A NEW ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF CHARLES N.R. MCCOY

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Introduction

This is a new and more extensively annotated bibliography of Charles N. R. McCoy. Two previous bibliographies have been published. One was an alphabetical listing of essays, encyclopedia entries, his book reviews, some notes and unpublished manuscripts, and reviews of his book. The second was a briefly annotated chronological list of those same materials. It appeared in the appendix of the book that collected a selection of his essays. Since those earlier bibliographies, two additional publications as well as an additional unpublished manuscript have been identified and are listed here. The two newly discovered earlier publications appeared in now extinct and generally inaccessible sources. They as well as the unpublished work accompany this new bibliography.

Here McCoy’s writings are listed chronologically. A topical listing was found unworkable because so many of his works apply to more than one of the fields in which he wrote: classical and medieval political philosophy, modern political philosophy, American political thought, international order, and Catholic social thought. Writing in the 1930s through the 1970s from an Aristotelian and Thomistic perspective his scholarly articles and even his book reviews and book notes reveal the applicability of principles that have not aged.

The intent of this bibliography is more than codifying the works of an author now twenty years deceased. The extended annotations and quotations from the respective works hopefully will motivate young or even seasoned scholars to probe McCoy and the structuring principles of political life that he explained.

A great variety of works were examined by McCoy during his career. He dealt with the American constitution, Lionel Trilling, John Courtney Murray, Reinhold Niebuhr, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Plato, Learned Hand, papal encyclicals, federalism, writings about international peace, democracy, Marx, liberalism, St. Augustine, and, of course, Aristotle and St. Thomas. Especially challenging to those already familiar with McCoy’s writings are the last four items in this new bibliography. All four were unpublished in his lifetime, though correspondence with McCoy reveals that he taught the material and used the manuscripts in seminars in the 1970s.
It is the topics, dealing with the counterculture and liberation theology, and their treatment, that startle those already familiar with McCoy. They appear out of step from his usual consideration of Rousseau, or Marx, or Plato, or Heidegger, within the history of political philosophy. Here he expresses a genuine sympathy with aspects of the new topics. They can be viewed as a drastic change or as a logical trajectory of his earlier work. Either view requires a close familiarity with his entire corpus and in particular his understanding of the liberalism inherited from the enlightenment. If indeed Western thought went wrong at that juncture, then an effort or impulse to overcome it is credible.

It was once commented that McCoy was a conservative. Any labeling would be misleading. The “Contemplation Passes into Practice” article, at the very end of the bibliography, along with those related to it can be regarded as culminating ones for McCoy’s corpus. From his very first published note, and throughout his writings, he is clearly an intellectually engaged Catholic, who sees a serious connection between faith, reason, and action. From the beginning he complained about Catholic teachers and students (all of us) who fail to realize the treasure of their intellectual heritage, and he lamented the failure to implement proper truths into practice. He frequently pointed to the portrayal by St. Augustine and St. Thomas of God’s providence as the model of human involvement with the things of earth. For McCoy there would be nothing liberal or conservative in following “the just distribution of temporal goods” seen in the divine model. There is much to be gained from studying any and all of McCoy’s writings (reviews and book notes included) about Aristotle, Plato, medieval thought, modern philosophy, Marx, American federalism, twentieth-century liberalism, and religious developments. One does not have to be Christian or religious to appreciate his insight into the “structure of political thought” and the responsibilities that accompany it. In coming to that appreciation, one would understand why modern political categories do not apply. It must be remembered that his very earliest writings reveal a mature grasp of Aristotelian and Thomistic principles and that he consistently followed and developed those tenets throughout his career. It therefore behooves the reader of his later works to find their developmental continuity. It would be delightful to have some new Ph.Ds grapple with this challenge.

As noted, his earliest writings, small pieces in 1933 and 1935, show a clear understanding of classical and medieval fundamentals. Having graduated from Dartmouth College in 1932, he was publishing in a sophisticated style the next year. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Chicago in 1938. In 1951 he received a second Ph.D., this
from Laval. The curious thing is that though he was a political philosopher, his earlier doctorate in political science was within the field of constitutional law. His second doctorate was in philosophy. He apparently chose not to write under Charles Merriam who was the political theorist at Chicago at the time. A reading of McCoy’s 1948 review of Merriam’s Systematic Politics may explain his choice. At Laval he worked with Charles de Koninck and his dissertation was on Ludwig Feuerbach. He had been moving in that direction as his writings in the 1940s show.

