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81. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Parvis Emad Heidegger’s Stance on Hölderlin in Beiträge
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This paper attempts to elucidate the exceptional stance Heidegger takes in Beiträge toward Hölderlin’s “poetizing.” On the one hand, Beiträge provides no specific guideline for understanding this exceptional stance. On the other hand, the text of a “Dialogue” Heidegger wrote almost a decade after Beiträge, providesthe hermeneutic guideline needed for understanding Heidegger’s exceptional position on this poet. This hermeneutic guideline is none other than what Heidegger calls the “Will.” Following this guideline, the paper proceeds to highlight the hermeneutic thesis according to which another appearing of being (Sein)—one not referentially dependent upon the “Will”—is sheltered and preserved in Hölderlin’s “poetizing.” Elucidating this thesis the paper concludes that Hölderlin’s“poetizing” unfolds from within the Other Onset (der andere Anfang) of thinking.
82. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Corry Shores Body and World in Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze
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To compare Merleau-Ponty’s and Deleuze’s phenomenal bodies, I first examine how for Merleau-Ponty phenomena appear on the basis of three levels of integration: 1) between the parts of the world, 2) between the parts of the body, and 3) between the body and its world. I contest that Deleuze’s attacks on phenomenology can be seen as constructive critiques rather than as being expressions of an anti-phenomenological position. By building from Deleuze’s definition of the phenomenon and from his more phenomenologically relevant writings, we find that phenomena for him are given to the body under exactly the opposite conditions as for Merleau-Ponty, namely that 1) the world’s differences 2) appear to a disordered body that 3) comes into shocking affective contact with its surroundings. I argue that a Deleuzian theory of bodily-given phenomena is better suited than Merleau-Ponty’s model in the task of accounting for the intensity of phenomenal appearings.
83. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Luka Nakhutsrishvili Corps propre et corps technique(s): Jean-Luc Nancy et la phénoménologie
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This essay deals with Jean-Luc Nancy’s ambivalent philosophical relationship to the phenomenological perspective on the problem of corporeity. The present analysis aims to point out how within the framework of a critical rejection of some of the fundamental elements of the phenomenological tradition, Nancy adopts some of its other elements in order to forge his own approach to corporeity. While traversing Nancy’s thinking from his critique of the Leib to his concept of technique and ecotechnics, the essay engages in a critical discussion of diverse phenomenological motifs from Husserl’s, Merleau-Ponty’s and Heidegger’s oeuvre.
84. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Gunnar Declerck Incarnation, motricité et rapport au possible
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For Husserl, kinaesthetic capability is a key piece of the process of perception. By ensuring the junction between the actual and the potential, it allows the exhibition of an object that is always more than what appears. Kinaesthetic capability preserves the transcendence of the object by preventing the phenomenon from being confined to pure actuality. This idea, however, poses significant challenges when one questions the nature of the possibilities that are at stake here. Especially, the perceived seems to enjoy a kind of emancipation from these capabilities as they actually are. How can one justify that the structures of the perceived world are the intentional correlate of the kinaesthetic skills of the subject if such structures continue to regulate the sense of the appearing objects when those skills are neutralized? We will see that only a genetic perspective, assuming the intrinsically historical character of the subject, provides a satisfactory answer to this question, and that this perspective leads to placing into question the actualist position that Husserl sometimes tends to adopt.
85. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Chris Nagel Phenomenology without “the body”?
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French phenomenology focused on “the body” to avoid the supposed transcendental idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology, and to provide an “existential” or “empirical” account of the origin of meaning, as Ricoeur put it. In practice, however, this has implicitly presupposed a Cartesian problematic of the relation between body and mind or “subject.” This is the source of the ultimate frustration of this effort, as well as the persistence of a “mystery” of meaning (to cite Merleau-Ponty and Henry). This essay offers an alternative, considering the embodiment of any meaningful experience, suggesting finally that embodiment must be accounted for in terms of subjection.
86. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Elizabeth A. Behnke, Cristian Ciocan Introduction: Possibilities of Embodiment
87. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Jan Bierhanzl Signifiance éthique et corporéité dans Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence
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The paper here presented deals with ethical signifying as happening in corporeity. The starting point is a provisional definition of ethical signifying as a process and a relation to the other. In the first part I attempt to describe precisely this process and distinguish two aspects: concretization and hyperbole. In the second and main part I try to outline concretization and hyperbole in the corporeal relation to the other. The modalities of ethical signifying are caress, vulnerability, maternity and last but not least the voice of the self.
88. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Anne Gléonec Corps animal et corps humain: l’« eff acement » de la propriété. À la naissance de l’institution chez Merleau-Ponty
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The purpose of this article is to show that in Merleau-Ponty’s lesser known works, one can find a path leading toward a phenomenology of the body that would not risk the “ambiguity of the flesh,” as The Visible and the Invisible is often charged with, but instead would sustain the ontology of nature that one finds in the “Working Notes” added to Merleau-Ponty’s last writings. Analyzing first his concept of nature, as it was developed in his courses at the Collège de France, the proposed aim of this text is to question anthropological difference by focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the contemporary sciences, whereby the Ineinander between the physical, living, and human orders is re-founded by a new, negative concept of nature. By deconstructing classical ontology and its understanding of space, time, and objectivity, and by returning to the domain of perception, this new concept offers a novel way to reveal the advent of life in nature, its institution, and the emergence of a new corporeity in life itself. The model of Merleau-Ponty’s essential concept of institution becomes birth, and therefore the human body will no longer be interpreted as “one’s own body,” but rather will be understood, in a radically a-subjective way, as from, and based on, the participation of our perception with animality. Thereby, the concept of “ownness” becomes secondary; however, the notion of institution, established against the lexicon of consciousness and subjectivity, opens another sense of anthropological difference, one that is based only on the experiences of corporeity.
89. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Diego D’Angelo Die Schwelle des Lebe-Wesens: Überlegungen zur Leibinterpretation Heideggers in der Nietzsche-Abhandlung
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One of Heidegger’s most important descriptions of bodily existence can be found in his Nietzsche lectures. This paper aims to elucidate this “metaphysics of the body” both in relation to Heidegger’s Leibniz-interpretation in the later Marburg lectures as well as in the context of his later thought. Leibniz and Nietzsche are Heidegger’s points of departure in the attempt to think the difference between θεωρία and πραξις beyond Being and Time: It is only by understanding their relationship, through a radical re-thinking of the problem of corporeality, no longer as a noun (der Leib) but as a verb (leiben), that one can possibly move beyond every traditional dualism, between theory and praxis but also and most notably between being and becoming.
90. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Carlos Lobo La « résistance de Derrida à la psychanalyse » et la phénoménologie transcendantale
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Following Derrida’s late analysis of the multifarious concept of resistance, this article aims at detecting the motives that lead him to install from the start a tension between two methods of analysis of consciousness (phenomenological and psychoanalytical), that many would have considered, if not affectively unbearable, at least logically unsustainable. Yet this general logical and affective attitude remains describable, and in order to do so, the author proposesto delve into some underestimated and hence underexploited resources of transcendental phenomenology, particularly those related to the analysis of affectivesyntaxes of consciousness, which are part of the “realm of positionality”.
91. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 12
Book Reviews
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Claudia Şerban, Claude Romano, Au coeur de la raison, la phénoménologie, Paris : Gallimard, 2010; Denisa Butnaru, Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela, Pierre Vermersch, A l’épreuve de l’expérience – Pour une pratique phénoménologique, Bucarest : Zeta Books, 2011; Christian Ferencz-Flatz, Jitendra Nath Mohanty, Edmund Husserl’s Freiburg Years 1916–1938, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2011; Nicoleta Szabo, Frédéric Moinat, Le vivant et sa naturalisation. Le probleme du naturalisme en biologie chez Husserl et le jeune Merleau-Ponty, Dordrecht – Heidelberg – London – New York : Springer, 2012; Rolf Kühn, Antoine Vidalin, Acte du Christ et actes de l’homme. La théologie morale a l’épreuve de la phénoménologie de la vie, Paris: Parole et Silence, 2012; Rolf Kühn, Benoît Kanabus, Généalogie du concept d’Archi-Soi chez Michel Henry, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York, Olms Verlag, 2011; Cătălin Cioabă, Matthias Flatscher, Logos und Lethe. Zur phänomenologischen Sprachauff assung im Spätwerk von Heidegger und Wittgenstein, Freiburg / München: Karl Alber, 2011
92. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Lorenzo Altieri Genèse d’une hérésie : la phénoménologie herméneutique de Paul Ricœur
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In this essay I revisit Ricœur’s famous greffe in light of Husserl’s method. In other words, I try to highlight the anti-idealist interpretation of phenomenology exposed by Ricœur in his early project (Philosophie de la volonté) and in some later works, in order to present the necessity of the graft of hermeneutics onto the worn out body of western reflexive philosophy. This surgery has a radical effect on the “Subject”: far from provoking a “rejection crisis”, the hermeneutical graft provides the Cogito with a new heart, and gives new life to Ricœur’s homme capable – the ultimate character of his long philosophical journey. The essay closes with an alternative interpretation of this “capability”.
93. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron Les formes du temps et la vie spirituelle selon Paul Ricoeur
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In order to identify the role that temporality plays for Ricœur’s view on the spiritual life, I will start my analysis from his interpretation of the Augustinian Confessions (book XI, ch. XXX). In his reading, Ricoeur makes use of the notion of extension to which he accords multiples meanings (spatial, categorical and existential) and he also points out the conceptual couple of distensio / extensio. I will bring forth Ricoeur’s misinterpretation that consists in strongly relating the discovery of this conceptual couple to the distinction between the three inner dimensions of time. I will end with a discussion of Heidegger’s analysis of the Confessions and his tentative to temporalize Dasein starting from the future.
94. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Natalie Depraz D’une science descriptive de l’expérience en premiere personne : pour une phénoménologie expérientielle
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I would like to propose an interpretation of Ricœur’s first phenomenological works in the light of what I call an “experiential phenomenology”, by answeringthree important questions. The first is a factual and historical interrogation: why has Ricœur abandoned his project of a descriptive phenomenology after publishing his first volume of the The Voluntary and the Involuntary and why did he afterwards direct his philosophical research towards the problem of interpretation? The second interrogation is an epistemological and a methodological one: in what way is the Husserlian phenomenology a first-person approach and how does Ricœur’s phenomenology of the will lead us towards an experiential phenomenology in first person? The final question is heuristical: what criteria should we point out in order to establish a phenomenological science that is 1) descriptive and 2) approaching the experience in first-person?
95. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Vincent Blok “Massive Voluntarism” or Heidegger’s Confrontation with the Will
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One of the controversial issues in the development of Heidegger’s thought is the problem of the will. The communis opinio is that Heidegger embraced the concept of the will in a non-critical manner at the beginning of the thirties and , in particular, he employed it in his political speeches of 1933–1934. Jacques Derrida for instance speaks about a “massive voluntarism” in relation to Heidegger’s thought in this period. Also Brett Davis discerns a period of “existential voluntarism” in 1930–1934, in which Heidegger takes over a notion of the will in a non-critical manner. In this article, this interpretation is challenged and a stronger interpretation of Heidegger’s concern with the will is developed. Our hypothesis is that Heidegger’s concern with the will at the onset of the thirties is brought about by his confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with the concept of the will. Based on his lecture courses from 1930 and 1936/37 and his Rectoral Address from 1933, enables us to discern three main characteristics of Heidegger’s destructed concept of the will in the early thirties.
96. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Guillaume Fagniez Hermeneutik im Ubergang von Dilthey zu Heidegger
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Despite the usual genealogies of hermeneutics, Heidegger’s appropriation of Dilthey’s philosophy only deals marginally with hermeneutics. Nevertheless, this paper aims to shed light on elements in favour of an implicit continuity in hermeneutics from Dilthey to Heidegger. Against the general background of the conception of life as self-interpretation, which allows the ontological radicalisation of Dilthey’s hermeneutical concepts, some diltheyan historical and aesthetical paradigms prove to be at work in Heidegger’s first phenomenology of life. “Destruction” itself, the very core of Heidegger’s concept of hermeneutics, can be partially traced back to diltheyan sources.
97. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Scott Davidson The Husserl Heretics: Ricoeur, Levinas, and the French Reception of Husserlian Phenomenology
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The legacy of Husserlian phenomenology in France, as Paul Ricœur observes, has inspired a series of “Husserlian heresies.” This paper seeks to shedlight on the Husserl heretics through a study of two influential thinkers who introduced Husserl’s to French readers: Levinas and Ricoeur. Their introductionsgave rise to the “standard picture” of Husserl as an Idealist. Their criticism of Husserl’s Idealism then provides the springboard into their own originalthought. What ultimately emerges from this, however, are two different visions of how phenomenology should relate to its own limits.
98. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Pol Vandevelde Le fondement ontologique du récit selon Ricoeur : mimesis, dette et attestation
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I examine the problem of what Ricœur calls représentance, which is a stand-in narratives offer of what took place (in the case of historical narratives) or actions (in the case of the re-telling of what people did). Ricœur rejects as insufficient two naive options: first, a simple adequacy between what took place and the historical narrative about it and, second, a simple heterogeneity between them so that historical narratives would be mere “possible versions” of what took place. I explore further why Ricœur brought into consideration the attitude of the one offering the narrative, what he calls a “being-in-debt” or “attestation”. I then offer an assessment of Ricœur’s success in still claiming that what actually happened serves as the ultimate referent of the narratives given of the past event or the action.
99. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
David-Le-Duc Tiaha La réserve de sens de la Lebenswelt. Enjeu de l’entrecroisement de la phénoménologie et de l’herméneutique
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The hermeneutic turn in Ricœur’s phenomenological ontology of the 1960 cannot be considered a break with his methodological approach of philosophy. In fact, as early as 1950 he had already initiated a first attempt to conjoin phenomenology and hermeneutics by relating eidetic description and explanation. The main purpose of the present analysis is to clarify the constellations constituting the structure of mutual determination between phenomenology and hermeneutics. The paper will focus on the question of the Lebenswelt, as reserve of meaning, a concept requiring a structural conjunction of the phenomenological (perception, imagination, re-presentation) and hermeneutical arcs (explication, interpretation, understanding).
100. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 13
Annalisa Caputo A Second Copernican Revolution. Phenomenology of the Mutuality and Poetics of the Gift in the last Ricœur
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Most scholars point out that Ricœur’s itinerary ends with a “phenomenology of the capable human being”. In this paper, I will try to propose a different hypothesis and explain why Ricœur’s last writings can be considered the starting point of a second Copernican revolution within phenomenology. A revolution of both method (from the analytic to the a-logical) and contents (from the theme of intersubjectivity to the theme of “giving” and loving), which, already in the Preface of Le volontaire et l’involontaire, Ricœur wished could follow after the first revolution of the reflexive phenomenology: a hermeneutic poetic phenomenology that develops the project that the early Ricœur had drafted, but not completed in the 1950s. This is the project of a Poetics of the Gift, in which is hidden, in my opinion, the fecundity of Ricœurian philosophy and the possibility for it to become paradigmatic for the philosophy to come.