It is perhaps in the third point that the value of the book emerges. Weaving in the way he was shaped by his Anglicanism, notably its music and formal language, with his sociology, the walk into Catholicism conveys a sense of disenchantment. He finds some of its music banal, the understanding of his sociological trajectory slight, so that what emerges is a slide from a sense of theological depth into the raw modernism of much of Catholicism, as in Scotland, where the legacy of the misinterpretation of Vatican II lingers too long. But what saves the book is the conclusion, the sense of depth when he realizes that his life and his world view is now bound into his Catholicism. Despite its flaws, where the dreams of enchantment seem so elusive, he comes to settle with the notion that it is the completeness of Catholicism that is the source of its wonder.

Eclectic and perhaps lacking the drama of journeys of others into Catholicism, Oliver, in highly adverse circumstances, has produced a unique account of a journey of self-reflection, influenced by sociology but more pertinently shaped by theological concerns. There are no dramas here, though tragedies of the loss of his son and son-in-law are noted. What might have occasioned bitterness is ignored, so rendering all the more credible the sense of grace, calm reflection, and realization of a deepening faith. Oliver did not need to write this book; he wanted to share what he found with others.

How he died is not clear. What is clear is that somebody who loved him much enabled his legacy to go to press. He or she undertook for him the duties of copy-editing, indexing, and cross checking, thus enabling a fitting memorial to a good man who found his faith and wanted others to hear about it.

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Colin Patterson, *Chalcedonian Personalsim: Rethinking the Human*. Peter Lang, 2016.

In an article on the theological notion of the person, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) wrote, “The contribution of Christian faith to the whole of human thought is not realized; [the notion of person in Christ] remains detached from it as a theological exception, although it is precisely the meaning of this new element to call into question the whole of human thought and to set it on a new course” (“Concerning the No-
tion of Person in Theology,” *Communio* 17 [1990]: 439–54). Rather than being an exception, Christ is the “fulfillment of the entire human being” (148). Taking seriously Ratzinger’s statement, Colin Patterson attempts to ponder deeply the notion of person within the Christian tradition and in relation to Jesus Christ. Since the “truth about the material world . . . must directly connect with the revelation given through Jesus Christ,” a subordinate purpose of *Chalcedonian Personalism* is to make that connection by entering into the dialogue between theology and science through the discipline of psychology (xviii).

*Chalcedonian Personalism* is divided into two parts. Named after the title of the book, the first part offers a short description of how the notion of person developed in the early Church through reflection upon the Persons of the Trinity and Person in Jesus Christ. Chapter 1 frames the theological context for this development, which centers upon “how Jesus and the Spirit are related to God the Father, and . . . how Jesus as divine could also be a human being” (28). The terms person and nature are used in the teaching of the Church, and their relationship is asserted; however, the manner in which those two concepts are related is not expressed either within orthodox conciliar statements, or within the medieval period (18–19). Whatever “we say about the divine Persons, we do so only by referring to their nature” (16).

After the Middle Ages, the notion of person in Christian thought largely comes to a standstill until revived in the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988) and Joseph Ratzinger (1927–). In chapters 2 and 3, Patterson explores the intellectual climate that led “to the actual emergence, within the Catholic tradition, of Chalcedonian personalism” recovered by von Balthasar and Ratzinger (104; 93). He traces a relational understanding of person within the Catholic intellectual tradition, while at the same time noting that personalist thought emerged primarily within Lutheran cultures, which were not encumbered by the Boethian notion of person (104).

After outlining the intellectual atmosphere of post-Enlightenment Europe, chapter 4 offers an account of divine personhood, grounded in the thought of von Balthasar and Ratzinger, which highlights “the uniqueness of persons, persons as fundamentally distinct from nature and persons as relations” (xv). Like contemporary personalists, both theologians first consider persons “in their human form rather than as part of strictly theological reflection” (31). Von Balthasar highlights relationality—as opposed to any “substance” talk in his Christianized concept of person (99; 127). Ratzinger claims that, in God, “person is the pure relativity of being turned toward the other; it does not lie on the level substance . . . but on the level of dialogical reality, of relativity towards the other” (110). Given the
problem of the Aristotelian categories, Ratzinger recognizes relation “as a third specific fundamental category between substance and accident, the two great categorical forms of thought in Antiquity” (110–11).