Whether his philosophical orientation originated as an undergraduate at Dartmouth or whether it was entirely from independent study has been a mystery. Recent help from an archival specialist at Dartmouth, and tracing his course work reveals, so far as is available, little that would support the Dartmouth origin. The two philosophy professors he took courses from, Maurice Picard and William Kelley Wright, worked in fields of philosophy far removed from McCoy’s specialty. There is no record of McCoy publishing (student newspaper or a forum for political essays) while at Dartmouth. Advocates for the well-rounded liberal arts student, however, would be pleased to learn that he was involved in two musical groups, the Dartmouth Symphony Orchestra and the Players (the theatrical group) Orchestra. (In his days as a professor he played the violin for personal enjoyment.)

His writing and his logic were tightly drawn. Where others would write a chapter, McCoy would write a few pages. Still, rereading a paragraph, page, or chapter may be required for maximum value. And yet his writing is fluid. No abruptness occurs within sentences, paragraphs, or chapters, though they demand that the mind of the reader be constantly engaged. Those who prefer open effusiveness should look elsewhere for their philosophy.
Annotated Bibliography of Charles N. R. McCoy

“Communication on Tickets for Utopia,” The Commonweal, Vol. 18, (August 4, 1933), pp. 347-348. [A brief comment concerns social science and the goals of education versus genuine social science as understood by Aristotle: “Catholic teachers and students have themselves failed to realize the treasure they have in the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy for constructing a genuine social science. . . . Sloppy and bad thinking, thinking full of holes and patched with specious terminology—that is the difficulty with the most advanced social scientists today.”] [Note that this was written in 1933. And see how this is developed fully in his “Value-Free Aristotle and the Behavioral Sciences” (1970) article.]


The Law Relating to Public Inland Waters, Chicago, (Chicago University Press, 1938, 134 pp.). (Dissertation abstract. 1940, 29 pp.) [A tightly reasoned, well-written study in the area of constitutional law and history. McCoy went to Chicago in part it seems because his family friend, Jerome Kerwin, was teaching there. Kerwin had also written on the law and public waters. McCoy chose not to write under Charles E. Merriam who taught in the political theory area at Chicago at the time. This treatment is partially reflected in the “American Federalism . . .” (1940) article.]

Review of Homer C. Hockett, The Constitutional History of the United States 1776-1826. Review of Charles A. Beard, American Government and Politics in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 (October 1939), pp. 398-399. [Hockett’s work is weak on moral foundations of constitutionalism because of Lockean principles: “It is . . . discouraging to find Professor Hockett discountenancing any notion of natural right and affirming (as in effect all tyrannies do affirm) that rights are a purely social creation.” Beard’s text is “a valuable asset in the class-room. . . .”]
"American Federalism—Theory and Practice," The Review of Politics, Vol. 2, (January 1940), pp. 105-17. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility . . . pp. 209-220.) [This article is a theoretical application of the above-cited dissertation on the law relating to public waters. It deals with the nature of federalism, John Marshall’s decision particularly in the Gibbons v. Ogden case, the Civil War, Webster and Calhoun, and the T.V.A. Case, and ends with the observation that “unless the Court returns to the wisdom of Marshall . . . the inadequacy of the compact philosophy will be perpetuated in the public law of a nation that passed through fire and sword to reject forever the political implications of that philosophy.”]

Review of Homer C. Hockett, The Constitutional History of the United States 1826-1876 in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (October 1940), pp. 403-404. [This is a follow-up from the earlier review of volume one. McCoy questions whether Hackett gives sufficient attention to “the court’s abandonment of Marshall’s distinction between power over commerce as a police power and as a concurrent power . . .”]

Review of Arthur N. Holcombe, The Middle Classes in American Politics in The Commonweal, Vol. 33, (January 10, 1941), p. 305. [Professor Holcombe defends American middle class democracy and he seeks a sound political philosophy which he unfortunately bases on “an act of faith in Kant’s philosophy of history. The future of democracy . . . depends ultimately upon a proper education. That education cannot begin with Kant . . .”]

