My previous article on the subject of international politics in the pages of this journal argued that there was a basic compatibility between Catholic teachings regarding international politics and the theory of political realism as advanced most prominently by the great international affairs scholar Hans J. Morgenthau, even though it pointed out areas of disagreement. This article attempts to apply the basic principles comprising a Catholic-realist theory to a few current international questions.

First, we review these basic principles. The basic perspective of political realism—which holds that society is governed by objective laws, the ubiquitous reality in international life is that nations seek to gain power to further their interests, that political realities must always be accepted and moral results are less than satisfying, and that morality cannot be identified with any one nation's views—is accepted in a Catholic-realist position. While carefully avoiding moral crusades, efforts must be made by nations and actors to address moral questions nonetheless, taking heed of the Church's teaching on such matters as development, human rights, and the rights of nations. When confronted by an especially great moral evil or evil ideology, such as communism or Nazism, a foreign policy may rightfully be oriented to opposing it, but must always proceed prudently. Finally, the central role of the papacy as an international moral arbiter and conciliator should be recognized.

We seek here to determine how a Catholic-realist theory would be applied to the following crucial current questions: globalization, and more broadly the role of international organizations; military interventions, peacekeeping, and more basically war and peace in the contemporary world; foreign aid; international law, international juridical structures, and the protection of human rights; nationality groups and nation-building; and immigration.

Globalization and International Organizations. The previous article made clear the popes' support for international organizations, but we must note
their recent reservations. We should also consider Morgenthau’s comments about the possibility of international community which additionally enlighten us about the entire globalization question. What do we mean by this much used, but unclearly defined, term “globalization”?

To paraphrase two authorities, it involves the stretching of social, political, and economic activities across frontiers and around the world; the intensification of our interdependence in these and other areas; accelerated international communication and transportation, and the more profound impact of distant events on people’s lives and the greater possibility that local developments will have worldwide consequences—and all of this to an unparalleled degree. To speak specifically about politics, these authorities say that globalization means that states “must often work together to pursue the public good...transnational agreements...will often force national governments to adopt major changes in domestic policy....The emerging shape of governance means...the transformation of state power...producing the potential for a more activist state.” They go on to say that, “Globalization has disrupted the neat correspondence between national territory, sovereignty, political space, and the democratic political community. It allows power to flow across, around, and over territorial boundaries.” Morgenthau doubts how far this can go. Some think that it will mean that single regional or continental or even a world state can ultimately emerge. Morgenthau emphasizes, however, that such an expansive state requires a preexisting moral and political community and the kinds of social conditions which would result in men giving their overriding loyalties—beyond their nation-state—to it; such a community and conditions do not exist and are not likely to.

The Church has been taking note of globalization for some time. Both Popes Paul VI and John Paul II declared that the “social question”—i.e., the socio-politico-economic developments which the Church has been addressing since Leo XIII—had become worldwide in scope. John Paul notes in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987) that nations and particular regions could no longer be isolated in economics since they are increasingly influenced by faraway factors, and that “interdependence” among all types of countries is close and they have to share development or all will be affected by retrogression (and we noted in the previous article that wealthy nations have an obligation to aid poor nations and help in their development). The Church emphasizes the need for the kinds of cooperative efforts among nations that globalization envisions. The Church supports nations growing closer and associating and working with each other more; this is the way things should proceed since all men are brothers, common human creatures with the same Creator. Their assisting each other is necessary to secure justice for all and is an obligation of international charity.

