need to be taken to bring the reality closer in line with the ideal. Clearly the socio-
logical analysis constitutes an intellectual activity independent of the activity by
which the moral standard is delineated. However, the sociological analysis is
clearly subordinate to the moral mission which serves to frame that activity. 
Brennan’s argument is not esoteric, given the fact that his book is meant to appeal
to a general audience and therefore a premium is placed on accessibility. 
However, the development of a morally-grounded sociology or a Catholic sociolo-
gy requires systematic efforts to integrate two autonomous yet cybernetically
linked intellectual activities—the development of universal moral principles upon
which society should be grounded, on the one hand, and the identification of
social and cultural forces that either support or impede the actualization of those
principles, on the other. In unpacking Brennan’s argument, we are able to infer
the outlines of such an integrated perspective. High on the agenda of those inter-
ested in developing, legitimizing, and institutionalizing a morally based sociology
or a Catholic sociology should be to present such a perspective in as explicit and
codified a form as possible.

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John J. Mulloy - Christianity and the Challenge of History. Front Royal, 

This book, the only one by John Mulloy, was published a few weeks before his
death on 9 October 1995 in Fayetteville, Arkansas. As he points out in his
Acknowledgements, it is made up mostly of articles published in “The Catholic
Tradition” column of the Wanderer during the late 1970s and 1980s, and in The
Dawson Newsletter, a quarterly devoted to the thought of Christopher Dawson
(1889-1970) which was founded in 1983, Mulloy being the editor.

Thus they were written in those fateful decades following Vatican II when a
wave of secular social idealism swept over the Catholic Church, and the leaders of
the Catholic revival in the earlier decades were dismissed as irrelevant or outdat-
ed. This historical condition explains the long quotations Mulloy uses to give the
reader a vivid impression of orthodox writers who should be their guides on the
great Christian theological themes in Part I and the various philosophers of history
in Part II.

Before describing its qualities let me mention three recommendations. 
Dawson, in his review of Ronald Knox’s book Enthusiasm (Dublin Review, 1952)
said that a good book deserved a good bibliography. In the same way, Mulloy’s
book deserves a good index; not only an index of names but an index of cultures

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and civilizations analogous to the excellent one he did as editor of Dawson’s *Dynamics of World History* in 1957. Perhaps an index could be added if there is a second edition.

Second, since Mulloy quotes so much from Dawson, an appendix listing all of Dawson’s books from 1928 to 1993 would give the reader an idea of what year they were first published and would avoid confusion. For example, Mulloy quotes from the 1985 reprint of *Christianity and the New Age* on page 199—the reader should be made aware that its original date is 1931. On page 103 he quotes from *Christianity East and West* (1981) which is an expanded version of *The Movement of World Revolution* (1959). Third, when quoting from a book such as *The Dynamics of World History* (1957), which includes articles from over a 35 year period, the original source and date should be indicated.

In Part I on The Origins of the Christian Conception of History there are marvellous passages from Newman, Bouyer, and Dawson which Mulloy highlights in his analysis of those fundamental Christian doctrines which tend to melt away when Christianity is identified with some of the fashionable forms of social idealism. These short chapters which comprise about a quarter of the book show Mulloy at his best as a Catholic popularizer—someone who can build a bridge between the world of Catholic scholarship—and the world of the ordinary Catholic layman. Indeed it is doubtful if the average Catholic will be able to withstand the formidable pressure to conform to the modern “hedonistic mass civilization” (Dawson’s phrase), without internalizing the Christian understanding of Original Sin, the conflict of the two Kingdoms, and the Pauline and Johannine doctrines of the New Adam and the New Birth from above.

In Part II, The Challenge of the Philosophers of History, the best chapters are those in which Mulloy compares and contrasts Christopher Dawson with Karl Jaspers on the Axial Age in History, with Friedrich Nietzsche on Classical Civilization, with Francis Schaeffer on Saint Thomas and Secular Humanism and with Karl Marx on Capitalism, Christianity and Communism. This type of analysis has the great advantage of giving the reader a clear picture of Dawson’s views on four distinct periods of history and the western culture. One hopes that this would lead the reader to become interested in Dawson’s work, to acquire some of his books and thus to become acquainted with one of the great Catholic minds of the 20th century.

Two chapters in this section raised questions in my mind as I read and reread them. In the one, “Chesterton and Nietzsche on the Meaning of Christianity,” Mulloy is particularly good on Chesterton and his criticism of Nietzsche but rather poor on Nietzsche and Christianity. He leaves the reader confused on this issue because he fails to point out at the outset that when Nietzsche and Chesterton are speaking about Christianity they are not referring to precisely the same thing. The Christianity which Nietzsche attacked with such passion was the
watered down Christianity of the liberal rationalists, the liberal humanitarians, and the liberal Protestants which Nietzsche saw as powerless to prevent the progressive secularization of European culture in the last half of the 19th century.

