Jacques Maritain’s “Integral Education”: Its Context, Content, and Feasibility Today (Part I)¹
Richard Upsher Smith, Jr.

The purpose of this article is to provide the context of Jacques Maritain’s teaching about integral education, to sketch the content of integral education, and to examine the feasibility of integral education today. The argument will consider, in particular, Maritain’s books Integral Humanism and Education at the Crossroads, as well as his essays on education anthologized in The Education of Man.

γένοι οἷος ἐσσὶ μαθών.—Pindar, Pythian 2.72

THE CONTEXT OF “INTEGRAL EDUCATION”

The Magisterial Context

The Church teaches that the seeds of effective human development must be sown in the garden of a new humanism. While magisterial documents recognize the need for the acquisition of the techniques of western civilization in the developing world, they also argue that true human development will require primarily the cultivation of a new view of the human person and of human community throughout the world. This new humanism the Church identifies as “integral humanism,” taking the term and conception from Jacques Maritain’s book of that name, published in 1936.²

The idea entered magisterial teaching with Pope Paul VI’s encyclical letter Populorum Progressio (1967). The first principle of his argument is as follows: “Development cannot be limited to mere economic growth. In order to be authentic, it must be complete: integral, that is, it has to promote the good of every man and of the whole man.”³ He urges a “transcendent humanism,” and says,

If further development calls for the work of more and more technicians, even more necessary is the deep thought and reflection of wise men in search of a new humanism which will enable modern man to find himself anew by embracing the higher values of love and friendship, of prayer and contemplation. This is what will permit the fullness of authentic development, a development which is for each and all the transition from less human conditions to those which are more human.⁴

At the end of the first part of his letter, Pope Paul connects this new, transcendent, authentic humanism with the “integral humanism” taught by Jacques Maritain. “What must be aimed at is complete humanism,” he writes (no. 44), citing Maritain’s *L’humanisme intégral*.5

In his encyclical letter *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, issued in 1987 on the twentieth anniversary of *Populorum Progressio*, John Paul II reinforced the teaching of Pope Paul’s encyclical. He did not use the term *humanism* in the document, but central to his argument are these words from *Populorum Progressio* §42: “development of the whole human being and of all people.”6

The *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, published in 2004, understands humanism, as taught by Pope Paul in *Populorum Progressio*, as the final cause of Catholic social doctrine.

> The Church . . . intends with this document on her social doctrine to propose to all men and women a humanism that is up to the standards of God’s plan of love in history, an integral and solidary humanism capable of creating a new social, economic and political order, founded on the dignity and freedom of every human person, to be brought about in peace, justice and solidarity. This humanism can become a reality if individual men and women and their communities are able to cultivate moral and social virtues in themselves and spread them in society (n. 22).”7

In his encyclical letter *Caritas in Veritate* (2009), Pope Benedict XVI made a “fresh reading of *Populorum Progressio*, more than forty years after its publication.”8 In his conclusion, Benedict wrote,

> Only if we are aware of our calling, as individuals and as a community, to be part of God’s family as his sons and daughters, will we be able to generate a new vision and muster new energy in the service of a truly integral humanism. The greatest service to development, then, is a Christian humanism that enkindles charity and takes its lead from truth, accepting both as a lasting gift from God. . . . *A humanism which excludes God is an inhuman humanism.* Only a humanism open to the Absolute can guide us in the promotion and building of forms of social and civic life—structures, institutions, culture, and ethos—without exposing us to the risk of becoming ensnared by the fashions of the moment.9

Benedict also summarizes how a humanism can be both oriented towards the human and towards the divine: “All this is of man, because man is the subject of his own existence; and at the same time it is of God, because God is at the beginning and end of all that is good, all that leads to salvation.”10

Keeping all this in mind, one may say that the Magisterium teaches that the fulfillment of the vocation of humankind, caught in the toils of
unjust social, economic, and political arrangements, lies in a transcendent, complete humanism, an integral humanism, in accord with which all aspects and structures of human life are ordered to the good of men, man as known both by faith and by reason. Reason alone is insufficient. It has given us bourgeois capitalism and communism, for example. Only faith can help human beings transcend their own fallenness, and thus help human-kind to repent of its sinful social, economic, and political arrangements.

