Tocqueville, the Pantheistic Tendency of the “Democratic Social State,” and Catholicism’s Present Situation
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This article explores Tocqueville’s fears about the future of religion in the “democratic social state” (owing to democracy’s affinity for “pantheism”) and their relevance to the future of Catholicism in America. While Tocqueville valued the Protestant public culture democracy inherited from aristocracy because it provided the “moral ties” needed to prevent “democratic freedom” from becoming “democratic despotism,” he worried that this culture would not endure in the face of democracy’s inner dynamism. It also explores why Tocqueville thought that Catholicism might survive democratic pantheism (now called “secular liberalism”) longer than Protestantism. The fact that events seem to have vindicated his “dread” about the future of religion so far, suggests that democracy’s recent attempt to suppress Catholic morality on abortion and contraceptive coverage in employee health insurance, the definition of “family” in adoption policy, and so on, puts that survival in question. The dangers to the religious liberty of Catholics today thus seem rooted in the democratic social state’s permanent nature rather than in more recent and historically contingent developments.

This article approaches “The Future of the Catholic Church in the American Public Order” from the history of American political thought; specifically, Tocqueville’s (1) “dread” that “religion” in general will lose its influence in the “democratic social state” now (1835) replacing the aristocratic social order; and (2) his suggestion that Catholicism might survive. I follow a hunch that these arguments might illuminate Catholicism’s currently endangered liberty, namely, government’s thus far partially successful attempt to impose on Catholic social institutions policies in the areas of health care/insurance, and family/adoption, that are opposed to Catholicism’s moral teachings.

Linking these ideas, I argue that Tocqueville’s “dread” has already been partly fulfilled by the decline/suppression of the Protestant public culture which prevailed in Tocqueville’s time through the 1960s. I then consider 1) what might be the affinity between “religion” and the waning
aristocratic social order; 2) religion’s corresponding lack of affinity with the emerging “democratic social state”; and 3) what difference(s) between Protestantism and Catholicism might account for their differing ability to cope with democratic society.

If this analysis succeeds, Tocqueville’s profound and enduring understanding of religion in the democratic social state might clarify Catholicism’s prospects in our time.

**RELIGION, CATHOLICISM, AND THE “DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL STATE”**

Tocqueville’s book is written “under the impression of a kind of religious dread.” Initially he dreads the “irresistible revolution” of equality, represented by the new “democratic social state” of early 1830s America, which he thinks heralds modernity’s future. Eventually, that dread is extended to the fear that “religions” will lose their influence under democracy’s “social state” owing to the “pantheism” that state fosters. The chapter in *Democracy in America* Volume 2 arguing this concludes:

> If one finds a philosophical system which teaches that all things material and immaterial, visible and invisible, which the world contains are only to be considered as the several parts of an immense Being, who alone remains eternal in the midst of the continual flux and transformation of all that composes Him, one may be sure that such a system, although it destroys human individuality, or rather just because it destroys it, will have secret charms for men living under democracies. All their habits of mind prepare them to conceive it, and put them on the way toward adopting it. It naturally attracts their imagination and holds it fixed. It fosters the pride, and soothes the laziness of their minds.

> Of all the different philosophies used to explain the universe, I believe that pantheism is one of those most fitted to seduce the mind in democratic ages. All those who still appreciate the true nature of man’s greatness should combine in the struggle against it.

This dread for the future of religion under the democratic social state at first seems paradoxical since “the religious atmosphere of the country was the first thing that struck me on arrival in the United States.” However, the stakes are great because pantheism cannot provide for democracy the indispensable benefit that religion can provide. “Most religions,” writes Tocqueville, “are only general, simple, and practical means of teaching men the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. That is the greatest benefit which a democratic people derives, from its belief, and hence belief is more necessary to such a people than to all others.” “Pantheism” as a “philosophical system” (not a religion) cannot provide this benefit because
everything pantheism knows—i.e., “all things material and immaterial, visible and invisible, which the world contains”—comes into being and passes away. Hence, the “immortality of the soul” is beyond what pantheism can know, much less take its bearings from, about the duties a democratic people owe one another.