The highly theoretical Part II, entitled “Chalcedonian Anthropology,” aims “to relate person and nature in humans” by drawing upon recent scientific theory to explicate the notion of nature (xvi). Arguing that one can only fully understand the human person in light of the mystery of the Incarnate Word, Patterson applies the Christological content of Chalcedonian personalism in Part I to human persons in part two (GS #22; 133). He likewise applies affirmations of the first part, such as the uniqueness of persons, persons-in-relation, and love, to the anthropology of the second part (343).

Chapter 5 introduces the task of thinking through Chalcedonian personalism. To be sure, person is connected to human nature by a fundamental distinction, not a separation; “what is ‘person’ is not ‘human nature’” (343). Indeed, given the differences in how person is understood, a rethinking of the concept of nature is necessitated (133). Chapters 6 and 7 clarify, then, what is meant by human nature in “strongly naturalistic” terms as distinct from persons, for persons “cannot be understood within the categories of nature” (133; 152). For example, Patterson critiques “the traditional idea that we humans have a separate, higher-order inclination to know the truth about the world and ourselves . . . and in its place [he defends] the idea of human thought as being in the service of other non-intellectual motivational systems” such as attachment, dominance, coalitional grouping, reciprocity, mating, and conscience (133–34; 197–221). In this context, Patterson introduces (chapter 8) a conceptual category, the “semblant,” as a means of “conceiving how two seemingly unrelatable ideas—person and nature—might be linked together” (134; 234). Sembnants are pointers to persons, or “a way by which person-in-relation might be expressed or recognized,” such as the self, consciousness, mind, soul, will, action, moral responsibility, sin, and so forth (226). Since semblants describe the relation of person and nature, they are “less foundational than either nature or persons”; instead, semblants are mediating concepts, and manifestations of the person (234–36).

The last three chapters of Part II elucidate several implications of Chalcedonian anthropology, such as its impact on our thinking about human freedom and the soul, and its relation to Sacred Scripture (xvi). In chapters 9 and 10, Patterson elaborates upon “the ramifications of this way of thinking about things with reference to the concepts of freedom and the soul respectively” (134). For example, free will “is not directly a characteristic of persons, but rather a semblant concept pointing to signifi-
cant features of persons-in-relation”; it is “an expression of the grace that flows from [Christ’s] Cross and Resurrection” (286). Chapter 11 examines “the links between the anthropological principles . . . derived from Chalcedonian personalism, and the Scriptures,” concluding with a new way to understand parts of Scripture (349).

In an otherwise thoroughly researched work, Patterson fails to provide sources and make distinctions regarding various types of evolution and evolutionary theories to which he refers. At the same time, Chalcedonian Personalism might be considered a milestone contribution to theological anthropology, which initiates additional works to address some of its underlying concerns.

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It is no secret that American lawyers have a very low standing in the eyes of their people. Nor is it a secret that Catholic lawyers share in this low standing. This may be seen as understandable, given the lack of any widespread, distinctively Catholic approach marking out Catholic lawyers as particularly ethical practitioners. Still, Catholic lawyers and other Americans should and often do care about the relationship between human law and the norms recognized by the Church. Particularly in times of cultural crisis, it is important to examine the rules by which we actually live in light of the pattern of right conduct embedded in the structure of being.

Ronald Rychlack has put together a highly useful series of articles on the relationship between American law and the teachings of the Catholic Church. In twenty-two chapters this volume discusses areas of law from torts (the law of civil wrongs), to marriage, to the relationship between church and state. Chapters also discuss law-related issues, including the failures of Catholic law schools and the legal implications of the Catholic conception of the person. Sometimes the message is one of congruence, sometimes of disappointment and critique, most often a bit of both. The reader generally is given a helpful summary of central issues of law as seen through the lens of Catholic thought. Some of these necessarily brief chapters manage far more, addressing complex doctrines and intricate le-