THE NATURE OF INTEGRALISM AS A SCIENTIFIC SYSTEM OF THOUGHT

Vincent Jeffries
California State University, Northridge

This article is an introduction to a symposium on integralism. To clarify the nature of integralism, Pitirim A. Sorokin's ideas regarding culture types, their corresponding systems of truth and knowledge, and integralism as an innovative ontology and epistemology are described. The reasons why integralism should be considered an incipient paradigm in the social sciences are advanced. The remaining articles in the symposium are summarized in terms of the various projects necessary to establish integralism as a viable tradition of thought in the social sciences.

Integralism is a system of thought that has the potential to fundamentally alter and redirect the social sciences in a more positive and creative direction. At the present time it is in the early stages of development. Foundational ideas for this perspective are found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (Jeffries 2001), Pope John Paul II (Jeffries 2000) and Pitirim A. Sorokin (Jeffries 1999; Johnston 1995, 2001; Nichols 2001). This article explores the nature of integralism and serves as the introduction to the second symposium of articles on integralism in The Catholic Social Science Review. The first, consisting of three articles, appeared in Volume 6 in 2001.

Integralism was first formulated and advocated by Pitirim A. Sorokin (1941a:741-746, 1957a, 1957b, 1961, 1963:372-408, 1964:226-237). It is a unique perspective in the social sciences because it rests on the fundamental assumption that the true reality contains physical-empirical, rational-meaningful, and supersensory-superrational components. Therefore, the ontology of the social sciences should include components that reflect each part of this reality. Likewise, the epistemology of these sciences should include methods of cognition that can be adapted to each of these aspects of reality: these are faith, reason, and the senses.

The incorporation of ideas derived from religious faith into the frame of reference of the social sciences is the defining feature of integralism. Sorokin's ideas are a singularly important source for explicating the fundamental nature and purposes of this perspective. His ideas serve as a
connection between the ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, Pope John Paul II, and church traditions on the one hand, and modern social science on the other (Jeffries 2000, 2001, 2002b). Sorokin's views of the nature of integralism, which evolved through a series of writings, are general, eclectic, and somewhat ambivalent (Nichols 2001). However, an essential idea can be drawn from his writings on integralism, his references to historical systems of thought and cultures which he identifies as idealistic or integral, and analysis of his concept of integralism by others (Jeffries 1999; Johnston 1995, 1996, 1998; Nichols 2001). This idea is that the essence of integralism is the combination of faith, reason, and the senses into a harmonious system of ideas and of social science.

This article describes Sorokin's integralism in the context of his analysis of culture types and systems of truth and knowledge. On this basis, some of the characteristics of integralism as an incipient paradigm in the social sciences are described. The articles on integralism in this symposium are considered in relation to some of the projects necessary to create a viable tradition of integral social science.

THE INTEGRAL SYSTEM OF TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE IN HISTORY AND IN SOROKIN'S WRITINGS

Sorokin's historical analysis of culture provides a basis for understanding his idea of integralism (Ford 1963, 1996). This study was a pioneering effort in applying statistical analysis to the description of similarities and variations in culture over time. The analysis of data focused on the culture of Western Civilization, though examples are also provided from other cultures. Quantitative methods are applied to examine cultural characteristics and trends from 600 B.C. to 1925 A.D., with some variations in this time span depending on the topic studied. Data are presented according to periods of time ranging from twenty to one hundred years (Sorokin 1937a, 1937b, 1941a, 1957a). Social relationships, war, and internal disturbances are also studied in this manner (Sorokin 1937c, 1957a:436-604).

