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81. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Stewart Goetz The God of Consciousness: A Review Essay on Recent Work by J. P. Moreland
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In his two first-rate books, Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument and The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism, J. P. Moreland argues that our existence as conscious beings presents insurmountable problems for naturalism and evidence for theism. In this review, I summarize Moreland’s treatment of three issues in scientific theory acceptance, which he claims are relevant to determining which world­view, theism or naturalism, is better able to explain the existence of conscious mental entities. I then raise some questions about their supposed relevance and conclude with some thoughts about the simplicity and immateriality of the soul.
82. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
William Lane Craig Timothy O’Connor on Contingency: A Review Essay on Theism and Ultimate Explanation
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In the first part of Theism and Ultimate Explanation Timothy O’Connor provides a compact survey of the metaphysics and epistemology of modality, defending modal realism and a priorism. In the book’s second half he defends a Leibnizian-style cosmological argument for an absolutely necessary being. He seeks to answer four questions: (1) Is the idea of a necessary being coherent? (2) In what way is the postulation of such a being explanatory? (3) Does the assumption of necessary being commit us to denying the very contingency of mundane things which it is meant to explain? (4) What are the implications of necessary being for theology? In this review I highlight a few of the obscurities and apparent weaknesses of this otherwise commendable book.
83. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Mark Nowacki Assessing the Kalam Cosmological Argument: A Reply to Guminski
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Guminski’s critical assessment of my version of the KCA (the “N-KCA”) is unfounded because he (1) fails to identify what is distinctive in the argument, (2) overlooks the importance of modality within KCA thought experiments, (3) does not recognize that the central arguments of the N-KCA are independent of specific mathematical accounts, and (4) overlooks key metaphysical distinctions, including that between infinite multitude and infinite magnitude. I also argue against Guminski’s “Alternative Version” of interpreting KCA thought experiments. Finally, I clarify what is meant by “temporal marks” and offer some thoughts on future research directions for the KCA.
84. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Gary R. Habermas Farewell to an Old Friend: Remembering Antony Flew
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This essay is a personal tribute to the life of philosopher Antony Flew (1923–2010). After some brief comments about Flew’s life, the article is divided into academic and personal memories that were shared between Gary Habermas and him. Included are details of various academic publications, debates, critiques, as well as several private discussions.
85. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Steve Schley Knowledge of God
86. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Tim Weldon The Vision of Gabriel Marcel: Epistemology, Human Person, the Transcendent
87. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Jeremy A. Evans Loving Wisdom: Christian Philosophy of Religion
88. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Adam Wood On Aquinas
89. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Michael W. Austin God and the Reach of Reason: C. S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell
90. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
News and Announcements
91. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Gregory E. Ganssle Tactics: A Game Plan for Discussing Your Christian Convictions
92. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Michael S. Jones God’s Rivals: Why Has God Allowed Different Religions? Insights from the Bible and the Early Church
93. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Craig J. Hazen Editor’s Introduction
94. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Jeremy Evans Guest Editor’s Introduction
95. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Timothy O’Connor Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency
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Twentieth-century analytic philosophy was dominated by positivist antimetaphysics and neo-Humean deflationary metaphysics, and the nature of explanation was reconceived in order to fit these agendas. Unsurprisingly, the explanatory value of theism was widely discredited. I argue that the long-overdue revival of a modalized, broadly neo-Aristotelian metaphysics and an improved perspective on modal knowledge dramatically changes the landscape. In this enriched context, there is no sharp divide between physics and metaphysics, and the natural end of the theoretician’s quest for a unified explanation of the universe is God, an absolutely necessary, transcendent, and personal source of all contingent reality.
96. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Thomas D. Senor On the Tenability of Brute Naturalism and the Implications of Brute Theism
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Timothy O’Connor’s book Theism and Ultimate Explanation offers a defense of a new version of the cosmological argument. In his discussion, O’Connor argues against the coherence of a brute fact “explanation” of the universe and for the claim that the God of theism cannot be logically contingent. In this paper, I take issue with both of these arguments. Regarding the former, I claim that contrary to what O’Connor asserts, we have no good reason to prefer an account according to which the universe is explained via a necessary being to that of a naturalist who thinks that the universe is contingent and ultimately unexplained. Regarding the latter, I argue that the possibility of a logically contingent God is fully consistent with traditional theism.
97. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Hugh McCann Modality and Sovereignty: On Theism and Ultimate Explanation
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Two important aspects of O’Connor’s Theism and Ultimate Explanation are explored. The first is whether God’s existence should be considered ontologically necessary. I suggest that although existence is essential to God, it is not a matter of ontological necessity. The second is whether prior to creating God deliberates about what universe or universes to create. I argue that he does not, that to say he does is to mistake creation for a kind of manufacturing. Implications of these claims regarding divine sovereignty are briefly discussed.
98. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Graham Oppy Orcid-ID The Shape of Causal Reality: A Naturalistic Adaptation of O’Connor’s Cosmological Argument
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In Theism and Ultimate Explanation, Tim O’Connor sets out and defends a cosmological argument from contingency. In my paper—which might have been titled “Naturalism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency”—I argue that, even if you grant O’Connor his various controversial assumptions about modality and causality, the argument that he sets out provides stronger support for naturalism than it does for theism. In particular, I claim that considerations about theoretical and ontological parsimony favour a naturalistic necessary shape for contingency over a theistic necessary shape for contingency.
99. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Michael J. Almeida O’Connor’s Permissive Multiverse
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I distinguish restrictive and permissive multiverse solutions to the problems of evil and no best world. Restrictive multiverses do not admit a single instance of gratuitous evil and they are not improvable. I show that restrictive multiverses unacceptably entail that all modal distinctions collapse. I consider Timothy O’Connor’s permissive multiverse. I show that a perfect creator minimizes aggregative suffering in permissive multiverses only if the actual universe is not included in any actualizable multiverse. I conclude that permissive multiverses do not offer a credible solution to the problems of evil and no best world.
100. Philosophia Christi: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
R. Scott Smith Intentionality and Our Fashionable Philosophies: Constructivist Implications for Naturalism, Physicalism, Moderate Nominalism, and Postmodern Epistemologies
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Many understand intentionality as the ofness or aboutness of mental states yet disagree about it metaphysically. I will argue that (1) intentionality seems best understood as an abstract universal; (2) it is needed to have factual knowledge of reality, yet (3) metaphysical treatments (or uses) of intentionality by several fashionable philosophies land us in constructivism. I will focus on Daniel Dennett’s treatment of intentionality and then extend my findings to other naturalist and physicalist views, postmodern epistemologies, and nominalism. I also will sketch show how we use intentionality to know reality before suggesting an implication for epistemic externalism.