But it is knowledge of those duties which democratic society needs from “religion.” In particular, “[t]he main business of religions is to purify, control, and restrain the excessive and exclusive taste for well-being which men acquire in times of equality.”

Thus when any religion has taken deep root in a democracy, be very careful not to shake it, but rather guard it as the most precious heritage of aristocratic times.” Thus, “despotism may be able to do without faith, but freedom cannot. Religion is much more needed in the republic they advocate than in the monarchy they attack, and in democratic republics most of all.”

His reasons are rational, political and instrumental rather than theological: “How could society escape destruction if, when political ties are relaxed [by abolishing rule by kings and aristocrats], moral ties are not tightened?” Religions teach those ties (especially regarding material “well-being”) necessary for preserving freedom in democratic republics.

His “dread” is that democratic peoples will turn away from concern with their immortal souls and with the moral ties which that immortality teaches and underwrites. This dread is rooted in democracy’s “general distaste for accepting any man’s word as proof of anything.”

Seeing that they are successful in resolving unaided all the little difficulties they encounter in practical affairs, they are easily led to the conclusion that everything in the world can be explained and that nothing passes beyond the limits of intelligence. Thus they are led to deny anything which they cannot understand. Hence they have little faith in anything extraordinary and an almost invincible distaste for the supernatural.

Yet finally he does not quite predict that all religions will lose their influence. The key statement is “our posterity will tend more and more to a single division into two parts—some relinquishing Christianity entirely, and others returning to the bosom of the Church of Rome.” The latter seems puzzling since he attributes the democratic social state’s existence to the Puritanism of America’s first English settlers. Why might Catholicism retain its influence while the Protestantism which gave rise to democracy’s social state would not?
FROM PROTESTANT PUBLIC CULTURE TO SECULAR LIBERAL PUBLIC CULTURE

The Protestantism Tocqueville knew has now lost most of its formerly dominant social impact. The coming into dominance during and after the 1960s of what would now be called “secular liberal public culture” has set up a twenty-first-century confrontation with Catholicism to which no obvious outcome presents itself except Catholicism’s being suppressed, at least in the public square. As liberal secularism has gained increasing control of the federal judiciary and administrative agencies, this contemporary form of what Tocqueville knew as “pantheism” has recently moved to prohibit Catholic social institutions from following Church moral teachings and compel them to act instead upon those of liberal secularism (in adoption and child custody policies, in health care and insurance coverage for employees, etc.).

But this is a relatively late development. Earlier (beginning in the 1960s), the Supreme Court had begun to remove the then-dominant Protestant public culture from public institutions. The big Court decisions which cumulatively accomplished this were banning teacher-led prayers in public schools (*Engel v. Vitale*, 1962); banning state-required Bible reading in public schools (*Abington v. Schempp*, 1963); prohibiting states from banning the teaching of evolution in public schools and requiring that they teach only a secular (irreligious or non-religious) point of view (*Epperson v. Arkansas*, 1968); requiring that government action in general must have a secular purpose (*Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 1971); and banning posting the Ten Commandments in public schools (*Stone v. Graham*, 1980).

Seeing twenty-first-century liberal secularism’s nascent suppression of Catholic moral teaching in certain Catholic institutions, in light of its earlier suppression of Protestant culture in public institutions, confirms Tocqueville’s dread of Protestantism’s loss of influence and focuses our attention on a consequent question: Does Catholicism remain an exception to that dread?

RELIGION’S ARISTOCRATIC CHARACTER

Although “religion [is] the most precious heritage of aristocratic times,” Tocqueville says neither that “religion” is essentially aristocratic nor that Christianity is essentially an aristocratic religion. But his “dread” suggests at least religion’s affinity with the former aristocratic age—an affinity missing from the democratic age then coming into being.

But what might that aristocratic affinity be? A hunch: Perhaps religion’s concern with the soul’s immortality is closer to aristocracy’s trans-
generational concerns than it is to democracy’s almost exclusive concern with each generation separately.

