FRAMING A CATHOLIC SOCIOLOGY FOR TODAY’S COLLEGE STUDENTS: HISTORICAL LESSONS AND QUESTIONS FROM FURFEY, ROSS AND MURRAY (PART I)

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As part of a continuing exploration of how to more effectively define and teach a Catholic sociology to today's college students, I examine ways in which the idea of Catholic sociology was framed in the early days of this academic effort in the United States. I overview some significant pedagogical and conceptual issues set forth in a number of widely used, explicitly Catholic, college-level sociology texts from the 1930's and forward by three key authors of that era: Fr. Paul Hanley Furfey, Dr. Eva Ross and Fr. Raymond Murray. I draw some lessons for our teaching and curriculum development from their long-running efforts to set forth what Catholic sociology is and how to teach it, and what they decided to include in their textbooks. I end by posing some questions we need to more fully consider if we are to effectively advocate for a Catholic social science in our undergraduate programs today.

Introduction

Over the past few months I have started to develop a college level textbook for introductory sociology from a faithfully Catholic point of view. Elsewhere I have explored the rather notorious and growing anti-Catholic bias present in almost all intro texts;¹ and it was confronting that bias repeatedly in my effort to teach basic sociology, and commiserating with colleagues in the Society of Catholic Social Scientists facing the same chronic challenge, that I decided to see what I could do to address this challenging problem.

The territory of introductory sociology is currently dominated by a couple of dozen major authors and a handful of powerhouse publishing companies who put very large resources behind introductory sociology text packages. These packages typically include a one-size-fits-all textbook available in a long or short version; massive test banks and test creation software; student study guides; glitzy ancillaries like overhead packs, companion web sites and interactive CD-ROM's; and additional deals offering free access to TV news
video archives and other visuals. There is a modicum of variation in the authors’ more or less explicit theoretical orientation in these books—some of the more popular entries lean more toward conflict theory, symbolic interactionism, or world systems or comparative sociology—but most are intentionally eclectic and try to present various theoretical outlooks on issues. Functionalism is still mentioned, but often as a foil for contemporary criticisms of past views of the nature of social stratification and deviance. There have also been a fair number of shorter monograph style books in the tradition of Peter Berger’s famous Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective—first published in 1963 but still in print today!—such as Earl Babbie’s 1988 The Sociological Spirit or Michael Schwalbe’s 2001 The Sociologically Examined Life. But these can be quite idiosyncratic; they have not had the quantitative impact on the intro market that Berger’s book did in its heyday and the “coffee table” intro texts—so called because of their size, shape and amount of pictures—do now. In any event they also share the fundamentally secular worldview of more traditional sociological textbooks, simply framing it in a more conversational and personal essay format.

Whatever diversity exists in either theoretical influence or size, it is unfortunately skin deep, for there is precious little room within the discipline for any textbook remotely oriented toward a Catholic or other religious (or even cultural) outlook, except for the secular “spirituality” of the concerned seeker for truth and justice in the liberal or left-radical traditions. A wide split between Faith and Social Science, fallacious though it may be from a non-positivist, Thomist point of view, has been effectively modeled for the next generation of social science students through the textbooks they study. Yet at the same time as the texts seem to model this split of science and values, they tilt terribly in one political direction which passes as a scientific viewpoint. As Peter Berger himself ruefully commented in a 2002 article entitled “Whatever Happened to Sociology?” the field is now dominated by not only a certain methodological fetishism, but, perhaps worse, an “ideologization” that has “deformed science into an instrument of agitation and propaganda (the Communists used to call this “agitprop”), invariably for causes on the left of the ideological spectrum.” Sociology has been swept by derivatives of the Marxism of the 1960’s, mixed with certain strands of radical feminism and a relativistic multiculturalism.

But how can this continue? There are faculty in colleges and universities who seek to teach their students the value of sociological tools and thought, but who also seek to engage that disciplinary tradition in the light of the Catholic Faith, or put social science in the service of Catholic social reform, not just rehash the prevailing politically correct mantras. This is what I want to do. And yet, where to find this kind of pedagogical resource? I had very little idea.
I studied in a sociology graduate program where the department chair happened to be a well-known sociologist of religion, an active Catholic, and once a member of the landmark organization called the American Catholic Sociological Society. Even so, I learned virtually nothing either in my courses or in the late night discussions at faculty parties about anything remotely resembling a Catholic sociological tradition, much less a Catholic sociological tradition of college textbooks, except for a few references to Christian democracy (and other "reactionaries") in my history of social thought class, and some passing references to how the Association for the Sociology of Religion and its journal *Sociological Analysis* had emerged from an earlier "sectarian" Catholic organization, leaving such anti-intellectual particularism or provincialism behind. For me the only connection possible between sociology and any religious organization or framework was for the latter to be treated as the object of scientific analysis, as in the sociology of religion. If I had been specializing in the sociology of religion perhaps I would have learned more, or been prompted to ask more deeply—but my focus was on the dominant leftist political economic analysis of social change so common in the late 1960's and '70's.

What this has meant for me now, lo these many years later, is that as I groped for a way to define what a Catholic textbook should include and why, and how to frame the relationship between religious or theological propositions and empirical study, I was operating almost exclusively on my own intuition and some inferences drawn largely from conversations with several SCSS members and some study of materials in the realm of Catholic Social Teaching. And yet there had been an important attempt to form a Catholic sociology in the United States that endured about three decades, as I have come to discover. Drawing on a small but useful body of historical and sociological research about this movement, I have been examining its struggles in order to see what they might tell us today about the thorny problem of defining and doing and teaching a Catholic sociology in our time, with our cultural situation and student body. And, indeed, it is proving to tell me a lot.

The three sociologists in the title of this paper were those whose textbooks I kept coming across as I attempted to assemble some evidence of any explicitly Catholic sociology; and a concomitant tradition of Catholic introductory sociology textbooks. I began my trek by following the lead of SCSS founder Stephen Krason, who in his 1993 paper "What The Catholic Finds Wrong with Secular Social Science," skillfully outlined a number of epistemological, philosophical and theoretical divergences between especially positivist-inspired social science and a Catholic counterpart. His last objection to secular social science was particularly poignant for me, because it focused on the question of college teaching. As Krason put it:
Eleventh, and finally, the way social science is presented to students in a college classroom by its secular practitioners is in striking contrast to the way it traditionally was taught by their Catholic compatriots. We can see this by consulting any solid Catholic social science textbook of only a generation ago (before the secularizing forces of the post-Vatican II era tragically transformed American Catholic campuses). These books typically made Catholic social teaching, as derived from the great encyclicals, and a solid philosophical foundation the basis for social science principles (p.8).

And what might some examples of such texts “from only a generation ago” be? Krason first cites Joseph Cardinal Hoffner’s 1962 Fundamentals of Christian Sociology, and by listing some of its striking—by contrast to today’s typical intro soc book—chapter headings gave some clue as to what a Catholic sociology text would have involved. Hoffner penned sections on “The Principle of Subsidiarity,” “The Characteristics of Natural Law,” “The Family as a ‘Cell’ in Human Society,” and “The Origin and Meaning of The State in Christian Social Teaching,” just to name a few. But was Hoffner’s work just an isolated or outlier case? Emphatically not, says Krason:

Lest one think that such an approach was atypical, a reflection of the fact that it was the work of a renowned scholar in the Catholic hierarchy, he should also consult texts such as E.J. Ross’s Rudiments of Sociology, or Sister Mary Consilia O’Brien’s Catholic Sociology. It is virtually impossible to find an introductory sociology textbook today which would study the discipline in such a way.

Krason then proceeded to describe some more general features of a Catholic social science that would shape its research and orient its textbooks, drawing on the work of another SCSS founder, sociologist Joseph Varacalli, and also an important earlier Catholic sociologist, Fr. Paul Hanley Furfey, who in 1944 wrote an amazingly prescient book about what we might call a Catholic sociological imagination, entitled The Mystery of Iniquity, as well as many other works including several undergraduate textbooks. I’ll return to discussion of such a framework later.

That did it. I had to try to find some of the books Krason, and then Varacalli and then Furfey, were referring to from this almost lost tradition of explicitly Catholic social scientific college teaching. While I have not yet located Hoffner’s book, I did manage to find many others. They turned up in used bookstores, where such old and musty texts, now discarded but with their library stamps and checkout cards still intact, served as sad reminders of the decline of so many Catholic religious orders, schools and colleges. They appeared in the rare books web sites of Catholic bookstores. And occasionally
they showed up in area Catholic college libraries, where the old hand-stamped checkout cards testified to how these library books had not been borrowed by anyone for decades.

I also decided to concentrate on these three prolific authors because they had their materials published not only by the Catholic press, in particular The Bruce Publishing Company, but also by major publishing houses reaching larger mainstream textbook markets, such as Macmillan and Appleton-Century-Crofts. All three were members, key figures, and/or officers of the American Catholic Sociological Society (ACSS), founded in 1937-38. And all three suggested poignant, if somewhat different, images of what learning introductory Catholic social science in college could mean.