Chesterton, on the other hand, had discovered the dynamic Christianity of the Catholic tradition and looked to this tradition to restore the vitality of European culture in contrast to Nietzsche who looked to the pre-Socratic philosophers. The failure to underline this distinction trivializes Mulloy’s whole discussion and critique of Nietzsche on Christianity and European history.

The other chapter dealing with Freud and Dawson on *Civilization and Its Discontents* certainly brings out clearly their different views on religion and culture and underlines Dawson’s frequent criticisms of Freud’s rationalism in relation to the transcendent. Nevertheless, Mulloy fails to show Dawson’s sympathetic treatment of Freud’s discovery of the unconscious and its tremendous implications for the truth about human nature and human culture. It is true that Dawson was aware that Freud’s discovery could easily be used to caricature religious leaders such as Keble, Froude, and Newman in Geoffrey Faber’s book *Oxford Apostles* (1933). I am surprised that Mulloy doesn’t refer to Dawson’s preface to his study of the Oxford Movement where there is a wonderful critique of Faber’s Freudian reductionism (*The Spirit of the Oxford Movement* 1933, v-ix).

I think it is worthwhile to highlight three of Dawson’s essays over a thirty year period in which he shows considerable sympathy towards Freud and the realm of the unconscious. In the booklet he wrote at the request of T.S. Eliot, *Christianity and Sex* (1930), he is critical of Freud’s views on primitive culture and uses the anthropologist B. Malinowski to correct his error. However, in the third part of the essay, Freud’s views on the disorder of the sexual instinct are shown to be much closer to the truth about human nature than the primitivism of D.H. Lawrence and the mixture of rationalism and romanticism in Bertrand Russell, Havelock Ellis, Marie Stopes, and Robert Briffault. (This essay is in Part III of Dawson’s *Enquires into Religion and Culture*, 1933).

In “The Study of Christian Culture as a Means of Education” (1950), Dawson uses Freud’s three categories to explain the “profound revolution in the psychological basis of culture by which the new society of Western Christendom came into existence.” He shows how religion was translated from the sphere of the Id to that of the Super Ego; from an instinctive cult of natural forces which were blind and amoral to an act of faith in a new life and in sublimated patterns of spiritual perfection.

The Sense of Guilt was transferred from the corporate responsibility of the blood feud to the sphere of the individual conscience. It became the sense of sin and produced as a correlative, the act of repentance.
Further on in the essay he explains how in the case of Naziism and Communism this spiritual revolution has been reversed and the sense of guilt loses its personal character and is reabsorbed in the mass consciousness, reappearing in the forms of racial hatred and class war. (This essay forms chapter I in Understanding Europe, 1952, under a new title).

Finally, there is the remarkable assessment of Freud in his chapter entitled Western Man and the Technological Order, the last one in The Crisis of Western Education (1961). There are four references to Freud, three to Freud the psychologist and philosopher and one to Freud the rationalist and it is to the former that very high praise is given. Ours is the “age of Frankenstein” and the only way to avoid catastrophe is to recognize the illusions of the liberal ideology and admit the disorder that exists near the surface in our own society and in every society.

Dawson mentions a number of thinkers in the nineteenth century who were not deceived by these illusions—Blake, de Maistre, Goya, de Tocqueville, and Nietzsche.

Yet it was a liberal and a rationalist, Sigmund Freud, writing in Vienna in the early year of the twentieth century, who dealt the final blow to the liberal ideology by his analysis of the psyche and his discovery of the vast uncharted territory of the unconscious. And when they had tasted the fruit of the tree of psychological knowledge, the children of Adan Smith were driven out of their cozy liberal paradise, in which they had lived so securely, into a jungle where they had to face wild beasts whose very existence they had ignored.

And a few paragraphs further on:

As a philosopher he was always aware of the necessity for repression or the renunciation of the instinctual gratification as a necessary condition of civilization. In fact, as I have pointed out, Freud has done more than any other modern thinker to undermine the liberal ideology by his diagnosis of the psychological fallacies on which its humanitarian and optimistic ethic were based.

Finally after criticizing Freud’s view of religion as an illusion he repeats his achievement as a psychologist and its tremendous implications.

The reason why modern civilization has been able to secularize itself as it has done, is that the domain of reason has been so widened and strengthened by the development of science and technology that man came to believe that his reason was strong enough to create a self-sufficient moral
order which in turn would produce the perfect society. In this he was mistaken, as the experience of the last fifty years has shown us. As Freud pointed out, man was attempting to live beyond his psychological means, an attempt that must lead to bankruptcy sooner or later.

But these two chapters on Nietzsche and Freud are only two out of twenty-six and the reader who wants to appreciate John Mulloy, the apostle of Christian culture, would do well to reflect on the concluding paragraphs of the last chapter of Part I, “The Contagion of Divine Fire,” with their eloquent description of the Incarnation and its reflection in the history of Christian culture.

–Edward King

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