Amongst aristocratic nations, families maintain the same station for centuries and often live in the same place. . . . A man almost always knows about his ancestors and respects them; his imagination extends to his great-grandchildren, and he loves them. He freely does his duty by both ancestors and descendants and often sacrifices his personal pleasures for the sake of beings who are no longer alive or are not yet born.\(^{15}\)

In contrast,

The continuous activity which prevails in a democratic society leads to the relaxation or the breaking of the links between generations. It is easy for a man to lose track of his ancestors’ conceptions or not to bother about them. . . . Those who have gone before are easily forgotten, and no one gives a thought to those who will follow. All a man’s interests are limited to those near himself.\(^{16}\)

So if “religion” is essentially about teaching the soul’s immortality to both present and future generations, would not religion be more congenial to an aristocratic than a democratic social order?

And could that difference be reflected in the different institutional structures of Catholicism and Protestantism? Obviously both seek, like aristocracy, to preserve their teaching and practice from one generation to the next. But Catholicism has a ruling hierarchy charged with so doing which resembles an aristocratic ruling hierarchy (e.g., of King, Lords and Commons). Catholic priests, bishops, and popes claim, and are accorded, a right to authoritatively remember the historic faith and to authoritatively instruct the faithful about how it is to be preserved and lived in present circumstances.

In contrast, Protestantism has no hierarchy with such authority so that passing on the faith is far more decentralized to each faith community. And in those communities, each individual conscience has the authoritative right and responsibility to define and pass on the faith. This lack of an authoritative teaching hierarchy might render Protestantism structurally less able to resist the democratic social state’s “continual movement,” which Tocqueville sees relaxing or breaking the “tie which unites one generation to another.”

These explanations would sufficiently explain 1) religion’s greater affinity for aristocratic social order than for democracy’s social state; and 2) why Catholicism might be more likely than Protestantism to retain its influence against democratic society’s dissolving tendencies.
In addition, they might show the reasonableness of the fears of Tocqueville which gave rise to this paper: 1) That religion is indispensable to democratic peoples but will likely lose its influence to the “pantheism . . . [which is] most fitted to seduce the human mind in democratic ages”; and 2) that “[O]ur posterity will tend more and more to a single division into two parts—some relinquishing Christianity entirely, and others returning to the bosom of the Church of Rome.”

TOCQUEVILLE’S ANALYSIS AND CATHOLICISM’S CONTEMPORARY SITUATION

Men who live in times of equality find it hard to place the intellectual authority to which they submit, beyond and outside humanity. . . . They look into themselves or into their fellows for the sources of truth. . . . Democratic peoples . . . will wish to find the chief arbiter of their beliefs within, and not beyond, the limits of their kind. . . .

The nearer men are to a common level of uniformity, the less they are inclined to believe blindly in any man or class. But, they are readier to trust the mass, and public opinion becomes more and more mistress of the world. . . .

Trust in common opinion will become a sort of religion, with the majority as its prophet.

The twentieth-century suppression of public-culture Protestantism has weakened Christianity’s ability to influence democratic society’s belief in immortal souls and the duties of man to man. One thinks especially of the duties most directly relevant to preserving society: e.g., the duty of obedience to lawful authority (“honor your father and your mother” can no longer be posted in public schools); the duty not to steal (“you shall not steal” cannot be posted there, either); the duty of marital fidelity (nor can “you shall not commit adultery” be posted there); and the duty of lifelong marriage (nor can “you shall not covet thy neighbor’s wife” be so posted).

Tocqueville foresaw that the pantheism which has overcome the influence of Christianity on these matters increasingly absolutizes the “passion for equality.” For example, two generations ago that passion overcame “thou shalt not kill” to justify women’s right to kill their unborn babies. That “irresistible revolution” of equality Tocqueville saw “advancing century by century over every obstacle and even now going forward amid the ruins it has itself created” continues today.

An example from the last two generations is how the new secular liberal attempt to treat religion and non-religion equally (see the Supreme Court cases cited earlier) has led to a wholly non-religious/secular public
life and to public opinion that sees this as the only possible meaning of “the separation of church and state.”