Exploring all this material in reasonable depth required a paper beyond the usual length feasible for publication in one issue of the Catholic Social Science Review. The Editors kindly offered to provide space in two sequential issues, and therefore I have divided the full paper into two parts. In Part I below, I provide a basic introduction to the emergence of Catholic sociology in this country during the 1940's and later, and outline the basic approach explicitly Catholic sociologists took to the pedagogy of a Catholic sociological imagination. I also introduce two of the types of pedagogical books I saw evidence of: what I will define as works of legitimation and works of foundation.

In Part II, which will appear in the next issue of the Review, I examine the third type of pedagogical materials, what I call works of instruction: that is, typically formatted introductory textbooks as well as monographs that would be seen as usable in the classroom. Then I develop some implications of the legacy of mid-20th century Catholic sociological pedagogy for our own era, and propose some questions we need to address to improve our ability to offer a sociology faithful to the teachings of the Church in today's college classrooms.

The Roots of Catholic Sociology in the American Catholic Sociological Society

There exists very good, if not copious, scholarship on the emergence, vitality and decline of the American Catholic Sociological Society (ACSS), which is important to at least briefly consider here as the institutional incubator and underpinning of a Catholic social science teaching effort that lasted three decades. The sociology of this chapter in the history of sociology in the U.S. has been pretty well laid out, and differences of sociological interpretation of the chapter are likewise clear. The ACSS was formally organized in the late 1930's to provide social and psychological support for self-identified Catholic sociologists and social science teachers who felt emarginated by the mainstream sociological establishment as personified by the American Sociological society (ASS); to help clearly define a Catholic sociological
perspective in the U.S. that could be disseminated to high school and college students; and influence if possible the broader profession by legitimating a critical sociology grounded in Catholic assumptions about both social reality and epistemology. A broader agenda vis-a-vis the Church was to encourage her to embrace inductive social science as a legitimate component of the intellectual apparatus of Catholic social teaching, social action and social analysis. ACSS' mission was, to put it simply, "to restore all things in Christ."¹⁸

Catholics who claimed or sought a professional identity that integrated their Faith and their sociological discipline faced two interrelated sorts of emargination before World War II, related to their religious worldview and to their social location in the expanding social institution of higher education. Their marginal role as Catholics in sociology was first about the way they thought about society: their ideas were seen as archaic, "out of date." But is was also about the fact that they entered the field of sociology from Catholic colleges and universities, considered at the time to be of much lower status intellectually and professionally, especially with respect to modern research methodology. Thus the ACSS was founded in 1938 on the explicit premise by its founders that the then-prevailing sociological enterprise, as represented by the American Sociological Society and its regional daughters, was generally hostile to the very notion of trying to integrate Faith and sociological analysis. If you were trying to do sociology, go to the meetings, and get your materials published, and you were explicitly Catholic in your concerns and values, you were treated shabbily.⁹ Here is one of my favorite characterizations of the founding from Loretta Morris:¹⁰

For Catholic sociologists it had been a long winter, decades long. A winter of the mind, a winter of isolation, a winter of soul-sapping disparagement. Then in December 1937, in a bleak storm-pounded Atlantic City, a small group of Catholic sociologists declared: Enough!

They were not alone in feeling frozen out by the hostile condescension of academic and the scholarly community. As Robert McNamara noted of the period, the sociological establishment regarded anyone committed to a specific set of religious beliefs and a specific religious institution as incapable of genuinely scientific research, i.e. not "willing to go wherever discoveries of the social sciences might lead." Nor did attendance at American Sociological Society conventions lessen this sense of isolation; if anything it intensified it (p.329).

Morris then cites the recollection of one of the founding members, Fr. Francis Friedel, whose words sadly echo those I hear today from SCSS colleagues about the American Sociological Association (ASA), and which express some of my own reasons for seeking out the Society of Catholic Social Scientists:
We were pretty much disgusted with the meetings of the A.S.S. First of all, the papers were largely research topics, and to all appearances, it was a matter of research for the sake of research. Secondly, the outlook of these sociologists was poles away from ours. They were just in that period when Sociology was a science copying its procedures from the natural sciences. For these secular sociologists the approach was supposedly scientific and objective but, unconsciously, for all practical purposes, anti-moral and anti-religious. Value judgments then were not supposed to receive any consideration. Don’t ask me how they could even talk about delinquency, crime, poverty, etc. without setting up some kind of norm. We were pretty much satiated with that sort of attitude (pp.329-30).

The 1930’s were witnessing the ascendency of the cult of value-free sociology modeled after the natural sciences, and anything smacking of religiosity was considered dubious, retrograde and anti-intellectual. This is the period when the very ability of Catholic colleges and universities to produce solid empirical research in the social sciences was doubted. Catholics were perceived as perhaps well intentioned but overly invested in merely “applied”—translated as “less intellectually powerful”—studies rather than scientific ones. They were dedicated to social service improvements—noble, but something the academic elites were in fact trying to distance themselves from in their competition with the natural sciences’ model of “pure research.” “Catholic social science” was viewed as an oxymoron.

It was at least in part a stereotype, to be sure: though college sociology courses were often offered in blended departments including social work and criminology (not unlike today!), what we would clearly recognize as sociology had been taught in Catholic institutions for decades, and several autonomous graduate programs in Catholic universities had already emerged by this time, for example at St. Louis University and The Catholic University of America.11 On the other hand, it was also true that many sociology teachers in Catholic colleges and also high schools still did not have graduate degrees in the discipline at this time, and were often members of religious orders clearly located in the habitus of the Church as an institution. Many did need more training in research methods, having their primary background in social philosophy or a related field. Some researchers were being trained, to be sure, but fewer than in the rapidly growing secular universities. And finally, it was also true that many Catholics embraced a sociological approach we would today call clinical or applied, where empirical inquiries were the handmaiden of improving social conditions along the lines suggested by the great encyclicals and Catholic social action movements. Their first interest was, indeed, making a more just society, not the generation of positivist sociological laws which was the dominant espoused ideology of science in the discipline.
As a result of all such factors, not to forget the occasionally strong anti-Catholic bigotry in the America of the day, Catholic academic subculture and organizations were on the defensive, perceived by this country's intellectual elite as part of an immigrant old world institution neither fully "Americanized" nor fully able to "shed" its odor of theology and churchly identity. This was only fed the more by internal Church disagreements about how to embrace contemporary social science without at the same time embracing secularism and materialism: many Catholic academics, loyal to their fields but also to their Church, were anxious over the fact or appearance of lending any support to manifestations of modernism—of which sociology as a discipline was often considered a primary example. They accurately perceived a strong ambivalence within the Church hierarchy about whether or not to support and build mainstream empirical sociology in Catholic academia. For years, concerns we would today consider in the realm of sociology, such as the analysis of poverty or immigrant life or the then-new trend toward eugenics, had been addressed primarily through the frameworks of Catholic social welfare groups, theology and moral/social philosophy. Empirical sociology as an enterprise was suspect, even if its facts were at times helpful.

However, taking their cue from the widely influential encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*, there were some Catholic scholars and activists who sought refuge from the chilly atmosphere of the A.S.S., and at the same time wanted to encourage a change in Catholic intellectual life toward more openness to sociological thinking and use of modern inductive research techniques. Deriving support from the neo-Thomist revival of this period (which argues for a distinction between faith and reason but not a wide separation) and Catholic to the core, these individuals eventually found their way to starting a new organization on the premise that an integration of Catholicism and sociology was both possible and desirable, in terms of the scholarly fruits it could bear in theory and research and in terms of helping the Church come out of its defensive shell regarding engagement with the modern world.

This proactive reform-mindedness toward the Church thus converged with the more reactive motive vis-a-vis academic sociology, to fuel the desire to develop a more spiritually and philosophically congenial enclave from which to challenge the growing secular sociological enterprise. Specifically this meant influencing mainstream sociological theory and practice through a higher public profile for a distinctly Catholic perspective that needed to be crafted and publicized; as well as, hopefully, eventually exerting more influence on the business of professional associations like ASS and the Midwest Sociological Society through a process of affiliation and engagement. It would turn out that both of these goals were not effectively realized, but they were the hope.

Unfortunately for the organization, as Kivisto for example points out, from the very early days members were split about how to position themselves...
relative to mainstream sociology to accomplish their influence. Some were more pluralist, expecting a distinctively Catholic sociology to emerge and assume a rightful place among the other respected traditions in the field, yet stand visibly apart because of its religious foundations and goals. Others were more assimilationalist, and expected to eventually merge into the mainstream over time; they saw themselves adopting the concern for social justice and the moral focus of Catholicism as a personal motive for engaging in research and writing, but not really doing anything different qua sociologists than anyone else. They believed there were valuable Catholic motives for doing good sociology that could be foregrounded and argued as legitimate; but there was no such thing, really, as a "Catholic sociology" per se. The history shows a victory, if we can call it that, for the assimilationalists, who from the first had anyhow doubted that a Catholic sociology should stand apart or even, for that matter, could be clearly defined as a scholarly framework.