This interpretation is true to Maritain’s teaching. Maritain used the term “integral humanism” for the “theocentric humanism” that he hoped could be brought into being in place of the “anthropocentric humanism” of modernity, in his own day represented by bourgeois capitalism and communism. “The first kind of humanism,” he wrote, “recognizes that God is the center of man; it implies the Christian conception of man, sinner and redeemed, and the Christian conception of grace and freedom. Anthropocentric humanism, in contrast, “believes that man himself is the center of man, and therefore of all things. It implies a naturalistic conception of man and of freedom. If this conception is false, one understands that anthropocentric humanism merits the name of inhuman humanism, and that its dialectic must be regarded as the tragedy of humanism.”

Maritain hoped that this new humanism, this “humanism of the Incarnation,” would usher in a “new Christendom.” Maritain considered himself a conservative: “A true conservative, then, is a man who is reverent towards the past, and yet is keenly aware of changing times and of the needs of the future. He will decline neither to the Right nor to the Left.” As Jean-Louis Allard comments, it is

a way of thinking both old and new which presupposes nothing revolutionary (if that is understood as an untimely and radical transformation of social and political structures), but recalls in season and out of season that human progress cannot be realized if it is not in and by a spiritual and internal revolution, that of the mind and the heart, making possible the conquest of personal freedom and social freedoms in an effort and joy constantly renewed, and, as a consequence, susceptible of leading to the most profound social transformation in a respect for man and his real advancement.

Thus, Maritain’s conviction that integral humanism would see out not only communism, but also capitalism, was not in itself revolutionary, in that he saw it as a long process. The revolution he sought was in man. So, since the magisterial documents argue that true human development needs first the cultivation of this new humanism, it is clear that they too are calling for a revolution in the way we understand ourselves and live.
**The Context in Maritain’s Thought**

The term *humanism* is used in many different ways. Classicists employ it to indicate either (1a) the ancient conception of man—the ancient anthropology—as well as the types of education and forms of civic life associated with this anthropology, or (1b) the revival of classical studies in the eighteenth century and the academic tradition thereby established, ably but unsuccessfully defended in the early twentieth century by such scholars as Paul Shorey (Chicago) and Edward Kennard Rand (Harvard). Medievalists use the term particularly of (2) the revivals of ancient learning in the Carolingian Renaissance and the Renaissance of the Twelfth Century. Students of the Italian Renaissance and its offshoots throughout Europe use the term to mean either (3a) the grammatical and literary interests, as well as the philanthropy, of men such as Petrarch or (3b) the skeptical reflections of men such as Montaigne. Finally, the term is used now for total explanations of human affairs, whether (4a) communism and bourgeois capitalism or (4b) the integral humanism of the Catholic Church.

The term itself is modern, though based on the Latin term *humanitas*. Maritain acknowledges the contribution of Antiquity (1a) and the Middle Ages (2) to humanism. “Western humanism,” he says, “has religious and transcendent sources without which it is incomprehensible to itself.” By “transcendent” he means “all forms of thought, however diverse . . . which find as principle of the world a spirit superior to man, which find in man a spirit whose destiny goes beyond time, and which find at the center of moral life a natural or supernatural piety.” Thus, he concludes, “the sources of Western humanism are both classical and Christian; and it is not only in the bosom of medieval times, but also in one of the least questionable parts of the heritage we have from pagan antiquity, the part evoked by the names of Homer, Sophocles, Socrates and Virgil,” that Western humanism finds ideas such as heroism.

However, he views the history of western humanism as essentially a modern phenomenon (3b leading through modern philosophy to 4a). He sees it as a reaction against the divine orientation of medieval man. Maritain argues that medieval western theologians were content, as regards their anthropology, with a theological knowledge of human beings as persons who suffered from a double wound: demonic concupiscence and divine love. Maritain therefore concludes, “[T]he Middle Ages were just the opposite of a reflex age: a sort of fear or metaphysical modesty, and also a predominant concern to see things and to contemplate being, and to take the measures of the world, kept the gaze of medieval man turned away from himself.”
After the collapse of the medieval world, Maritain continues, the “humanist Renaissance” and the “Reformation . . . wished to proceed to an anthropocentric rehabilitation of the creature.” With its origins in the certainty of a Calvinist sense of indefeasible personal predestination or in a Molinist sense of primary personal initiative in good works, modern humanism came to see man as possessing an absolute freedom in his own sphere. At the origins of modern philosophy per se, “the Cartesian rationalism of the seventeenth century claimed in this manner [of regarding “grace as a simple ornament capping nature”] to furnish the world with a perfect natural wisdom of which man existentially considered would be capable in actual fact.” Finally, concludes Maritain, “with the Hegelian conception of history, one will be in the presence no longer of two freedoms confronting each other, that of God and that of man, but of a single freedom, that of man, in whom will come to self-realization the divinity-in-becoming in the world and in history.” From Hegel humanism passed easily over into the atheism of Karl Marx.

