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Displaying: 81-100 of 415 documents

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81. Symposium: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Joseph Carew The Threat of Givenness in Jean-Luc Marion: Toward a New Phenomenology of Psychosis
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Absent within Jean-Luc Marion’s theory of selfhood is an account of psychosis that displaces standard phenomenological and psychoanalytic models. Working primarily with Book V of Being Given, my paper sketches the formal possibilities exhibited in a self who cannot manage the superabundance of the given and, swept away by an uncontrollable flood of givenness, thereby falls into a hysteria of self-experience and loses its ipseity. Then, contrasting psychosis with positive figures of the self, I explore the dynamic relationship between givenness and the gifted highlighted by the phenomenological diremption and effacement of selfhood displayed in both.
82. Symposium: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Lukas Soderstrom Nietzsche as a Reader of Wilhelm Roux, or the Physiology of History
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This paper explores one of the main sources of Nietzsche’s knowledge of physiology and considers its relevance for the philosophical study of history. Beginning in 1881, Nietzsche read Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus by Wilhelm Roux, which exposed him to a dysteleological account of organic development emphasising the excitative, assimilative and auto-regulative processes of the body. These processes mediate the effects of natural selection. His reading contributed to a physiological understanding of history that borrowed Roux’s description of physiological processes. This physiological description of history proceeded from the similarity between the body’s mediation of its milieu and history’s mediation of the past.
83. Symposium: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Alistair Welchman Deleuze’s Post-Critical Metaphysics
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Badiou claims Deleuze’s thinking is pre-critical metaphysics that can-not be understood in relation to Kant. I argue that Deleuze is indeed a metaphysical thinker, but precisely because he is a kind of Kantian. Badiou is right that Deleuze rejects the overwhelmingly epistemic problems of critical thought in its canonical sense, but he is wrong to claim that Deleuze completely rejects Kant. Instead, Deleuze is interested in developing a metaphysics that prolongs Kant’s conception of a productive synthesis irreducible to empirical causation. Where Badiou’s criticism might hold, however, is in the risk that Deleuze’s strategy runs of contaminating his new metaphysics with a new kind of transcendental idealism. This reading has recently been developed by Ray Brassier and I explore and evaluate it, concluding that in Difference and Repetition this accusation may be correct, but that by the time of Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze (now with Guattari) has the intellectual re-sources to resist it.
84. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Vittorio Hösle The European Union and the U.S.A.: Two Complementary Versions of Western “Empires”?
85. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Francesco Tampoia Autobiography-Heterobiography, Philosophy and Religion in Derrida
86. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Pamela J. Reeve, Antonio Calcagno Introducing…Vittorio Hösle
87. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Vittorio Hösle Review Essay: A Metaphysical History of Atheism
88. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Ronald J. McKinney Revisiting the Sokal Hoax: The Paradoxical Gravity of Boundary Issues
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In the first section of my paper, I want to consider the “paradoxes of complementarity” between polarised notions such as the quantum concepts of “wave” and “particle.” I will argue that if we treat this topic with all the “gravity” it deserves, we will be able to understand once and for all why this debate (and others like it) can never be completely resolved (paradox intended). In the second section, I want to consider the notion of “parody.” At the end, astute readers must determine forthemselves whether I can be trusted to mean what I say, or whether this is all merely ironic, a post-modern hoax, one that undercuts the very boundaries it installs.
89. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Ugo Perone The Risks of The Present: Benjamin, Bonhoeffer and Celan
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The following remarks try to trace a scenario of twentieth-century philosophy, which in my opinion shows a new interest in the issue of time. Many have underscored that nineteenth-century philosophy replaces the paradigm of Nature with that of History as an historical a priori in Foucault’s sense, that is, as the horizon within which the problems are to be located and solved. The issue of identifying the dominant nineteenth-century paradigm—further complicated by thedeclining resort to the great narratives of this “short century”—is still open, so I do not believe it improper to point out that many twentiethcentury philosophers suddenly reconsidered the issue of time as a way of defining the nineteenth-century paradigm of time in a new manner.
90. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Jean-François Bissonnette, Bernard Stiegler De L’Industrialisation Du Mal-Être À La Renaissance Du Politique. Un Entretien Avec Bernard Stiegler
91. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Robert T. Valgenti Ugo Perone’s Philosophy at the Threshold: Space, Time and (Simulated) Political Life
92. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
L. Sebastian Purcell After Hermeneutics?
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Recently Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux have attacked the core of the phenomenological hermeneutic tradition: its commitment to the finitude of human understanding. If accurate, this critique threatens to render the whole tradition a topic of merely historical interest. Given the depth of the criticism, this essay aims to establish a provisional defense of hermeneutics. After briefly reviewing each critique, it is argued that Badiou and Meillassoux themselves face rather intractable difficulties. These difficulties, then, open the space for a hermeneutic response, which is accomplished largely by drawing on the work of Paul Ricoeur. We close with a suggested program for hermeneutic thought.
93. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Dana Hollander “A Thought in Which Everything Has Been Thought”: On the Messianic Idea in Levinas
94. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Ugo Perone Public Space and Its Metaphors
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The political does not exist. What exists is individual and collective life; there is nature, with its inexhaustible cycles; there is the world, the (blind and astute) interlacement of the actions, conflicts and visions that will become history. The political exists only as an invention: the invention of a specific space of the relation that intercepts life, modifies nature, and is a curvature of the world. I would like to dwell on this invention, not without warning that the political of which one speaks precedes and constitutes specific kinds of politics, since it is the condition of their possibility.
95. Symposium: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Linda Martín Alcoff, Alireza Shomali Adorno’s Dialectical Realism
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The idea that Adorno should be read as a “realist” of any sort may indeed sound odd. And unpacking from Adorno’s elusive prose a credible and useful normative reconstruction of epistemology and metaphysics will take some work. But we argue that he should be added to the growing group of epistemologists and metaphysicians who have been developing post-positivist versions of realism such as contextual, internal, pragmatic and critical realisms. These latter realisms, however, while helpfully showing how realism can coexist with ontological pluralism, for example, as well as a highly contextualised account of knowledge, have not developed a political reflexivity about how the object of knowledge—the real—is constructed. As a field, then, post-positivist realisms have been politically naïve, which is perhaps why they have not enjoyed more influence among Continental philosophers.
96. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Babette Babich Adorno on Nihilism and Modern Science, Animals, and Jews
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Adorno, no less than Heidegger or Nietzsche, had his own critical notions of truth/untruth. But Adorno’s readers are unsettled by the barest hint of anything that might be taken to be antiscience. To protest scientism, yes and to be sure, but to protest “scientific thought,” decidedly not, and the distinction is to be maintained even if Adorno himself challenged it. For Adorno, so-called “scientistic” tendencies are the very “conditions of society and of scientific thought.” And again, Adorno’s readers tend to refuse criticism of this kind. Scientific rationality cannot itself be problematic and E. B. Ashton, Adorno’s translator in the mid-1960s, sought to underscore this with the word “scientivistic.” Rather than science, it is scientism that is to be avoided. So we ask: is Adorno speaking here of scientific rationality or scientistic rationality? How, in general, are we to read Adorno?
97. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Daniel Colucciello Barber The Power of Nothingness: Negative Thought in Agamben
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This paper addresses the nature and value of Giorgio Agamben’s negative thought, which revolves around the theme of nothingness. I begin by observing the validity of negative thinking, and thus oppose those affirmative philosophies that reject Agamben’s thought simply on the basis of its negativity. Indeed, the importance of negative thought is set forth by Agamben’s attention to the specific biopolitical logic that governs the present. If we are to understand the present, then we must begin by understanding the nothingness inherent in the logic of biopolitics. At the same time, I argue, it is important to distinguish two kinds of negative thought. The first, ultimately limited manner of negative thought follows a strictly Heideggerian path of contemplation. While Agamben shows a certain affinity with this style of thinking, I call for increased focus on a different manner of negative thought, one that turns on the power to think nothingness. I develop this second manner of negative thought by advancing the concepts of love and exile, which provide the means by which the potentiality of nothingness may inhabited in novel ways.
98. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Marie-Eve Morin Towards a Divine Atheism: Jean-Luc Nancy’s Deconstruction of Monotheism and the Passage of the Last God
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In Briefings on Existence, Alain Badiou calls for a radical atheism that would refuse the Heideggerian pathos of a “last god” and deny the affliction of finitude. I will argue that Jean-Luc Nancy’s deconstruction of monotheism, as well as his thinking of the world, remains resolutely atheistic, or better a-theological, precisely because of Nancy’s insistence on finitude and his appeal to the Heideggerian motif of the last god. At the same time, I want to underline, by considering it as a Derridean paleonymy, the danger of Nancy’s maintenance of the word “god” to name the infinite opening of the world right at (à meme) the world.
99. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Ian Angus A Conversation with Leslie Armour
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Leslie Armour is the author of numerous books and essays on epistemology, metaphysics, logic, Canadian philosophy and Blaise Pascal, as well as on ethics, social and political philosophy, the history of philosophy (especially seventeenth-century philosophy) and social economics. A fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, he has worked as a reporter for The Vancouver Province, briefly as a sub-editor at Reuters News Agency, and for several years as a columnist and feature writer for London Express News and Feature Services. He has taught at universities in Montana, California, Ohio and Ontario. Now a researchprofessor of philosophy at the Dominican University College, Ottawa, an emeritus professor at the University of Ottawa, and editor of the International Journal of Social Economics, he and his wife, Diana, divide their time between Ottawa and London, U.K.
100. Symposium: Volume > 15 > Issue: 1
Deborah Achtenberg Plato and Levinas on Violence and the Other
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In this essay, I shall describe both Plato and Levinas as philosophers of the other, and delineate their similarities and differences on violence. In doing so, I will open up for broader reflection two importantly contrasting ways in which the self is essentially responsive to—as well as vulnerable to violence from—the other. I will also suggest a new way of situating Levinas in the history of philosophy, not, as he himself suggests, as one of the few in the history of philosophy who has aphilosophy of the other but, instead, as one of a number of 20th century philosophers who turn to pre-modern thinkers for aid in critiquing early modern thought on a variety of topics, including whether the self is essentially closed or, instead, vulnerable, open and responsive to what is outside it.