not leave behind his interest in philosophical questions.

Odo's text may thus have been written before or after Anselm's *De conceptu virginali et originali peccato*, composed between the summer of 1099 and the summer of 1100. Both authors share the view that original sin is the result of the loss of original justice that Adam enjoyed. Moreover, Odo shares Anselm's understanding of adequate

37. For Odo’s competitive relationship with Raimbet of Lille, see Herman’s *Liber de restaurazione*, 2, p. 275. This portion of Herman’s text, which discusses school debates on universals at Tournai and Lille, is reproduced in Picavet’s *Roscelin*, Appendix. For a good discussion of the twelfth-century debates on universals, see John Marenbon, *Early Medieval Philosophy (480–1150): An Introduction* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 131–139.


41. For Anselm’s discussion of original justice and original sin, see especially *De conceptu virginali et originali peccato* 1–2. For a good discussion, see A. Michel, “Justice
satisfaction, found in Anselm's *Cur Deus Homo*, which identifies the satisfaction of the God-man as necessary to remove the stain of original sin. It is not so clear, however, that Odo and Anselm agree on the most probable philosophical solution to the problem of the transmission of original sin, especially if we accept Gilbert Crispin's apparent traducianism as Anselm's own. Odo displays a preference for the creationist solution, although not without recognizing the advantages offered by traducianism.

What distinguishes Odo's work on original sin is the effort to set out and consider according to philosophical principles the two most probable options—traducianism and creationism—in order to discover the truth about them. He defends his philosophizing as a pedagogical device, confessing that he does not philosophize in order to demonstrate the truth of faith but only in order to teach that truth more effectively. The philosophical discipline assists the teacher of truth, he claims, inasmuch as many clerks in his church are trained in the liberal arts and will be convinced more quickly and easily through them. At the same time, however, he recognizes a broader mandate for philosophy. Truth, he claims, is something so weighty and difficult that even the learned man has trouble discovering it. But the learned man is one who seeks the reasons (*rationes*) for things, so that the


42. For Odo's treatment of the Incarnation and Atonement, see his *Disputatio contra Judaeum Leonem nomine de adventu Christi filii Dei* (PL 160:1101–1112).


44. *De peccato originali* 3 (PL 160:1102C): "Philosophicas considerationes quod posuimus, ne precor, arguant fratres quasi catholicam fidem munire voluerim per philosophicam rationem. Non feci ut munirem, sed ut docerem. . . . Ideoque philosophica quaedam adhibuimus, quia novimus de clero Catholicos, liberalibus eruditos artibus, videre clausa ciitus per ea quae noverant."
hiddenness of truth will be disclosed and mysteries revealed. With Anselm, then, Odo seems to move from faith to understanding by seeking the necessary reasons for things.

ODO OF TOURNAI'S DE PECCATO ORIGINALI

An edition of Odo's text is found in Migne's *Patrologia Latina* (PL 160:1071–1102). This edition is based on the older *Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum*. Although no critical edition of the text is available, I have compared these printed editions with one another and with a twelfth-century manuscript, Douai Bibl. mun. 201 (fol. 92–112), and find them reliable and reasonably free of corruption.

Odo's treatise is divided into three books. In the first book, he attacks the Manichaean conceptions of evil as a real nature or essence and of sin as a positive defect. Evil, he explains, is only a privation of good, while sin is the privation or absence of justice in the will of the rational soul.

The soul is created good by God. Injustice enters when the soul fails to preserve and guard the gift of original justice that God conferred upon the first human being as a natural or preternatural gift. Although we give names to various evils—inequality, impiety, darkness, blindness—these names do not signify real existents. If these privations can be ordered by the mind under genus and species, they cannot be subsumed under the most general genus, being itself. Properly speaking these evils have no essence, no species or genus. Their order and the names they bear are borrowed from real existents—inequality from justice, impiety from piety, and so on. The mind, Odo explains, can only contemplate nonexistents by borrowing forms (*formas*) from existing things. So too language can only refer to nonexistents by borrowing the names of things that really exist, "for speech follows

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45. *De peccato originali* 3 (PL 160:1102C): “Sed veritas ponderosa est et gravis ... quam vix eruditus invenit. Ideo sunt undequeaque rationes quaerendae, ut aperiatur occulta non ut muniatur fortissima; ut detegatur clausa mysteriis, non ut roboretur immutabilis.”