An older example is the passing away of the Christian idea that political authority is ordained by God and hence its sacredness imposes a divinely instituted moral duty of law-abidingness on faithful believers. Romans 13:1–2 reads: “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, whoever rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted.”22 Does this New Testament admonition any longer prevail even among believers living in the “democratic social state”? On the contrary, do not both believers and non-believers cite more often the Declaration of Independence, which says that governments “derive their just powers from consent of the governed” (i.e., not from God and His law)?

The difference between these two different sources of government’s just powers, according to the nineteenth-century Catholic thinker Orestes Brownson, is that the Declaration’s version is “political atheism” because it deprives the state of its divine origin and sacredness, thereby depriving it of any religious duty to be obeyed.23 Lacking this duty, no modern government “can sustain itself for a moment without an armed force sufficient to overawe or crush the party or parties in permanent conspiracies against it.”24 Brownson thereby echoes both Tocqueville’s question—“How could society escape destruction if, when political ties are relaxed [by abolishing rule by kings and aristocrats], moral ties are not tightened”?—and Tocqueville’s conclusion that “despotism may be able to do without faith, but freedom cannot. Religion is much more needed in” a republic than in a “monarchy . . . and in democratic republics most of all.”25

If contemporary democracy has forgotten or abandoned the Christian view of the sacredness of government’s authority, but remembers the Declaration’s political atheism, is the contemporary attack on Catholic religious freedom difficult to understand?

There was a time when James Madison could publicly defend religious freedom to his fellow citizens on religious grounds. Man’s duty to his Creator is “precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.” Hence, “every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, must always do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. . . . [I]n matters of Religion, no man’s right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.26

Today, such an argument would be unacceptable public discourse since it is based on belief in a Creator which the prevailing secular secu-
eralism/pantheism can neither have nor know. Hence, Madison’s argument would violate both its understanding of “the separation of church and state” and the Supreme Court’s Lemon test (derived from that understanding) requiring that all government action must have a secular [non-religious] purpose.27

Within secular liberal public life, belief in a Creator cannot be the basis of a claim to religious liberty. Among other objections is that such a claim might require civil society to grant religious individuals and institutions exemption from otherwise valid laws. From the secular liberal point of view this would permit “discrimination,” which would be a decisive objection given its passion for equality.

The qualification “might” recognizes our long history of exempting individuals from otherwise valid laws when obeying those laws would violate their religious convictions (Mormon polygamy notably excepted). The standard examples are the federal draft law exempting those religiously scrupulous of bearing arms (which began with the first draft law during the Civil War); and Supreme Court cases exempting Amish children from attending school after eighth grade despite state compulsory school attendance laws that required more schooling (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972.)

However, these exemptions were granted before public culture Protestantism had been largely replaced by secular liberal public culture. The latter led the Supreme Court to reject the constitutionality of such exemptions, notably in Oregon v. Smith (1990). In that case, the Court ruled the free exercise clause of the first amendment did not require Oregon to exempt religious individuals from their state’s law prohibiting the use of peyote as part of a religious ceremony. The reason given was that “[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”28

In 1993, Congress attempted to restore the principle that religious freedom required exempting individuals from otherwise valid laws which would require them to violate their religious convictions. It did so using its lawmaking authority under the Fourteenth amendment, Sections 1 and 5, by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). However, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional that part of RFRA which required states to exempt such individuals in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997). The Court continued to accept the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the federal government under the theory that Congress can constitutionally grant exceptions to laws that it itself has passed. But the Court has not held that the free exercise clause itself requires Congress to do so. So when a federal administrative regulation recently required contraceptive
and abortion coverage to be included in private employee health insurance coverage (under the Affordable Care Act), it did not exclude religious employers whether for-profit (Hobby Lobby) or non-profit (Little Sisters of the Poor).

In *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores* 134 S. Ct. 2751, (2014), the Court did uphold the claim that this “contraceptive mandate” violated “religious freedom.” But 1) the vote was narrow—five Republican justices against four Democratic justices; 2) it applied only to “closely held” corporations; and 3) it was unconstitutional only because the Court said it was not “the least restrictive way to ensure access to contraceptive care.” It was not a principled defense of “free exercise.” While it may have been the first time the Court has recognized a for-profit corporation’s claim of religious freedom, it is only an interpretation of RFRA by following the “least restrictive” requirement from the 1990 *Oregon* case. Subsequent to *Boerne*, some twenty-one states have passed their own RFRAs.