Characteristics of culture are described and analyzed in terms of general culture types and in terms of various compartments of culture. Sorokin maintains there are cultures which are highly integrated, though no culture is ever completely integrated. This cultural integration is manifested in a logical and meaningful consistency that characterizes the general culture and is articulated in different compartments of culture. The focal points of integration are basic premises which define the nature of reality, the needs and ends to be satisfied, the extent of their satisfaction, and the methods of satisfaction (Sorokin 1937a:55-152, 1957a:20-52).
Integrated Culture Types

Two polar types of integrated culture are identified and formulated as ideal types, the ideational and sensate. Sorokin maintains that all real cultures fall somewhere in a continuum between these pure types, being predominately one or the other, or a mixture of the two. In an ideational culture the predominant definition of the nature of reality is that it is nonsensate and nonmaterial, supersensory and superrational, focusing on some concept of God or the Ultimate Reality. Consistent with this definition of reality, the needs and ends are viewed as mainly spiritual, the extent of their satisfaction the maximum, and the method of their satisfaction is the minimization of material and physical needs through the internal control of the self. In some instances satisfaction of needs is also sought through changing the sensate world to direct it towards more spiritual needs and values. In direct contrast, in a sensate culture reality is defined as limited to the physical and material that can be apprehended with the sense organs. Consistent with this definition of reality the needs and ends to be satisfied are of a physical and material nature, and the extent of their satisfaction is the maximum. Such satisfaction is obtained through modifying or changing the external environment in some manner. In some instances, this modification of the external milieu entails a creative effort of some type, in others it is primarily exploitative and parasitic. The third type of integrated culture is the idealistic. In this type of culture ideational and sensate are combined into a harmonious system in which the ideational perspectives are foundational (Sorokin 1937a:55-152; 1957a:20-52). In later writings, Sorokin refers to an idealistic culture as an integral one, and these terms can be considered as interchangeable (Sorokin 1961:95-96, 1963:481; Ford 1963:53).

Using both historical examples and qualitative data Sorokin demonstrates how these three integrated culture types have fluctuated in dominance over the last 2500 years in Western Civilization. Compartments of culture that are studied extensively include the fine arts, philosophy, ethics, law, and systems of truth and knowledge. Ideational culture was dominant in early Greece until the beginning of the fifth century BC and from the fifth century AD to the thirteenth century. Sensate culture was dominant from the third century BC to the end of the fourth century AD and from the sixteenth century to the present. Though still dominant, it is now in a state of decline. Idealistic culture prevailed in the fifth and fourth centuries BC and in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries AD (Sorokin 1941b:17-22, 1957a).

Systems of Truth and Knowledge

The most important compartment of culture for understanding the characteristics of integralism is what Sorokin refers to as the system of truth and knowledge. This system includes ideas pertaining to religious, philosophical, and scientific thought (Sorokin 1937b:1-180, 1941a:80-132, 1957a:225-283).
The ideas central to this compartment of culture address basic questions of ontology and epistemology such as the nature of reality, the identity and characteristics of the subject matter of systematic inquiry, the criteria for ascertaining truth, and the methods of validation. Sorokin notes fundamental differences in the systems of truth and knowledge in the three types of integrated cultures. They are described as follows:

These three main systems of truth correspond to our three main supersystems of culture. They are the ideational, sensate, and idealistic systems of truth and knowledge. Ideational truth is the truth revealed by the grace of God through his mouthpieces (the prophets, mystics, and founders of religion), disclosed in a supersensory way through mystic experience, direct revelation, divine intervention, and inspiration. Such a truth may be called the truth of faith. It is regarded as infallible, yielding adequate knowledge about true-reality values. Sensate truth is the truth of the senses, obtained through our organs of sense perception. If the testimony of our senses shows that “snow is white and cold,” the proposition is true; if our senses testify that snow is not white and not cold, the proposition becomes false.

Idealistic truth is a synthesis of both, made by our reason. In regard to sensory phenomena, it recognizes the role of the sense organs as the source and criterion of the validity or invalidity of a proposition. In regard to supersensory phenomena, it claims that any knowledge of these is impossible through sensory experience and is obtained only through the direct revelation of God. Finally, our reason through logic and dialectic, can derive many valid propositions—for instance, in all syllogistic and mathematical reasoning. Most mathematical and syllogistic propositions are arrived at not through sensory experience, nor through direct divine revelation, but through the logic of human reason. Human reason also “processes” the sensations and perceptions of our sense organs and transforms these into valid experience and knowledge. Human reason likewise combines into one organic whole the truth of the senses, the truth of faith, and the truth of reason. These are the essentials of the idealistic system of truth and knowledge (Sorokin 1941b:81-82).