46. Labis describes Odo's logical exposition as "un des plus beaux spécimens de considérations rationelles sur les dogmes catholiques que présente la théologie scolastique" (see his "Le bienheureux Odon," p. 519).

thought, so that language has not established words other than as thought orders images."  

Similarly, the art of the painter can only represent nonexistent or fantastic things by employing the forms of things that are. But the forms of evil then are not derived in the customary way—that is, by a process whereby mind 'selects' and forms figures (figurae) of real things. Rather, they are assumed or borrowed according to their likeness to real essences. Consequently, one cannot say that evil or injustice is 'in' a subject in the same way that knowledge of grammar, for example, is 'in' Socrates. When we say injustice is 'in' Adam, we mean rather that the positive essence, justice, is no longer 'in' Adam.

Justice is a species under the genus, the Good. While all things are good, as Boethius taught, so far as they exist, not all are just. The essence of justice is not 'in' all things, not even all good things. Moreover, justice is properly predicated only of rational agents. Thus, when one says that the human being is unjust, one expresses a privation rather than a simple negation, because justice is lacking where it ought to be. Sin is not the presence of a positive defect in human nature so much as it is the absence of the positive gift of original justice, which Adam ought to have preserved along with his nature.

Once Odo has explained that the 'nature' of sin is injustice, he moves in book 2 to consider how that shadow nature is transmitted from Adam to subsequent generations. Essential to his discussion is Paul's claim that 'in' Adam all human beings have sinned. One concern, then, is to explain in what sense all human beings are 'in' Adam and how Adam's sin can be communicated to others.

Odo acknowledges that in a genetic sense all human beings are 'in' Adam, who is a material cause. Just as my body is contained in the seed of my father, his body is contained in the seed of his father, and so on, even to the first parent of the human race. All can thus be said to descend from Adam according to the flesh. This theory helps to


50. Anselm argues as well that all of us exist in Adam materially through Adam's seed, according to our nature although not according to our person. See his De conceptu virginali 23.
explain how certain family resemblances or physical characteristics pass from one generation to the next. It would be simple enough to aver that Adam's sin passes from parent to child with the material seed during the process of procreation. But Odo rejects this claim, just as Augustine had, inasmuch as Adam's sin is located in the soul—more specifically, in the will—and not in the flesh. Merely the instrument of a sinful soul, the body is of itself capable of neither good nor evil.

Still, procreation provided a powerful model from ordinary experience in order to explain both the sense in which all are 'in' Adam and the way in which sin is transmitted from Adam to later generations. The spiritual traducianists argued by analogy that just as my body is 'in' Adam and descends from his, so too my soul is 'in' Adam and descends from his along with the seed of the flesh. There are a number of advantages to this view. Just as certain physical resemblances in later generations could be explained according to the genetic model, whereby the body of the child is produced by the separation of the seed from the body of the parent, so too certain moral or psychological dispositions could be explained by the hypothesis that the soul of each child is contained virtually or in some other way in the soul of the parent and, ultimately, in that of the first parent. Adam's sin deprived his soul of original justice. His descendants receive their souls from his concomitant with the seed that flows from him. Their souls thus display the same lack or privation that Adam contracted, as well as the same inclination toward sin, which is concupiscence.