"Let Israel Hope in the Lord," Orate Fratres, (January, 1941), pp. 109-111. [An inclination to give the world over “in good riddance” is a denial of our responsibilities: “(H)aving turned from the common Fatherhood men . . . lost the common brotherhood; and as the modern world came to maturity, national, class and individual strife became the accepted law of its life.”] Reprinted below.

Review of Charles H. McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (July 1941), p. 263. [“McIlwain . . . eludidat(es) the salient principles of constitutionalism in its growth from the time of the Greeks to the present.”]

has shown perhaps that proportional representation is not the remedy; he
has not quite shown that the defenders of proportional representation
were wrong in seeking some device for rectifying the weaknesses of the
majority system.”

“The Place of Machiavelli in the History of Political Thought,”
[He examines the interpretation of Machiavelli by professors such as J.
W. Allen, F. J. C. Herrnshaw, and Allan H. Gilbert which are found
lacking and he suggests a way “to produce a more nearly genuine
reading of political thought, a reading that will succeed in doing
something other than baffle the intelligence.”]

Review of S. Shepherd Jones and Denys P. Myers (editors),
Documents of American Foreign Relations: Volume III, July 1940 in
Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (January 1943), p. 557. [A
description of a collection by the World Peace Foundation documenting
the world at war. “It is pathetic that a documentary collection . . . must
be appealed to as more persuasive for peace that the light of man’s
natural (but self-abused) intelligence.”]

Review of Manley O. Hudson, International Tribunals, Past
and Future in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 31, No. 3 (October
1945), p. 368. [“Judge Hudson’s argument in behalf of the continued use
and adaptation of the existing juridical structure is entirely convincing;
. . . one suspects that Judge Hudson would like to insist upon the natural
moral basis of international law but that, unfortunately, there is still
something unacceptable about such language.”]

“Amercan Political Philosophy after 1865,” Thought, Vol. 21
(January 1946), pp. 249-271. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility
. . . pp. 221-238.) [A treatment of the theoretical foundations and
implications of the Gilded Age, “robber barons,” the Gospel of Wealth,
and the Fourteenth Amendment in light of “classical and medieval
understanding of natural law.”]

Review of Carl L. Becker, Freedom and Responsibility in the
American Way of Life in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 32, No. 1
(April 1946), pp. 98-100. [Points out Becker’s confusions and
misconceptions about Christian and natural bases for liberty, and
democratic government versus pure chance: “Becker says the things that
any disinterested and intelligent person who had the requisite
information would quite necessarily say . . . . Unfortunately . . . after that there is . . . a realism that is full of illusions and an idealism that is silly in view of its basic cynicism."

"Democracy and the Rule of Law," Modern Schoolman, Vol. 25, No. 1 (November 1947), pp. 1-10. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility . . . pp. 39-48.) [Explains Aristotle's treatment of democracy by observing that, "It is ironical that scholars whose intention it has evidently been to provide out of Aristotle a defense of democracy have succeeded in producing a theory that by identifying democracy and rule of law involves the destruction of both." "(I)n repudiating Plato's teaching that scientific knowledge renders a man superior to rules, Aristotle is simply saying that scientific knowledge of practical matters is not enough—and not that it is not necessary." "A political regime erected upon the negation of prudential truth becomes a proximate rule of action beyond which there is no other measure." ]


Review of Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State in Modern Schoolman, Vol. 25, (May 1948), pp. 271-278. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility . . . pp. 122-130.) [Extended examination of an important work: "The wonderful and terrifying truth that his book contains was quite hidden from Professor Cassirer." "What . . . Professor Cassirer has conclusively and brilliantly, if unwittingly, shown is that the most portentous of mythical monsters is that sacro egoismo which allows nothing except that which 'reason can produce according to its own design'—that fundamental idea, the very badge of that rationalism in which Professor Cassirer had so learned and charming a faith." ]

Review of Charles E. Merriam, Systematic Politics in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 33, No. 4 (January 1948), pp. 480-481. [Points out that there is no explanation of in what way Merriam's wide-ranging treatment is systematic or how it combines with his "faith" in scientific advances: "Having chided Aristotle for unscholarliness . . . Mr. Merriam has no trouble in declaring for himself that 'I am assuming the indefinite...
perfectibility of men . . ., the validity of continuing creative evolution of mankind in the direction of higher levels of the physical, intellectual and spiritual.’”