The problems the Church would have with globalization, however, are suggested by the above definition. The principle of subsidiarity would have to
be upheld; only truly international problems could be addressed by any supranational political entity. Arguably, this has not been the case. For example, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child in some ways seems to seek supplant the family’s authority in childrearing. In the European Union, where the political aspects of globalization have perhaps advanced the farthest, increasingly matters which had hitherto been viewed as domestic are being subjected to the determinations of the supranational body. The popes have also insisted that whatever international or supranational authority is set up, governments should not be coerced or pressured to enter into it. If such authority becomes the order of the day, however, it will be very difficult for nations to refuse—especially if they are small and weak. This, along with ongoing intrusion into their internal affairs, would threaten their natural right of self-determination. Moreover, to weaken the ties and sentiments of people to their “fatherland” (i.e., legitimate patriotism, as discussed in Catholic thought) in order to fashion commitment to a supranational entity could easily undercut the obligations in charity of citizens to their particular nations—which include the obligations to help the poor and oppressed among them and to try to “Catholicize” their nations —and the rights of nations to shape good citizens in order to promote their common good.

Since the main vehicles for globalization are international organizations, we must note the sometimes critical assessment Pope John Paul has made of them. He has expressed concern that they have been manipulated for national and political reasons, and has called for a review of their “operating methods, operating costs and effectiveness.” Reform of international organizations thus seems to be in order, and nations can and should currently seek it. Looked at in this light, the recent U.S. withholding of part of its U.N. dues to force changes is understandable, even if it might be argued that other ways to accomplish this were preferable. While the popes have supported the U. N., and they see it as the chief international organization, they do not hold that it is the only vehicle for international organization and cooperation.

War and Peace, Military Interventions, and Peacekeeping. The just war doctrine has been the centerpiece of the Church’s teaching on war and peace. The classic criteria are as follows: the war must be resorted to on the sovereign’s authority, just cause, rightful intention, and the war must be waged by the proper means. The just cause criterion has been further elaborated in recent times as the destructive power of modern warfare has made the Church believe it especially urgent to avoid war wherever possible: War can be resorted to only when a nation’s rights, independence, or the possession of vital national resources have been unjustly violated or are imminently threatened; other means of preventing the aggression (e.g., diplomacy, embargoes, economic sanctions) have been tried and failed; and and there is a proportion between the forseeable
evils of the war and the anticipated benefits from it. This hesitancy about entering war is seen also in political realism, where a nation’s military is understood to be its servant and not master, limited war is seen as a crucial option, and diplomacy is strongly stressed as a means of lessening and disengaging conflicts. Both perspectives see war as something not inevitable.

A Catholic-realist perspective would hold there to be a strong obligation on nations to resolve differences short of war and would emphatically endorse techniques such as sanctions, etc., which are so evident today as a better course, if they can be effective. It would recognize that rhetorical exchanges between nations and perhaps simulated displays of military strength are part of international politics, but would stand firmly for the proposition that nations can actually use military force only to vindicate the most serious rights. As important as national interest is, it would probably not justify the use of force as a mere means to further it if a nation or another nation whose aid it comes to are not genuinely threatened. Since, as stated above, just cause would include a genuine threat to a nation’s rights, including its access to vital natural resources, a war by a Western power to stop a belligerent from cutting off a significant part of its oil supply would seem, all other things being equal and means of pacific resolution having failed, to be justified.

Since the proportion of harm would in many cases be greater than the expected benefit of a war, due to the destructive character of modern weaponry which would be likely to affect civilian populations (even if inadvertently), a Catholic-realist theory would hold that a nation has a heavy burden to meet to justify any significant use of force. A very serious effort would always be required to limit the scope and intensity of any armed conflict, which the Falklands War of 1982 certainly showed is possible in the contemporary world. Even limited war would have to be evaluated carefully in light of the other dimension of just war: jus in bello, or how a war, once legitimately entered into, is conducted. The two principal criteria for jus in bello are discrimination—that civilians should never be intentionally targeted—and proportionality in another sense, that of using only the amount of force necessary to achieve objectives based upon the just cause for which the war was undertaken. Questions could be raised, for example, about the “limited” Vietnam War on both grounds: some of the means of conducting it did not seem to sufficiently discriminate and the fact that it dragged on with escalating losses and used considerable firepower—although by no means all that the U.S. was capable of—may make proportionality doubtful.