The fluctuation of these systems of truth and knowledge from 580 B. C. to 1920 A. D. is examined. Quantitative analysis is applied to data from Graeco-Roman and later Western cultures according to twenty and one hundred year periods (Sorokin 1937b:3-60). In the quantitative analysis sensate truth is indicated by empiricism. Ideational truth is indicated by religious rationalism, mysticism, and fideism. The idealistic truth of reason is indicated by
idealistic rationalism. Two forms of quantitative analysis are presented. Evidence is summarized according to the number of prominent thinkers who were partisans of these different approaches. Evidence is also summarized according to the influence of each philosopher as indicated by a weighted measure employing multiple criteria. In addition to this quantitative analysis, a detailed qualitative analysis of the writings of representative advocates of these different approaches is presented (Sorokin 1937b:61-123). In addition, a quantitative analysis of the incidence of scientific inventions and discoveries over the stipulated time period is presented (Sorokin 1937b:125-180).

Fluctuations of systems of truth over time periods according to the dominant culture type are supplemented by an over-all comparison of these systems in Western Civilization from 580 B.C. to 1900 A.D. (Sorokin 1937b:53-55). Total sums of the indicators for the quantitative data are tabulated for each approach and for each system of truth. Results show that the three systems of truth have been close in power, with a slight predominance to the truth of faith with a total score of 1650, followed by the truth of the senses with 1338, and the truth of reason with 1292. Sorokin speculates that the results may indicate that “possibly each form of truth has its own important function...” and “perhaps the whole and absolute truth is indeed the truth which embraces in some way all the three forms of truth...”, each of which is only “partial truth” by itself (Sorokin 1937b:55).

**Integralism**

Integral truth incorporates these three systems of truth into a harmonious and balanced system (Sorokin 1941a:746-764). In this sense it can be viewed as most closely resembling the system of truth of idealistic culture.

Sorokin's advocacy of integralism as an ontology and epistemology derives from his view of the nature of the absolute and true reality:

In its inexhaustible plenitude the total reality is inaccessible to the finite human mind. However, its main aspects can roughly be grasped by us because we are also its important part. Of its innumerable modes of being three forms or differentiations appear to be most important: (1) empirical-sensory, (2) rational-mindful, and (3) supersensory-superrational (Sorokin 1956a:180).

Because of this nature of the reality that is the subject matter of the sciences, integralism is necessary as an ontology and epistemology. It is most adequate because it most closely corresponds with the nature of the true and absolute reality:
...the integral truth is not identical with any of the three forms of truth, but embraces all of them. In this three-dimensional aspect of the truth of faith, of reason, and of the senses, the integral truth is nearer to the absolute truth than any one-sided truth of one of these three forms. Likewise, the reality given by the integral three-dimensional truth, with its source of intuition, reason and the senses, is a nearer approach to the infinite metalogical reality of the coincidentia oppositorum than the purely sensory, or purely rational, or purely intuitional reality, given by one of the systems of truth and reality. The empirical-sensory aspect of it is given by the truth of the senses; the rational aspect, by the truth of reason; the super-rational aspect by the truth of faith. The threefold integral system of truth gives us not only a more adequate knowledge of the reality, but a more valid and less erroneous experience, even within the specific field of each system of truth. Each of these systems of truth separated from the rest becomes less valid or more fallacious, even within the specific field of its own competence Sorokin (1941a:762-763).

Sorokin believed that in an integral system of truth and knowledge science, religion, ethics, and philosophy will act in consort, rather than being opposed to each other (Sorokin 1941b:317-318, 1998:284). In an integralist system of social science

...religion enters into harmonious cooperation with science, logic, and philosophy without sacrificing any of its intuitive truth revealed through the superconscious of its seers, prophets, and charismatic leaders. On the other hand, in its turn it supplements science, logic, and philosophy through its system of ultimate reality—values. In this way religion, logic, science unite to form a single harmonious team dedicated to the discovery of the perennial values and to the proper shaping of man’s mind and conduct (Sorokin 1948:158).