Review of Carl Joachim Friedrich, Inevitable Peace in Modern Schoolman, Vol. 26, (May 1949), pp. 364-366. [Points out that Friedrich assumes an antithesis of nature and reason in mediaeval thought and goes on to build his peace on Kantian assumptions where reason remakes nature and peace: “It is . . . (a) kind of incredible confusion that is repeatedly presented to the reader of this book, and presented moreover in an appropriately pompous way.” Friedrich is misled “by the decoy of Kant’s ‘critical realism,’ a philosophy which, better than any other modern philosophy, carefully couches in ‘intuitions’ its impossible ‘evidences.’”]

“The Turning Point in Political Philosophy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 (September 1950), pp. 678-688. [The “change” in political philosophy after Aristotle is seen in the light of Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Heine’s observations on Religion and Philosophy in Germany.]

Review of Juan de Mariana, The King and the Education of the King: (An English Translation and Criticism by George Albert Moore), Modern Schoolman, Vol. 27, (May 1950), pp. 329-331. [Moore in his criticism does not understand the fullness of Mariana’s attempt to destroy divine-right theory, and thus Moore wrongly suggests a “nonthetheological view of civil society,” while speaking of the “intrusion of God into politics.” “It is extremely difficult to discover what Dr. Moore’s estimate of Mariana is: here, he says, he is like Aristotle, and here, like Rousseau; here like Hobbes, and here like Machiavelli . . . The ambiguity is oppressive.” He adds, however, that “the translation and the introduction undoubtedly represent tremendous labor. And the voluminous footnotes provide very valuable source materials for the knowledge of Mariana’s contemporaries.”]

Review of A. C. Ewing, The Individual, The State, and World Government in Modern Schoolman, Vol. 28, (January 1951), pp. 164-165. [Ewing attempts to create a nontotalitarian ethics of “universalistic utilitarianism.” McCoy: “His confusion becomes evident when we recall that he has already laid it down in the definition of his universalistic utilitarianism that the following of its principles will not always lead to the good of those who practice them, but will lead to the general good. Thus the author moves in circles around the problems of the individual and his rights, of the state, and of international government.”]

Review of Martin J. Hillenbrand, Power and Morals in Modern Schoolman, Vol. 28, (March 1951), p. 235. [Regards book as worthwhile but full of graduate school jargon and hurried. “The chapter on natural law . . . is good in many respects but fails to bring out the primacy of right desire in practical truth.”]

Review of Cornelia Geer Le Boutillier, American Democracy and Natural Law in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 (July 1951), p. 202. [Three brilliantly funny paragraphs about the utter confusion of Le Boutillier. “It is . . . a book . . . utterly wanting in an understanding of the subject with which it purports to deal.”]

“A Serious Indictment,” Social Justice Review, Vol. 44, (November 1951), p. 236. [About 275 concise words excerpt from his 1946 “American Political Philosophy After 1865” (supra) on tradition, family, property, the purpose of the state, and the robber-baron view that destroys them.]


“The Logical and the Real in Political Theory: Plato, Aristotle, and Marx,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 48, (December 1954), pp. 1058-1066. [“Marx simply completed a modern trend—that of transposing the whole order of nature to the domination of man: its accomplishment by revolutionary ‘practice’ is preceded by a speculative conquest in identifying the order of things in nature with the order which reason puts in its own acts. To do this is to destroy science and to replace it with myth—the myth of Plato’s philosopher-king or the myth of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”]

Review of Alan Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua, the Defender of the Peace in Modern Schoolman, Vol. 31, (January 1954), pp. 146-147. [Praises Gewirth’s clear and full statement of Marsilius’s position even though Gewirth does not himself evaluate it. Furthermore, “it should be of special interest to some ‘Neo-Thomists’ that the Marsilian revolution wrought changes in the understanding of Aristotle that are in many respects, curiously like those wrought by these same Neo-Thomists.”]

Review of Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 (October 1954), pp. 318-320. [Niebuhr, failing to understand the pessimism of liberalism, ought to restudy classical and medieval philosophers. McCoy points out that for Niebuhr, “men are not good enough for us to presume that they seek justice, but they are evil enough for us to presume that they seek something. Justice and its rules follow only upon the knowledge of whatever it is that men happen to seek. This is a truly amazing position for ‘Christian realism’; but it fits into the structure of Dr. Niebuhr’s thought.”]

“Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, and the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Sapientis Aquinatis, Vol. 1, (1955), pp. 328-338. [This is a slightly different development on Feuerbach than in earlier (1951) article. Commenting on Feuerbach’s use of Aquinas, McCoy observes, “The confusions here are as incredible as they are clever.”]

“The Meaning of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Structure of Political Theory,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. 50, (1956), pp. 50-62. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility . . . pp. 61-72.) [Rousseau is treated or analyzed in light of many others, e.g., Cassirer, Gay, Marx, Thomas, and more Marx. McCoy suggests that “the critical method of Verstehen that Cassirer employs . . . be extended from Kant to include Marx at the one extreme of the historical process and the Greek-Mediaeval tradition at the other; then . . . the true bearing of Rousseau’s thought on the structure of political theory will become clearer. . . .”]

“The Doctrine of Judicial Review and the Natural Law,” Catholic University of America Law Review, Vol. 6, (December 1956), pp. 97-102. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility . . . pp. 239-245.) [Important treatment of American theory and constitutional law, John Marshall, and the Marbury v. Madison Case. “The title of this article suggests that judicial review bears a unique relation to natural law, that it is related in a way that the legislative power and the executive power are not. This is indeed the case: judicial review immediately evokes the idea of ‘jurisdiction’; on the other hand, ‘legislative power’, ‘executive power’ signify government. The distinction between government and jurisdiction is at the heart of the whole theory of constitutional or limited government.”]

Review of Ewart Lewis (editor), Mediaeval Political Ideas in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 42, No. 3 (October, 1956), p. 363. [Praised as an excellent delving into the ideas of mediaeval thought: “Mrs. Lewis has here made accessible many important sources of mediaeval political ideas; but the painstaking and devoted work has been in behalf of ideas themselves, and not ‘Background’. . . . The volumes are provided with extraordinarily good notes, bibliography and index.”]

“Social Justice in Quadragesimo Anno,” Social Order, Vol. 7 (June 1957), pp. 258-263. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility . . . pp. 249-257.) [Is “social justice” new? “The many students of this question seem not to have been impressed with the possibility that the phrase ‘social justice’ may not primarily signify justice as a virtue but rather a certain rectitude or order in the disposition of the parts of that whole which is society; and that the name of the virtue derives from its relation to this primary meaning.”]
“Comment on ‘Sociology of Religion’” The Commonweal, Vol. 67, (November 8, 1957), pp. 153-154. [About Fr. Fichter's social science as a theoretic science which then allows questionable “social engineering.” “Liberal in its origin, this conception of social science leads of necessity to a tyranny as rigorous as that of the Marxist.”]

“The Dilemma of Liberalism,” Laval Theologique et Philosophique, Vol. 16, (No. 1, 1960, pp. 9-19. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility . . . pp. 73-85.) [Hume, Cassirer, Eddington, Learned Hand, David Riesman, Erich Fromm, Lionel Trilling, and the implications of modern thought: “There are . . . ends of humans life appointed by the natural reason (including truth, which is the end of the theoretic intellect) and the natural associations (the family, the state) which guarantee the ends of living. These are indeed indefectible principles in the sense that the liberty of contrariety whereby they can be exorcised is not a mark of the perfection of human nature. Indeed, as Aristotle says, it is vice that exorcises them.”]

Review of Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth Century Political Thought in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 46, (July 1960), pp. 214-216. [“Intersubjective transmissible knowledge” is the inadequate basis for scientifically constructed truth: “The reason why Brecht cannot . . . bridge what he calls the ‘logical gulf’ between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ . . . is because, with Kant, he has severed all communication between what traditionally has been thought of as the reason that is nature, the reason that is the cause of nature, and the human reason.”]