The difficulty with this account both of medieval and of modern philosophy is its bias against St. Augustine, as Henri de Lubac has demonstrated. Indeed, Steven Menn has shown that Descartes’s philosophy was, in fact, a Christian humanism, and has argued that his Augustinianism may provide a way out of the miasma of post-modernism. It would be better, therefore, to identify as “inhuman” the atheistic humanisms that flourished in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—Comteism, Marxism, and Nietzscheism, as studied by Father de Lubac—than to characterize all modern humanism, from the Renaissance to the twentieth century, as inhuman.

Be that as it may, Maritain’s idea of an integral humanism (4b) stands in a remarkable continuity with the ancient tradition of humanism (1a). Werner Jaeger, the author of the magisterial three-volume work Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, explains the ancient meaning of this term:

By discovering man, the Greeks did not discover the subjective self, but realized the universal laws of human nature. The intellectual principle of the Greeks is not individualism but ‘humanism,’ to use the word in its original and classical sense. . . . It meant the process of educating man into his true form, the real and genuine human nature. That is the true Greek paideia, adopted by the Roman statesman as a model.

Thus, humanism as a type of education assumes also a knowledge of the “true form” of man, a true form originally uncovered by the cultural tradition of Greece and Rome. Moreover, Jaeger points out that

[originally the concept paideia had applied only to the process of education. Now [in the sophistic period] its significance grew to include
the objective side, the content of paideia—just as our word culture or the Latin cultura, having once meant the process of education, came to mean the state of being educated; and then the content of education, and finally the whole intellectual and spiritual world revealed by education, into which any individual, according to his nationality or social position, is born.31

Finally, Jaeger notes that, “In approaching the problem of education, the Greeks relied wholly on this clear realization of the natural principles governing human life, and the immanent laws by which man exercises his physical and intellectual powers.” They were,” he observes, “the first to recognize that education means deliberately moulding human character in accordance with an ideal. Only this type of education deserves the name of culture.”32

Therefore, such a humanism—a true humanism, an integral humanism—forms persons according to an ideal. This ideal, moreover, originated for the Greeks in the heroic pursuit of beauty (τὸ καλὸν) and of excellence (ἡ ἀρετή). It was never simply private, not individualistic, but was always oriented towards life in the state.33 Finally, despite the anthropocentric nature of Greek humanism,34 despite too the Sophistic relativism, Socrates and Plato, with Aristotle in their company, demonstrated clearly that an anthropocentric humanism must find its completion in the divine. One might say that, while humanism is necessarily anthropocentric,35 “because man is the subject of his own existence,” it falls short of its own essence if it does not take into account man’s relation to the divine.36

The characteristics Maritain sees as essential for theocentric or integral humanism agree very well with the characteristics of Greek humanism as described by Jaeger: the formation of persons for life in community according to a human ideal that embraces all that is good, true, and beautiful, including man’s relationship to the divine. In fact, Maritain defines humanism as the tendency “essentially to render man more truly human, and to manifest his original greatness by having him participate in all that which can enrich him in nature and in history.” It “at once demands that man develop the virtualities contained within him, his creative forces and the life of reason, and work to make the forces of the physical world instruments of his freedom.37

Again, in thinking about the argument that heroic periods and humanistic periods have not coincided historically, Maritain points to the “example of the humanist saints,” citing specifically “the admirable Thomas More.” Does the existence of such saints, he asks “show only that humanism and sanctity can coexist, or does it show also that there can be a humanism nourished at the heroic sources of sanctity? . . . Can there be a
heroic humanism? For my part, I answer Yes.”

