Displaying: 1-20 of 748 documents

0.09 sec

1. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 1
Boletín de suscripción
2. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Víctor Sanchez de Zavala Towards a less simple but sounder (psychological) Pragmatics II
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper addresses first the appticability of the main notions included in the general notion meant item, meant partial situation (MPST), meant activity (MACT), and implicitly meant background situation (IMBST) -that of meant agent will be only mentioned in an aside-, plus the notion meaning activity (MNGACT). It will be shown that, when coupled to other notions, such as ‘ontological status’ of IMBST relative to the focussed (part of) current situation (FCST), as well as to the matching ‘ontological’ properties of the meant items above, they allow to set up unified and apparently successful methods to explore important and debated pragmatic issues. Then their usefulness for research in the domain traditionally accorded to speech-act theory is put to (a preliminary) test; and finally the general processual sketch of linguistic activity advanced in the last Sections of P.I is carefully gauged as to its prospects regarding actual implementation of more specific processual sketches of both emission and reception linguistic activities.
3. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Ignacio Ayestarán Uriz Superando Fronteras: Estudios europeos de Ciencia-Tecnología-Sociedad y Evaluacion de Tecnologias
4. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Boletín de suscripción
5. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Władysław Krajewski AFOS 1994 Workshop: Foundations of Science, Madralin (Warsaw), August 1994. IUHPS 1994 Conference: Theories and Models in Scientific Processes, Warsaw, August 1994
6. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
María Cerezo The Nature of All Being: A Study of Wittgenstein’s Modal Atomism
7. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Proximas reuniones
8. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Ignacio Ayestaran Handbook of Science and Technology Studies
9. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Carlos Minguez Sobre el valor de las matemáticas: Juan Luis Vives y el Prefacio de Osiander
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper analyses some aspects in Osiander’s (1498-1552) “Preface” to De Revolutionibus (1543) by Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1453) and the “Preface Letter” also by Copernicus to the Pope Paul III (1468-1549). The reading is carried out from the intellectual framework where the works are written, taking as a reference De Disciplinis (1531) by Juan Luis Vives (1492-1538), whose pedagogical thought had great influence on the 16th century. This paper points at the coincidence of attitudes as to the function of Mathematics, and therefore, of Astronomy, for both a purely probabilistic assessment of theastronomical hypotheses, and the overcoming of the instrumentality of the calculations by means of their practical use. This last channel, promoted by a sceptic academicism which was already present in the first half of the 16th century, contributes to a better understanding of the reality of the progressive acceptation of a new structure of the world. Vives has very frequently been talked of as the clear antecedent of the great masters of thought of the modern culture, but his style and the dynamics of his thought -totally Humanist- are very different from those of Copernicus and Osiander, and thus, this paper aims to analyse his cultural context and his reflections about himself.
10. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 2
Dov M. Gabbay A General Theory of Structured Consequence Relations
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
There are several areas in logic where the monotonicity of the consequence relation fails to hold. Roughly these are the traditional non-monotonic systems arising in Artificial Intelligence (such as defeasible logics, circumscription, defaults, ete), numerical non-monotonic systems (probabilistic systems, fuzzy logics, belief functions), resource logics (also called substructural logics such as relevance logic, linear logic, Lambek calculus), and the logic of theory change (also called belief revision, see Alchourron, Gärdenfors, Makinson [2224]). We are seeking a common axiomatic and semantical approach to the notion of consequence whieh can be specialised to any of the above areas. This paper introduces the notions of structured consequence relation, shift operators and structural connectives, and shows an intrinsic connection between the above areas.
11. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
John Corcoran Information Recovery Problems
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
An information recovery problem is the problem of constructing a proposition containing the information dropped in going from a given premise to a given conclusion that folIows. The proposition(s) to beconstructed can be required to satisfy other conditions as well, e.g. being independent of the conclusion, or being “informationally unconnected” with the conclusion, or some other condition dictated by the context. This paper discusses various types of such problems, it presents techniques and principles useful in solving them, and it develops algorithmic methods for certain classes of such problems. The results are then applied to classical number theory, in particular, to questions concerning possible refinements of the 1931 Gödel Axiom Set, e.g. whether any of its axioms can be analyzed into “informational atoms”. Two propositions are “informationally unconnected” [with each other] if no informative (nontautological) consequence of one also follows from the other. A proposition is an “informational atom” if it is informative but no information can be dropped from it without rendering it uninformative (tautological). Presentation, employment, and investigation of these two new concepts are prominent features of this paper.
12. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Víctor Sanchez de Zavala Towards a less simple but sounder (psychologieal) Pragmatics III
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Before processual analyses of the activities of Iinguistic emission and reception are performed, a modicum of elaboration of the notions and technical devices previously suggested is necessary. First, theoretical resources previously developed are revised in two different fashions: some require to be elaborated in higher detail, while in other cases what is needed is to remove, at least in part, some restrictions initially laid down for simplification purposes. Then some notional clarifications and new specific distinctions a.nd notions are suggested for the study of emission, since the fact that this kind of linguistic performance is all but ignored in traditional (psychological) Pragmatics calls for an attempt to dispel some confusions originating in such a virtual neglect, and, on the other hand, for creation of a suitable array of such theoretical tools.
13. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 10 > Issue: 3
Víctor Sanchez de Zavala In memoriam Miguel Sánchez-Mazas
14. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Andoni Ibarra, Cristina Corredor Letter from the editors
15. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Javier Suárez Bacterial species pluralism in the light of medicine and endosymbiosis
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper offers a new argument in defence of bacterial species pluralism. To do this, initially I present particular issues derived from the conflict between the non-theoretical understanding of species as units of classification and the theoretical comprehension of them as units of evolution. Secondly, the necessity of the concept of species for the bacterial world is justified; I show how both medicine and endosymbiosis research make use of concepts of bacterial species linked to their distinctive purposes which do not conjoin with the other available concepts. Finally, I argue that these examples provide a new defence for the philosophical thesis of pluralism.Este trabajo ofrece un nuevo argumento a favor del pluralismo de especies en bacterias. Para ello, presento los conflictos derivados de la consideración de las especies de modo no teórico, como unidades de clasificación, frente a su tratamiento teórico como unidades de evolución. Después, justifico la necesidad de un concepto de especie para las bacterias; muestro el modo en que tanto la medicina como la investigación sobre endosimbiosis emplean distintos conceptos de especie bacteriana ligados a sus diferentes propositos que no son coherentes con el resto de conceptos existentes. Por último, argumento que estos dos ejemplos proveen nueva evidencia en favor del pluralismo filosófico.
16. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Eduardo Mizraji Illustrating a neural model of logic computations: The case of Sherlock Holmes’ old maxim
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Natural languages can express some logical propositions that humans are able to understand. We illustrate this fact with a famous text that Conan Doyle attributed to Holmes: “It is an old maxim of mine that when you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”. This is a subtle logical statement usually felt as an evident truth. The problem we are trying to solve is the cognitive reason for such a feeling. We postulate here that we accept Holmes’ maxim as true because our adult brains are equipped with neural modules that naturally perform modal logical computations.Los lenguajes naturales pueden expresar algunas proposiciones lógicas que los humanos pueden entender. Ilustramos esto con un famoso texto que Conan Doyle atribuye a Holmes: «Una vieja máxima mía dice que cuando has eliminado lo imposible, lo que queda, por muy improbable que parezca, tiene que ser la verdad”. Esto es una sutil declaración lógica que usualmente se siente evidentemente verdadera. El problema que tratamos de resolver es la razón cognitiva de tal sentimiento. Postulamos que aceptamos la máxima de Holmes como verdadera porque nuestros cerebros adultos están equipados con módulos neurales que ejecutan naturalmente computos de la lógica modal.
17. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Miguel Ángel Sebastián Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Many have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order-Representationalist (HOR) theories attempt to explain such self-awareness by means of higher-order representation. Consciousness depends on our capacity to represent our own mental states: our Theory of Mind. It is generally agreed that such an ability can be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition.I will argue that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories.Muchos han argumentado que la diferencia entre estados fenoménicamente conscientes y otros tipos de estados reside en la auto-conciencia implícita que muchos estados conscientes poseen. Las Teorías de la Representación de Orden Superior (HOR) pretenden explicar esa auto-conciencia mediante representaciones de orden superior. La conciencia depende de nuestra capacidad de representar nuestros propios estados mentales: nuestra Teoría de la Mente. Se acepta en general que esta capacidad puede descomponerse en otras dos: la lectura de mentes y la meta-cognición.Argumentaré que la conciencia no puede depender de la lectura de mentes. La sostenibilidad de las teorías HOR depende, por tanto, de la relación entre la lectura de mentes y la meta-cognicián. Analizo algunas concepciones de esa relación y argumento que ninguna de ellas parece ser una opción plausible para las teorías HOR.
18. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Ilkka Niiniluoto Unification and Confirmation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
According to the traditional requirement, formulated by William Whewell in his account of the “consilience of inductions” in 1840, a scientific hypothesis should have unifying power in the sense that it explains and predicts several mutually independent phenomena. Variants of this notion of consilience or unification include deductive, inductive, and approximate systematization. Inference from surprising phenomena to their theoretical explanations was called abduction by Charles Peirce. As a unifying theory is independently testable by new kinds of phenomena, it should also receive confirmation from its empirical success. The study of the prospects of probabilistic Bayesianism to motivate this kind of criterion for abductive confirmation is shown to lead to two quite distinct conceptions of unification, linking up and screening off, and in both cases the unifying theory can be seen to receive probabilistic support from empirical phenomena.De acuerdo con un requisito tradicional, formulado por William Whewell en su explicación de la «consiliencia de las inducciones» en 1840, una hipótesis cientifica debería tener poder unificador, en el sentido de que explique y prediga varios fenómenos mutuamente independientes. Las variantes de esta noción de consiliencia o unificación incluyen la sistematización deductiva, inductiva y aproximada. Charles Peirce llamó abducción a la inferencia que va de fenómenos sorprendentes hasta sus explicaciones teóricas. Puesto que una teoría unificadora puede contrastarse independientemente a partir de nuevas clases de fenómenos, también debería recibir confirmación a partir de su éxito empírico. Se muestra que el estudio de las perspectivas del bayesianismo probabilístico para motivar este tipo de criterio para la confirmación abductiva conduce a dos concepciones distintas de la unificación, vinculación (linking up) y anulación (screening off), y en ambos casos puede observarse que la teoría unificadora recibe apoyo probabilístico a partir de fenómenos empíricos.
19. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Luca Forgione Kant and Natural Kind Terms
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke’s essentialist approaches, touching upon different aspects (metaphysical and epistemological in particular) of Kant’s slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz’s approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections, to eventually pinpoint Kant’s contribution and see how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference. Starting with textual evidence even from the logical corpus, in the present essay I will attempt to discuss some of the arguments dismissing Kant’s adherence to this view. These assume that in his approach to the semantics of natural kind terms, Kant appears to be still holding on to a nominalist/conceptualist position, though he seems to be well aware of a few key issues for the theorists of direct reference.Como es bien sabido, la reflexión linguistico-filosófica sobre los términos de género natural experimentó un notable desarrollo a principios de los setenta con las aproximaciones esencialistas de Kripke y Putnam, que tocaban distintos aspectos (metafisicos y epistemológicos en particular) de orientación kantiana. Preliminarmente, sin embargo, puede ser útil revisar algunas de las etapas teóricas en las aproximaciones de Locke y Leibniz a los términos de género natural a la luz de las reflexiones contemporáneas, para finalmente determinar la contribución de Kant y observar cómo algunos comentaristas le han situado dentro de la teoría de la referencia directa. Comenzando con pruebas textuales que incluyen incluso el corpus lógico, en este ensayo me propongo discutir algunos de los argumentos que desestiman la adhesión de Kant a esa concepción. Estos argumentos asumen que, en su acercamiento a la semántica de los términos de género natural, Kant parece sujetarse aún a una posición nominalista-conceptualista, aunque parece ser plenamente consciente de algunas cuestiones centrales para los teóricos de la referencia directa.
20. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Dingmar van Eck, Raoul Gervais Difference making, explanatory relevance, and mechanistic models
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper we consider mechanistic explanations for biological malfunctions. Drawing on Lipton’s (1993) work on difference making, we offer three reasons why one should distinguish i) mechanistic features that only make a difference to the malfunction one aims to explain, from ii) features that make a difference to both the malfunction and normal functioning. Recognition of the distinction is important for a) repair purposes, b) mechanism discovery, and c) understanding. This analysis extends current mechanistic thinking, which fails to appreciate the distinction. We illustrate our contribution with a case on sleeping disorders as arising from disruptions of circadian rhythms.En este artículo tomamos en consideración las explicaciones mecanicistas de las disfunciones biológicas. A partir del trabajo de Lipton (1993) sobre diferenciación (difference making), damos tres razones por las que se deberia distinguir entre: i) aspectos mecanicistas que sólo suponen una diferencia para la disfunción que se pretende explicar, y ii) aspectos que suponen una diferencia tanto para la disfunción como para el funcionamiento normal. Reconocer la distinción tiene importancia para: a) fines de reparación, b) el descubrimiento de mecanismos, y c) la comprensión. Este analisis extiende el pensamiento mecanicista actual, que no llega a percibir la distinción. Ilustramos nuestra contribución con un caso de desorden del sueño que surge de disrupciones de los ritmos circadianos.