The Structure of Political Thought: A Study in the History of Political Ideas. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963. McCoy’s only book is of monumental importance with applicability that goes beyond the time in which it was published. As an explication of the underlying fundamental structure of political thought, it makes manifest the classical-medieval foundation in Aristotle and Aquinas that is gradually altered as man replaces God as the central focus of thought. Aristotle’s prediction that “politics would be the highest science if man were the best thing in the universe” comes true in the modern totalitarian state and its 1984 variations. Of course, Aristotle made it clear that “man is not the best thing in the universe,” but the Kantian depiction of modern science obscures this truth.
“St. Augustine,” in History of Political Philosophy. Edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963), pp. 151-159. [Compact study of Augustine. “The central idea . . . is: ‘Ambition’ and ‘proud sovereignty’ are . . . the wounds of sin inflicted by the Earthly City on the State . . . Far from eliminating the State by referring its temporal peace to eternal peace, St. Augustine’s thought rather would re-establish the State’s integrity both in the mode of its operation (which is free) and in the order to its end (which is the temporal human common good).”]


Review of Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 49, No. 3, (October 1963), pp. 429-431. [“Professor Ullmann has made an unfortunate excursion into the field of political philosophy. No amount of legal and historical documentation can take the place, in the history of political ideas, of the elemental intelligence concerning the concepts that must be handled.”]

“Peter and Caesar,” Continuum, Vol. 3, No. 4, (Winter 1966), pp. 454-460. [On the origins of religious liberty, the connection between metaphysics, theology, and politics, Vatican II, John Courtney Murray, Erich Fromm, the Earthly City and the City of God, and realizing the true human dignity in the concrete political structure. “When Father Murray establishes the basis of a systematic doctrine of religious liberty in the affirmation of the personal and political consciousness of contemporary man, he identifies ‘virtue’ with the simple affirmation of the political consciousness; he thus abandons the notion of ‘ideal’ altogether, and in doing so he destroys the liberty of contrariety that defines the citizen.”] Reprinted below.


Review of Ralph Lerner and Mushin Mahdi (editors), Mediaeval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 (January 1967), pp. 593-595 [“Twenty-five important works . . . give the student an appreciation at once broad and deep of the political themes treated by the three religious communities of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.”]

“The Historical Position of Man Himself,” found in Melanges a la Memoire de Charles de Koninck. (Quebec: Les Presses de l’Universite Laval, 1968), pp. 219-231. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility . . . pp. 86-99.) [A study of Heidegger and an essential extension of Structure: “For Marx, all that is ‘natural . . . must be overthrown by revolutionary action. But their surrogate—work, considered as the first need of life because by work man makes himself specifically human—is, in Heidegger’s view a perpetuation of man’s self-estrangement; he is alienated in the products of his labor.”]

“The Value-Free Aristotle and the Behavioral Sciences,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 1970), pp. 57-73. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility . . . pp. 100-121.) [A formal treatment of the social sciences previously dealt with briefly in comments or reviews: “In the controversy on facts versus values in political science the assumption seems generally to be made that
classical political philosophy is the bastion of the ‘value approach’ and that modern political philosophy has freed itself for a ‘scientific’ study of ‘facts.’ I would like to suggest that there is a very real and profound sense in which classical political philosophy—and that of Aristotle in particular—is value-free—value-free but not ethically neutral; and that modern theory, while ethically neutral, is distinguished indeed by a preoccupation with value such as is quite absent from the classical treatment of politics. . . . I have elsewhere (in Structure) tried to show that all of the great modern theories of politics reveal a growing lack of interest in the contingent and difficult thing that political liberty is, and a growing preoccupation with a kind of causality and a kind of being that are absolute and universal in efficacy.”

“Humanae Vitae: Perspectives and Precisions,” The New Scholasticism, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1970), pp. 265-272. (Also available in: On the Intelligibility . . . pp. 258-265.) [Puts the papal letter on birth control in the context of natural law thought: “The consciences that national hierarchies have said are free to make their own decisions in this matter are free precisely to form themselves not arbitrarily but by using nature (and indeed the central ideal of Humanae Vitae) as their guide. . . . We cannot place ourselves outside of all science and, in the full existentialist sense, retreat to the inner structure of the free resolve in its freedom; to do so would be to engage the person in that process of self-destruction that Gabriel Marcel has said is going on today at every level of being.”]

Review of Christopher Morris, Western Political Thought: Volume I, Plato to Augustine in Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 56, (January 1971), pp. 695-696. [Views the work as an immensely erudite treatment marked by humor and ambivalence, but essentially using political philosophy “for milking.” “Contradictory positions ‘guide’ the author’s presentation of western political thought.”]


[Critique of the “simplistic” transferral of alienation, liberation, and praxis to Christian political theology.]