Even if jus ad bellum (i.e., when war can be resorted to) criteria are satisfied, discrimination and proportionality raise much doubt about such types of modern weaponry as nuclear and chemical-biological (CBW). While the scope of this article does not permit a serious examination of this large topic, what we can fairly say is that because of its inherent lack of discrimination
CBW is simply rejected and nuclear weapons, at least as far as actual use is concerned, would for the most part be likewise. Strategic fission nuclear weapons, such as would be used in a nuclear exchange, could not discriminate sufficiently if not in their actual explosive effect then in the fallout they would leave. Tactical fusion nuclear weapons, such as the neutron bomb (essentially an anti-tank weapon), which do not tend to leave long-term fallout are morally better, although they cause a very terrible and painful death for combatants over a day or two if they are not immediately killed. They are an improvement, but thus still raise moral questions if actually used. Conventional weapons, even though they can actually cause as much or more destruction than nuclear weapons if used in massive, concentrated amounts—consider the World War II saturation and fire bombings of places like Dresden and Tokyo—are preferred.

Indeed, the latter historical examples probably demonstrated a violation of proportionality as respects jus in bello (and of discrimination, as well). A policy of heavy conventional bombing to demoralize a population, to grind a nation into submission, and to cause unwarranted destruction does not conform to Catholic moral teaching. Again, it is morally acceptable only to use as much violence as is needed to achieve the just purpose that a nation has gone to war for in the first place. Obviously, this will not be calculable with precision, and a margin of error will likely be needed. Still, it is something that serious, careful, intelligent statesmen and military leaders are capable of doing. As far as using nuclear weapons as a deterrent is concerned, Pope John Paul II has said that this is morally acceptable so long as it is a step toward progressive multilateral disarmament (including both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons).

A final point on war and peace, which Catholic teaching stresses but political realism seems to be impervious to, is that true peace requires a strong effort to secure “a social order based on justice and charity”; peace is not the mere absence of hostilities alone. Thus, any Catholic perspective on international political life must be part of a larger outlook about what is needed for the good political society generally.

American foreign policy has been noted in the post-World War II period for relatively small-scale military interventions, of varying durations. These have ranged from Vietnam War-type conflicts to “Operation Just Cause” to topple an internationally and domestically troublesome despot, to peacekeeping missions. What would a Catholic-realist view say about interventions? We might perhaps modify the probable view of the strict realist that no such actions should be undertaken unless they further national interest by saying that they at least should not undercut national interest; in any event, moralistic crusades must be avoided. A Catholic-realist policy would be simultaneously cognizant of the just cause criteria above and of St. Augustine of Hippo’s teaching that justice and charity can both dictate one nation coming to
the rescue of another on the one hand, and the right of nations to be secure from intervention on the other. This right, however, is not absolute: “if the affairs of a State are in deplorable condition or if a people are suffering from inhuman tyranny” —this terminology shows that the situation must be extreme—a nation effectively gives up that right. Either other individual nations, as indicated above, or the community of nations may intervene. Moreover, limited wars would seem to be aimed at meeting the proportionality criterion of jus in bello. National interest and a heavy dose of prudence—i.e., have a clear purpose in mind, not an overly ambitious plan, and a reluctance to undertake open-ended commitments—should govern both limited wars/military interventions and peacekeeping missions.