THE NATURE OF INTEGRALISM AS A SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM

Developing an Integral System

Developing integralism from the ideas provided by Sorokin involves recognition of certain characteristics of his model. As noted by Nichols (2001), his model is very general and eclectic, permitting of different “variants” of integralism. This generality and eclecticism is particularly true of his notion of the third mode of cognition, in addition to those of the senses and reason. In general, Sorokin describes this mode as intuition, which is regarded by him as any cognition not accessible through sensory and/or rational methods alone. Intuition includes the truth of faith in terms of revelation or mystic experience, but is clearly not limited to this in Sorokin’s formulation (Sorokin 1941a:746-
In his analysis of integral culture types and systems of truth and knowledge Sorokin (1937a:143-150, 1937b:3-123) appears to be consistent in identifying some reference to the supersensory, usually but not necessarily as foundational, as characteristic of integral or idealistic historical systems. Since the most fundamental characteristic of integralism is the incorporation of religious ideas in a scientific system, the model provided by these historical cultures provides a basis for specifying the nature of an integral model for contemporary social science.

A previous article (Jeffries 1999) has maintained a general model of integralism can be developed for the social sciences by defining fundamental religious ideas that appear to be close to universal as the truth of faith. For example, in religious moral and ethical systems ideas such as doing good and avoiding evil, the Golden Rule, and the love which is directed toward the welfare of the other, variously referred to as benevolent, altruistic, compassionate, unlimited, or agape love, appear to be close to universal. Likewise, the desirability of individual movement toward spiritual perfection in the form of greater goodness is characteristic of all major religions. Though typically differing in specifics, the world religions are essentially similar in the general nature of such ideas (Hick 1989; Hunt, Crotty, and Crotty 1991; Post 2003; Sorokin 1948:154-158, 1998). Such religious based ideas can then be introduced into the social sciences at various levels of the scientific system and practice and in various disciplines (Jeffries 1999).

A Catholic variant of integralism is one in which faith, reason and the senses constitute a harmonious system with faith being foundational. An exemplar of an integralism of this nature can be found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (Jeffries 2001). Such a system is also that of John Paul II, who explicitly distinguishes these three sources of truth (John Paul II 1998:41-48 Nos. 28-35). There is a “unity of truth, natural and revealed” in which the revealed truth of faith, the philosophical truth of reason, and the scientific truth gained through research complement each other in a unified system of non-contradiction in which revealed truth is foundational (John Paul II 1998:47-48 Nos. 34-35). Without the authority provided by the truth of faith, findings regarding human behavior gathered through empirical methods can be erroneously interpreted (John Paul II 1993:48-50 Nos. 32-34, 135-136 Nos. 112-113). Such a system can be unambiguously established because of the Church's teaching on the nature of truth. In a Catholic variant of integralism, the truth of faith is the body of fundamental ideas contained in Sacred Scripture and the Apostolic Tradition as interpreted by the Magisterium of the Church (Catechism of the Catholic Church 1994: 19-38 Nos. 50-141). Adherence to the ideas proclaimed by the Magisterium is essential to remain consistent with the revealed truth of faith (Barilleaux 1998; Krason 1996). Such adherence provides a common core of ideas within the integral model which can be
regarded as certain in their truth. This power of certainty was given by Christ himself to St. Peter and the apostles and to their successors. With a presupposition of certainty, ideas from this source can be introduced appropriately into various levels of the scientific system of the social sciences.

**Integralism as a Paradigm**

An important work by Kuhn (1970) advanced the idea that significant advances in science are achieved through the development and adoption of fundamentally different ways of defining, conceptualizing, and analyzing the subject matter of a science. Kuhn called these new ways of thinking paradigms. Ongoing research, which Kuhn called normal science, typically takes place within the context of an established paradigm which is taken for granted in terms of its basic assumptions. When findings accumulate which the dominant paradigm cannot adequately explain, a new paradigm develops which initiates a scientific revolution, described by Kuhn as follows:

The extraordinary episodes in which that shift of professional commitments occurs are the ones known in this essay as scientific revolutions. They are the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science... Each of them necessitated the community’s rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with it. Each produced a consequent shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the profession determined what should count as an admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. And each transformed the scientific imagination in ways that we shall ultimately need to describe as a transformation of the world within which scientific work was done. Such changes, together with the controversies that almost always accompany them, are the defining characteristics of scientific revolutions (Kuhn 1970:6).

