Search narrowed by:




Displaying: 1-20 of 3667 documents

0.109 sec

1. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Charles Péguy Liberté
Bookmark and Share
2. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
P. Ian Boyd, C.S.B. Avant-propos de l’éditeur
Bookmark and Share
3. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Patrick Kéchichian La revue des livres
Bookmark and Share
4. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Brian J. Sudlow Le Réalisme catholique: terrain commun entre les lettres catholiques en France et en Angleterre
Bookmark and Share
5. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Philippe Maxence La France et Chesterton, une « divine entente »
Bookmark and Share
6. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Dermot Quinn La conversion au Dieu caché: Chesterton, Claudel et la renaissance de la littérature catholique
Bookmark and Share
7. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
P. Ian Boyd, C.S.B. Chesterton et les renouveaux littéraires en France et en Angleterre au XXᵉ siècle
Bookmark and Share
8. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Paul Claudel Adresse de Paul Claudel à G.K. Chesterton
Bookmark and Share
9. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Alain Lanavère 1926. Un coup de tonnerre: Sous le Soleil de Satan
Bookmark and Share
10. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
G. K. Chesterton G.K. Chesterton et le curé d’Ars
Bookmark and Share
11. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
G. K. Chesterton Comprendre la France
Bookmark and Share
12. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Philippe Maxence Introduction
Bookmark and Share
13. The Chesterton Review en Français: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
G. K. Chesterton L’affaire Claudel
Bookmark and Share
14. Chôra: Volume > 17
Olivier Renaut Le plaisir dans la cite platonicienne
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This article aims at showing that the definition of pleasure in Plato’s dialogues cannot be separated from a political educational program and an anthropology that consider pleasure as the main vehicle towards virtue. The political use of pleasure is as important as its definition, insofar as its manifestation and content are the prerogatives of the legislator. All pleasures are politically meaningful in the Republic and in the Laws, and among them especially the triad hunger, thirst and sex ; in making pleasures a “public” issue, as pleasures are object of surveillance and political control, Plato gives several means in order to shape the way pleasures are felt in the city, and in order to make the community of pleasure and pain a fundamental role in unifying the city under the reason’s commands.
Bookmark and Share
15. Chôra: Volume > 17
Annick Jaulin, Michel Crubellier Présentation
Bookmark and Share
16. Chôra: Volume > 17
Charlotte Murgier Platon et les plaisirs de la vertu
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
How does Plato conceive the pleasures attendant on the virtuous life? Does he provide a specific account of them ? By reading through key passages from Laws book 5, Republic book 9 and the Philebus, I try to assess the way Plato endeavours to demonstrate that the virtuous life is also happy and thereby pleasant. I investigate to what extent these texts put forward any specificity of the pleasures of being virtuous, and how far the account they provide harmonizes with Plato’s general views about pleasure.
Bookmark and Share
17. Chôra: Volume > 17
Karine Tordo·Rombaut Protagoras 351b3‑358d4 : le plaisir et rien d’autre
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In Protagoras 351b3‑358d4, Socrates apparently admits the use of pleasure and pain as criteria for distinguishing between good and bad. Focusing on this passage, my paper outlines three problems, raising from : (1) the contradiction between Socrates’ objection to pleasure in other platonic dialogues and his assent here to a hypothesis which identifies good with pleasure ; (2) the petitio principii apparently involved in Socrates’ argument to support the thought that knowledge is more powerful than emotions ; (3) the compatibility of his “ hedonist ” hypothesis with his “intellectualist” thought. My paper undertakes to reconstruct Socrates’ argument, in order to answer problem (2). I contend that this argument makes the humans admit they are deprived of the knowledge both of good and evil and of pleasant and painful, a point sufficient to silence them when they speak of “knowledge being defeated by pleasure”. This contention helps answering problem (1), through a distinction between so‑called pleasures (to which Socrates objects) and real ones (which he might accept). My conclusion answers problem (3), by showing that, held together, both the “hedonist” hypothesis and the “intellectualist” thought lead to not take pleasure for granted, as required to secure a philosophical approach.
Bookmark and Share
18. Chôra: Volume > 17
Michel Crubellier Aristote : poursuivre et fuir
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
ARISTOTLE ON PURSUIT AND AVOIDANCE. Pleasure and pain play an essential role in Aristotle’s conception of the goal‑directed activities of animals and human beings, since they trigger the reactions of pursuit or avoidance, and hence the entire behavior. The present paper inquires into Aristotle’s analysis of this phenomenon on the basis of De Anima III , chapter 7 and De Motu Animalium, chapters 6‑7‑8. The crucial move in this analysis is the definition of pleasure and pain given in both treatises : “To feel pleasure or pain is to actualize through the sensitive mean towards what is good or bad, as such”. The paper examines the meaning of this definition and shows how it connects and agrees with the explanation of the principles of the physical motions of animals in the De Motu Animalium.
Bookmark and Share
19. Chôra: Volume > 17
Marguerite Deslauriers Le plaisir et le temps dans le livre X de l’Éthique a Nicomaque
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Aristotle begins the discussion of pleasure in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics with the claim that pleasure “is thought to be most properly connected with our kind,” (EN X 1, 1172a19‑23). In his positive account of pleasure in X 4, he suggests that we can somehow experience pleasure otherwise than “in time” (1174b2‑10). The aim of this article is to show how the claim that pleasure does not occur ‘in time’ might illuminate the claim that pleasure is most properly connected to our kind. The point, I will argue, is not only that pleasure is complete at every moment – that will be true of many activities – but also that pleasure has the same structure as the best activity available to us, and a structure different from the best activity available to other kinds. Several passages indicate that Aristotle believes that all living things act for the sake of immortality, understood as divine and eternal life, and connect the pursuit of eternal life with the activities that are natural to a species. These offer us a way to understand why the pleasure of contemplation is the best pleasure, and why pleasure is most intimately connected with our kind. I begin in section (ii) with an exploration of the pleasures proper to different activities which are in turn proper to different kinds. In subsequent sections (iii) I take a closer look at contemplation, particularly insofar as it is an activity that does not take place ‘in time’ but rather ‘in a moment’, and consider Aristotle’s reasons for describing such activities as wholes, or indivisible, or without parts ; and (iv) I turn to the relation between the activities and pleasures proper to different kinds and the possibilities available to those different kinds for approximating divine life. In the final section (v) I return to question of pleasure and its intimate connection with our kind.
Bookmark and Share
20. Chôra: Volume > 17
Annick Jaulin Aristote : le plaisir des differences
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Given the necessary connection between pleasure and energeia, the value of an aristotelian pleasure depends on the value of its correlative activity. Since the absolute pleasures the philokalos takes in his virtuous activities might go hand in hand with pains, the definition of absolute pleasure cannot rely on the distinction between mixed pleasure (pleasure with pain) versus pure pleasure (pleasure without pain). So, how can we characterize the pleasures of the temperate man (sophron) ? My thesis is that the right way to define the pleasures of the temperate man is to describe them as pleasures derived from differences. A pleasure derived from differences is involved in the pleasure human beings get from the formal use of their senses. It then belongs to the kind of pleasure they take in knowing. This formal use of the senses helps understanding how the pleasures of the temperate man can be separated from the pleasures enjoyed by children and animals.
Bookmark and Share