Foreign Aid. The Church has talked much about the need for the better-off nations to aid the less well-off. She has not specified how this is to be done, however. When one considers the principle of subsidiarity and encyclicals such as Populorum Progressio emphasizing so much the need for both public and private efforts for development, he is led to think that it does not refer just or perhaps even primarily to inter-governmental assistance. Indeed, it is possible that the public authorities of a wealthy nation might decide that the best way to provide aid—both immediate humanitarian aid and longer-term investment and developmental aid—is to try to arrange for private entities to give it. The Church also makes it clear that aid must be disinterested and should not violate the receiving nation’s rights to manage its own affairs. A particularly reprehensible attempt to use aid to interfere in the lives of poor nations occurs when it is given with essentially coercive population control conditions attached. Receiver nations can be held accountable for aid’s being properly used or used as intended. Wealthy nations can also choose to refrain from aiding nations with repressive or internationally aggressive governments, though the Church’s emphatic disagreements with the on-going U.N. sanctions against Iraq, however, suggest that this may not be justified in the long-term if it means much continued suffering for such nations’ people. Obviously, nations do not have to give certain types of aid (e.g., military aid or certain kinds of technical assistance) whose most likely effect will be to prop up the ruling cadres of such a regime or be used to threaten other nations. Also, acknowledging the realities of international politics in the manner of political realism, the Church does not find it unacceptable that nations give aid because of their national interest or because they are seeking to promote a certain political philosophy (so long as the latter is morally acceptable). She recognizes, as political realism does, that the motives of nations are often mixed. Political realism takes note of the fact that while nations are inevitably driven by concern for their political interests, they also engage in many humanitarian activities which are not related to them.

International Law, International Juridical Structures, and the Protection of Human Rights. The Church has commended the advancement of
international law, establishment of international legal structures (along with international organizations generally and other types of international cooperation), and the securing of human rights. The Church seems to be considerably more hopeful about the substantial development of each of these than does political realism, even though (as the previous article stated) the latter does seem to hold out the possibility that international juridical structures may emerge in the future. The reason that international law, and for that matter international organizations such as the U.N., cannot truly be effective in addressing the most serious problems in international politics, according to political realism, is that international society is highly decentralized with many sovereign states competing with each other and an unequal distribution of power among them. Thus, there can be no reliable, consistent check on the transgressions of all the members of the society. Where organizations such as the U.N. have been effective, say realists like Morgenthau, it has been in the situations where big power interests have coincided to increase the likelihood of success of a particular course of action. Perhaps this is one of those areas where, as discussed in the previous article, straight-out political realism slides toward the cynical.

A Catholic-realist perspective would take the position that international law and juridical and other structures can and should be developed to the degree that the realities of international political life will permit. It would perhaps have to work with national interest as a way of bringing this about, with the scholar perhaps pointing out how national interests can be furthered by it and statesmen and other individuals involved in international affairs trying to actively convince others active in it that this is so and taking initiatives that will help to make it so. Political realism’s skepticism about the possibilities of development in this area seems to be belied by its own acknowledgement of increasing international efforts and agreement to restrain the destructiveness of war. To be sure, a Catholic-realist perspective will be aware of the great difficulties of forging effective—and, even more importantly, just—international juridical structures (such as the International Court of Justice and the new International Criminal Court), which dictates that they be approached prudently. Countries will inevitably, at least in the present-era, be treated differently because even if the judicial decisions attempt to be even-handed between strong and weak nations, they are in fact likely to be enforced only against the latter. On the contrary, strong nations may actually be victimized by these juridical structures in other ways, as when efforts are made to unjustly prosecute their operatives, even if minor ones such as their military men (this has been a major objection raised against the ICC by American military authorities). In short, there will be a tendency of nations to use these structures, as Pope John Paul says has happened with international organizations generally, to promote their own interests even if this does not serve justice.
We could see the likelihood of the following: Justice may be stretched and exaggerated charges brought against nations by their adversaries who seek to weaken them; the predominant secular ethos of the organized international community may result in its “playing God” and wanting to find fault with nations and individual actors even when some harmful action of theirs could not have been avoided (e.g., when an oil tanker has an unavoidable accident, without any genuine negligence, and causes environmental damage); and a standing cadre of professional international prosecutors may be formed and more and more offenses created under international law, with the result that the same kind of prosecutorial manipulation and abuse to secure convictions may develop that allegedly we are seeing domestically in the U.S. today.