Thus, the heroic origins of ancient humanism are still reflected in integral humanism.

As we have seen, Maritain opposes this humanism to the anthropocentric humanisms of modernity. Nevertheless, Maritain’s Neo-Thomism is thoroughly modern in its concern with human subjectivity and freedom, and he understands that modernity has made substantial gains for human freedom. Furthermore, in examining the question whether the new Christendom should be genuinely new or a simple reversion to medieval forms, he argues that it will be necessarily new for the following reasons.

First, in virtue of a law dominating the temporal as such, and concerned . . . with the junction of Man and Time. . . . Second, it is impossible—it would be contrary to the mental make-up of humanity, since every great experience, even one accomplished in error, is oriented by the attraction of a certain good, however badly this is sought, and consequently unearths new areas and new riches to be exploited—it is impossible to believe that the sufferings and experiences of the modern world have been useless. . . . Finally, if it is true . . . that God governs history . . . it would be to go against God himself and to wrestle with the supreme government of history to claim to immobilize in past form . . . the ideal of a culture worthy to be the end of our action.

Thus, integral humanism and the new Christendom, in Maritain’s view, will preserve (1) the “pluralism” discovered in modernity, as well as (2) the “autonomy of the temporal,” (3) the “freedom of persons,” (4) the “unity of social race,” i.e., equality, and (5) the impetus towards “fraternal community.” In addition, it will be animated by (6) the “spiritual attitude of St. Thomas,” i.e., by “his central intuition of analogy.” The new Christendom, therefore, will be a third age, following upon the first age, the formation of Christian Europe, and the second age, the dissolution of Christian Europe.

However, such a revolution in our self-understanding as will establish this integral humanism will require also a revolution in education. As Maritain said in his Terry Lectures at Yale during the Second World War, “To correspond to this integral humanism, there should be an integral education.”

THE CONTENT OF “INTEGRAL EDUCATION”

The General Purpose

As a pithy summary of the essential task of education, both Jaeger and Maritain quote Pindar’s famous line, “Learn what you are, and be such” (γένοι’ οἷος ἐσσὶ μαθών). Maritain takes this to mean that “the chief task of education is above all to shape man, or to guide the evolving dynamism
Richard Upsher Smith, Jr.

through which man forms himself as a man.” Therefore, a true humanism, an integral education, desiderates a genuine idea—“a philosophical-religious idea” of man. (We assume, therefore, a Catholic anthropology in what follows.) Integral education must enable children, young people, and adults to learn what they are and to become what they are, to attain their true form, to become more truly human, to attain ultimately “unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ” (Eph. 4:13). “The education of man,” says Maritain, “is a human awakening.”

Learning Regarded from the Point of View of the Soul

Memory. The nature of the soul thus emerges as of principal moment. In addition to intellect and will, by which we exercise our freedom, the rational soul also possesses memory, “the ground of the soul,” shown by St. Augustine to hold a certain analogy to the Heavenly Father, as intellect reveals the nature of his Son in a certain way, and will, their Holy Spirit. One inevitably recalls “the fields and extensive palaces of memory” of the tenth book of St. Augustine’s Conessions. As he strays through the locations of his memory looking for God, Augustine discovers images of past perceptions of sensuous phenomena and physical actions, in which he also finds himself, as well as imaginative depictions of future events confected of past images; he discovers his knowledge of the liberal arts, with the knowledge of number; he discovers too the memory of feelings experienced formerly by his own soul, his passions; he even discovers remembering and forgetting, and falsehoods that he once took for truths. Thus, in “the broad plains and caves and caverns of [his] memory” he discovers a various content, a content the nature of which demands a division into three broad categories: images of that which comes into the body through the senses; that which, like the liberal arts, was somehow already present for memory, and that which, like the passions, is present by certain notions. Therefore, in Augustine’s doctrine, we see that human memory contains a content partly sensuous, something shared with the other animals, which must after all rediscover “their own nests and dens,” as Augustine avers, and partly spiritual or rational.