“Aristotle and the Medieval Tradition.” Unavailable until published in On the Intelligibility of Political Philosophy, edited by James V Schall and John J Schrems, (The Catholic University of America Press, 1989), Chapter 1. [The Division of the Science - Speculative and Practical, Practical Sciences - Operative According to the Imitation of Nature. “Man’s self-government and his liberty consist precisely in this that he shares in the disposition of Divine Providence by being capable of an art by which he disposes himself well with regard to the end fixed for him in his nature by the divine art.”]

“Liberation Theology and Political Philosophy: A Brief Note.” Unavailable until published in On the Intelligibility of Political Philosophy, edited by James V Schall and John J Schrems, (The Catholic University of America Press, 1989), Chapter 18. [Sympathetic yet critical treatment: “The . . . factor that contributes, in a positive way, to the appeal of liberation theology is the central fact that Karl Marx, unlike the political philosophers in the modern Western democratic tradition, retained as a constitutive part of his social doctrine the theological elements of Greek-medieval political thought. . . . Alone among the modern political philosophers Marx retained—if, indeed, in profoundly perverted form—this theological element of the Classical-Christian tradition: the primacy of the ‘spiritual.’”]

“The Counter Culture: Its Sense of Life.” Unavailable until published in On the Intelligibility of Political Philosophy, edited by James V Schall and John J Schrems, (The Catholic University of America Press, 1989), Chapter 11. [“The ‘ontological obsession’ of the counter culture is wholly at odds with the Enlightenment teaching that the cosmos is unjustifiably credited with a kind of ‘reason’. . . . The Counter Culture is engaged in an upward thrust from the point of almost non-being to which the Enlightenment principles had led us. . . . Of Aristotle’s idea of the state as a communication—a community of friends for the sake of a good and noble life . . . we may . . . note that the ‘ontological obsession’ of the Counter Culture young people—their concern for the sacred, for ‘divinities whose honor we have neglected’—is not unrelated to the new feeling for community.”]

“The Counter Culture: Its Place in the History of Political Thought.” Unavailable until published in On the Intelligibility of
Political Philosophy, edited by James V. Schall and John J. Schrems, (The Catholic University of America Press, 1989), Chapter 12. [“In the established institutions are indeed forces of extreme radicalism, then,... the Counter Cultural revolution may be understood to be a conservative movement. ... The ‘humanizing’ of nature (a goal altogether worthy of pursuit) has evidently been pursued in the wrong way; it has issued in the dehumanizing of both nature and man. ... Theodore Roszak remarks, ‘The counter culture takes its stand against the background of this absolute evil, an evil which is not defined by the sheer fact of the bomb, but by the total ethos of the bomb. ...’ We see then that the counter culture takes its stand against that process of self-destruction that Marcel says is taking place ‘at every level of being’, and which Heidegger describes in terms of the ‘destruction of the history of ontology.’”]

“Contemplation Passes into Practice: Religion and Reality.” Published below. [“That past religious values were ‘in themselves inadequate’ to furnish ‘significant interpretation’ of man’s solving his difficult environmental problems, that those values ‘were unsatisfactorily secured to begin with’ is surely a profoundly mistaken view, and I should like to adduce evidence to show that the traditional values were indeed rich in insights and in significant interpretations of man’s solving his difficult environmental problems.”] [Related to the two counter culture articles above, the “Liberation Theology ...” article above, the Petulla (1973) review, the Heidegger (1965) article, and, indeed, the whole corpus.]


4. The first three of this set appeared in the 1989 (Intelligibility) collection and the fourth will be produced with the two inaccessible earlier works mentioned above.

5. I am grateful to Barbara Krieger, Archival Specialist, Ranner Library, Dartmouth College, for generously providing what information was available on McCoy’s career there. She also graciously provided information other background information about his courses and his professors.

6. Wright, undergraduate and PhD, 1899 and 1906 respectively, published in the area of the history of modern philosophy and ethics and his perspective was Humean and Kantian. Picard, as his 1919 dissertation at NYU shows, dealt with “values, immediate and contributory, and their interaction.” He was also an ordained Episcopal priest. Their respective writings show that both Wright and Picard were very capable philosophers though neither displayed the Aristotelian or Thomistic orientation that McCoy displayed from his earliest writing.