Lately, special international war crimes tribunals have come into vogue. The post-World War II tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, of course, were the paradigms for later proceedings. The notion of the international punishment of war criminals, however, was not unheard of before then. Fr. Higgins tells us that the great Catholic Thomistic international law authority, Francisco Suarez, “found the justification of international punishments in the Jus Gentium—those conclusions from the Natural Law which the nations of his time had agreed should govern their inter-State acts.” As it developed, modern international law—which was grounded solely in the consent of nations and did not want to give explicit recognition to natural law principles—put aside this notion. Before the post-World War II tribunals, “every modern international convention” was “silent” “concerning punishments to be inflicted after war is concluded.” Higgins says that it is not clear that there is a natural law right for the victors in a war to punish the vanquished; leading Thomistic thinkers at the time modern ideas of international law were emerging had different views about it. Suarez’s position, for example, was based on the general agreement of nations to set up such a regimen of international punishment; he believed that in the absence of some kind of prior agreement nations had no authority to punish.

Since Nuremberg and Tokyo, there is implicit and increasingly explicit agreement among the community of nations about international war crimes adjudications and punishments. Still, any perspective informed by Catholic social teaching must make sure the rule of law is maintained. Many leading commentators at the time had reservations, at least privately, about the post-World War II trials because the crimes in question—as heinous as they were and by any standard deserving of severe punishment—had not been formally spelled out with definiteness (at least by American legal standards, and the Americans were the prime prosecutors) nor the death penalty specified; they thought that there was an ex post facto character to them. While we believe that the offenses prosecuted by the post-War tribunals were such obvious transgressions of the natural law they could and should have been prosecuted even in the absence of
written or codified provisions, these are legitimate concerns which need to be specifically addressed by international law.

There are quite realistic dangers of war crimes tribunals—that is, of accepting without limit the principle that the victor may punish the vanquished. They are similar to the potential problems mentioned above about the ICC. For one thing, the victor may not be just or may not have prosecuted a just war. For another, national interest and the tendency of nations to let moral norms be shaped according to their own biased and skewed perceptions or to universalize their own particular practices and preferences which may not truly rise to the level of morality may motivate unjustified prosecutions. Third, prosecutions may result from mere vengeance, not true justice. Senator Robert A. Taft’s comments about the post-War trials, which caused such a firestorm at the time, that “[t]he trial of the vanquished by the victors...cannot be impartial no matter how it is hedged about with the forms of justice” would have to be considered seriously in light of the realist understanding of how nations act, often amorally or immorally, in light of their interests. This suggests that war crimes tribunals need to be international bodies—perhaps standing ones—and not simply manned by the victor or victors. Nevertheless, we have also noted the problems of a standing body like the ICC (which, in fact, would probably deal with most war crimes matters). This leads us to agree with Higgins that such tribunals should be convened or charges preferred only in those “clear instances...when appalling crimes are committed and the very instance of international society demands that they not go unpunished.” The ruling international agreements need to spell out clearly what the offenses would be, how grievous or massive the violations would have to be for prosecution to occur, and the procedures to be used and possible punishments to be inflicted. We believe that there should be as little ambiguity or room for judgment about what the prosecutable offenses are, and they should be required to have been committed on a substantial scale (e.g., genocide, mass murder). We do not believe that every offense that would be prosecutable under domestic law or every action that could be considered a “human rights violation” should merit prosecution. What should be required are truly crimes against humanity, truly the most serious offenses. If not, the risk is run of trivializing international moral outrages, letting opportunistic nations simply use the system to achieve their selfish objectives, and breeding cynicism and ultimately undercutting confidence in and the effectiveness of such tribunals.

Even while not every wartime human rights violation should spawn a war crimes prosecution, there is no question, as stated in the previous article and indicated above, that an approach to international politics based on a Catholic understanding should strongly promote the cause of human rights and favor its being a centerpiece of a nation’s foreign policy. As the previous article also said,
political realism would not favor a nation’s doing this unless its national interest dictated it. Recall that we must avoid moralism and moralistic crusades with their tendency to both hurt the nations carrying them out (both because they cannot afford to ignore their interests and they lose credibility with other nations who realize how readily nations identify their own preferences with universal morality) and exacerbate an already bad situation.