Maritain holds a view of our subconscious life similar to this view of memory. In speaking of “the dynamics of education,” he says,

[I]t is all important to make clear that the word subconscious or unconscious covers two thoroughly different, though intermingled, fields. One is that field explored with special eagerness by the Freudian School, the field of the instincts, latent images, affective impulses, and sensual tendencies which should be called the unconscious of the irrational in man. The other, missed by the Freudians, is the field of
the root life of those spiritual powers, the intellect and the will, the fathomless abyss of personal freedom and of the personal thirst and striving for knowledge and seeing, grasping and expressing—I should call this the preconscious of the spirit of man. For reason does not consist only of its conscious logical tools and manifestations nor does the will consist only of its deliberate conscious determinations. Far beneath the apparent surface of explicit concepts and judgments, of words and expressed resolutions or movements of the will, are the sources of knowledge and poetry, of love and truly human desires, hidden in the spiritual darkness of the intimate vitality of the soul.58

On the one hand, we find here the irrational and sensuous subconscious; on the other, the springs of rational thought and free choice in “the spiritual darkness of the intimate vitality of the soul.” Is not the former power the power that we share with the animals? Is not the latter the ground of the activity of the rational soul, the created image of the Heavenly Father? In giving philosophical content to this idea, Maritain argues,

On the one hand, our intellect is fecundated by intelligible germs [species impressae] on which all the formation of ideas depends. And it draws from them, and produces within itself, through the most vital process, its own living fruits, its concepts and ideas [species expressae]. But it knows nothing of the germs it receives within or of the very process through which it produces its concepts. . . . On the other hand . . . we possess in ourselves the Illuminating Intellect [νοῦς ποιητικός; intellectus agens], a spiritual sun ceaselessly radiating, which activates everything in intelligence, and whose light causes all our ideas to arise in us, and whose energy permeates every operation of our mind. And this primal source of light cannot be seen by us; it remains concealed in the unconscious of the spirit.59

Maritain concludes that “a place is prepared in the highest parts of the soul, in the primeval translucid night where intelligence stirs the images under the light of the Illuminating Intellect, for the separate Muse of Plato to descend into man, and dwell within him, and become a part of our spiritual organism.”60

It seems clear, then, that the Platonist Augustine and the Thomist Maritain are very close together here in the doctrine of memory of the one, and in the doctrine of two unconsciouses of the other. Yet two major differences strike the reader. The first arises from terminology. Maritain does not call the two unconsciouses memory, because he does not think of the vis conservativa specierum, much less the vis memorativa, as the ground of the person. The second is Maritain’s bringing down of the Muse into the mind, that is, his argument that divine illumination works through the Illuminating Intellect, which is concealed in, and belongs to, each person’s
Richard Upsher Smith, Jr.

mind. Nevertheless, the ideas of two levels of memory and of two unconscious seem compatible as to their content and function.

At any rate, these reflections permit Maritain to say,

[E]ducation has a great deal to do with the irrational subconscious dynamism of the child’s psyche. But, particularly in the case of school and college education, it is with the preconscious or the subconscious spirit that education is mainly concerned. . . . Here it is not a question of techniques, nor of a training of the subconscious. It is rather a question of liberating the vital preconscious sources of the spirit’s activity.61

*Intellect and Will.* If education aims first—and always—at bringing the spiritual or musical preconscious to birth, what roles, then, do intellect and will play in this process? Jean-Louis Allard summarizes Maritain’s teaching on “the dynamics of education” with the terms “existential curve” and “sapiential curve.” The former is “related to the attitude held in the face of life, work, and other people”; the latter is “situated in the development of mind starting with the natural love of truth and ascending to the aspirations after wisdom.”62

Allard argues that on the existential curve of education the child’s soul is opened to the identity of being and good: “*ens et bonum convertuntur.*” Thus, the child learns to be open and “generous” towards what is around him, at his core he accepts and is unafraid. This demands a special focus and attitude of the teacher. “In order to foster the awakening of the person and stimulate an expansive impetus, this loving attention [of the teacher] must comprise two features which cannot be dissociated: it must be directed toward the spiritual preconscious (inwardness) and it should be expressed in the form of encouragement.”63

As regards the sapiential curve, Allard stresses Maritain’s doctrine that education must, above all else, foster “the love of truth.” He summarizes Maritain’s teaching on the education of the intellect under three heads: “the assistance of the educator is so precious here, and, for it to be positive and efficacious, this assistance should fix its attention on the liberation of the power of intuition, should tend to unify not to scatter, so as to make sure that the student’s reason *truly masters the things learned.*”64 Of particular interest for our topic is the first head, for “the liberation of the power of intuition” is particularly concerned with the spiritual preconscious. Allard says that

the multiplication of material facilities and educational means is of little use: what especially counts is to pay attention to the inner core of intellectual vitality, the intuitive power of the learner. And how? “By moving forward along the paths of spontaneous interest and natural curiosity, by grounding the exercise of memory in intelligence, and
primarily by giving courage, by listening a great deal, and by causing the youth to trust and give expression to those spontaneous poetic or noetic impulses of his own.”