The issue is whether a claim to freedom on grounds of religion, either should or could be recognized by government as exempting those who adhere to that religion from the operation of laws which everyone else is legally obligated to obey.

When public culture Protestantism was ascendant (roughly prior to *Smith* 1990), the answer was that they could be so exempted but were not constitutionally required to be so exempted. In particular, those who believed war incompatible with their religious faith could be exempted from military service by law. Similarly, parents who believed sending their children to school after age 14 undermined their religion could be exempted from state compulsory attendance laws that everyone else was required to obey.

However, criminalizing the Mormon religion’s polygamy requirement, and the Supreme Court’s upholding that criminalizing, seems to show that the Court does not think all suppression of religious practice violates the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

Since the triumph of secular liberal public life the answer to the question whether freedom on grounds of religion, either should or could be recognized by government as exempting that religion’s adherents from laws which everyone else is legally obligated to obey, became a qualified “no.” “[P]rohibiting the exercise of religion” has become constitutionally acceptable as long as that is only an “incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision.”

In general, the more intense the passion for equality has become, the less religious exemptions to otherwise valid laws have been granted.
CONCLUSION

One of the liberties democracy claims to protect is religious liberty (e.g., the First Amendment). But early on Tocqueville saw that the relation of democracy and religion was ambiguous. The present danger to the religious liberty of Catholics and Catholicism resembles that to public culture-Protestantism in the 1960s as well as that of Mormon polygamy in the late nineteenth century. The latter two were ultimately officially outlawed, although the former was outlawed only in public institutions while Mormon polygamy was outlawed simply. So democracy has different degrees of suppressing by “redefining” religious liberty.

The *Smith* case (1990) signified liberal secular public culture’s move to restrict religious liberty by excluding religious liberty exemptions from otherwise valid laws. This restriction shows that suppressing Catholics’ religious liberty by suppressing their moral practices concerning abortion, contraception, and the nature of the family would not be beyond the pale of previous suppression of religious liberty claims. For how far that suppression/redefinition religious liberty could go, we may recall Cardinal George’s fears.

The examples of Mormon polygamy and public culture Protestantism, show 1) that Tocqueville’s dread about religion’s fate is at least plausible; and 2) that the current attempted suppression/redefinition of Catholics’ religious liberty could well be successful.

Tocqueville’s dread might give pause even to non-Catholics. That “[d]espotism may be able to do without faith, but freedom cannot” suggests the fundamental alternatives are that *society as a whole* is held together either by voluntary obedience (“freedom”) or by some sort of coercion (“despotism”); and that as religion loses influence, democratic despotism replaces democratic freedom because a free society can be held together peacefully only by religion.

There is a contemporary line of analysis that seems to coincide with Tocqueville on this point. Derived from Walter Lippmann’s 1955 book *The Public Philosophy*, it argues that

core liberal commitments to majority rule, free speech, and private property require an underlying moral consensus. Without such a consensus, . . . public life turns into a contest for power rather than a means to realize a higher vision. This marks the death of liberalism. Absent objective moral truths, rights become political and thus can be redefined—or defined away.

This coincides with Tocqueville’s views that 1) the religions are the necessary ground and source of democratic society’s moral consensus be-
cause 2) the “religions” teach the “greatest benefit” of the “doctrine of the immortality of the soul”; and 3) “all [religions] teach the same morality in the name of God.”

The Lippmann-derived analysis thinks that the absence of that moral consensus frees “rights” from the former moral consensus so they become merely political and can be redefined away. This seems a fair contemporary description of the “freedom becoming despotism” Tocqueville foresaw.

