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81. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Christopher Belshaw Gold
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Kripke’s opponents claim that gold, in all possible worlds, is a yellow metal. They believe that the atomic number can vary from world to world. Kripke inverts this, holding that while gold is, in all possible worlds, the element with atomic number 79, its surface properties may vary widely from world to world. Both views are flawed, but of the two, the rival is to be preferred. There is a better view. Gold is, in all possible worlds, the element with atomic number 79. And (given certain specifiable conditions) it is, in all possible worlds, a yellow meta!. Only insofar as they give rise to familiar and important surface properties is there reason to maintain that structural properties are at the essence or nature of things.
82. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Boletín de suscripción / Order Form
83. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Thomas Sattig Proper Name Change
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Gareth Evans (1973) adduces a case in which a proper name apparently undergoes a change in referent. ‘Madagascar’ was originally the name of a part of Africa. Marco Polo, erroneously thinking he was following native usage, applied the name to an island off the African coast. Today ‘Madagascar’ is the name of that island. Evans argues that this kind of case threatens Kripke’s picture of naming as developed in Naming and Necessity. According to this picture, the name, as used by Marco Polo, referred to a part of the African mainland, since he was connected to the latter by a historical chain of communication. Since we are historically connected to Marco Polo, the name, as it is used today, still refers to the African mainland. But it doesn’t. The aim of the present paper is to give a conclusive account of the phenomenon adduced by Evans, which is compatible with Kripke’s picture.
84. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Josep Macià Does Naming and Necessity Refute Descriptivism?
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In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke offers a number of arguments in order to show that no descriptivist theory of proper names is correct. We present here a certain version of descriptivist theory -we will characterize it as an individual-use reference-fixing descriptivist theory that appeals to descriptions regarding how a name is used by other speakers. This kind of theory can successfully answer all the objections Kripke puts forward in Naming and Necessity. Such sort of descriptivist theory is furthermore compatible with the picture about reference that Kripke presents. It also seems to be able to account for some phenomena that are difficult to explain on Kripke’s view (the existence of informative identity statements and true negative singular existential statements).
85. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Libros recibidos / Books Received
86. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 13 > Issue: 3
Genoveva Martí Rigidity and the Description of Counterfactual Situations
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In this paper I discuss two approaches to rigidity. I argue that they differ in the general conception of semantics that each embraces. Moreover, I argue that they differ in how each explains the rigidity of general terms, and in what each presupposes in that explanation.
87. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
SUMARIO ANALITICO / SUMMARY
88. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Boletín de suscripción / Order Form
89. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Vladimir Kuznersov On the Triplet Frame for Concept Analysis
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The paper has two objectives: to introduce the fundamentals of a triplet model of a concept, and to show that the main concept models may be structurally treated as its partial cases. The triplet model considers a concept as a mental representation and characterizes it from three interrelated perspectives. The first deals with objects (and their attributes of various orders) subsumed under a concept. The second focuses on representing structures that depict objects and their attributes in some intelligent system. The third concentrates on the ways of establishing correspondences between objects with their attributes and appropriate representing structures.
90. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Yaroslav Shramko A Theory of Relevant Properties 1: Reflections and Definitions
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In the paper a theory of relevant properties is developed. The theory permits us to distinguish between properties that are relevant to an object and the properties that are irrelevant to it. Predication is meaningful only if a property is relevant to an object. On the base of introducing a special negative type of predication as opposed to usual sentential negation, a new notion of generalization for properties is defined. Context-free, as weIl as context-depended relevance of properties are considered.
91. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
José A. Díez A General Representation for Internal Proportional Cornbinatorial Measurement Systems When the Operation Is Not Necessari!y Closed
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The aim of this paper is to give one kind of internal proportional systems with general representation and without closure and finiteness assumptions. First, we introduce the notions of internal proportional system and of general representation. Second, we briefly review the existing results which motivate our generalization. Third, we present the new systems, characterized by the fact that the linear order induced by the comparison weak order ≥ at the level of equivalence classes is also a weIl order. We prove the corresponding representation theorem and make some comments on strong limitations of uniqueness; we present in an informal way a positive result, restricted uniqueness for what we call connected objects. We conclude with some final remarks on the property that characterizes these systems and on three possible empirical applications.
92. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Olga Korpalo, Valentin Omelyantchik, Yaroslav Shramko Presentation
93. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Valentin Omelyantchik Aristotle’s Extensional Modality: Hintikka’s Intuitions, Lukasiewicz’s Logic and Mignucci’s Verdict
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The paper discusses interpretations of Aristotle’s modal notions by modern commentators (J. Hintikka, J. Lukasiewiez, M. Mignucci). It is shown that the semantics of modal notions which the above mentioned authors attribute to Aristotle is based on the algebraic idea of multiplier.
94. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Andriy Vasylchenko Apprehensio Simplex in the Kiev-Mohyla Academy
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The aim of this article is to reconstruct the theory of simple apprehension held in the Kiev-Mohyla Academy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We start from Aristotle’s idea of two kinds of knowing and from the Thomist theory of the two operations of the intellect in view of the ontological distinction between essence and actuality. In dealing with the theory of the activities of the intellect in the Kiev-MohylaAcademy, we consider simple apprehension as a form of Aristotle’s immediate knowledge. We conclude by introducing the notion of non-representational simple apprehension.
95. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Anatoliy Ishmurarov Logical Modelling of Conflict Phenomenon
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The paper seeks to schematize some fundamental characteristics of the conflict situations by means of modal (intensional) logic. Conflict is considered a deviant interaction as well as an intersubjective process of delegitimizing an activity on realization of interests. Interpreting a normal interaction as a symmetry of certain type, the author constructs a special model of a symmetric situation and applies it tothe analysis of a conflict. The paper examines theoretic schemes for legitimization of deviations as well as for legitimization of social asymmetry, and ascertains a general relationship between symmetrization and deduction (deductive legitimization) by means of the operation C of “deductive closure” (consequences addition).
96. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Libros recibidos / Books Received
97. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Agenda / Notebook
98. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Volodymyr Navrorskyy Paraconsistent Description of Change
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The aim of this paper is to present a description of change in the framework of tense logic. After considering some examples of using the intervals, we present the main principles of the logic of inconsistent reasoning. Then we built a tense interval paraconsistent semantics and discuss some of its possible applications.
99. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Olga Korpalo Rationality and Emotions: (The Perspectives of Logical-Cognitive Analysis)
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This article is an extension of the author’s previous work on this subject. Primarily it outlines the main directions of this mode of analysis and possible fields to which it could be applied. The first chapter demonstrates a specific method of understanding emotions. The second chapter examines the concept of emotions as a source of the specific modes of “internal” rationality of an agent. The third chapter isdevoted to a comparison between various emotions and the two basic intentional states - belief and desire. The fourth chapter will present the instrumental typology of certain emotional concepts. The final chapter represents preliminary logical schema of the meanings of emotional concepts.
100. Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 14 > Issue: 2
Luis Girela Many Simple Universes or Only a Very Complex One?
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Through the mental experiment that I suggest, it is possiblc to demonstrate that Hugh Everett’s quantum interpretation, known as of the “many universes”, is incongruent with the special theory of relativity.