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1. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Ken Siegel Is Every Possibility Actualized in an Infinite Period of Time?
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It has often been thought that the existence of an infinite amount of time implies the realization of all possibilities. However, it can be proved that it is not true that for any T, if T is an infinite period of time, then every possibility is actualized in T. The proof works for any sense of 'possibility' in which there are possibilities that cannot be actualized simultaneously.It still might be argued that if there is an infinite amount of time, then each possibility is actualized sometime (during some infinite period of time, though not all). In particular it might be claimed that if there is an infinite amount of time, then there is an uninterrupted infinite period of time; and (P*) for any T, if T is an uninterrupted infinite period of time, then every possibility is actualized in T. However, it can also be shown that (P*) is not necessarily true.For it to be actually true, some very strong Principle of Universal Random Change must be true.
2. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Jane Lipsky McIntyre Locke on Personal Identity: A Re-Examination
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In this paper I offer an analysis, reconstruction and defense of Locke's account of personal identity. I begin with a detailed analysis of Locke's use of the term 'conscious' in its historical context. This term, which plays a central role in Locke's theory, had senses in the seventeenth century which it does not have today. In the light of this analysis, an interpretation of continuity of consciousness as the ancestral of memory is given. It is argued that this interpretation of Locke's theory of personal identity does not involve an ontological commitment to immaterial substances, and Locke is defended against the historically important criticisms of Butler and Reid. In the conclusion I suggest that the account of the individuation of persons implicit in Locke's discussion of personal identity is similar to the account of contextual individuation given by Hintikka.
3. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
David T. Ozar Social Rules and Patterns of Behavior
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In this paper I clarify the distinction between actions performed under a social rule and a mere pattern of behavior through an examination of two distinctive features of actions performed under a social rule. Developing an argument proposed by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law, I first argue that, where a social rule exists, there nonconformity/conformity to the pattern of behavior set down in the rule count as good reasons for criticism/commendation of actions covered by the rule. Secondly I argue that, where a social rule exists, nonconformity/conformity to the pattern set down in the rule must be taken account of (at the risk of self-contradiction) in judging actions covered by the rule commendable or subject to criticism. This in turn means that, where a social rule exists, there can be no genuine exceptions to the rule because the notion of a genuine exception to a social rule makes no sense.
4. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Caroline Dudeck Hegel on Private Experience
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In this article I try to offer a new reading of "Sense Certainty" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. Especially, I try to show that the primary thrust of Hegel's analysis is directed against a view which takes language to be private and private experience to be incorrigible or certain. Hegel plays a number of games with the sense-certain consciousness in order to reveal the social character of language, as well as the role of concepts in experience.I also attempt to show, against Ivan Soil's reading, that Hegel's apparent claims concerning language must be carefully interpreted and that Hegel is not saying that it is impossible to refer in language, to particulars, but, rather, that such reference requires universal conceptual frameworks.Finally, I briefly examine Hegel's position toward ordinary language as well as some further implications of the notion of private language which Hegel suggests in the Science of Logic
5. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Robert F. Litke What Influences Action is not Necessary Conscious
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It is ccranonly supposed that what we know and believe influences what we do, that knowledge and beliefs provide us with considerations (rules, reasons, action-plans, etc.) which guide our action. Sane recent discussions of human behavior makes this appear dubious. In particular, by holding that influential considerations must be conscious occurrent events they make it appear that there is substantially less influence than we usually take for granted. In turn, this suggests that in large measure human action is unknowing, that agents often do not know what they are doing. In my view accounts leading to such conclusions are themselves dubious. I show that these accounts give rise to puzzles and paradoxes if they are taken as applying to routine sorts of everyday behavior (as their authors intend). I hope, in this way, to raise substantial doubt about the viability of these counter-intuitive accounts of human action.
6. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Martha Brandt Bolton Leibniz and Hobbes on Arbitrary Truth
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Leibniz repeatedly daims to refute "Hobbes' doctrine of arbitrary truth". I argue against several recent expositors of Hobbes that Hobbes' view comes to nothing more scandalous than "nominalism" about kind terms. Although some have recognized that it is this thesis which Leibniz claims to refute, his argument has not been correctly understood. I maintain that the argument rests upon Leibniz' theory of signs and his account of concepts. In brief, Leibniz argues that concepts have structures which correspond to structures of (possible) things; thus, kinds are independent of language and truth is independent of arbitrary convention.
7. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Gerald Doppelt Incorrigibility, the Mental, and Materialism
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This paper constitutes a thoroughgoing critique of Rorty's interesting attempt to characterize the mental and its elimination within materialism in terms of the incorrigibility of mental reports. I elucidate, criticize, and improve the concept of incorrigibility his position requires. Then I argue: (1) that although mental-state reports are as corrigible as physical reports, this reflects contingent matters which do not affect the boundary of the mental and the physical; (2) that even if the familiar paradigm mental-event reports ("I am in pain") are incorrigible, there are mental events for which our language does not provide descriptions plausibly considered as incorrigible; (3) even the familiar mental-event reports are not incorrigible which I show through examples that explain how and why persons maintain false beliefs about their most simple sensations, thoughts, indeed anything, I then suggest that Rorty’s conception of the triumph of materialism is simplistic and inadequate in a number of respects. Finally, I attempt to show how difficult if not impossible it is to define or eliminate the mental without presupposing it; in trying to get the barest sense of Rorty's materialist world, the mental forces itself into our mind at every turn.
8. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Wesley Morriston Perceptual Synthesis in the Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty
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The chief purpose of this paper is to clarify and evaluate Merleau-Ponty's account of perceptual synthesis. Since he develops his own view in the context of a critique of empiricism and idealism, I begin with a brief sketch of his reasons for rejecting their accounts of perception. What I then try to do is to show that Merleau-Ponty's own view, when fully and clearly stated, fails to escape all of the difficulties that he finds in those empiricist and idealist accounts that he rejects. In particular, I will suggest, his claim that the sensory content of experience must have a form and structure of its own tells as much against his own account of perceptual synthesis as against the empiricist notion of association or the idealist theory of judgment.
9. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Bruce Nissen John Dewey on Means and Ends
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This article analyzes John Dewey’s critique of the traditional distinction between means and ends in terms of "instrumental" and "intrinsic" value. Dewey's own counter doctrine of the "continuum of ends and means" with only a temporal distinction between the two is also analyzed. It is argued that both Dewey's critique and his own position fail; Dewey fails to invalidate the instrumental value/intrinsic value distinction, fails to show that the relation between means and ends is symmetrical, fails to show that we always prize the means equally with the end, fails to account for "external" means which are not incorporated into their end, confuses an end or goal with the plan to achieve that goal, and ultimately borders on a utopian position that means necessarily resemble their ends.
10. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
T. R. Girill Explanatory Pragmatics: A Critical Analysis
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Although context and comparison are widely regarded as vital to explanatory pragmatics, no systematic treatment of them is available which is free from unnecessary vagueness. The goal of this paper, therefore, is to develop a network of clear, explicit principles describing the conditions under which an audience finds a sentential explanation pragmatically adequate. Previous suggestions are spelled out overtly, and revised or rejected when they cannot overcome counter-examples. The roles and interrelationships of type appropriateness, explanatory power and explanatory appeal as pragmatic concepts are examined and clarified. In the process of formulating improved pragmatic principles, misleading assumptions by earlier writers are disclosed, and the logical consequences of each proposal are compared.
11. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Ken Siegel Variable Classes
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In his paper "Why a Class Can't Change Its Members," Richard Sharvy appears to establish the impossibility of the existence of a variable class—that is, a class that at one time has a member that is not a member of it at another time. I first indicate the importance of Sharvy's argument for our understanding of the concept of identity in the contexts of time and modality, and I summarize his argument. Sharvy says that a class C that has one (non-variable) group of members at t2 and another (nonvariable) group of members at t2 would be identical with both the class C1 that always has the first group as members and the class C2 that always has the second group as members. This is an impossibility, since in general, one thing cannot be identical with two.I then criticize Sharvy's argument by pointing out a weakness in the defense of the claim that C = C1 and C = C2. This weakness is due to an ambiguity in Sharvy's Principle of Extensionality.
12. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Philip Ostien Beyond Truth and Reference
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Quine has moved toward "naturalism" in philosophy, which I applaud; at the same time his work has touched off a new round of pseudo-problems in philosophy, which I lament. I read the pseudo-problems as evidence that the shift toward naturalism has not been thorough-going enough. In this paper I undertake an extended discussion of sane of the problems and prospects of a thorough-going shift to a naturalistic viewpoint in philosophy, making frequent reference to Quine’s work. I suggest, in particular, that the notions of truth and reference, so central to Quine’s views, are not likely to survive as theoretically central notions within the kind of theory of language and thought which a more perfect naturalism (vaguely) foresees and works toward.
13. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
William O’Meara The Social Nature of Self, Action and Morality in the Philosophy of George Herbert Mead
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Part 1 of the paper considers Mead's concept of the self as a social process which is essentially cognitive, necessarily related to the community of all rational beings and potentially free. Part 2 considers how rationality and freedom are so rooted in the evolutionary, social act that pragmatic intelligence and creativity are the evolutionary process become self-conscious. Part 3 considers morality as a social act which is both cognitive and creative. Mead's evaluation of Kant's ethics is judged insufficient; hence Mead's concept of the self cannot serve as the basis for a necessary transition from factual to value judgments. Distinctions made by Sellars, Castañeda and Baier are used.
14. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Paul R. Gomberg Morality and the Push for Results
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In "Freedom and Resentment" P.F. Strawson proposes that the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists can be resolved if we can identify what is missing in the compatibilist account of our morality, an account intended to reconcile determinism and moral responsibility. Strawson argues that our common morality requires us to take an involved attitude toward others. He says that compatibilist accounts of that morality suggest that we take an objective attitude toward others, which precludes being morally involved with them. I argue, on the contrary, that taking an objective, results-oriented attitude toward others does not preclude moral involvement and moral community. This leaves us with the original problem of why compatibilism seems to leave something out. I argue that compatibilist accounts of morality lead to a radically altered conception of individual responsibility and its relation to general social causes of individual wrongdoing.
15. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Mark Sagoff Morality and the Logical Subject of Intentions
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This paper interprets Kant's theory of right on analogy with his theory of truth. The familiar distinction is presented between the mental act and its object: e.g. between the act of believing and the belief; the perceiving and the thing perceived; the act of willing and the action willed. The act of mind is always private; different people, however, can perceive and believe the same or contradictory things. The notion of truth depends (for Kant) on the intersubjectivity or universalizability of the mental object. It might seem that the act intended as well as the act of intending must be private, however, because I can will only my own actions; but Kant suggests that I may will not as myself but as one of a community: the logical subject of the intending may not be I but We. Kant had in mind the community of rational beings; Bradley and Green relativize the community to national groups.
16. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Richard A. Hogan The Technē Analogy in the Charmides
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This paper discusses the interpretation of Charmides 164Dff. given by John Gould in The Development of Plato's Ethics. Gould claims that in this passage Plato wishes to indicate that he wants to delimit or qualify Socrates' analogy between morality or virtue on the one hand and art or craft (technē) on the other. Plato does this, supposedly, by showing us the unacceptable consequences which follow from assuming a complete analogy between morality and technē. I argue that this interpretation conflicts with the text, which seems to indicate that the root of whatever problems occur in the dialectic is not the technē analogy, but rather that the analogy is not being applied strictly enough. In particular, I try to show that the failure of Critias' definition of temperance is due, in large measure, to his failure to specify an object for the knowledge which he asserts is equivalent to temperance.
17. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Ralph L. Slaght Is Justified True Belief Knowledge: A Selective, Critical Survey of Recent Work
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This monograph is a critical survey and conceptual classification of recent work in the analysis of non- basic knowledge. The survey extends from the 1950's to Harman's Thought and Lehrer's Knowledge. Although the survey is not all-inclusive, I have examined at least twelve of what I believe to be important and interesting analyses. These analyses fall into three groups: Type I analyses, where the authors have concentrated their attention on the relation between the justifying evidence and false statements; Defeasibility-type analyses; and amalgamations of these two types. It is my conclusion that Type I analyses are wrong-headed, and that, while there are no clearly adequate analyses of the other varieties, they represent attempts in the right direction. An extensive bibliography is included.
18. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
James L. Hudson A Note on Cosmological Arguments
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The central part of any cosmological argument for the existence of God is the inference of a conclusion of the form 1(ᴲx)-Fx from a premiss of the form 1 (ᴲx)Fx'. Since the premiss here is known only a posteriori, such an argument would ordinarily be classified as itself a posteriori. But I point out that any argument of this form may by a trivial modifi- cation be turned into an argument which requires no a posteriori premisses, and that the modified version is in fact a less misleading presentation of the reasoning involved. I conclude that cosmological arguments are best viewed as a priori arguments.
19. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Guy Lafrance Marcel Mauss et l’épistémologie structuraliste
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The first intention of this article is to show, with some essays of Marcel Mauss, how his way of studying cultural facts anticipates the structural analysis method in anthropology.The concept of "fait social total" is confronted with the concept of structure as developed by Claude Lévi-Strauss, so that we could see the similarities and the distinctions.As well as reconstructing a decisive period of the history of structuralism within the French philosophical and sociological tradition, this article seeks to show the elements of Mauss1s contribution to structuralist anthropology and in a more general why his contribution to the epistemology of the social sciences.
20. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
William Todd Beliefs, Feelings, and Actions
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In this paper it is claimed that beliefs, feelings, and actions are typically complex phenomena which have simpler components. In particular, beliefs often involve feelings and actions, while actions involve feelings and beliefs, and feelings involve beliefs and actions. It is then suggested that unconscious beliefs and commitments, both ontological and otherwise, may be discovered by the examination of actions and feelings. While these will vary from one individual to another, it is suggested that it may be possible to form certain generalizations which are of philosophical interest.