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Displaying: 81-100 of 163 documents

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81. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Stanislav Sousedík František Mayronis o pomyslných jsoucnech: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
82. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Quodlibeti quaestiones Vi. et Vii (De entibus rationis): A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
83. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
David Svoboda Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
84. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD Znovu o abstraktních pojmech: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
85. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Paul E. Oppenheimer, Edward N. Zalta O logice ontologického důkazu: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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In this paper, the authors show that there is a reading of St. Anselm’s ontological argument in Proslogium II that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This reading takes Anselm’s use of the definite description “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” seriously. Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified sentence “there is an x such that…” does not imply “x exists”. Then, using an ordinary logic of descriptions and a connected greater-than relation, God’s existence logically follows from the claims: (a) there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable, and (b) if x does not exist, something greater than x can be conceived. To deny the conclusion, one must deny one of the premises. However, the argument involves no modal inferences and, interestingly, Descartes’ ontological argument can be derived from it.
86. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD Suárezova nauka o receptivních potencích a její ohlas u R. Arriagy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse).
87. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Anselmův ontologický důkaz očima teorie abstraktních objektů: Úvodní poznámka
88. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Machula Les quatre causes de l’être selon la philosophie premiére d’Aristote: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
89. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD K Novákově odpovědi: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
90. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík Základní fenomény lidského bytí očima filosofie. Témata týkající se života každého člověka.: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
91. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Problém abstraktních pojmů: Odpověď Davidu Peroutkovi
92. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík Dilinganae Disputationes. Der Lehrinhalt der gedruckten Disputationen an der philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Dillingen.: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
93. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Peter Hoenen SJ Descartův Mechanicismus: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
94. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Rastislav Nemec The Eternity of God. Comparative Study of Bernard Lonergan SJ and Richard Swinburne.: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
95. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Michal Chabada Das natürliche Gesetz und das konkrete praktische Urteil nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
96. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Pavel Blažek XII. International Congress of Medieval Philosophy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
97. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Tomáš Machula Naturrecht und Menschwürde. Universale Ethik in einer geschichtlichen Welt: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
98. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD Závěrečné vyjádření: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
99. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Josef Novák Přirozená theologie pro naši dobu: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
100. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Daniel Heider Analogie vnitřní atribuce jako možné řešení nejasností v Aristotelově pojetí blaženosti v Etice Níkomachově: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The paper deals with the problem of conceptual interpretation of Aristotle’s prima facie divergent opinions on human happiness in his Nicomachean Ethics, especially in Book 1 and Book 10. As its starting point it takes the well-known expository scheme connected with the polarity “Dominantism versus Inclusivism”. It attempts to show that the relationship of two main candidates on human happines, namely the activities of moral virtues and of contemplation, should be understood on the basis of the predicative scheme called the intrinsic analogy of attribution. While both contemplation and the activities of moral virtues are intrinsically valuable, it is argued that they exhibit certain order of priority and posteriority: the theoretical activities of our intellect realise happiness primarly, whereas the moral activities merely secondarily. The desirable character of intrinsic goodness of our moral actions consists in the fact that they are beautiful and that they, in a certain way, approximate theoria. Interpreting the teleological relation between moral action and contemplation as one of approximation thus seems to represent a plausible alternative, which, unlike the standard means–end relation, keeps in balance both of the desiderata, i.e. the intrinsic goodness of our moral actions as well as their intrinsic orientation toward contemplation.