Might there be some hope that Catholic religious liberty might survive the present danger in Tocqueville’s thought that “[O]ur posterity will tend more and more to a single division into two parts—some relinquishing Christianity entirely, and others returning to the bosom of the Church of Rome”? Probably not, if Tocqueville is right that the consequence of religion losing its influence is democratic despotism. For, it seems to have been the pre-1960s social influence of Protestant public culture which forestalled that despotism, thereby, if perhaps incidentally, protecting Catholic religious liberty. And it seems unlikely that Catholicism can successfully protect its liberty alone against the increasingly prevailing pantheism of the secular liberal public culture.

Any hope would have to lie in the truth that we do not know the political future with certainty, and that God’s grace can produce results that no human wisdom could foresee. “For by grace you have been saved, through faith—and this is not from yourselves, it is the gift of God” (Ephesians 2:8, NIV).

Notes

2. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 452. Later he goes further: “In a democracy, therefore, it is ever the duty of lawgivers and of all upright educated men to raise up the souls of the fellow citizens and turn their attention toward heaven” (emphasis added). Ibid., p. 543. The Reeve translation translates the highlighted phrase as “all the virtuous and enlightened men who live there.”
3. Ibid., p. 544.
4. Ibid., p. 448.
5. Ibid., p. 544.
7. Ibid.
8. This could be a problem if different religions taught different moralities. Fortunately, he finds that is not the case in America. “There is an innumerable multitude of sects in the United States. They are all different in the worship they offer to the Creator, but all agree concerning the duties of men to one another... All teach the same morality in the name of God.” Ibid., p. 290.
10. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 430. Given Descartes’s relevance to pantheism, consider that “in most of the operations of the mind, each American appeals to the individual exercise of his own understanding alone. America is therefore one of the countries in the world where philosophy is least studied, and where the precepts of Descartes are best applied. Nor is this surprising. The Americans do not read the works of Descartes, because their social condition deters them from speculative studies; but they follow his maxims because this very social condition naturally disposes their understanding to adopt them.” P. 429.
12. “Puritanism was not just a religious doctrine; in many respects it shared the most absolute democratic and republican theories.” Ibid., Vol. I, p. 36.
13. That the suppression could go beyond the public square is reflected in a May 2010 quote from Chicago’s Francis Cardinal George. “I expect to die in bed, my successor will die in prison and his successor will die a martyr in the public square. His successor will pick up the shards of a ruined society and slowly help rebuild civilization, as the church has done so often in human history.” http://www.ncregister.com/blog/tim-drake/the-myth-and-the-reality-of-ill-die-in-my-bed/.
15. Ibid., p. 507.
16. Ibid., pp. 429–430. Thomas Jefferson justifies this exclusive concern of each democratic generation with itself. “The earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct. They are masters too of their own persons, and consequently may govern them as they please.” To James Madison, Sept. 6, 1789, http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/Thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl81.php.
22. New International Version. Douay-Rheims reads: “There is no power but from God: and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore, he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.” The King James version reads: “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.”
23. Orestes Brownson, The American Republic (Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2002), esp. pp. 33–42. The result of the loss of this moral duty, Brownson saw, is that the governments “now in the civilized world” (1865) are “the logical or necessary result of the attempt to erect the state on atheistical principles.” (80–81).
24. Do modern governments need police forces because neither government nor citizens any longer believe in political authority’s sacredness, which previously encouraged citizens’ voluntary law abidingness?


29. Reflecting the “incidental effect” rule from *Oregon v. Smith*. Note 28 and text.


31. “Seems” because the Court cast doubt on whether Mormonism was a religion at all and whether any religion, properly so called, could teach polygamy. See *Davis v. Beason*, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890). Justice Field for the Court said “Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of the United States, by the laws of Idaho, and by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries, and to call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind. A crime is nonetheless so, nor less odious, because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion.” https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/133/333/case.html.

32. Since *Smith* (1990); note 28.

33. See note 13.

34. See notes 6–8 above.

35. “Despotism, dangerous at all times, is therefore more particularly to be feared in ages of democracy.” Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Vol. II, p. 510. “I have always thought that this brand of orderly, gentle, peaceful slavery which I have just described could be combined, more easily than is generally supposed, with some of the external forms of freedom, and that there is a possibility of its getting itself established even under the shadow of the sovereignty of the people.” Ibid., pp. 692–93.