The magisterial context of the idea of integral education has now been investigated, as well as its background and context in the thought of Jacques Maritain. As to content, the general purpose of integral education, and its relation to human psychology have also been examined. In the final part of the article, the examination of the content of this concept will be resumed in sections dealing with integral education as maieusis, with the pedagogical method appropriate to such a maieusis, and with the curriculum. The article will conclude with an investigation of the feasibility of integral education today. Two proposals will be made, one having to do with new or reformed colleges, the other with educational co-operatives.

Notes

1. Part II of this article will appear in volume 23 (2018) of the Catholic Social Science Review.


4. Ibid., §§16 and 20.


that it is clear that Paul’s teaching on humanism was fundamental to the council’s thinking. In all, Paul’s letter is cited sixty-six times in the Compendium.


9. Ibid., §78. Benedict uses the term “Christian humanism” at this place, but as he also cites Populorum Progressio, §42, here, it is clear that he is thinking of Maritain’s concept. Indeed, Maritain himself uses the term “Christian humanism.” See note 14 below, and the quotation to which it is appended. Cf. Integral Humanism, 173.


12. In his Freedom in the Modern World, in Integral Humanism, Freedom in the Modern World, and A Letter on Independence, 62, Maritain identifies the terms “bourgeois society” and “capitalist society” (= bourgeois capitalism), and categorizes them under “anthropocentric humanism.” He finds no fault with capitalism per se, but objects strenuously to the later eighteenth- and nineteenth-century harnessing of the system to interest-earning, or usury, as he calls it. “The successive condemnations of usury by the Church stand at the threshold of modern times like a burning interrogatory as to the lawfulness of its economy. . . . [T]he capitalist regime is wedded to the unnatural principle of the fertility of money” (Freedom in the Modern World, 63 and 68, and 62–72 passim). For a critique of Maritain’s position, see Matthew J. Mancini, “Nominalism, Usury, and Bourgeois Man,” Review of Social Economy 48 (1985): 73–83.


23. Ibid., 165. See Stephen Menn, *Descartes and Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 7–12, for an account of earlier twentieth-century interpretation of Descartes. See esp. 9 on the problem of grace “capping nature.”

Richard Upsher Smith, Jr.


26. See Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 22: “both Protestant and Catholic reformations were attempts to re-Christianize, or, as it recently has been put, to Christianize for the first time a society that had been only superficially converted in the past.” Menn has shown that Descartes was “putting himself forward as the philosopher of the Catholic Reformation” (45); on Descartes’s relation to Cardinal de Bérulle and the Oratory, see 46–50. See also Wayne J. Hankey, “Philosophical and Theological Foundations of Augustinian Theology in the Future,” in Augustinian Spirituality and the Charism of the Augustinians, ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. (Villanova: Augustinian Press, 1995), 40 and 37. “[T]here is in Augustine a gracious Christocentric humanism which is able to invert the natural subordination of humans to angels, indeed to overthrow the hierarchy of creatures generally. . . . The unification of our self-knowledge with the knowledge of God, which took place so decisively in St. Augustine’s theology, became the new beginning for philosophy in Descartes, Father Malebranche and their successors. Thereby philosophy cut itself away from the pagan neo-Platonism which Christianity had used as the vehicle of its thinking for a millennium and a half. The new beginning of Modern philosophy, based on Augustine’s unification of the structure of human thought and conversion with the Christian idea of God, gave it a claim to be regarded as the first radically Christian philosophy.”