Kuhn offers various definitions of the term paradigm, not all of which are comparable in meaning because they range considerably in the level of generality ascribed to a paradigm (Masterman 1970; Ritzer 1975:1-34). Ritzer offers the following definition that is intended to be consistent with Kuhn’s most general meaning of paradigm:

A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science. It serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community (or subcommunity) from another. It subsumes, defines, and interrelates
the exemplars, theories, and methods and instruments that exist within it (Ritzer 1975:7).

Ritzer notes that the paradigm is the most important characteristic differentiating one scientific community from another. Scientific disciplines usually have more than one paradigm, particularly those in the social sciences. Further, because a paradigm is highly general, a paradigm typically includes more than one theory (Ritzer 1975:1-34).

Integralism can be viewed as an incipient paradigm in the social sciences (Jeffries 1999). Two important characteristics of scientific systems, originality and generality (Black 1995), are the basis of the paradigmatic status of integralism. Integralism is original because it does not currently exist as an accepted perspective in any of the social sciences. Integralism is general because it entails introducing faith based ideas in every aspect of the social sciences. A fully developed integral paradigm introduces religious ideas that can be applied at every level of the scientific continuum, to any subject matter within the social sciences, and within the context of the major purposes of science. These characteristics of integralism can be considered in more detail.

A basic presupposition of integralism is that social science can be informed by faith as well as by reason and the senses. This presupposition is the basis of an ontology and epistemology which has been common in some periods of history but which is not recognized in mainstream contemporary social science. It clearly distinguishes and differentiates integralism from established and dominant traditions of thought in this historical era. It also places integralism outside of and at variance with what is considered to be scientific in the view of the overwhelming majority of social scientists. For these reasons, integralism is original.

Integralism is general because it can be applied across various aspects of the social sciences. One of these aspects is the levels of the system of science itself. The elements of scientific theory and the practice of scientific investigation in the social sciences range from the abstract and general level to the specific and concrete (Turner 1991:1-30). At the most abstract level, often referred to as meta-theory, are basic presuppositions, value judgements, positions pertaining to ontology and epistemology, and the philosophical justifications for these components. Concepts, propositions, and various forms of their arrangement such as analytical models and schemes represent the middle level of scientific theory. Empirical data, operational definitions, and empirical generalizations are examples of more concrete levels of theory and scientific practice. Integralism interjects faith based ideas at all levels of the scientific continuum. For example, an idea such as virtue can be used as a value premise, integrated with various theoretical perspectives, incorporated in theoretical or research propositions, studied as an independent or dependent variable, or operationalized in the context of diverse research methods. This is
also true of other religious based ideas such as benevolent love, sin, or the Ten Commandments (Jeffries 1999).

A second sense in which integralism is general is in terms of the subject matter of the social sciences to which the integral perspective can be applied. All of the social sciences are characterized by the common basic frame of reference of culture, society, and personality. This frame of reference identifies the fundamental subject matter and mandates the study of interrelationships between phenomena in this context (Parsons 1961; Parsons and Shils 1951; Sorokin 1947, 1966:635-649). This frame of reference can be specified by Ritzer's (1979) delineation of two basic levels of analysis: microscopic-macroscopic and objective-subjective. Each of these levels are in reality a continuum, from small to large, and from the material and observable to the subjective realm of ideas. An integrated approach would examine the intersection of these two levels at any point. The various social science disciplines such as economics, anthropology, history, political science, psychology, and sociology typically emphasize different intellectual traditions and different problems for analysis and empirical investigation within this frame of reference. Integralism entails a comprehensive theoretical and research agenda of studying religious based ideas that transcends divisions among the social sciences, and can be applied to any subject matter characteristic of the social sciences. For example: the virtues can be studied in any disciplinary tradition, in various disciplinary specialties, in terms of their objective or subjective manifestation, and at any point on the micro-macro continuum (Jeffries 1999).