Despite the advantage traducianism offered, Odo identifies creationism not merely as equally likely (which Augustine was often inclined to do) but as the orthodox view, although he does not cite a single orthodox defender of this position. He remarks, "the orthodox say that the human soul in no wise descends from a soul, but that new ones are made daily by God for new bodies." His willingness to identify creationism as the orthodox view makes it certain that Odo will not oppose this position, unless one wishes to attribute to Odo an uncharacteristic and dangerous irony.

52. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1077B).
53. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1078B): "Dicunt ergo orthodoxi humanam animam ab animo nullo modo descendere, sed in recentibus novas a Deo corporibus fieri quotidie."
54. The claim that Odo clearly perceives the theological difficulties inherent in
Although Odo will defend creationism, he recognizes all too well that certain difficulties arise with the orthodox view. The most powerful objection arises from reason: "If I have only the body from Adam, and the soul truly is not from Adam but from God alone, and since sin is only in the soul and not in the body, then how can I say that I have sinned in Adam?" Creationism, then, might lead to either one of two unacceptable conclusions: (1) We do not sin 'in' Adam, and therefore do not suffer the guilt of original sin. (2) Since God creates new souls ex nihilo that are defective, lacking the justice they ought to have, God is the author of their sin or evil.

Odo perceived that the first conclusion led to Pelagianism, the second to Manichaeanism. It is all the more surprising that he vigorously defends creationism. Although creationism does allow Odo to defend the notion that God is the proximate efficient cause of every soul in a way that God is not for every body, this is not the focus of his work. Rather, the effort to understand the orthodox view provides the occasion for a detailed exposition of Odo's metaphysics. This exposition will conclude that God does, in one sense, create defective or deprived souls ex nihilo, but it insists that Adam is responsible for the defect. It also concludes, however, that the embodied soul that God creates is modeled after that unchanging human nature or species that is 'in' Adam. The soul, then, is created anew, but also from a 'root' or antecedently existing species, even if it is not transmitted directly from this root species but through some third thing (such as semen).


55. *De peccato originali* 2 (PL 160:1078C): "Nam si solum corpus ab Adam habeo, animam vero non ab Adama, sed a solo Deo, cum peccatum in anima tantum sit, et non in corpore, quamodo dico in Adam pecasse?"

It is not new in an absolute sense. Thus, both alternatives—creationism and traducianism—appear in Odo’s discussion. It reflects traducianism because God creates our souls after an existing nature; it reflects creationism because these later souls are not created from Adam’s individual soul.

If this solution is to have any merit, Odo must first explain how Adam’s individual sin could possibly affect the species-nature that we all share. Only then can he absolve God of all guilt for having created souls *ex nihilo* that yet carry the defect of the privation of original justice. A large portion of his text, then, is given over to a discussion of the manner in which Adam’s sin could affect the human nature itself.

It is the orthodox view, Odo contends, that the whole and entire human species was ‘in’ Adam at creation. Though an individual man distinguished by the addition of various accidents, Adam nevertheless constituted the entire human species. The species had only a single member.

Although it is the proper nature of the species that it is common to many, *per accidens* it may have but a single member. Odo provides other examples of species having only one member: the phoenix, the world. There is a phoenix nature, but only one phoenix. What can be said of the individual phoenix can also be said of the phoenix nature or species. Similarly, there is only one world, so that what can be said of this world can also be said of world as species-nature. Moreover, there is a phoenix nature, and a world nature, and a human nature—in the case of these single-member classes—because there is an individual; at the same time, there is an individual phoenix because there is a phoenix nature. The existing species-nature and an individual imply one another. There cannot, for Odo, be a species without any individual or particular instantiation of the species-nature. Yet even in the case of the species-nature that has a single member, species and individual are not logically identical. Each has its own peculiar properties. The species, by definition, can be predicated of many even *if per accidens* it has but one member. The individual, however, cannot.

