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81. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Luca Maria Scarantino Volume Introduction
82. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Murat Baç Pluralistic Kantianism and Understanding the "Other"
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In this paper I present Pluralistic Kantianism as a viable alternative to other prominent accounts of the determination of the truth conditions of our ordinary empirical statements. I further claim that this sort of Kantianism is capable of handling certain theoretical difficulties faced by any scheme-based semantics. Moreover, Pluralistic Kantianism can shed some light on such crucial issues as cross-cultural communication and understanding. As a result, if the account offered here is on the right track, we may get a palatable alternative to both restrictive monism and apathetic relativism, both of which ultimately fail to explicate or enlighten the successful and unsuccessful instances of cross-cultural understanding.
83. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Ioanna Kuçuradi Series Introduction
84. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Martha Zapata Galindo Philosophie und Politik: Nietzsches Denken und der Nationalsozialismus
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Im Folgenden werden die unterschiedlichen Nietzsche-Bilder der deutschen Philosophie skizziert und insbesondere wird nach ihrer Bedeutung im nationalsozialistischen Kontext gefragt. Dabei geht es nicht darum, festzustellen, ob Nietzsche ein "Wegbereiter" des Nationalsozialismus war oder nicht. In der Hauptsache sollen die wichtigsten Nietzsche- Interpretationen - aus den Jahren zwischen 1930 und 1945 - in konkreten politischen und gesellschaftlichen Lagen und Verhältnissen sichtbar gemacht werden. Daher werden die konkreten historischen Bedingungen, unter denen Nietzsches Denken gedeutet wurde, zum Ausgangspunkt gemacht. In diesem Vortrag wird auf die wichtigsten Schnittstellen für die Faschisierung von Nietzsches Philosophie hingewiesen. Unter Faschisierung ist eine bestimmte Reorganisation der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft zu verstehen, bei der die Parteien und Organisationen der Arbeiterbewegung ausgeschaltet und die Instanzen der Zivilgesellschaft als Apparate des Führer-Staates refunktionalisiert werden. Als ideelle Vergesellschaftungsmacht leistete die Philosophie hier ihren Beitrag zur Stabilisierung der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft, indem sie eine zustimmende Wahrnehmung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse organisierte. Gerade in dieser Richtung leistete die Nietzsche- Interpretation zwischen 1933 und 1945 einen wesentlichen Beitrag nicht nur zur Konstitution eines nationalsozialistischen Subjekts, sondern zugleich zur Reproduktion der Herrschaft.
85. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Zbigniew Wendland What Will XXth Century Philosophy Carry Over Into the XXIst
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The paper centers on philosophy's major trends and trials at the turn of the XXt h and XXIs t century, its leading idea is based on several basic assumptions which can be summarized as follows: 1) the title is a query after XXt h-century philosophy's main achievements and their usefulness in the XXIs t ; 2) speaking about philosophy's achievements, the author particularly means its critical role in condemning and de-mystifying evil, dispelling illusion and myth, and disclosing untruth; 3) the answer to the titular question is based on the entire paper's main assumption that there are three main problems of XXt h-century thought which - as a heritage - will be carrying over into the XXIs t . These problems are the problem of being (Sein), the problem of reason, and the problem of humanity (man). In connection with these problems the author formulates his main thesis that the twentieth century philosophy is characterized by three features which are the following: (a) anti-metaphysical disposition, (b) anti-rationalism, and (c) anti-humanism.
86. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Tibor Szabó Lukács's Road to Himself
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According to our opinion, Lukäcs's way does not lead to Marx but to himself and his independent philosophy and in spite of its inconsistency and mistakes it is still one of the most significant achievements of the XXt h century.
87. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Carmen Segura Peraita Rehabilitación de la razón práctica (La contribución de Hans-Georg Gadamer a la filosofía actual)
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Las criticas a la filosofia moderna, vertidas desde el pensamiento actual, son sobradamente conocidas. Algunas de ellas han querido hacer realidad un proyecto de destrucciön radical. Ahora bien, tal destrucciön solo resultarä verdaderamente eficaz si, como de hecho estä sucediendo, va seguida de propuestas alternativas que se atengan de manera mäs adecuada a la realidad humana y a la estricta tarea de la filosofia. En esta Hnea de contribucion positiva se encuentra, a mi juicio, la particular aportaciön de la hermeneutica filosöfica contemporänea, encaminada a la rehabilitaciön de la razön practica. En esta ponencia se harä menciön especial a la comprensiön de Hans-Georg Gadamer, el pensador alemän fallecido en 2002, que tan decididamente ha marcado el curso de la filosofia actual.Tal rehabilitaciön parece un paso necesario en el camino conducente a una comprensiön mäs acertada de la tarea filosöfica y de su objeto. El reconocimiento de algunos aspectos de la razön, tales como la flnitud o su caräcter situacional, puede contribuir a una vision mäs ajustada de su esencia y posibilidades. Elimina, ademäs, el peligroso riesgo que supone la pretension de lo absolute* e incondicionado. Admitir lo que podriamos denominar los Umites de la razön no significa ineurrir en posiciones relativistas ni eseepticas; constituye, tan solo, un necesario ejercicio de atenimiento a lo real.
88. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Rosário Rossano Pecoraro Du droit á la justice: Derrida et Vattimo
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Ce travail a pour objectif d'analyser les reflexions ä propos du droit et de la justice faites par Jacques Derrida et Gianni Vattimo. L'objectif principal est de mettre l'accent sur les traits dominants qui distinguent ces reflexions quand elles touchent aux exigences de la praxis (juridique, ethique, politique), ä laquelle les deux philosophes s'adressent de fagon differente. D'un cöte, il y a la deconstruction deridienne, qui denonce le manque de fondement du droit, sa violence originelle, et au moyen d'une double seance et un double mouvement se deplace en un exercice intellectuel lucide, radical et incessant; de l'autre, l'ontologie faible [debole) et nihiliste du philosophe italien dont la proposition est une hermeneutique qui n'en reste pas ä la phase de la denonciation mais veut "faire justice", de fagon pratique et concrete, en essayant d'affaiblir et de reduire peu ä peu la violence originelle du droit.
89. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Jacques-Bernard Roumanes Le problème de la singularité universelle considérations épistémologiques et esthétiques
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Mes recherches actuelles tendent ä croiser l'analyse epistemologique avec l'esthetique pour degager le röle du sujet historique dans Velaboration des savoirs universels. II s'agit, pour moi, de deplacer le point de vue transcendantal, formel, afin de renouveler la perspective epistemologique par le concept de diathese. Deux questions se posent. Quel est l'apport du sujet 1) dans le processus de structuration formelle des savoirs? (construction, deconstruction, reconstruction de la connaissance), 2) dans la transmission - transformation des savoirs? (decontextualisation et actualisation historique des paradigmes successifs).En diathese, la conscience de soi - chacun, chacune d'entre nous - ne s'envisage que traversee par la conscience d'autrui. II suffit de rompre avec le solipsisme identitaire des formalismes classiques, et leur determinisme problematique, pour constater avec stupefaction que l'autre tient, en soi, la part constitutive de notre biographic- de la langue de la mere ä la langue des autres. Langue etrangere, qui est pourtant le vehicule de la connaissance de soi. D'oü mon interet pour une reconsideration ä la fois epistemologique et esthetique du cogito cartesien, place ä la fois au coup d'envoi des theories de la conscience et du renouvellement de la pensee scientifique moderne et contemporaine.Dans cette perspective, l'indice de verite des analyses et des syntheses produites par le chercheur, ne saurait prendre forme et force que dans la diathese d'une communaute de recherche, ä la fois specifique et historique. De lä, irresistiblement, le logos devient dialogos. Ce qui signifie que, d'une part, chaque conscience se voit de facto qualifiee pour participer ä l'elaboration ou ä la transmission des connaissances et que, d'autre part, pour qu'un acte de conscience individuel devienne epistemologiquement significatif, i l s'avere necessaire qu'il soit formule ä l'interieur d'une communaute de recherche. Laquelle, seule, peut ä la fois l'actualiser (et done le limiter) comme savoir historique, tout en l'universalisant comme savoir formel. Evitant ainsi le piege de l'hypostasier comme savoir absolu. Le concept de diathese ouvre done ä une epistemologie genetique, preoccupee autant de structure et de construction que d'histoire des sciences. Car ce n'est pas tant (mais aussi) la formalisation des enonces scientifiques que le degre de conscience de leur contenu conceptuel, qui determine avec le plus de rigueur le degre de verite des savoirs d'un individu au sein d'une communaute de recherche, ou d'une communaute de recherche dans l'histoire de la connaissance.
90. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Constantinos V. Proimos The Secret and Responsibility: Derrida's Interpretation of Kierkegaard
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This paper concerns Jacques Derrida's reading of S0ren Kierkegaard's interpretation of the biblical story of Abraham's sacrifice. Abraham's decision to listen to God's command and sacrifice to Him his beloved son is based on his personal faith which conflicts with general morality. On the basis of this story, Derrida argues that we often witness similar conflicts between religion and morality, demonstrating that responsibility is ultimately based on something irresponsible, i.e. something secret. The paper finally discusses Derrida's logic of ultimates.
91. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Daniel W. Smith Deleuze and Derrida, Immanence and Transcendence: Two Directions in Recent French Thought
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This paper will attempt to assess the primary differences between what I take to be the two primary philosophical "traditions" in c o n t e m p o r a r y French philosophy, using Derrida (transcendence) and Deleuze (immanence) as exemplary representatives. The body of the paper will examine the use of these terms in three different areas of philosophy on which Derrida and Deleuze have both written: subjectivity, ontology, and epistemology. (1) In the field of subjectivity, the notion of the subject has been critiqued in two manners, either by appealing either to the transcendence of the other (Levinas, Derrida) or to the immanent jlux of experience itself, in relation to which the Ego itself is trancendent (Deleuze, Foucault, Sartre, James). (2) In the field of ontology, a purely "immanent" ontology would be an ontology in which there is neither a "beyond" or an "otherwise" Being, nor "interruptions" in Being, both of which would require an appeal to a formal element of transcendence (Deleuze). Such a "transcendent" and aporetic structure, which can never appear or be present as such within Being, is what lies at the basis of the project of deconstruction, with its attendant aporias (Derrida). (3) This distinction, finally, finds parallels in Kant's epistemology, for whom the possible experience is conditioned by purely immanent criteria (Deleuze), whereas what goes beyond the limits of possible experience is transcendent (Derrida). Drawing on these three thread of analysis, the paper concludes with an assessment of what is at stake in the ethical differences between the two traditions. The question of "transcendence" is "What mast I do?", which is the question of morality (a duty or obligation that is beyond being, an "ought" beyond the "is"). The question of "immanence" is "What can I do?" (my power or capacity as an existing individual within being). For Levinas and Derrida, ethics precedes ontology because it is derived from an element of transcendence (the Other); for Deleuze, ethics is ontology because it is derived from the immanent relation of beings to Being at the level of their existence (Spinoza).
92. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Ferda Keskin Foucault's Kantian Legacy
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Foucault argued in his retrospective writings that it is possible to give an overall interpretation of his work around the question of subjectivity and that his individual books are historical analyses of the constitution of certain subjective experiences that he finds characteristic of modernity. Furthermore, he called this history of the emergence, development and transformation of subjective experiences a 'history of thought.' Hence understanding the sense in which Foucault uses the notion of thought seems to be crucial for an interpretation of his writings within the framework he provided in his retrospective accounts. In this paper I will argue that the Foucaultian notion of thought is Kantian in fundamental ways, and that this Kantian framework is present throughout his entire work. This argument will provide the background for a rejection of the claim that Foucault's individual writings are specific and marginal. Finally, I will claim that the standard periodizations of Foucault's work under the headings of archaeology, genealogy and ethics have to be reconsidered and revised.
93. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Elif Çirakman Heidegger's Concept of Human Freedom: From Metaphysical to Its Tragic Sense
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In this paper, I examine how and why Heidegger's early conception of freedom as the ground of the self-appropriation of Dasein had been gradually transformed after 1930. The approach of Heidegger to the issue of human freedom displays how his thinking proceeds from Kant's formulation of the problem in "The Third Antinomy" of the first Critique to Sophocles' tragedy of Antigone. I argue that the reason behind this transformation resides in the attempt of thinking the relation between freedom and natural necessity over and beyond the constraints of critical philosophy. What seems pivotal in this transformation is Heidegger's growing concern with the "tragic" in which he envisages the possibility of a genuine exposure to the "truth" of the conflict between freedom and necessity and, more primordially, to the "abode" wherein the encounter between man and Being {Sein) occurs. Here, the "tragic" is pointing to the limits of representation and what is presented. In other words, it exhibits the limits of human freedom in its relation to the truth of Being. In the passion for disclosure of Being {aletheia), man is driven into the freedom of instituting its truth. In Heidegger's late thinking, human freedom is determined not any more by the obligation of choosing oneself but by the necessity of clearing the truth of Being. Human freedom is tragic in the face of this necessity that it has to answer. Therefore, man is envisaged as having no right or mastery over his freedom for there is no total clearing of its origin. Finally, I argue that it seems impossible to understand the transformation in Heidegger's concept of freedom without an appeal to his emphasis on the "tragic" as being an attempt to deepen and to transfigure the problem as treated in Kantian critical philosophy. In its tragic sense, Heidegger's concept of human freedom displays what lies beneath the Kantian antinomy: the incomprehensible origin of human freedom conceived as the event of the historical appropriation of Being {Er-eignis).
94. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Patricia Verdeau Bergson, penseur des problèmes mondiaux dans le chapitre IV des Deux sources de la morale et de la religio
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Comment l'humanite peut-elle resoudre les problemes d'une cite close ou d'un monde clos? Un des problemes essentiels pose est celui de l'agrandissement, qui rend les societes difficilement gouvernables et dangereuses, et qui renvoie done ä la question de la guerre. En 1932, Bergson est un des premiers philosophes ä pressentir la possibility de l'extermination, du genocide. Quelle est la place de la democratic d'une part et d'une societe des nations d'autre part dans la resolution des problemes mondiaux? Pour Bergson, la democratic est la conception politique la plus eloignee de la nature, la seule qui transcende, dans ses intentions au moins, les conditions de la societe close. Est-ce que les organisations de cooperation efficaces sont mondiales? Les problemes mondiaux se resolvent, mais seulement si, explique Bergson, une portion süffisante de l'humanite est decidee ä les surmonter. L'humanite, qui n'a cesse de contredire la nature, est capable, pourtant, explique Bergson, de fournir l'efTort necessaire pour depasser ce qui reste clos en 1'homme, de l'ordre de l'immobilite de l'espece. Or cet effort vise la mobilite meme, une conscience synonyme d'invention et de liberte. Penser l'humanite et ses problemes n'a pas pour ambition de decouper des essences, mais d'intervenir dans un processus humain en mouvement. Les problemes mondiaux ne sont ni speciflquement anthropologiques ni speciflquement politiques, mais ä l'articulation des deux, dans une jointure entre theorie et pratique, la ou l'humanite est consciente et, partant, agissante. La conscience des problemes de l'humanite, reels et possibles, est chez Bergson plus metaphysique qu'anthropologique, dans le sens ou il ne s'agit pas d'envisager l'humanite dans l'ensemble de ses determinations, mais d'appliquer ä certains de ses evenements la double perspective du voir et du vouloir propre ä l'intuition metaphysique.
95. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Talip Karakaya Le concept de l'existence chez Jean-Paul Sartre et Martin Heidegger
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Ce que nous voulons faire dans ce travail, est de presenter des concepts differents de terme de l'existence chez Martin Heidegger et Jean-Paul Sartre. Parce que cette analyse nous donnera la possibility de bien comprendre les principales idees de ces penseurs dans la Philosophie contemporaine.D'abord, nous devons remarquer que le terme d'existence retient une place centrale chez eux. Comme nous l'avons expose dans notre travail, la filiation entre ces penseurs est construite particulierement sur cette idee. Dans ce travail, nous avons pose differentes questions, et nous livrons leurs reponses. D'ailleurs, on voit que chez Heidegger, l'essence du dasein reside dans son existence, et chez Sartre l'existence precede l'essence. En plus, quand Sartre parle d'existence, c'est de maniere abstraite, autrement dit l'existence est un concept analytique. L'existence sartrienne etant la facticite, elle exprime la condition humaine d'un etre pour lequel dans son etre il y va de son etre. D'un autre cote, l'existence pour Heidegger n'est pas un cadre abstrait, un autre mot pour dire la condition humaine mais un lieu etrange et inquietant.Brievement, l'une des plus grandes caracteristiques de l'existence chez Heidegger est qu'elle n'est pas connaissable objectivement, et n'est pas definissable tout court. Mais chez Sartre, l'existence, c'est avant tout d'etre dans ses actes et par ses actes.
96. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Ilkka Niiniluoto Abduction and Scientific Realism
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Many scientific realists think that the best reasons for scientific theories are abductive, i.e., must appeal to what is also called inference to the best explanation (IBE), while some anti-realists have argued that the use of abduction in defending realism is question-begging, circular, or incoherent. This paper studies the idea that abductive inference can be reformulated by taking its conclusion to concern the truthlikeness of a hypothetical theory on the basis of its success in explanation and prediction. The strength of such arguments is measured by the estimated verisimilitude of its conclusion given the premises. It is argued that this formulation helps to make precise and justifies the "ultimate argument for scientific realism": the empirical success of scientific theories would be a miracle unless they are truthlike.
97. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Ayhan Sol Entropy, Disorder, and Traces
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Traces are generally considered to constitute an ontologically distinct class of objects that can be distinguished from other objects. However, it can be observed on close inspection that the principles to demarcate traces from other objects are quite general, imprecise and intuitively unclear, except perhaps the entropic account envisaging traces as low entropy states. This view was developed by Hans Reichenbach, Adolf Grünbaum, and J. J. C. Smart on the basis of Reichenbach's theory of branch systems that are subsystems of wider systems. According to this theory, traces form within subsystems as low entropy states as a result of interaction with wider systems. It is also claimed that entropy is the measure of disorder, and that traces are ordered states. I argue that the concepts of entropy and disorder are used beyond their legitimate limits of application, for there are clear-cut counter-examples in the literature. I also analyze the concept of trace together with some examples from classical mechanics and geology in order to show that traces are determined relative to a particular context in which they are so defined.
98. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Peter Reynaert Phenomenology Encounters Cognitive Science: Naturalizing Conscious Embodiment
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The paper argues for the relevance of phenomenology for the contemporary debate about a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Phenomenology's analysis of intentionality in terms of the conscious act, its representational content and the intentional object sustains an interpretation of qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties of the conscious mental acts themselves and not of their content. On the basis of this anti-representationalist clarification of the nature of qualia, the paper substantiates the claim for a more comprehensive naturalistic explanation of embodiment. A phenomenological, i.e. noetico-noematical, analysis of bodily experience helps to integrate the role of the lived body in accepted psycho-physical explanations of conscious embodiment (for instance of proprioception). Furthermore and more importantly, noetical phenomenology identifies a proper bodily self-awareness, consisting of sensations localized on the lived body, as the quale of conscious embodiment. It is maintained that naturalizing embodiment demands a radical explanation of the conditions of possibility of this bodily self-awareness.
99. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Alfonso García Marqués Sentido y Contradicción
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In Book IV of the Metaphysics Aristotle argues that first philosophy investigates not only being qua being but also the axioms or principles of demonstration. In the same place he establishes which principles are first. The first among these is the principle of contradiction. The thesis I defend in my communication is that the principle of contradiction in Aristotle is not merely formal in the style of modern symbolic logic, but is the constituent law of all discourse. As such, the most precise sense in which it is a 'first principle' is that of a condition of the possibility of significance: terms and judgments have significance if they comply with the condition; if they violate it they signify nothing and are vacuous. If my interpretation is correct, various consequences will be derivable from a first principle, of which the most important is its link with essence and substance.
100. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 12
Ferda Keskin Volume Introduction