Integralism is also general because it incorporates three basic purposes of scientific analysis and investigation: scientific, reform, and practical. Turner and Turner (1990) note that these three models of science have all been important in the development of sociology. Sorokin's system of thought can be viewed as an exemplar because it fully incorporates these three perspectives (Jeffries 2002a; Nichols 1999). Sorokin's integralism contains a scientific component in which concepts are formulated, research is conducted, and theories are developed and tested. On this basis general laws regarding the structure and dynamics of sociocultural phenomena are formulated. Examples of Sorokin's work which fall primarily within this perspective are his historical studies of mobility (Sorokin 1959) and of social and cultural change (1937a, 1937b, 1937c, 1941a, 1957a), and his general system of sociology (Sorokin 1947). The reform component of integralism focuses attention upon inconsistencies, contradictions, and problematic aspects of culture and social relationships. Comparisons are made between reality and the value premises of integralism, and the general public is informed. Examples of this perspective in Sorokin's writings are his analyzes of the crisis of sensate culture (Sorokin 1941b), of the relationship of power to morality (Sorokin and Lunden 1959), and of the sexual revolution (1956b). The practical aspect of integralism focuses on the means through which cultural, social, and personal reconstruction can
be advanced and through which altruistic love can be increased. A primary example of this perspective is Sorokin's strongly data based analysis of altruistic love with its considerable emphasis on the techniques of altruistic transformation (Sorokin 1954). Another example is his analysis of the nature and means of personal, social, and cultural reconstruction (Sorokin 1948). Consistent with Sorokin's foundational work, integralism is a paradigm entailing a comprehensive and inclusive theoretical and research approach to social science that includes these three concerns of science, reform, and practice. In this integral system fundamental ideas derived from the truth of faith are the focal point of each of these basic purposes of science (Jeffries 1999).

THE PROJECTS OF INTEGRALISM

The development of integralism as a school of thought and its eventual establishment as a viable tradition requires concerted activity at all points of the scientific continuum of abstraction and within each disciplinary tradition. Because of its breadth and inclusiveness integralism entails a wide variety of potential projects necessary for its fuller development.

One project of integralism is to explore how the truth of faith will influence the subject matter and practice of social science. Various authors (Barilleaux 1996, 1998; Furfey 1996; Montes 1998) have noted how faith based presuppositions can influence the certitude and content of the social sciences. More specifically, Vitz (1996) has noted how the moral framework derived from faith can serve to integrate religious ideas with psychology. The article by Lickona (2003) that is part of this symposium is an example of this very important area of analysis. She notes the relevance of the documents of the Second Vatican Council and the writings of John Paul II in terms of the ontology and epistemology of integralism. These writings highlight the difference between faith and natural knowledge. They further bring to attention the manner in which faith can shape the method and content of the social sciences by focusing attention on issues such as the dignity of the person and the importance of love. As an example, Lickona notes how faith and the presuppositions it provides regarding human nature would potentially influence the topics of research in the area of marriage. The article concludes by considering an additional influence of faith on social science practitioners: the necessity of viewing science as a vocation.