This is where it makes so much sense for nations to follow the lead of the Holy See, which is outside the state system and has overwhelming moral prestige, on such matters—and, of course, can truly be said to promote universal morality since the Church is the divinely-appointed arbiter of the natural law. It is indeed difficult for nations to be convincingly called “hypocritical” when their judgments about human rights around the world follow the Church’s—at least as long as they work ardently to protect human rights in their own domains. Still, as we argued in the previous article, a pro-human rights policy does not mean dealing with every nation the same way (so long as a foreign policy does not ignore another nation’s human rights abuses). While prudence dictates that some be openly confronted and denounced, it also indicates that the cause be promoted more quietly, but as uncompromisingly, with others. It would not be wrong, for example, for the U.S. to deal quietly with a Third World ally’s troublesome human rights practices, but directly and openly with a hostile regime which threatens to both undercut American interests and carry out aggression against its neighbors.

Nationality Groups and Nation-Building. “Nation-building” became a frequently-used word during the American/U.N. intervention into Somalia in the 1990’s, when it was held that among other purposes forces were somehow supposed to help reconstitute a civil society that had broken down amidst conflicts among competing regional warlords. Nation-building—or trying to both get disparate, antagonistic groups in a country to live together and to construct governmental institutions which will in both appearance and actuality treat them all fairly—is, to say the least, a difficult and tricky business. It can usually be undertaken only in the most unusual circumstances when disaster has befallen a nation and its people are ready for a new socio-political order (such as was the case with West Germany and Japan after World War II). For foreign nations or even the international community to think that they can do this easily or in a routine manner is the height of hubris. While, as we have said, foreign nations or the international community can intervene in a nation’s affairs, even militarily, in truly grave circumstances, the best that can be expected is to oust the truly oppressive regime or, in the case of civil strife, to keep warring parties away from each other and try to pressure them to negotiate with each other so that peace can be restored and the groundwork laid for functioning and just governing institutions.
Still, how should the international community approach this question of promoting the construction of stable nations in the wake of conflict among nationality groups? The fact is that we are confronted with bloody internecine conflicts of the character of Serbs, Muslims, and Croats in Bosnia, Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories, and Tutsi and Hutu tribal groups in Rwanda and Burundi. As we said in the previous article, the rights of minorities must always be respected and, we could add, paraphrasing Pacem in Terris, neither majority nor minority chauvinism is acceptable. Respect for natural law and human rights in the Church’s tradition means essentially that nationality groups should be allowed to continue their own cultural heritage and even maintain their own language. This would not preclude—for the Catholic tradition, and certain not in the spirit of political realism—a nation prescribing that public affairs be conducted in the dominant language. Prudence and the need for good order would indicate nothing less. Since nationality is not the ultimate reference point for men, however, it cannot be a rigid basis on which to construct a country (even while it is certainly to be expected that grouped within single nations will be people of the same nationality background).

The meaning of all this is that where there are sharp nationality divisions within an existing country, particularly strong efforts should be made to accommodate and make sure that arrangements are set up to begin to build good relationships. Negotiation is especially important here, as it is in relations among nations. This may result in even “affirmative action”-type arrangements, where power-sharing is put into place or so many seats in a parliament for different groups are set aside or a strong federal system with largely autonomous regional units is erected; it may be necessary to do this for the sake of preserving peace and order, even if in the absolute sense it is not the most desirable arrangement. As one noted Catholic authority says, in doing things such as this, or in enacting accommodationist-type legislation and public policies, public decisionmakers would be “provid[ing] for the common good of the whole in such a way as to preserve the collective personality and satisfy, within the limits of possibility, the aspirations of each component part.” Where large nationality groups are not satisfactorily incorporated into particular nations, such as the Palestinians and Kurds, or where attempts to share power have clearly failed, as in Rwanda, the reality of nationality as a basis for political unity—even if not an absolute—may indicate that separate nations need to be set up, and this may be a legitimate goal of the international community. Still, this should not be viewed as the be-all-and-end-all solution and should probably be turned to only when it seems to be the only alternative. We must keep in mind, after all, that if nationhood for virtually any group that claims serious grievances is blithely turned to as a solution countries could break apart left and right and functional order—”the first need of all” —would eventually break down. Although no
nation can be sanguine about the possibility of balkanization and internal breakdown, it is clearly a much greater likelihood in nations with a couple of sizable nationality groupings—one larger than the other—and without a tradition of pluralism, the opportunity of all groups to access to political, social, and economic development, and a set of fundamental widely-held national principles that promote acceptance of and relative equality of different groups and of the dignity of the individual.