The relationship between the individual and the species-nature in the instances mentioned above is, for Odo, rather different than it is for species having many individuals. In the cases above, apart from those logical properties that pertain to the species *per se* (e.g., that it can be predicated of many), the individual is closely identified with
the universal. In other cases, the individual is merely a part of the whole nature, as a point is only a part of a line. In some cases, the individual is clearly distinct from the species, as an individual dog reveals only a 'part' of the dog nature. As a result, for a species having many members, the accidents of the individual distance it from the species-nature. In these cases, it is not true that whatever is said of a single individual can also be said of the species. Rather, only what can be said of all individual dogs—that is, what they have in common—can be predicated of the species.

While it is possible for the species to have but a single member, this is not true, Odo insists, for the genus. There can be no genus having a single species for the simple reason that the species is the genus with a substantial difference added. If there were a genus with a single species, species and genus would collapse into one another. If the genus “animal” had the single species “rational animal,” then all animals would be rational. Consequently, genus and species would be both logically and ontologically indistinguishable. There is, however, a genus “animal” that subsumes the species “rational animal” and “irrational animal,” and the two species differ substantially from the genus.

While the species must differ substantially from the genus, the individual does not differ substantially, but only accidentally, from its species-nature. Thus, the individual human being can be identified with the species in a way in which the single species cannot be identified with the genus.

Although philosophical considerations lead Odo to distinguish species and genus in this way, there seems also to be an underlying theological interest. For him, Adam is ‘in’ the species (and the species nature is ‘in’ Adam) in a way in which he is not ‘in’ the genus. Moreover, the properties of the individual are communicated to the species—as in the case of the species with only one member—in a way in which they are not communicated to the genus, which must have at least two species under it. Odo intends that Adam’s loss of original justice is communicated to the species, but not to the genus. Consequently, as we shall see, it is appropriate to speak of a sin of human nature even while that sin is not attributed to the entire genus “animal.”

Despite the special character of the relationship between the individual and the species in the case of the species that has per accidens only a single member, Odo is careful to distinguish the two. Other-
wise, one might be tempted to add that whenever the individual changes, the species also changes. But one must still introduce a distinction. Species have their own properties by which they differ from individuals. For species are, in themselves, unchangeable, in-composite, and incorruptible, while individuals do change, are com-posite, and, ultimately, will die. The species, by its very nature, is universal and can be said of many. The individual, on the other hand, is singular and not universal, and it is constituted as or in its substance by its accidents. Some accidents and properties of individuals, however, can be predicated of the universal in a secondary sense, even though they are not 'in' the universal in the same way that they are 'in' individuals. In particular, the species possesses those characteristics through which it differs from other universals because there is an individual that possesses them. Because there is some individual man, Peter, the human species has that property (rationality) that distinguishes it from the genus.

These properties can be shared in some way through the substantial union of the individual and the species, in a manner analogous to the way in which the attributes of the soul affect the body when the soul is infused in the body or, conversely, as the passions and needs of the body affect the soul. Odo explains that the individual human being is actually a composite of many substances or forms (multiplex substantia). Unlike the Godhead, in whose single substance subsist three persons, the human person is a rational individual composed of several substances. But 'person' is properly said only of the rational soul and not of the body alone. Although a composite of many substances, the human being is a person first and foremost through the human soul. Yet when the soul is joined to a body, the properties of the soul are communicated to the body in much the same way that the properties of the divine person are communicated to the human nature assumed

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57. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1079B): "Individuum non nisi de uno dici potest. Species etiam si de uno solo dicitur, universalis est; individuum vero non nisi singulare est."


60. Cf. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1083B): "Id autem quo species ab universalibus differt non habet nisi in individuo, et sic habet in individuo quasi non sit aliquid quam ipsum individuum, cum tamen species sit et non individuum."

in the Incarnation. In both cases there is a communicatio idiomatum, a sharing of properties.