Another project necessary for the development of integralism is the introduction into social science of concepts that include in some manner faith based assumptions. Such concepts are important because in varying degrees they directly incorporate the truth of faith within the existing conceptual framework of the social sciences. Previous articles by Jeffries (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b) have noted the importance of the concept of virtue in this regard. The symposium contains two articles that are devoted to this same task. In the first
of these, Vitz (2003) maintains that a more adequate understanding of the nature of the individual can be gained through a concept of person that is derived from three primary levels of analysis: theological, philosophical, and psychological. This “integralist” concept includes the importance of substance in the form of the body, the influence of relationships with others and with culture, and the central importance of love for the integration of personality. This view of the person is broadly grounded in the Judeo-Christian tradition and within this context the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. It both draws upon and transforms modern theory and research. This concept of person is regarded as representing a more adequate conceptualization of the individual than more limited current views. In the second article pertaining to a particular concept Johnston (2003) emphasizes the importance of the concept of sin for the description and analysis of social organization. He describes the early treatment of this concept by E.A. Ross, one of the pioneers in the development of modern social psychology. Ross viewed the concept of sin as an important way of understanding changes in wrongdoing as society became more industrialized and differentiated with relatively autonomous concentrations of power in large impersonal organizations. However, Johnston notes the concept of sin and of evil became separated from scholarly analysis, as lamented by both Menninger and by Lymann. Johnston maintains Sorokin’s integral perspective and his concept of a declining sensate culture provide an avenue through which this concept can again become central in understanding human actions and the nature of society.

Despite common features of the social sciences, each discipline has distinctive concerns and unique traditions. Therefore, an analysis of what is necessary for the reconstruction of each of the social science disciplines is an important project in the development of integralism. In the symposium Montes’ (2003) analysis of the science of economics is an example of work of this nature. He begins by noting that contemporary economics is dominated by neoclassical economics. This perspective is characterized by the ideal of value free positivism, a restricted view of the person as an economic agent, and a means-end rational model. Montes maintains a new model of economics as a science is necessary. The writings of Pope John Paul II and Catholic social teaching emerging from the social encyclicals provide the value context for developing this new perspective. These sources focus this new orientation on the value premise of the inherent worth of the human person and the need for economic science to further understanding of how persons can be protected and nurtured. This model would also focus on providing understanding of how to improve economic conditions without legitimating various forms of injustice. Montes formulates the “principle of multiple cultural expressions” which states that there are a variety of economic systems compatible with the basic stipulations of Catholic social teaching. The task of theoretical development and research is thus to identify these varied economic systems
and the requirements for their optimal functioning.

There are recognized areas of specialization within each of the social sciences. Another major project in the theoretical and research agenda contained in the integral paradigm is the reconstruction of each of these areas in accordance with the basic principles of integralism. The article in the symposium by Nichols (2003) represents an example of this project applied to the sociological specialty of deviance. Nichols begins by tracing the history of this specialty area from the 1890's to the present. Currently, some scholars are questioning whether the study of deviance remains a viable field. Nichols maintains Sorokin's integralism can revitalize and redirect the sociology of deviance. An integral paradigm for the scientific study of deviance derived from Sorokin's writings would have several major features. An integral approach would balance the current emphasis on the study of negative deviance with the study of positive deviance, as in the case of creative individuals and moral exemplars. Again, in contrast to the current emphasis on determinism, an integral approach would balance this with the study of the free choice of individuals and its effects on their lives and on society. Another innovation in the integral approach to deviance would be the recognition of spirituality as a "transcendent interior dimension" which is a variable operative in both positive and negative deviance. An integral approach to deviance would also substitute universal standards shared by world cultures and religions for the current moral relativism in this field. Finally, in the area of methodology, an integral approach would emphasize the investigation of multiple contexts of deviance.

The articles in the symposium illustrate three broad projects necessary for the development of integralism: analysis of how basic ideas pertaining to ontology and epistemology derived from the truth of faith have implications for the social sciences; identifying and explicating specific faith based concepts which have theoretical and research potential; and describing the manner in which disciplines and specialty areas can be reconstructed from an integral perspective. Projects of this nature involve the more abstract levels of the scientific continuum. Projects on the research level focusing on the causes and effects of faith based concepts are also needed. Successful and long lasting systems of thought in the social sciences typically generate far ranging research programs (Alexander and Colomy 1992; Tiryakian 1979). It is important to recognize that the ability of integralism to attain lasting prominence in the social sciences is partially dependent on the development of research programs that produce valid generalizations of both theoretical and practical importance in numerous specialty areas.
REFERENCES


Vitz, Paul C. 2003. “The Crisis in the Psychological Concept of Self or Person: A Neo-Thomist and Personalist Answer.” The Catholic Social Science Review 8: