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81. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Lui Ping-keung Man and God
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This paper follows Eric Voegelin’s discussion on Gnosticism, politics and science. Gnosticism is ancient, but survives well into the modern age. Marx and Heidegger are among the modern gnostics who are determined to deny or ignore the existence of God, that is, an existence beyond what mankind can plausibly know. The political result, in the case of Marxism, has been known to be disastrous. A philosophic remedy is for man to recognize an order of being in which God is given a foothold, that is, to accept an ontology that is different from Marx’s and Heidegger’s in a fundamental way. The author suggests that while most if not all social theories remain gnostic such ontology befits theoretical sociology.
82. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Ni Liangkang, Chen Zhiyuan The Ultimate Consciousness and Alaya-vijnana: A Comparative Study on Deep-Structure of Consciousness between Yogacara Buddhism and Phenomenology
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Both Yogacara Buddhism and Husserl’s phenomenology discuss deep-structure in a certain sense. The opposite superficial-structure, in Yogacara Buddhism, unifies the upper seven consciousnesses, and in Husserl’s phenomenology, embraces all kinds of objective consciousnesses. The relationship between those two structures, whether in Yogacara Buddhism or in Husserl’s phenomenology, is regarded as a sort of founding-founded relationship. According to the things themselves, in consciousness, deep-structure takes priority over superficialstructure. But to dwell on them asks for a reversing routine taken by Husserl: he begins with the analysis of superficial consciousness before descending into the deeper parts. But it is in Yogacara that we see more loyalty to the genetic order of the things.
83. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Kamei Daisuke The Possibility of a “Linguistic Community”
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Is a “linguistic community” among different languages possible? This question is important when it comes to the linguistic aspect of intercultural phenomenological problems. Hence, we consider the problem of translation by referring to the works of Husserl, Benjamin, and Derrida. We first examine Husserl’s use of the term “linguistic community” and then criticize it on the basis of Derrida’s interpretation. Following this, we seek the possibility of the “linguistic community” in translation through the theories of translation of Benjamin and Derrida, particularly by referring to Benjamin’s “pure language” and Derrida’s concepts of “sur-vival” and “promise.”
84. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Abe Jun To the Field of Life: A Comparison of Husserlian Phenomenology and the Yogācāra Buddhism
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The main aim of this paper is to compare Husserlian phenomenology and Yogācāra Buddhism in the discussion of living matter, particularly hylē in the former and ādāna consciousness in the latter. While they not only share the same interest which is the constitution of phenomena, i.e., for consciousness itself, but also the enigma of such living matter, they approach these subjects using a different methodology. This comparative study might open the field of life which Husserlian phenomenology failed to describe, and might unite, just like yogā means “union” in English, Western and Eastern philosophy which have been strictly separated.
85. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Jeff Malpas The Thinking of World: Exploring the Significance of Heidegger’s Later Philosophy
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The vast majority of work on Heidegger has focussed on the work of the 1920s and early 1930s, most notably on Being and Time. The thinking that follows after that, especially the thinking belonging to the post-war period, has received much less attention, particularly from English-speaking commentators. Yet although Being and Time is an enormously important and philosophically rich work, we cannot come to any real understanding of the Heideggerian project, or of what Heidegger came to view as lying at the heart of that project, if we remain with that early thinking alone. Rather than treat Heidegger’s later philosophy as given over to mysticism and poetry, this paper argues that the later thinking is essential to any adequate estimation of the nature and significance of Heidegger’s philosophy. The later thinking arises, in fact, directly out of Heidegger’s attempt to respond to, and to overcome, the shortcomings that exist in the earlier work. Inasmuch as Being and Time thus represents, in many respects, a failed pathway, the direction into which Heidegger is turned by that failure—the direction of the later philosophy—is perhaps the more important.
86. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Lau Kwok-ying Four Forms of Primordial Spatiality Essential to the Understanding of Architecture: A Phenomenological Sketch
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This paper contains some preliminary reflections of a phenomenological philosopher on spatiality. They draw our attention to four basic forms of primordial spatiality essential to the understanding of the phenomenological and ontological conditions of activities pertaining to architecture as a discipline serving for the construction of the human habitat, namely: 1) the space of signification inaugurated by writing; 2) cartographic space constitutive of the representation of the world and locality; 3) oriented space and existential spatiality opened up by the living-body; and 4) the Earth as Ground-Ark which is the ultimate space of the human habitat. Drawing textual and theoretical resources from the works of Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Derrida and especially of Husserl, these reflections conclude that there exists only one Earth as Ground-Ark on which is built the common human habitat. This is a “primitive truth”—”primitive” in the sense of primordial—a truth understood by the most primitive human civilizations. This is also a truth forgotten by the brilliant successors of Copernicus who, while dreaming of a technologically advanced humanity, contribute in spite of their success to the irrecoverable devastation of the Earth as the only space of our common habitat.
87. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Iida Suguru Action and Time Toward Elucidation of Life-worldly Time
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The purpose of this paper is to review the structure of the subjective time which has not been explicitly discussed by Schutz, with the action theory by him as a guide, and to show the overlapping time structure interwoven by intentional experience and objective time to be life-worldly time. Eventually, by disclosing the three phases of life-worldly time constituted by the intersection of multiple qualitatively differing times, two conclusions can be drawn: intentional experiences are not self-identical, but in an inter-reflective relationship with objective time; and the ego constituting time in the natural attitude can be positioned on intentional experience only through self-referential circulation by action as a medium.
88. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Kageyama Yohei The Formation of the Concept “Existence” by the Early Heidegger
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The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the theoretical process through which Martin Heidegger in the 1910’s came to his idea of fundamental ontology. In particular, I will try to elucidate the necessity for him to introduce the concept of “existence” in ontological investigation. I will divide his development into three stages and make clear genetic relation between them. First, motivated by Catholic realism, Heidegger tried to explicate universal categorical structure of entity, which lead him to introduce concept of logical validity and normative account for cognition. Second, inspired by Lask’s account of objectity, Heidegger switched to ontology of signification and lived experience which gives condition of truth for the first stage. Third, motivated by religious experience of finitude, he came to the idea of existence which conditions facticity of signification and is thus regarded as the principal instance of ontology.
89. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Lee Nam-in Husserl’s Phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception
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This paper aims to show that there is a fundamental similarity between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology developed in his Phenomenology of Perception and some types of Husserl’s phenomenology. I will do this by defining the basic character of the phenomenology of perception and comparing it with Husserl’s phenomenology. I will try to define the basic character of the phenomenology of perception by taking into account the chapter 4 of the Introduction of Phenomenology of Perception that has the title: “the phenomenal field”. In section 1-2, I will show that the phenomenology of perception could be defined as a phenomenological psychology that aims to clarify the structure of the phenomenal field and, at the same time, as a transcendental phenomenology that aims to clarify the structure of the transcendental field. Thereafter, in section 3, I will draw the conclusion that the phenomenology of perception is a phenomenology that has two pillars of a phenomenological psychology and a transcendental phenomenology. In section 4, comparing the phenomenology of perception with some types of Husserl’s phenomenology developed in Crisis3, I will show that there is a fundamental similarity between them. In section 5, I will show that there are also differences between the phenomenology of perception and Husserl’s phenomenology as a whole and that there remains a necessity to promote a phenomenological dialogue between them.
90. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Wang Wen-Sheng Husserl’s Phenomenological Epoche behind Hannah Arendt’s Conception of an Authentic Culture
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In an article, “The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Its Political Significance”, Hannah Arendt showed us her conception of an authentic culture, which is signified with two elements: art and politics. How can art and politics relate to each other? What do they mean in view of the concept of authentic culture? How can we reach the concept of authentic culture? Regarding these questions, I will connect Arendt’s answer, which owes much to the Kantian way of “reflective judgment” or “judgment of taste”, with the phenomenological method which Edmund Husserl contributed to us.Husserl’s phenomenological method is nothing but epoche. There are many and different interpretations of epoche. There are also many steps leading up to the general term of epoche. I will on the one hand, expose the epoche generally in an artistic sense which is similar to Aristotle’s and Kant’s discussion of art.On the other hand, I will point out the significance of “lifeworld epoche”, a step toward the epoche, as a way of conveying what Arendt conceived as being culture.Since I have tried to disclose Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method behind Arendt’s authentic culture if asked how we could reach what Hannah Arendt’s meant about the authentic culture. In this regard, Arendt seemed still to be a phenomenologist. But Husserl’s phenomenological method contributes to Arendt’s conception of the authentic culture only as a necessary condition. As we said above that a phenomenologist is an artist, it was about the attitude of life. As we also said above the authentic culture is to be shown in the life of action and art, it was about the content of life. In this regard, we hear still from Arendt that on the one hand the public sphere provides space for art, on the other hand, the political experience and action itself is left without any trace, but the beauty doesn’t disappear. So they must co-exist, in order to contribute to human authentic culture. So it is worthy to further investigate what Husserl in his works directly talked about the authentic culture. And it would enlarge our viewpoint, if we, with regard to “publicity”, interpret some issues and conceptions in Husserl’s texts, e.g.: culture, leisure time, politics, humanities, even sciences, and philosophy as a rigorous science, etc.
91. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Murata Junichi The Phenomenology of Illumination: The Ontology of Vision in Merleau-Ponty’s Eye and Mind
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According to Aristotle, there are two models of vision. The one is a contact model, according to which the realization of vision is explained by the process of the contact between light and eye, and the other is a medium model, according to which the realization of vision is made possible only through some medium that constitutes a distance between a seer and something seen. Aristotle defends the latter model, criticizing the former one. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of vision and painting, which he explicated in his last work Eye and Mind, can be interpreted as a development of the medium model of vision. He especially focuses on the role of illumination, which plays a role of the medium and constitutes the distance and makes a vision possible. All painters are trying to paint this role of illumination, which constitutes “depth, space, and color,” that means, the “flesh” of the world. In this sense, Mereau-Ponty’s ontology of vision and his ontology of “flesh” in his later works can be interpreted as a development of his and David Katz’s phenomenology of illumination.