Immigration. This today is certainly a contentious issue in the U.S., Europe, and even elsewhere. Political realism approaches this simply by taking note of the reality of the resistance of nations to easy and substantial emigration of at least certain groups of people across its borders. Also, the issue of immigration, like all international questions, would be considered in light of a nation's interests. The Church, on the other hand, favors easier immigration and the greater possibility of people moving across borders. She bases this, essentially, on the fact that we are all members of a common human race which constitutes, in some sense, a “world community.” Nevertheless, she does not hold that men have an absolute, unlimited right to emigrate. Pacem in Terris says this right applies “when there are just reasons for it.” It makes it a “duty” of nations “to accept immigrants” “as far as the common good rightly understood permits” (probably referring both the the nation’s particular common good and the need to uphold the universal common good). This means that if a nation could truly be harmed by too great of an immigrant flow, it could limit it. Almost certainly, it would not be justified in simply shutting off immigration or holding it, literally, to a trickle. It almost goes without saying that a nation, in light of its right to self-defense, could exclude persons who could pose a threat to it. What the Church holds here, in effect, is that a nation may bring its genuine interests to bear on immigration and related questions, but—as is the point of this entire Catholic-realist perspective that we are trying to construct—these interests may not subvert basic moral principles and the dignity of the human person.

The right to go to a different country seems to be vitiated in the mind of the Church especially when people cannot find work in their home countries; it is a logical corollary of the right to work, so that one can sustain himself and those he is responsible for. Still, Gaudium et Spes seems to make the addressing of people’s employment needs—certainly by their indigenous country, probably (in light of the many magisterial statements about the moral imperative of development) assisted by other better-off countries and the international community—the first concern here. It should further be said that the right to go elsewhere to find employment may not be quite the same thing as the right to emigrate; the former perhaps presumes only a temporary relocation, the latter a permanent one. This means that nations can perhaps meet their obligations to
such needy people crossing their borders by permitting them such temporary access (e.g., a work visa), as well as by assisting with development in their nations. Economic reasons, of course, are not the only legitimate ones for immigration, as is indicated by the concern expressed by the Church for refugees. They flee their countries also because of persecution for different reasons and violation of their human rights, and should be “welcome[d by]...those countries which can take in refugees.” Immigrants, migrants, and refugees must all have their basic human rights protected in their new countries. On a somewhat different question, it is a basic human right to move and change residence “within the confines of...[one’s] own country.” Thus, something like the internal passport system of the old Soviet Union would be morally unacceptable.

Obviously, this article has only been able to scratch the surface about how to address the areas of international politics above and there are many, many more areas that could be taken up. We have sought to lay out some basic points and draw some initial conclusions about how the central realist principles joined to Catholic social teaching can reasonably be applied to these areas. The challenge rests with other scholars who work heavily in the international relations area and who have been similarly impressed with the basic soundness of political realism and are likewise committed to the teachings of the Church, to explore this area in greater depth and to further elaborate this perspective to enable it to get a respectable hearing in a field of political science which is all too rife with instrumentalism, amoralism, ideologically-driven viewpoints, and standard social science abstractionism.