So by the late 1960s the ACSS had over time lost its raison d'être for various reasons, including:

• A failure to have a clearly defined or developed consensus around the notion of Catholic sociology;

• The weakening of past prejudice and discrimination toward Catholic sociologists in the ASA and other professional bodies, coupled with a desire on the part of many sociologists and social science teachers with Catholic roots to be more a part of the mainstream of the discipline, i.e., a dynamic of assimilation;

• A shift in the vocational background, professional credentialing and academic socialization of sociologists with Catholic roots, as less were members of religious orders, and more received training in secular institutions and felt their religious identification decline relative to their academic identification;

• The conceptual ascendancy of the "sociology of Catholicism" and, more broadly, the "sociology of religion," in place of a religiously-grounded and inspired sociology, as more discipline-oriented and non-Catholic researchers came into the organization who sought to pursue the sociology of religion as a specialization, thus fostering a diffusion of mission and constituency.

In short, over time the desire of a majority of ACSS members to enter the mainstream of the profession via ASA and regional associations, overcame their predecessors' and opponents' need to maintain a bastion of difference within which to develop and refine a Catholic-based social analysis and cultural
critique. As Tolson puts it, a split emerged between what were perceived by the newer cohorts to be religious “traditionalists” versus what the first generation members saw as “young turks and progressive democrats” more gung ho about sociology as a modern science that should be less encumbered by religious ideology. The “young turks” perceived that the ACSS was too clubby organizationally, and worse, functioned to stigmatize their professional identities in a “Catholic ghetto.” They were probably right about both of these, various scholars of the ACSS agree; but it is also unfortunately true that the “traditionalists” did not show an ability to solve the problems that plagued the ACSS from its inception, and could not now develop a viable approach to healing this emerging split, or making a strong case for retaining the concept of a Catholic sociology.

Without going into the gory details of the power struggle and other events leading up to these events, in 1964 the Society’s journal, long known as the American Catholic Sociological Review, was renamed Sociological Analysis: A Journal in the Sociology of Religion. And in 1970 the ACSS went out of formal existence, renaming itself the Association for the Sociology of Religion (ASR). The language of these two changes clearly indicates the shift to a more secular, mainstream focus on religion and religious behavior as objects of study, away from a religiously inspired endeavor meant to examine social life from a particular religious stance.

Scholars analyzing this phenomenon weigh in differently on its meaning. Some, like Paul Reiss, ACSS’s last president who enthusiastically shepherded the formal organizational transition to ASR, or Loretta Morris, or Peter Kivisto, tend to celebrate the change as a victory for secular humanism and assimilationism. Catholics were finally assimilated into and embraced a truly scholarly identity as disciplinary researchers, and achieved a more “universalistic” and professional academic outlook, transcending their narrow “parochialism.” They cast the Catholic remnant as wisely discarding their perhaps understandable but dated insistence on an explicitly values-based sociology in favor of a more scientific approach to the discipline.

Others like Varacalli and Krason consider it a failure at best, a sellout at worst, a triumph of liberal and Marxist ideology on the part of some, or of a shallow positivism on the part of others, in the guise of an emergent professionalization of the ex-marginal group. There was certainly a sociological shift over time in who was part of ACSS and why they were there, and the ACSS as an organization had certainly not helped itself thrive over the years because of problems with its leadership, organizational culture and finances, plus its inability to effectively delineate the meaning of a Catholic sociology in a convincing and consistent way. But beyond these admitted problems, argue Varacalli and Krason, there certainly also was evidenced a rejection of a truly Catholic worldview by those who sought professional identities within mainstream sociology, on one hand, and by and those who were moving
leftward within the Church and who identified with the so-called spirit of Vatican II on the other. For both these groups, the ACSS as an organization and an idea were viewed as old fashioned. The historical combat Catholic social thought had led against modernism, and its assertion of natural law bases for social life, were simply unacceptable to sociology by 1970, and were either rejected or diluted by those Catholics who sought to pursue analyses of the role of religion in social life without a religious interpretation of that role.

Using Peter Berger’s framework, Varacalli summarizes this whole organizational change process quite well, placing it in a broader cultural context of the difficulties many specifically Catholic academic organizations fell prey to, along with the ACSS, during the same time period. Speaking of the attempt to build up what I would call social capital, and he calls a network, Varacalli recounts that:

Part and parcel of the development of this network was the creation of distinctly Catholic social science perspectives and the establishment of separate Catholic scholarly organizations founded on the dual premises that Catholics bring distinctive philosophical presuppositions and metaphysical starting points into their intellectual approaches, and that Catholics should appropriate anything of worth in secular intellectual endeavors for the benefit of the faith. The American Catholic Historical Association was founded in 1919, the Catholic Anthropological Conference and the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1926, the Catholic Biblical Association of America in 1936, the Canon Law Society of America in 1939, the Catholic Economic Association in 1941, the Catholic Theological Society in 1946, the American Catholic Psychological Association in 1947, and the Albertus Magnus Guild, an organization of Catholic scientists, in 1953. In the wake of the Second Vatican Council many of the various Catholic scholarly associations fell victim either to a “secularization from without,” i.e., dissolved as specifically “Catholic” organizations, or a “secularization from within,” i.e. internally transformed into shells of their once authentically Catholic selves while still formally keeping the Catholic label (pp.5-6).

This description certainly applies to the fate of the ACSS though it did not even retain the Catholic label. I would hesitate to call it a sellout without knowing the people involved, but I certainly believe it was a failure—one which we in SCSS are now trying to learn from in the work we do and in the way we try to organize ourselves to endure as an organization.
ACSS' Strong Legacy of Teaching Catholic Sociology

One thing we can learn from the ACSS is to carry on their legacy of Catholic pedagogy. The historical record of the ACSS's formation clearly reveals that, in addition to providing social and psychological support for isolated and emarginated individuals, another significant issue driving the formation of the organization was that Catholic social scientists were being professionally deprived as teachers. Freidel recounts how ASS meetings of the day rarely dealt with teaching issues, session programs tending to relegate them to a back burner as if many of the society's members were not teaching college courses most of the time. Hardly an unknown issue for us contemporary conference goers, though the ASA today has done a much better job advocating and supporting the professional development of teaching than ASS ever did. At any rate, the early members of ACSS were very concerned about the formation of students in their Faith tradition, and helping them escape the “Catholic ghetto” to take their rightful place in the broader society as educated leaders.

Thus, as Morris reports:

[T]here was more to the ACSS conventions than the creation of psychological community. Presented at that first organizational meeting at Loyola University were three papers reflecting a trinity of topics that would preoccupy ACSS members for years to come: undergraduate sociology curricula, job possibilities (or an answer to “What can I do with a sociology major?”), and research themes in “The Field of Catholic Sociology”...The state of sociology teaching in Catholic colleges was an early issue in ACSS. Mundie wrote to [founder] Ralph Gallagher in February 1938: “Our various schools are very far apart in both subject matter and teaching techniques in the first two semesters.” [citation] This concern remained a steady topic of informal discussion over the years. But only in 1955 was it brought into formal focus with the appointment of a commission to investigate the condition of teaching sociology.

If excellence in college teaching were [sic] a priority, so also was the teaching of sociology in high schools. Here ACSS was preeminent. As early as 1940, the Review carried an account of a Round Table on High School Sociology held during the ACSS convention of 1939. Later convention workshops offered high school teachers ideas on syllabi preparation, focusing subject matter, using the social encyclicals, teaching techniques, films, and textbooks. I remember Eva Ross striding through exhibit rooms, her high school sociology text tucked under her arm on the qui vive for conventioneering teachers. Few of these were professional sociologists; most were men and women religious with a strong social action orientation congenial to the ACSS spirit. (p.338)
Now both Morris, cited here, and Peter Kivisto, cited earlier, have some doubts about the professional value of this teaching focus. I think these doubts reveal their acceptance of the status hierarchy between teaching and "real" sociological work still quite prevalent today, and that they seem quite willing to project backward onto this group. For example, later on in this article Morris ponders aloud whether all the exchange of syllabi, discussions of teaching techniques and information-trading on textbooks might "signal a dilution of professional focus, a failure of professional nerve." For his part Kivisto certainly recognizes the need to forge a more consistent Catholic sociology curriculum especially in Catholic institutions; and he correctly identifies a major concern ACSS members had with the often highly relativistic and secularist textbooks then available, particularly in the area of family studies. But he rather condescendingly comments that this teaching concern "of course was an indication of the professional reality of most members of the Society. They taught at small Catholic colleges and had heavy teaching loads and other parochial [sic!] institutional commitments." (p.354) I think Morris and Kivisto have it backwards: it is precisely in their teaching effort that ACSS made one of its most important contributions to the Catholic sociology movement.

The ultimately dashed hopes of ACSS members to affect the broader discipline were to be pursued through professional productivity, to be sure, but that productivity depended on building up two critical foundations. First there was the compelling, if very difficult, problem of defining exactly what it meant to be a "Catholic sociologist" doing a "Catholic sociology." This indeed proved a major challenge according to diverse scholars of the situation. It was really never satisfactorily resolved as far as the broader sociological establishment was concerned, because that establishment valued a certain clear coherence at the theoretical or formal epistemological levels: the ACSS was thus judged negatively for its inability to formulate a distinct theory and methodology in paradigmatically acceptable terms.

But second, and more to my interest here, this definition had to be worked out so that it could be employed to frame a distinctly Catholic social scientific worldview among students. It had to be a definition-in-use that could frame the teaching process whereby a new generation of Catholic, and eventually other, students could be plausibly socialized into, or at least exposed to, a legitimate Catholic social scientific worldview. Such a pedagogical frame would of necessity involve:

- Defining a picture of the Catholic sociology student, i.e., what that student should know and be able to do as a result of studying in a course;

- Delineating the boundaries of course content; and
• Suggesting specific instructional strategies and approaches to assessing learning.

Did ACSS members succeed in doing this? I answer a strong yes. Based on my examination of a significant portion of ACSS scholarly production in the textbook arena, I believe that one place their search for a definition of Catholic sociology was effectively played out was in the effort to develop pedagogical materials to help the ACSS realize its mission to form a new generation of Catholic citizens through the teaching of Catholic sociology at both the secondary and post-secondary levels. From my point of view, despite what the larger discipline of sociology and some within ACSS itself had to say about why a Catholic sociology was impossible, and despite the failures of ACSS to forge a more unified theoretical front in the field, I think the ACSS did succeed in defining a Catholic sociology for teaching purposes.

That is, the texts written by ACSS members for both secondary and post-secondary audiences clearly set forth a distinct image of the educated student formed by a Catholic sociological imagination. They set fascinating parameters for the content of a Catholic sociology course. They exhorted students to a strong engagement with building a better society through both the ordinary mechanisms of citizenship and the perhaps extraordinary means of consciously applying the Gospel to questions of social justice. And they advocated, especially for their time, very sophisticated, distinctive, experiential learning and assessment approaches that today would be recognized as superior by the scholars of teaching and learning.

**Features of the “Catholic Sociological Imagination”**

In this section I will discuss the various texts I reviewed to extract from them a sense of the dimensions at the overall teaching project of ACSS sociologists. There are some differences among Ross, Furfey, and Murray on, for example, how tightly to define the relationship between Catholicity and sociology. Furfey, for example, always advocated a strong and explicit link—they were two sides of his coin—in the service of Catholic social activism. Ross was also committed to an intense Catholic sociology, though over time approached it in a more academic tone and demeanor, and by the late 1950's was in fact not so sure they should be fully integrated in theory and practice. She began to side with others in ACSS, like Franz Mueller, who did not believe the Catholicism did more than function as a basis of initial social concern for the individual sociologists or a source of social ethics which one used when taking sociological material and applying it in the policy arena—a
motivation or somewhat external ideological persuasion rather than a
penetrating epistemological position. (It was his position that came to prevail,
as I discussed earlier, and was so central to the transformation of ACSS into
ASR) Murray reads more like Ross.

But in order to provide a fuller sense of their total approach to how a
next generation of social thinkers should be formed, I will leave the sometimes
subtle differences among our authors aside. Instead I will focus on their work
as different sides of a total pedagogy, and discuss what I perceive to be types of
pedagogical books that make up the collective teaching movement of which
they were major engines. Each author contributed to disseminating these types,
these aspects of the total teaching project, in some ways. By taking this
approach of seeking commonalities and complementarities I think we get a
useful outline of their teaching strategy and the diverse tools they needed to
pursue their overall pedagogical agenda.

In my review I saw evidence of three ideal types of books: *works of
legitimation, works of foundation, and works of instruction*. By *works of
legitimation* I mean those intended to function as contributions to the
broader discipline of sociology, written in the language and style of the field,
wherein Catholic sociological ideas and figures are presented as just one more
part of the diverse quilt of contemporary sociology. They insert Catholic
sociology into the disciplinary mainstream. In these books the authors' own
predilections and passions for Catholic sociology are held more in check; the
explicitly Catholic material appears alongside other disciplinary threads and
trends, just as plausible and legitimate as any other school of thought.

By *works of foundation*, I mean books that went deeper into the
theological or philosophical or scientific basis of the Catholic sociological vision
or imagination, meant for perhaps more sympathetic, educated adult readers
already open to the idea that a sociology could have its starting point in
revelation and the work of the Holy Spirit. They are usually not meant for the
specific audience of secular academic sociologists, though likely included them;
yet they often use disciplinary ideas and figures as markers in the discourse to
make particular points about what is wrong with so much social thought today.

By *works of instruction*, I mean books written in the form and
function of textbooks, more or less as they exist today. I perceive two types of
these: first, overviews of the discipline or subject for the novice, with chapter
summaries at the end, sources for further investigation, research project
suggestions, and usually pictures or other graphics. Ross, Murray and Furfey all
wrote a number of these, for both high school and college courses. And
second, there were the more personal extended monographs a la C. Wright
Mills or Peter Berger, meant to express the author's personal sociological
vision and application of ideas to important social issues. Furfey in particular
was a master of this genre and I will discuss several of his books of this type.
In effect, in this breadth of pedagogical production we see evidence of the tactical diversity of the Catholic sociology teaching movement, which despite the flaws of its mother organization nevertheless did succeed in extending the reach of a Catholic sociological imagination further out into the American educational system.

**Works of legitimation**

It will be useful to enter this material by first having a sense of how the idea of Catholic sociology was justified to the broader academic world and how that justification translated into books having a particular character and content. The books of legitimation have one major purpose: to propose a writing of the scope of the total discipline of sociology which naturally includes Catholic sociology as one of its current significant trends, one that has ancient and venerable roots, and that should not cause any truly well-prepared intellectual cause for alarm or disturbance. The tone of such books is usually low-key, with the authors not forthrightly identifying with the Catholic perspective themselves, just reporting about it in a highly knowledgeable way. In this category I am going to discuss two books, one each by Furfey and Ross. Both are basically histories of social thought such as one would use in an undergraduate course or graduate seminar on social theory.

Furfey wrote many books for both popular and scholarly audiences starting in the late 1920’s, but in the 1950’s, at perhaps the height of the Catholic sociology movement’s prominence, he gave a more pedagogical shape to his ideas in two textbooks: his 1953 compendium of sociology for more advanced students entitled *The Scope and Method of Sociology*; and his 1958 social problems text for beginning students written with Mary Elizabeth Walsh, called *Social Problems and Social Action*. Both of these, but especially the social problems text, are striking to a reader from today for their explicit references to Catholic historical figures, documents, and ideas-things which would be clearly almost *verboten* in our contemporary mainstream materials. And both of these works of Furfey were published by major presses: Harper and Brothers and Prentice-Hall respectively, and intended for wide student audiences. Each work brings a Catholic dimension to the material, but in different ways. I will briefly discuss the social problems book later on in Part II, but the other work helps in our present need to examine how the *normalcy* of a Catholic sociological vision was established.

*The Scope and Method of Sociology* was written for a general academic sociology audience: it was an entry in the prestigious Harper’s Social Science Series, under the editorship of mainstream sociologist F. Stuart Chapin, which had included such works as Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma*, Sorokin’s *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, and several key works in the emerging statistical research methodology of the era. Of all the materials I examined for
this research, it is one of the most low key and "normal" books, closest to the
dominant paradigm of sociological writing. In this work an explicitly Catholic
point of view is "added in" as one perspective among several worth considering
in dealing with the role of values in social science. I sense an effort on Furfey's
part to set some distance between himself and the Catholic material, as for
example when he refers to Catholic sociologists as a group with "their" ideas—not "ours" or mine." And the voice is consistently objectivist and
passive, a striking departure from the intensely personal and dialogical prose of
his other books. So he is clearly playing down the personal partisanship his
other books reveal very explicitly—as we shall see—and trying to reach the
wider secular audience in academia. On the other hand, by daring to include
"Catholic sociologists" in such an overview of the discipline at all, and setting
forth absolutely no apologetics about the Catholic sociological material he
includes, his is an important statement of legitimacy.

Furfey uses most of the text to lay out a very competent overview of
current sociological epistemology and research methodology in terms quite
similar to other works of the day: there are chapters on the definition of
sociology as a distinct discipline, the logical structure of scientific inquiry,
statistical reasoning, types of observation, how to conduct case studies, the
possibility of using experimental (what we would call quasi-experimental)
methods, and how to create questionnaires, scales, survey items, and so forth.

What is unique to Furfey's text, however, is what he points to in his
subtitle: A Metasociological Treatise. For him, one cannot consider the pursuit of
scientific knowledge about human society-sociology: without clarifying criteria
for ascertaining the scope and methods of the field, for determining the
scientific quality and relevance of the propositions introduced for examination,
and for deciding how to apply the criteria in conducting sociological inquiry.
Sociology itself, therefore, cannot meaningfully proceed without an
accompanying "metasociology." Some aspects of this metasociology can be
addressed with logic, such as how to determine the scientific quality of
propositional argumentation or theoretical reasoning. But much cannot, even in
what appear to be technical areas like research methodology. For example, one
can logically describe an experiment on humans with a condition applied to
one control group and not to another. But one cannot morally argue that
some children should be deprived of love or nourishment just to see what
happens! And further, in defining the territory of what is considered
sociological inquiry or subject matter, predilections of the inquirer are often
defining and they are shaped by extra-logical issues and questions.

Thus, embracing the strong debate about values in sociology and
anticipating Gouldner, Furfey clearly states that sociology's territory is at least
in significant part shaped by and pursued using value judgments—it is
inherently value laden at its core. As soon as one starts talking about how
useful a study is, or how appropriate, or how convenient or relevant, we are in

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the arena of value judgments. And when a judgment is made in the realm of metasociology it is a metasociological value judgment: "A sociologist makes this sort of judgment when he judges one concept of sociology is likely to be more enlightening than another or that a particular way of setting up a research project is more feasible than another of that a proposed sociological experiment would be deleterious to the subjects and immoral." (p. 15). And this is not just a question of debating the idiosyncratic and perhaps obscure preferences of sociologists: the existence of metasociology as a parallel—Furfey calls it "auxiliary"—field of systematic inquiry implies that the nature of the value judgments can be made explicit and analyzed and verified. Metasociology is itself a science in this sense.

Furfey then pursues a history of social thought starting with the classic period and moving right through the 19th and 20th centuries, examining thinkers in terms of their metasociological propositions about what social thought consists of and how sociological analysis should be carried out. As in other books he is highly critical of the "Comtean" behaviorism and positivism of American metasociology—excepting the noetic sociology of Sorokin, and siding with those like Gunnar Myrdal who argued that values judgments as defining issues for study, commitment to using sociology for social improvement, and considering the policy implications of research are all part of the field. Social ethics was thus a kissing cousin of sociology, and their relationship placed sociology in between physical science and philosophy.

Then Furfey casually suggests that Catholic sociologists have taken up the problem of supra-empirical postulates very extensively and systematically, and thus deserve the attention of others in the discipline: "the results of their discussions may have a certain general interest" as he drily puts it. (p.47) (note the "their" here.) But in any case he then briefly lays out an excellent summary of the major positions taken on the role of supra-empirical postulates within the ACSS over the years, positions which were never really resolved within that organization but which informed concrete teaching practice in direct ways. His overview is worth citing at length because it captures very pithily the main themes characterizing Catholic sociology of the day, and help us see how the ACSS textbooks authors intellectually grounded their pedagogy in what we would call today an interpretive sociological paradigm. For the audience of this book at the time, too, he provides legitimation of the depth of debate among Catholic social thinkers through extensive footnotes containing references to his own and many other writings from the ACSS and European Catholic sociological circles, including then-current undergraduate sociology textbooks:

The problem of supra-empirical postulates has been rather extensively discussed by Catholic sociologists and the results of their discussions may have a certain general interest. Catholics, by virtue of their religious beliefs, have a very definite view of society. To what extent, if
at all, should this affect their sociology? The most varied answers have been given to this question. The two most extreme possible viewpoints would obviously be: 1) Sociology contains no supra-empirical propositions, and 2) Sociology contains nothing but supra-empirical propositions. Both these extreme views have actually been defended, the first by Delos and the second by Derisi [footnote]. The vast majority of Catholic sociologists take a position somewhere in between. As against Derisi, they affirm both the possibility and the value of empirical sociology. As against Delos, they maintain that the empirical data of sociology should somehow be brought into relation with philosophy and theology by the sociologist himself in his sociological writings. Different writers have tried to do this in different ways. Some have listed philosophical and theological propositions frankly and explicitly as postulates of their sociology [citation]. Others have insisted on the right of empirical sociology to enjoy “a certain autonomy”; the Catholic teacher should indeed inculcate Catholic principles in the classroom, but this is an additional function beyond his function as a sociologist. Another is to segregate whatever involves theological doctrine as a separate discipline, so that there would be a theological sociology separate from, but coordinated with, empirical sociology [citation]. A final possibility is to conceive of sociology in two senses, one narrow and one broad. In the narrow sense sociology would be a purely empirical science; in the broad sense it would take in not only empirical data, but also whatever supra-empirical postulates might prove necessary or useful for their fullest possible interpretation. (pp.47-49)

As I just observed, Furfeys footnotes to this passage are extensive and informative: and for me a critical feature is his summary of some of the specific “philosophical and theological propositions” that those who take the route of being very explicit include in their introductory textbooks. For example, he cites a 1928 Catholic intro text by Muntsch and Spalding (one I cannot locate yet) called Introductory Sociology, that he says was probably one of the first to actually list explicit postulates. They were four:

- The existence of God
- The freedom of the will
- The immortality of the soul
- The Incarnation.

He refers to Eva Ross’ widely used text Fundamental Sociology—which I will discuss later—indicating that she has six postulates similar to these, though he doesn’t identify them. He cites another text we will examine, Raymond
Murray’s *Introductory Sociology*, as building upon several similar postulates too:

- The existence of God
- Divine revelation
- Objective morality
- Conscience
- Free will
- Grace
- Belief in man’s future destiny in a Divine order.

After offering a few more examples like these from current intro texts, he cites the report of a 1940 ACSS conference panel discussion on the “The *Introductory Sociology Course in Sociology*” on how the existence of such postulates should concretely play out in the classroom: “After a detailed discussion of the relative amount of time to be given to the postulates from religion and philosophy, it was agreed that these should be stated as prerequisite to sociology but not taught in detail, except to show the sociological inferences arising from these truths.” (p.48)

What do we have here? First, we see that the basis for teaching a Catholic sociology has a firm grounding in a “wide” view of the discipline, one that should “bring in” the value system of Catholicism as part of the basis of the sociologist’s selection of issues for investigation, framework for interpretation of social facts, and ultimate purpose for studying society in the first place as an aspect of God’s creation. Second, we see that this “wide view” of the discipline is not bizarre, but simply one of various possible wide views on the table in opposition to the prevailing and more narrow behaviorist and positivist approaches. Third, we see that this wide view is so important that the introductory course in sociology can and should be organized to present it in an explicit way, thus positioning sociology in a direct relationship to the whole of the liberal arts structure of the college curriculum, between science and philosophy, occupying its own territory but, realistically, looking left and right to dialogue with its companion ways of knowing. A pedagogical implication of the approach to Catholic sociology defined here is that it can actually help students see relationships between their various fields of study in, say, general education, can help clarify relationships rather than simply pose disciplinary perspectives as antagonistic. This in fact was an implicit intention of the ACSS educators: to locate Catholic thinking at the nexus of general education, rather than isolate it in theology.

I find it interesting that the ACSS gave this book its award for distinguished scholarly contribution when it came out. I believe this signals that such efforts at reaching out to and speaking in the language of the mainstream were valued and encouraged.

Next, let’s consider *Western Social Thought*, by “E.J. Ross, Ph.D., and E. Kilzer, Ph.D.” E.J. is Eva; and E. is Dom Ernest Kilzer, OSB. I can’t help but
wonder if their choice to refer to themselves in this manner involved concerns for both gender dynamics and peoples' attitudes toward members of religious orders among the mainstream sociology readership. Their clearly indicated doctorates certainly signal a refutation of the stereotype that Catholic social thinkers have no academic credentials. But I have no direct evidence, this is just interesting speculation! In any case, Ross and Kilzer's book came out just a year after Furfey's, in 1954, but while Furfey's book was a foray into the heart of the discipline's prestige centers, this was one ring further away, published by a Catholic press, The Bruce Publishing Company, and carrying both the Imprimatur and Nihil Obstat. I infer here that it was probably destined more for Catholic college and university students as part of the ACSS effort to upgrade the intellectual stature of the sociological curricula in those settings. Ross came from Ireland originally, but got her Ph.D. in Sociology from Yale and in 1940 became a faculty member at Trinity College in Washington, DC, where she was chair of the Sociology Department for 29 years. Kilzer was on the faculty of the Benedictine St. John’s University in Collegeville, Minnesota. Both Ross and Kilzer served on the core Executive Committee of ACSS for several years each in the 1940's and '50s, and Ross was one of the most frequent contributors to the Society's journal over the years.

This too is intended as a college level social thought survey, whose goal is to introduce readers briefly to the “outstanding” figures of the Western tradition, a canon they reinforce in the conviction that it is Western thinkers who most strongly influence our own social and cultural development. The pedagogical goal here was to enhance the intellectual foundations of Catholic students by making them conversant with the entire Western canon, including figures from their own religious tradition, but not exclusively so. The message was also to help students realize that important Catholic thinkers in history, clerical and lay, were indeed a part of the proud Western tradition even though, because of the scientistic direction of the contemporary culture and the bias against religious thought on many campuses, they might not be aware of that fact.