28. See de Lubac, Drama of Atheist Humanism, passim.

29. There was continuity well into modernity. For example, John Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education stood squarely in the liberal humanist tradition, despite his empiricist notion that the child’s mind is tout court “white paper or wax” (§216). For Locke the end of education was the inculcation of the habits, skills, and knowledge necessary for the life and business of a gentleman (see esp. §94). It was only with the growth of American pragmatism and the progressive movement in education that classical education came under assault, and was finally all but driven from the schools. See Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876–1957 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Publisher, 1961), passim.
Jacques Maritain’s “Integral Education”


32. Ibid., 1: xxii.

33. Ibid., 1: xxvi, 3, 286. In fact, the pursuit of beauty and excellence was necessarily public, and was of aristocratic origin. See Jaeger, *Paideia*, 1: 6–7: “Thus the code of the nobility had a twofold influence on Greek education. In the first place, the city-state inherited from it one of the finest elements in its ethical system—the obligation to be brave. . . . And, secondly, the higher social standards of the polis were derived from aristocratic practice. . . . It was that chivalrous rivalry which struck out the motto of knighthood throughout the centuries: αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείρόχον ἐμμένειν ἄλλων. [Homer, *Iliad* 6.208.] (This motto, which teachers of all ages have quoted to their pupils, modern education ‘levelers’ have now, for the first time, abandoned.) Into that one sentence the poet has condensed the whole educational outlook of the nobility.”

34. Ibid., 1: 53, 280.


37. Maritain, *Integral Humanism*, 153. Elsewhere in this text (212) Maritain asserts that German and Russian thinkers usually oppose the terms “culture” and “civilization.” However, Jaeger, *Paideia*, e.g., 1: 57, seems to use them as synonyms, though he does distinguish (3) between education (training for adult life) and culture (formation according to an ideal).

38. Maritain, *Integral Humanism*, 153–54. The heroic Christian humanism for which Maritain calls is necessarily Augustinian (the “bosom of medieval times” was
thoroughly Augustinian in its embrace), and therefore Platonic. As a Neo-Thomist, Maritain was unable to see this point, as the goal of Neo-Thomism was the overcoming of the appropriation of Augustine in modern philosophy. See notes 27 and 28 above, and note 44 below. Thus, we need to look back behind St. Thomas More to Socrates, whose whole life was a preparation for dying and death! (Phaedo 64 A).

39. It is in heroism that we find that Maritain’s idea of the liberal arts for all citizens is not finally at odds with the aristocratic origin of these same arts. Thus, although for Maritain the problem today is how “to extend liberal education, and training in the humanities, not to a few, more or less destined to a life of leisure, but to all, destined as they are to be involved in the toils and anxieties of daily labor and the hard necessity of making a living, and who need, for this, vocational and technical training” (“Education and the Humanities,” in Education of Man, 93–94); nevertheless, insofar as Maritain sees the study of heroes as essential for the moral side of a liberal education, the aristocratic origin of liberal education is not any more insurmountable today than it was in democratic Athens (ibid., 109). See Joseph, Jacques Maritain, 34–36, for remarks on Maritain’s concept of heroism.


41. In his Freedom in the Modern World, 23–27, in dialogue with the liberal notion of freedom and with the socialist notion of freedom, Maritain developed a theory of a political philosophy that is both “communal” and “personalist.” See also Ibarra, Maritain, Religion, and Education, 45, for the thought that Maritain “was a modern man well acquainted with the literature, music, art, and science of his own age.” She also reports early socialist influence in his parents’ home (40), his friendships with the “socialist writer” Charles Pégy (41), with Léon Bloy, “who represented a version of French anti-bourgeois Catholicism” (43), and with the personalist philosopher Emmanuel Mounier (51), as well as his admiration for Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin (60).

42. Maritain, Integral Humanism, 241.

43. The phrases quoted above are taken from the section headings of Integral Humanism, chap. 5, “The Historic Ideal of a New Christendom II.” I take it that these characteristics of the new Christendom are also aspects of the “rehabilitation of the creature” (161) accomplished by modernity. Maritain speaks of the principle of analogy on 283. See also Freedom in the Modern World, 56. One finds in Wayne J. Hankey an account of the Neo-Thomist milieu to which Maritain belonged. See “Making Theology Practical: Thomas Aquinas and the Nineteenth Century Religious Revival,” Dionysius 9 (1985): 92–93.

44. Maritain, Education at the Crossroads, 88. On 89, Maritain sketches three ways in which integral education will assist in replacing “bourgeois individualism” by teaching “the vital connections [of the individual] with society, that is, not only the social environment but also common work and common good.” Joseph, Jacques Maritain, 36–39, organizes his work, especially chapters three, four, and five, as an exposition of these three “vital connections.”

Jacques Maritain’s “Integral Education”


46. Maritain, Education at the Crossroads, 1. See also his “Thomist Views on Education,” in Education of Man, 50–51.

47. Maritain, Education at the Crossroads, 4. See also his “Thomist Views on Education,” in Education of Man, 51–53.

48. Cf. Maritain, Education at the Crossroads, 7. The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, §37, sums up Catholic anthropology nicely. “The Book of Genesis provides us with certain foundations of Christian anthropology: the inalienable dignity of the human person, the roots and guarantee of which are found in God’s design of creation; the constitutive social nature of human beings, the prototype of which is found in the original relationship between man and woman, the union of whom “constitutes the first form of communion between persons”; the meaning of human activity in the world, which is linked to the discovery and respect of the laws of nature that God has inscribed in the created universe, so that humanity may live in it and care for it in accordance with God’s will.” Maritain, “Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education,” in Education of Man, 129–33, presents a Neo-Thomistic account of anthropology and sketches its impact on Christian education.


50. E.g., Bernard of Clairvaux, De gratia et libero arbitrio 2.3–4.


56. Ibid., 10.17.26 (Chadwick’s translation).
57. It is clear that Augustine believed in an intellectual memory, which contains intelligibles, “but so remote and pushed into the background, as if in most secret caverns, that unless they were dug out by someone drawing attention to them, perhaps I could not have thought of them” (10.10.17, trans. Chadwick). See Solignac, “La mémoire selon saint Augustin,” 561–63, and idem, “Recherche de la connaissance de Dieu,” in “Le Confessioni” di Agostino d’Ippona, Libri X–XIII, Lectio Augustini, Settimana Agostiniana Pavese (Palermo: Edizioni Augustinus, 1987), 20–21. However, we may also say that Augustine seems to have conceived of the memory as a faculty we share with other animals. (See the previous note.) In this latter opinion he appears to be in agreement with Aristotle, who contended that memory was sensuous, a faculty shared with the higher animals, having only an accidental connection with intellect. See Aristotle, De memoria et reminiscencia 449b30–450a25, in W. D. Ross, Aristotle: Parva Naturalia, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1955; repr. 2001). Solignac, “La mémoire selon saint Augustin,” 557–58, discusses Augustine’s divergence from Aristotle (and Plotinus) regarding the entirely sensuous nature of the memory, and only notices in passing (“Recherche de la connaissance de Dieu,” 18) that “Augustin admette l’existence d’une mémoire dans les pecora et aues, 17,26.” Cf. Hankey, “Neoplatonism,” in Peddle and Robertson, Philosophy and Freedom, 263–64.

58. Maritain, Education at the Crossroads, 40–41. Maritain, Integral Humanism, 200–01, gives guarded approval to Freud’s effort to overcome false bourgeois consciousness, and here, guarded approval to the concept of the id. Socrates might have done so, too, considering that he was able to paint such a monstrous picture of the enormities that we accomplish in our dreams, if we have not prepared ourselves rationally for sleep (Republic 571 A–572 C). Leo R. Ward, Philosophy of Education (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963), says “these ideas [of Maritain’s], inspired by a cross between Aquinas and Freud, are novel and also vital and basic to theory of education.” He is quite right, but he misses the compatibility with Augustine’s thinking on memory. Thomas Aquinas teaches that human beings have both a sensitive memory, a vis memorativa (ST I, q. 78, a.4, resp.), and an intellectual memory, vis conservativa specierum (ST I, q. 79, a.6, resp.) The latter is not a separate power from the intellect, but habitualis animae retentio, while intelligentia is actus intellectus (ST I, q.79, a.7, ad 1).


60. Ibid., 74. According to Maritain, “The sin of Platonism is separation, and a separatist conception of transcendence” (ibid., 64).

61. Maritain, Education at the Crossroads, 42.


63. Ibid., 70.

64. Ibid., 73.

65. Ibid., 73–74. Allard is quoting Maritain, Education at the Crossroads, 43.