In another way, as each form comes to constitute the human substance in the individual, each shares its specific nature with the whole. So, for example, one may call someone just, when properly speaking justice only belongs to his or her soul or rational nature. Similarly, one says that someone is black, when properly speaking it is only his or her body that is black. Just as seemingly incompatible attributes can be predicated of the God-man, so, too, seemingly incompatible attributes can be predicated of the human person as a result of this communication of properties. Insofar as the human person is a singular subject, it is indivisible; insofar as it is a whole and a composite, it can be divided. Insofar as the soul is immortal, so too is the body, just as the corruptibility of the body can be communicated to the soul.

As with this communication of properties between body and soul or singular and composite, there is a communication of properties between individual and species or common nature. On Odo's account, this communication is never whole or entire. There will always remain certain properties that are proper to the individual or the species alone, which properties distinguish them. Otherwise the individual and the species would perfectly coincide, which is not the case even for the species having a single member. For the first human being as well, soul is joined to body to constitute a (composite) human individual. But the species or universal itself is not material, and it is by its nature incomposite.

Yet the privation of original justice can be shared by the individual person and the species-nature. In original sin, it is the soul of Adam—his human soul—that has sinned. The human species has not sinned qua species, however, but only in the individual, namely Adam (and Eve). What Odo will attempt to demonstrate is this: that as the species-nature (rational animal) possesses its substantial difference of rationality only because there is a rational individual, so the species-

63. De peccato originali 3 (PL 160:1088A).
64. Augustine also notes that although the soul is immortal, it is not immortal in the sense that God is immortal, for the soul is corruptible whereas God is incorruptible. Cf. Epistle 166.3.
nature can lose its property of original justice when there is no individual possessing this property.

PERSONAL SIN AND NATURAL SIN

When the human species was first created, Odo explains, the human soul was 'divided' in two persons, Adam and Eve, yet it remained whole and entire. The human soul *per se*, the species-nature (*specialis natura*), is distinct from the soul in Adam and the soul in Eve.⁶⁵ Yet this same human soul or substance is common to both Adam and Eve. It is a unique property of the species to be common to many. Moreover, the species or common nature existed in no other individuals than these two.

Each of the two persons fell into sin at the suggestion of the serpent. More: each fell into the same sin. Because there were no other human persons, and because they committed the same sin, in each of them the species-nature (*natura specialis*) was stained by sin. But if every individual human person has fallen into the same sin, then the whole human nature has contracted the same sin:

Therefore in the soul of Adam and in the soul of Eve, who have sinned personally, the whole nature of the human soul is stained by sin; that substance which is common, is special for each. For beyond these two it does not yet have being. If it had been divided among others, the whole would not have been corrupted by these two alone. Because if these had sinned, perhaps some others would not have sinned, in whom the nature of the human soul would be undamaged. Now then where could a sinless human soul be which was everywhere a sinner?⁶⁶

The actions of Adam and Eve, then, affected human nature, the *natura specialis*. Although they are two individuals, scripture often treats them as one, explains Odo, by referring to them according to

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⁶⁶. *De peccato originali* 2 (PL 160:1081D–1082A): “In peccatricibus ergo personis est infecta peccato natura specialis, quae non est alibi quam in ipsis. In anima Adae ergo in anima Evae, quae personaliter peccaverunt, infecta est peccato tota natura humanae animae; quae communis substantia est, est specialis utriusque. Extra has enim nondum est eam esse. Si enim fuisset in aliis divisa, pro ipsis solis non inficeretur tota. Quia si peccassent istae, forsitan non peccasset aliae, in quibus esset salva humanae animae natura. Nunc autem ubi poterat anima humana munda esse quae peccatrix erat ubique?”
one name, Adam. It does this in order to indicate that they are both guilty of the same sin, and that it has passed to human nature itself. Therefore, although Adam and Eve are two, they may be treated in this sense as a single individual, and what happens to the “one” happens to the whole. Their special situation is comparable to that of the phoenix, the world, or any other species having a single member. This is, for Odo, a distinctive case: “Only when a species is said of a single individual is one able to speak of the accident of the species just as much as of the individual, although principally and in the first place there are accidents only in individuals.”67

Odo acknowledges the objections of critics, who insist that it is absurd to say that the species has sinned. “Universals always are what they are,” they object, “and, however individuals may change, universals endure immutably, and although mutability may be predicated of them through individuals, still it is not in them.”68 Odo agrees that the species does not sin in itself but in its persons. Still in much the same way that the accidents of the single individual of the species are shared or communicated with the universal, and the qualities of the part can be predicated of the whole, so too the sin of all individuals together is communicated to the universal. As the property of original justice is one that belongs to the species and is communicated to the individual soul, so the loss of original justice among all human persons is communicated to the species. If original justice is no longer found in human individuals, then it cannot be said either to be shared or common to many, therefore it is no longer ‘in’ the universal. “Therefore,” he concludes, “a person does not have sin without his species, since it has to be one and the same with it substantially, and there is in the first man a sin of nature personally, and yet not naturally. Because principally sin is in the person who has sinned, and secondarily in the species which has sinned.”69

67. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1079C): “Et quando de solo species dicitur individuo, tantumdem accidens dicere et de individuo valet et de species quamvis principaliter et primo loco sint in individuis accidentia.”


69. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1083C): “Non habet ergo persona peccatum sine sua specie, cum qua unum et idem habet esse substantiale, et est in primo homine
Because of this communication of accidents, the human soul, which is whole and entire in Adam and Eve, is guilty of sin, and other human persons, born in the natural way, cannot be created without that sin. Every person coming after Adam’s personal sin, then, is naturally sinful. 70 An understanding of original sin leads Odo to assert that he has sinned as a human being, but not as Odo; as a substance, although not as a person. 71

Again, just as something can be said of the whole on account of the part, so too some things can be predicated of the universal on account of the individual. Consequently, even though the soul is only a ‘part’ of the human being, Adam’s sin affected not only his soul but the entire human species—nature, body and soul. 72

This certainly constitutes a change of some sort in human nature. But for Odo it does not represent an essential change in what the human being is so much as a change in what the human being has. Humankind no longer has original justice, and therefore God cannot justly create human souls possessing original justice after the fall. It may perhaps best be described as a change of relation: the relationship between Adam (and therefore humanity as such) and God has changed insofar as Adam failed to offer God God’s due. A change of “relation” does not result in a change in the substance.

While this explanation does not solve the problem of the origin of the soul—Odo will attempt to do that at some length in other chapters in his work—it does establish a separation between the individual soul of Adam and the natura specialis, even as it provides for the communication of change in the individual to the nature. The change remains, even after Adam is gone. Creating the individual soul according to the same “form” or “nature” in Adam, God does create “new” souls suffering from a privation of original justice, but does so under a just necessity. While new as individual persons, they are

70. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1084A). Note that Odo does not hold that Adam alone is a human person who sinned, and not Eve, when he claims that the whole soul is in Adam. He is merely following the authority of scripture: "Ut igitur secundam Scripturae loquamur auctoritatem, quae primae conditionis duas personas accipit pro una et uno nomine vocat eae, id est Adam" (De peccato originali 2 [PL 160:1083B]).


created according to the preexisting species: "Therefore, God makes a new soul which does not have a new nature. It is then new in the same nature, and not new. In the person it is new, in the species it is not new. It is new in personal property, but not new in its common property." This paradoxical formulation reflects the tension throughout Odo's work between creationism and traducianism. While Odo vigorously defends creationism, the tension is never resolved. His effort to defend the orthodox theological position demands more than his philosophical skills can provide. But his detailed discussion of genus, species, individual, universal, and person in order to solve a theological difficulty reflects a renewed interest in the instruments of philosophy and identifies Odo as a significant philosophical writer of the early twelfth-century renaissance.

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