Thus Ross and Kilzer set out to make their students part of the “educated” elite who have a certain “cultural equipment” as they put it: apologizing for the necessary brevity of the sections on each thinker in their survey, they note that they include only “outstanding” thinkers, “those with whose name at least the educated person must be acquainted.” (p.iii) The Catholicism of the text is thus revealed, as in Furfey, not so much in an adamant and explicit advocacy for the vision, but rather in what is “obviously” necessary to be included in the history of social thought as a normal part of the canon.

Ross and Kilzer then develop a pretty typical survey of social thought from the classic period forward, starting with the Greeks, with the difference that they also include fairly extensive sections on material much less likely to show up in more secular textbooks. For example, they include Aquinas,
Macchiavelli and Thomas More in their list of *sine qua non* authors that should be part of one's "cultural equipment" today. There is a twenty page chapter on "The Hebrews" dealing with Hebrew models of government, teachings on marriage and family, norms for one's relationships with servants and slaves, property ownership, the care of the poor, and their concept of justice. Augustine is dealt with at some length, as well as thinkers in his tradition like John of Salsbury. "Aquinas and Dante" get their own section; Marsiglio of Padua and William Langsland—the author of the allegoric poem *Piers Plowman* on the disintegration of medieval Christendom—also get significant attention. Their sixth chapter is titled "Christianity," and presents how several key ideas such as the social virtues and the social teachings of the Church Fathers, the universal character of Christ's teachings, norms and values related to marriage and family life, the position of women and the issue of social equality more generally, and the Christian understanding of the human person, are all at the very core of Western civilization (a lesson the current European Union seems to be truly losing!). They have a unit on "Later European Sociology," and here discuss some of the Catholic sociologists who opposed Durkheim's "sociologism" by emphasizing the human capacity to transcend apparently determining social conditions. Christopher Dawson and distributism show up here, for example.

Finally, in their chapter toward the end on "Sociology in the United States," the founders and stars from the American tradition receive mention and comment, from Ward and Graham through Veblen to Sorokin and Znaniecki and Stouffer and Bogardus; but Ross and Kilzer indicate that they will not be treated in depth because they are likely to be studied in more detail in specialized courses within that discipline in this country. Instead their strategy is to explore the explicitly Catholic sociology as an emerging institutionalized tradition. Their list of top sociology departments includes Columbia, Harvard, North Carolina, Duke and Catholic University of America all in the same breath. They describe CUA's recent shift from a strictly social service, "ameliorist" approach to the field toward other work, such as research. Then Ross and Kilzer provide a list of recent sociology textbooks by Furfey and Murray in particular, to demonstrate that this tradition exists in the mainstream. And then they review the debates within Catholic circles about what the relationship between Catholicism and social science should be, in the same neutral language Furfey had used in his book, with Furfey and Murray said to argue the tight relationship, while others, such as Jacques Leclerq in France, arguing for more distance.

To sum up, in these two texts we observe the strategy of legitimation of Catholic sociology via an effort to insert it into mainstream academic territory as one of many sociological traditions. Ross and Kilzer, having the advantage of a more Catholic student audience, can let loose a bit more with the idea that the Catholic social thought tradition is actually the central axis of Western culture—something Furfey cannot go so far as to do. But both these works
carry the legitimation process to the two publics the ACSS had to reach: broader secular academia, and a perceived anemic intellectual environment within Catholic higher education itself.

Works of foundation

I found three works in the ensemble whose main purpose seemed to me about demonstrating the solid basis of the Catholic social vision in both scientific discovery and social philosophy. In other words their mission was to debunk the popular stereotypes that Catholicism and scientific research are incompatible and that Catholic social thought has nothing to say about the concept of progress. If faith in certain versions of science and social progress were (and are) the ideological hegemony of the day, Catholic educators had to dismember them by showing that a deeper look into both science and social ideals actually led one to very plausible Catholic stances and conclusions.

Let me deal briefly first with the entry that systematizes a profound critique of contemporary social ideals, another book by Fr. Furfey called *Three Theories of Society* published in 1937 by Macmillan as part of an Outstanding Catholic Books series. It is intended for an educated Catholic audience, meant to give them more powerful tools for dissecting why the current promises held out by both materialists and their idealist opponents are both doomed. It reminded me of some of the works of C.S. Lewis in its tone and richness. In any case, the book highlights the importance of telos in Furfey’s thought: a reminder that we must constantly consider society’s intended goals and purposes in exploring its institutions and processes. He is exploring why the contemporary society and some utopian alternatives are ultimately unsatisfactory possible ways of life and thus will fail as critical interpretive frameworks. He does so by contrasting what we could call three different world views. A world view is a way of knowing about the social order that is ultimately shaped by the set of ideals and values one has about its optimal directions or telos, and that generates a set of derived prescriptions about how to achieve those ideals and ends. In this work Furfey uses the term “society” to mean less a demarcated social group than a whole organization of social life, including social structures and principle institutions, as well as a sort of dominant character type or person who best exemplifies the way of life this society aims to realize.

A society consists of people organized toward some purpose that keeps them together. So society incorporates culture and structure and personality and a defined telos: it is the dominant telos that gives shape and direction to the rest in Furfey’s sociological imagination, it is what we think we should aspire to that molds the social order. To change the social order thus requires a new aspiration, a new telos—which of course for him is that provided by Christ and the Church. For Furfey three of these world views are competing in our day. The first is the dominant one, a positivist” society. Its “success ideal” is purely
materialistic and naturalistic. Furfey is saying that the scientific positivism of Comte (whose ideas he delves into in some detail) is actually one expression of a broader worldview that drives the materialist consumerism of everyone: scientists collect facts, others collect cars and property, with the same smug attitude of certainty about the "realism" of the outlook. Truth is just about what you can pile in front of you. The result is rampant social inequality and misunderstanding about the meaning of human life.

The next "society" he calls "noetic:" it acknowledges that success-society is unsatisfactory because it is based on the success-ideal. The success-ideal is unsatisfactory because it is based on the false epistemology of positivism. Positivism is unsatisfactory because it is a partial and superficial view of reality." (p.71) A deeper form of knowledge might come from concentrating not on superficial, changing realities like statistical patterns or empirical trends, but ultimate essences, in the manner of Plato. As Furfey cracks, Herbert Spencer seemed a tremendous mind in his day because of all the facts he had mustered together, and he became famous. But he is already out of date, while Plato is never out of date, nor are the truly great master artists ever out of date. But how to attain this deeper knowledge? Furfey examines in great detail various theories of cognition and perception rooted in sources as diverse as Aquinas and the Scholastics, Henri Bergson, and contemporary psychology. A truly noetic society would be one which systematic contemplation of deep truths was a major organizing force, and wherein it would be much easier for people to achieve some higher level of moral being because of their likely discovery of the operation and norms of the natural law.

But, says Furfey, the data of history are discouraging: noetic societies are ideal, but virtually non-existent. A part of a society here or there may achieve something of it—he lists Athens, cities of the Renaissance, and some short-lived utopian communities that managed to break with the selfish and acquisitive dominant culture especially in the U.S., like New Harmony, Indiana or the Oneida community in New York—but by and large noetic society has been a dream. We sometimes see individuals living noetically—and often regular people, not just members of the intelligentsia—but never a whole society. Some groups claim to be living it, but often are not if one looks closer—Furfey cites the Lynd's Middletown study as illustrating how a moralistic tone of goodness and consideration in fact overlaid a profound individualism and acquisitiveness in the apparently harmonious small town Midwest.

The only real possibility for achieving a better society is to found it on faith. Furfey calls this type of society "pistic:" it merges the intellectual and contemplative qualities of the noetic ideal with the concrete activism of social improvement based on love of neighbor. To merge faith and reason and try to live out the implications of that merger is the highest accomplishment. Summarizing, Furfey writes that:
"The moral is clear. Our search for a satisfactory human society must lead to a pistic society, a society founded on faith. Only such a pistic society can satisfy us. The reason for this is easy to see. A noetic society is better than a positivistic society because it is founded on a deeper truth. Just so, a pistic society is better than a noetic society because it is founded on a truth which is not only deeper, but infinitely deeper. The security of the foundation assures the value of the society built upon it." (pp.178-9)

Furfey's book functions in the teaching project to teach a wider educated public and encourage them to see Catholicism as a basis for a better society in terms much more sophisticated than the discourse of the popular, and perhaps, ritualistic Catholic piety which the public may have observed around them. In this Furfey is contributing a work of legitimation, to be sure, a proof that Catholics are educated and reflective; but a deeper purpose in my view is to furnish a foundation for social critique that he takes up later in many forms for many audiences, both popular, student and scholarly.

The next two books fascinate me because they both challenge head-on the stereotype of Catholics as know-nothing fundamentalists, and at the same time provide sophisticated syntheses of current anthropological evidence about human origins that reveal the strength of actual Catholic doctrines and positions. They develop the foundational compatibility of Faith and reason/science—especially the science of human origins. The first is by Eva Ross and is called, appropriately enough, Social Origins, published in 1936. The second is by Father Raymond Murray (though he is identified as Dr. Raymond Murray), a 1943 book called Man's Unknown Ancestors.

Eva Ross adopted that "wide view" of the discipline of sociology, I noted above, and thus almost always included consideration of the origins of society in all her books, addressing what today would be considered anthropological material. In her 1936 Social Origins she presents a summary or overview of current anthropological evidence about cultural universals. This short book was a compilation of lectures she had given to the Catholic Social Guild Summer School at Oxford, England, in 1935. Published by Sheed and Ward, it was intended primarily for a Catholic adult audience; and in it she models the scholarly openness quite typical of European Catholic intellectuals to issues of physical and social evolution then dominating scholarly debate. In Social Origins she makes an effective case that although the factual origins of society are not precisely accessible empirically, and probably will never be, we can use the study of so-called "primitive" societies remaining today as a heuristic indicator of earlier social existence, especially if those tribal cultures are not yet much affected by cultural diffusion.

In particular, she attacks the unilinear evolutionists and their claims that religion, like magic, is part of an earlier, "less developed" form of social system.
that has been evolutionarily replaced by societies having the modern, materialistic, scientific outlook. Nonsense, Ross argues: the evidence of such social evolution, or of other versions of Social Darwinism, is simply not there, and in fact, tends instead to show that earlier societies had a very highly developed, though certainly different, understanding of, and connection to, a higher being, which indeed modern societies have lost or corrupted. She summarizes her purposes this way:

To delve into the origins of our social institutions can give, of course, no positive accurate results. Yet the subject is not mere idle speculation. Quite apart from its general interest, it has a very important value from the sociological viewpoint. It enable us to better understand the fundamental operations behind our major culture-patterns. It enables us to meet on their own ground those sociologists who still propound unilinear evolution. These theorists take scanty account of history, and they will not listen to philosophical disquisition, or to religious revelation. They ignore the existence of a creator, and of an intelligently created and planned world, whose inhabitants have a destiny beyond the grave. (Forward)

To accomplish her goals, Ross draws upon ethnological data from about 30 tribes around the world to refute the positions of such figures as Herbert Spencer, Henry Maine, E. B. Tylor, Lewis Morgan, Levy-Bruhl, and even Durkheim, who set forth various models of social evolution that ranked societies as moving through defined stages, from “lower” to “higher” in terms of their relationship to the rational-scientific cultural outlook. Two of her conclusions in this book are quite striking, and found their way into the foundational propositions of her more pedagogical textbooks I'll discuss in the next Part of this paper. One is that if you study anthropology deeply, there are very strong indicators of the existence of “fundamental institutions” that emerge in all known cultures—first and foremost is marriage and family. There are different family and kinship norms and values and different moral systems across time and space, of course, but more commonality even in these than is usually claimed. Ross finds considerable evidence that monogamy was quite common, and further that the close-knit family is a cultural universal: the notion that earlier humans lived in promiscuous hordes and then polyandrous matriarchies is ridiculous.

She argues that earlier societies had communal ways of life but not to the exclusion of private or personal property—taking a jab at the emerging Marxian version of pre-history as essentially and thoroughly communistic. And finally religion is another universal—and not the fantasized “primitive” religions or magic systems supposed by the unilinear evolutionists in anthropology or by Freud, but religions that despite their differences often
recognize and worship a single prime mover or creator, of which the Judeo-
Christian tradition based on overt revelation is just one of a whole series. Ross
dismisses as foolish, assertions that earlier humans were physically more simple
minded and could not perceive or appreciate an infinite divinity.

Putting her various threads of argument together, Ross claims that
ethnographic evidence suggests how earlier humans actually tended to have a
more clear vision of God than many societies do today and those ways of life
express a particular understanding of the natural human condition endowed by
God (and which is expressed in the Church’s social teaching about natural law).
As she put it:

And it is extremely interesting to note that whereas these “primitive”
peoples in the remote corners of the earth are dominantly
monogamous, dominantly theistic, and have definite notions of
property rights, those who have a more complex culture (this
complicity and even progression being evident from their folklore and
from the anthropological researches which have been made), those
who have come in contact with other peoples, often bear signs of
degeneration from a much earlier culture-pattern. (p.20)

She then remarks that for us (Catholics) it is quite easy to imagine a
golden age at the dawn of human history, where the created Man lived in closer
harmony with God, unencumbered by sin. Ross acknowledges that the
evidence
from human physical evolution is uncertain about exactly how people as we
know them came to be, but the key point is to recognize that whenever the
right point came God ensouled beings and they became human in the essential
sense. And the anthropological evidence tantalizingly supports the biblical and
imaginal claims of an Eden: an Eden with monogamous relations lived in a
material world involving some ownership of land and objects, and in close
conscious awareness of God the creator. Later societies lose much of this and
must struggle to either retain some elements or rediscover their truth and
value. They diverge and begin to develop many understandings of God, often
erroneous, and many ways of life, often sinful: cultural diversity over time is just
the playing out of Babel in the world. Yet in all this diversity the hand of God
remains subtly discernible.

Thus Ross lays the foundation for Catholic social teaching and natural
law theory in her survey of ethnology, blending a very explicit Catholic view
with a very detailed and scholarly analysis of both the empirical evidence
emerging from cultural and physical anthropology and broader theories of
social change. Science and Faith are hardly in conflict; they together point to
one truth, in different ways.

Fr. Murray’s 1943 Man’s Unknown Ancestors is an even more detailed
overview of the state of current knowledge about pre-historical human life,
grounded in physical anthropology, archeology and ethnology. It would be used in an introductory anthropology course, I expect. Though published by Bruce it does not carry an Imprimatur or Nihil Obstat. Murray's own specialization was anthropology and he had done his own field work in Alaska; but he was Sociology Department head at Notre Dame for quite a while and very active in ACSS, serving as one of the founding members of its Executive Committee in the early 1940's.

Murray's goal in this book is to introduce students to the material of prehistory, but within the bookends of two key questions. First, how does the growing body of facts of prehistory and human evolution affect the relationship between science and Faith as ways of knowing? And second, does such evidence come to threaten the very significance of religion as an explanatory framework? He wants to establish three truths: first, that religion and science are very compatible as long as we understand religion in a more sophisticated, concretely Catholic way; second, that Catholics have always supported the conduct of scientific research; and third, that new findings in archeology and anthropology actually support a thoughtful reading of Scripture's accounts of human origins and the human social condition.

Thus in early chapters he is sharply critical of past efforts by Christian leaders to see the Bible as a literal account of creation history (e.g. John Lightfoot's famous calculation that humanity was created exactly in the year 4004 BC), and in general read it as a treatise in science. He recounts various episodes in cultural and physical anthropological research, like discoveries of remains or encounters with new peoples, that gradually and quite justifiably undermined the biblically literal approach to prehistory and human social evolution. But such episodes unfortunately set the stage for the rejection of the baby with the bathwater, as it were: the triumph of materialism and historicism in the study of humankind.

Over the next 15 or so chapters he then reviews in detail the state of current knowledge about human and cultural evolution around the world—marred of course from today's vantage point by the inclusion as fact of what we now know to be error, such as the Piltdown Man fraud. But the main case he makes is that we can indeed accept what anthropologists and archeologists are discovering, as long as we do so with the skepticism appropriate to any cumulative scientific endeavor: Evolutionary theory is looking better than it did a decade earlier, for example, but it is still not proven; and as we continue to test it with new data, new discoveries and wonders can only shed more detail about the true grandeur of God the creator—what today we would probably term "intelligent design."

The "we" here is Catholics, to be sure, who might be under the misunderstanding that the Church looks askance at science in general and the science of pre-history in particular. Nothing could be further from the truth, Murray explains: the Church has always embraced the notion that science

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cannot ultimately contradict faith, only inform it. But the audience is also non-
Catholics who would indeed have no real way of knowing from the book cover
or title or author identification that questions of the relationship between
Catholic doctrine and current scientific discoveries are central to the book.
This eventually does become apparent toward the end, when Murray directly
engages the question of whether Catholics are fundamentalists, and whether
there is, as a result of the latest discoveries of pre-history, a way to reconcile
biblical narratives with scientific ones. Murray is very forceful on these two
questions: he responds a loud no to the first and a thoughtful yes to the
second. Citing evidence from the fact that much science has been indeed
carried out by Catholic scholars, including clerics, and pointing out specific
Church teachings and documents, he adamantly separates Catholic thinking and
doctrine from that of the rather lost Protestants. He cites the Scopes trial as
a sad illustration of how religion *in toto* was painted with a misleading,
stereotyping brush, and its reputation as a source of scientific energy and
wisdom besmirched. He reminds us that the Catholic position was not at all
brought forward in this media circus, and this must be corrected in the future.
Scopes made all religion seem anti-intellectual, but it is really only Protestant
fundamentalism that is so limiting.

Regarding the relationship between biblical and scientific narratives,
Murray argues that the intelligent and informed position today is one of seeking
appropriate compatibilities. For example, science is starting to provide us a
rough sequence of species of beings that led up to the present Homo Sapiens
form (again he is using data available from the period which has now been
adjusted and refined, but the basic logic of a sequence of evolving types is still
used today). We can roughly identify when prehistorical man acquired the brain
capacity needed for complex thought and ideation, and for generating a
conscious tool-using culture: sometime around the Tertiary Era, i.e., the
Miocene and Pliocene eras, perhaps one million years ago. (Today's dating is a
little farther back.) That is about when Adam and Eve walked the earth, he
suggests. But religion must dispense with myths and errors wrought by
incorrect information and cultural biases, for example: iconographic images of
Adam and Eve as "perfect Northern Europeans," looking like moderns. Adam
and Eve were the first to have souls—but they probably looked like a pre-
Neanderthal *Pithecanthropus* or some other early human form. Their having
been created in the "image" of God means that they had souls: the image
expresses a beauty of *spirit*, not of physiology. We must get over our need to
project backward our fantasies and ethnocentrism, and when we do that we
will be rewarded by an openness to a wealth of information that will actually
strengthen our Faith.

In summary, these three works of foundation by Furfey, Ross and
Murray established a deeply-dug base underneath the expression of a Catholic
social imagination and the process of legitimation *vis-a-vis* academia that it
required. This foundation first excludes the supposed dichotomy between science and faith, then embodies a range of scientific data that actually supports a wide version of Catholic social thought. This science of human origins is in turn reinforced by a social philosophy that insists on a consideration of human goals and ends in evaluating types of social systems and cultures—an insistence that social life indeed has direction in its development. Foundational texts make it possible to assume that the project of legitimacy going on for Catholic social thought vis-a-vis American academia is actually resting on deeper facts from other disciplines about the ultimate nature of both human biological beings and cultural creators.

In the next installment of this paper, I will take up the last ideal type of texts, namely works of instruction. I will explore both traditionally-formatted textbooks as well as monographs that embodied good Catholic sociology, especially those penned by Fr. Paul Hanley Furfey, a prolific author of this form. Then I will conclude with some lessons and questions for the reader about how the teaching legacy of the SCSS might affect how we approach the teaching of college-level sociology today, both organizationally within the Society of Catholic Social Scientists and individually in our own classrooms.

Appendix

Works Reviewed for This Paper

By Fr. Paul Hanley Furfey
The Parish and Play (Philadelphia: Dolphin Press, 1928 New Lights on Pastoral.)
Problems (Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Co., 1931.)
Fire on the Earth (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935.)
Three Theories of Society (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937.)
This Way to Heaven (Silver Spring, MD: The Preservation Press, 1939.)
The Mystery of Iniquity (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1944.)
The Scope and Method of Sociology (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1953.)
The Respectable Murderers (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966.)

By Fr. Raymond W. Murray
By Eva J. Ross

A Survey of Sociology (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1932.) [author listed as E.J.Ross]

Rudiments of Sociology (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1934.) [author listed as E.J.Ross]

Social Origins (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936.)

Fundamental Sociology (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1945.) [first issued 1939]

Sociology and Social Problems (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1948.)

Western Social Thought (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1954) [author listed as E.J.Ross. E. Kilzer is Dom Ernest Kilzer, O.S.B.]. With E.Kilzer.


By Sr. Mary Consilia O'Brien

Catholic Sociology, Presented to Catholic Students and Based on the Encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI (New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons, 1939.)

Notes

Editor's note: Space limitations prevented the printing of Dr. Sharkey's entire article in this volume. The next volume will contain Part II of this study.

1. See my "Unwrapping Our 'Best Kept Secret': A Critical Review of Some Best-Selling Textbooks in Catholic Social Teaching." Paper presented at the October 2002 Meetings of the Society of Catholic Social Scientists. I argue that many popular CST textbooks have slid over into an implicit or explicit distancing from the Magisterial texts in an effort to reframe Catholic social teaching in terms acceptable to political liberalism—for example, by downplaying the role of encyclicals as a foundation for teaching; uplifting lay writings especially of the sociological type, embracing feminisms critical of Catholic doctrine and policy, and deleting consideration of Humanae Vitae and its implications from the CST discourse.

2. For an excellent analysis of the broad decline of functionalism in contemporary sociology as a discipline, with particular reference to the disappearance of conceptualization of and research about deviant behavior, see Anne Hendershott, The Politics of Deviance. (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002.)


definition of evenhandedness and objectivity about social facts by appearing to be simply a scientific argument about the “reality” of the situation, I can’t resist giving one extended example. In his treatment of the role of sociological mindfulness in analyzing moral problems—a worthy goal for a textbook—Schwalbe deals with the abortion debate as follows:

The need to be mindful of connections increases when the problem at hand evokes strong feelings. Abortion is a good example. To see the point I will make about sociological mindfulness, it will help if you can set aside, for a time, your feelings about this issue. Try to shift into an analytic frame of mind.

Opponents of abortion feel that that a fetus is an unborn child and that abortion is akin to murder. Others believe that until a fetus can survive outside the womb, it is part of a woman’s body. In this view, abortion is the exercise of a woman’s right to dominion over her body and her life. A point that is often missed is that abortion is not just about the rights of individual women to control their bodies. If we are mindful of how our society works, we can see there is more at stake: Restricting abortion makes it unlikely that women will ever achieve equality with men.

If women are forced to be mothers, they cannot compete as equals with men, who need never worry that pregnancy, or the obligation to care for a child, will impede their striving for success in work and politics. A lack of freedom to decide whether to give birth and care for children puts women at a disadvantage. Forcing women to be mothers by restricting abortion also reinforces the idea that being a mother is a woman’s most important role, implying that it is best if women make babies and homes rather than laws or economic policy.

There is another connection to see here. If women cannot get safe legal abortions, they will get them under unsafe conditions, risking injury and death. This has always been the case when abortion is restricted. What this means is that not only are women’s wishes ignored, but also their safety, when abortion is restricted. Such a policy thus conveys messages about women’s role and worth. It says, in effect, that women should not resist motherhood and that women are less important to society than the fetuses they carry...

Perhaps this sounds like an argument for abortion. Not necessarily. It is an attempt to practice sociological mindfulness with regard to the abortion issue, so as to see more of what is at stake. This way of seeing does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that abortion is right. You
might believe, for example, that abortion is an undesirable practice because it reinforces a view of inconvenient life as disposable and that such an attitude will have harmful consequences in the long run.

Differences in values may also lead to different conclusions. You might believe, for example, that a zygote or a fetus deserves no less moral consideration than a fully grown woman and that restricting women's freedom is a reasonable price to pay for protecting a fetus's "right to life." If so, then you may think it is fine to restrict or outlaw abortion. But to arrive at any sound and responsible conclusions either way, one must be mindful of the connections between abortion and women's freedom and equality (pp.31-2).

One could easily go on for an hour picking apart the biases here: biased use of terminology and phrasing; three times as much specific information and page time dedicated to the pro-abortion position (and I elided a whole paragraph more); declaring that abortion is intrinsically connected to women's "freedom and equality;" and subtly aligning the pro-abortion position with sociological mindfulness, i.e. examining facts and "believing" on the basis of evidence, while aligning the pro-life position more with "having values."


8. Their formal goals as expressed in the ACSS constitution were as follows: "1.) To stimulate concerted study and research among Catholics in the field of sociology; 2.) To create a sense of solidarity among Catholic sociologists; 3.) To unearth and disseminate the sociological implications of the Catholic thought pattern." The last goal was the one that implicitly justified the enormous teaching mission. See Tolson, pp.223-4.

9. A case can be made from a sociology of sociology perspective that the real
animus was particularly against Catholics rather than just any "faith tradition," insofar as professional sociology's formation was so heavily influenced in this country by liberal Protestant presuppositions about realizing the kingdom of God on earth, and by the latent Calvinism of Talcott Parsons, who influenced an entire generation of major scholars in the field. See Varacalli, op.cit., 1990, 250-51; Arthur Vidich and Stanford Lyman, American Sociology: Worldly Rejections of Religion and Their Directions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); and Arthur Vidich, "State, Society, and Calvinism: Parsons and Merton as Seen From Abroad" International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 1988, Vol. 2, No.1: 109-25.

10. Morris, op.cit.
12. I might point out that still to this day many self-defined faithful Catholic institutions retain a great books curriculum and avoid the modern specialized disciplines in their approach to defining the liberal arts.
13. See Tolson, pp.7-8; Varacalli, 1990, pp.253ff. Varacalli characterizes this as a victory of sorts for the then-liberal wing of the Church, which set out to foster a stronger engagement with the problems of modern society in anticipation, actually, of Vatican II.