Displaying: 81-100 of 538 documents

0.179 sec

81. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Jean Kellens Les origines du dualisme mazdéen
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The discussions about the origin of mazdean dualism are concentrated upon the interpretation of the Gathic stanza Y30.3 which opposes two mental powers called mainiiu and usually translated by «spirit». The divergence of the understandings led to a controversy on the nature of this dualistic opposition : is it philosophical, cosmic or religious ? Do these various distinctions remain relevant now we know that this stanza is not a piece of a sermon, but of a liturgical recitative ?
82. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Izabela Jurasz Heteros theos comme approche du dualisme dans la pensée d’Origene
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Of all the approaches to the concept of dualism in Origen’s thought, this article concerns the issue which does not seem very obvious : his understanding of the expression heteros theos. Is it possible to call Jesus “the other God”, existing aside from the only God ? Thanks to the Dialogue with Heraclides, we can judge the profundity of the issue. According to the Dialogue, heteros theos resembles the language used by Marcion, in which “the other God” means the Demiurge, an antagonist of the merciful God. But the expression also invokes the Judeo‑Christian inspired Christology, in which “the other God” signifies a manifestation of the God Jehovah, or a secondary deity, subordinate to Jehovah. In his other writings, Origen usually avoids calling Christ heteros theos, precisely because of the similarity to marcionism and monarchianism. However, forced to resolve the theological problem presented in the Dialogue, Origen decides to explain the meaning of the term “heteros”. His explanations are inspired by Aristotle’s categories, much simplified and illustrated by examples from the Bible. Origen shows that “difference” can be understood as opposition, but there are other possible interpretations of the term. More than anything, it is relative towards a particular characteristic. Origen’s argumentation, in comparison with other discussions concerning the term (Justin Martyr and Tryphon, Peter and Simon the Magician), illustrates that the understanding of God as “different” may lead to the emergence of dualistic concepts, which are often very radical.
83. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Ivan Guermeur Du dualisme et de l’ambivalence séthienne dans la pensée religieuse de l’Égypte ancienne
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In his De Iside, Plutarch uses the example of the Osirian myth and the cases of Osiris, Horus and Typhon (Seth) to define his doctrine of dualism which according to him offers an explication for the philosophical problem of the existence of Good and Evil. Since the philosopher has based himself on Egyptian mythology, the present study seeks to elucidate what the documentation of “pharaonic” Egypt teaches us about the conception of an opposition between Good and Evil, about the place that the complex figure of Seth takes within this concept, and about the typically Egyptian binary way of thinking.
84. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Helmut Seng Πατρογενὴς ὕλη. Au sujet du dualisme dans les Oracles Chaldaiques
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The Chaldaean Oracles are works of Middle Platonist poetry in Greek dating from the late 2nd century AD and attributed to Julian the Theurgist, who may have produced them together with his father Julian the Chaldaean. Only fragments survive, most via late antique Neoplatonists, whose many and varied individual interpretations often deviate from any meaning possibly deducible from the primary text. The question of dualism in the Chaldaean Oracles can be seen from two perspectives. From an ethical point of view, man stands in the middle between the intelligible and the material and has to choose his way. The material world is described in negative terms as a kind of netherworld and a most dangerous dwelling‑place for man who is exposed to seduction by material pleasure and attacked by demons personifying the passions ; he should turn his mind towards the intelligible. From an ontological point of view, however, matter is not an autonomous (and evil) principle, but originates from the highest entity, the intelligible Father ; for this reason, it is called πατρογενής (although this might be an inference by the interpreters of the Oracles). Ethical dualism is thus combined with ontological monism. The Chaldaean notion of not two, but three worlds, material, ethereal, and fiery (= intelligible), as well as the idea that in special cases a material body might be transformed into an ethereal one, could be interpreted as a kind of mediation of the two positions.
85. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Présentation des auteurs de ce volume
86. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Jean‑Baptiste Gourinat Les stoïciens et le dualisme
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The Stoic system is alternatively described as “dualist” because its physics relies on two principles, God and matter, or as “monist”, because these two principles are intimately linked, and belong to the same body. It is difficult to describe the Stoic system as monist, since every substance is a body, and the two principles, while united in the same body, coexist from all eternity since matter is not created by God. But it is inappropriate as well to describe it as “dualist”, because the inferior principle is completely passive and is not a cause, but endures the effect of the active cause. Moreover, matter is not responsible for evil, even if some interpreters, ancient and modern, claimed it : the only metaphysical principle which accounts for the existence of evil is the “affinity of the contraries”, according to which good cannot exist without evil and agent without patient, but this is not a dualist explanation.
87. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Gabriella Aragione, Frédéric Chapot Hermogene: fragments d’une pensée dualiste
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Known primarily through the heresiological writings, Hermogenes goes down in history as a dualist, almost a ditheist, who claimed the doctrine of two coexisting and ingenerated principles : God and the matter. Cleared up the commonplaces and the heresiological strategies of our sources, the analysis of the fragments and of the testimonies about Hermogenes shows that his doctrine was the expression of a specific ontological dualism : far from being an innovative thinker, Hermogenes refused the emerging doctrine of the “creatio ex nihilo” and affirmed the traditional view of the creation as the result of the demiurgic act of God who fashioned and ordered the preexistent matter. According Hermogenes, this dualism did not undermine monotheism, because God and the matter are unequal regarding their essence. It was on the basis of this axiom that he elaborated a theological system characterized by a sophisticate interlacement of anthropological, Christological and soteriological implications.
88. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Daniel Marguerat Le corps, lieu de conflit entre l’esprit et la chair: Anthropologie paulinienne et dualisme
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Pauline anthropology is of a fundamentally Hebrew nature : the body‑σῶμα is a holistic concept that designates man as creature in the world. The body is the way “I” is present in the world : man does not have a body, he is a body. Portraying the whole person, the body is the “temple of the Holy Spirit”, the setting for a sacred presence that transcends humankind (1Cor 6 : 12‑20). However, this body is also the scene of a conflict between flesh and spirit. The flesh‑σάρξ concept does not apply to a part of man but to the whole of man as a precarious, fragile and mortal being. As such, the human being stands up as an enemy of God, taking his human condition on as the foundation of his values (Rom 8 : 5‑8). The Spirit‑πνεῦμα is God’s sphere of influence in the world, to which one becomes affiliated through his spirit. Flesh leads to death while the Spirit turns to life. These two forces compete for the human body. Yet, such a dualism is not by nature ontological but historical : one remains capable of choosing between remaining a prisoner of mortal flesh or letting the Spirit of God dwell in him (Rom 8 :10).
89. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Fabienne Jourdan Introduction
90. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Isabelle Bochet Dépasser le dualisme: le concept augustinien de natura
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The Augustinian definition of the concept of natura rules out any form of dualism : all nature depends on God, it is what God wanted ; but, in the case of man, nature changes according to the actual relation to God, just as the image of God in the soul can be distorted by sin or reshaped by grace. This historical conception of nature sets Augustine against the Manichaean and Pelagian conception of nature as a static datum.
91. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
François Chenet Le dualisme de l’Esprit et de la Nature du Sāṃkhya
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Sāṃkhya, which is one of the oldest systems (darśana) of Indian Philosophy, advocates an uncompromising dualism in its theoretical metaphysical teachings. There is a fundamental dualism or split at the very heart of reality, and this dualism or split is the fundamental fact of existence.According to Sāṃkhya, there are two co‑present and co‑eternal realities. The first one is the principle of pure Consciousness, the Puruṣa, which is inactive, indifferent, eternally free and Alone. Puruṣa is the soul, the self, the spirit, the subject, the knower. The other of the two co‑present and co‑eternal realities of Sāṃkhya is Nature or Prakṛti : it is the primordial and unconscious “stuff ” of the entire unmanifest and manifest world, whereas Puruṣa is the presupposition of individual consciousness. Nature or Prakṛti is the ultimate material principle and thus the substratum from which manifest, in the presence of the self (puruṣa), the gross and subtle bodies including the mental organs of all living beings. But Sāṃkhya is not a dualism of mind and body or even a dualism of subject and object.In classical Sāṃkhya the world is not derived from consciousness, nor is consciousness derived from the world. The classical Sāṃkhya refuses to understand the world simply as a product of consciousness. It refuses to see the world as an illusory projection of consciousness, and thus it rejects any idealistic monism. Similarly, it refuses to see consciousness simply as a product of the world, and thus it rejects any kind of materialism or naturalism. Thus, it steers an intermediate course or path between the Indian notion of a conscious, cosmic Self or its equivalent, which is the ground of all being, on the one hand, and the notion of a conscious self, which is only an empirical, relative construction, on the other. It maintains, rather, a fundamental dualism, the opposite poles of which function in a kind of dialectical interaction. The fact of consciousness and the fact of the world are two irreductible realities in constant interplay with one another. Though quite separate and unconnected, Spirit and Nature mutually interact to bring about the process of creation, self‑awareness and, finally, enlightenment. But Spirit or Puruṣa and Nature or Prakṛti are always only in proximity to one another, never in actual contact. This is a puzzling notion if one thinks of Puruṣa and Prakṛti as two things. Puruṣa and Prakṛti are two realities of a completely different order.Right knowledge is the knowledge of the separation of the Puruṣa from the Prakṛti. The individual soul (jīva) has to realize itself as the pure Puruṣa through discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.From a rational point of view, classical Sāṃkhya can be regarded as a bundle of contradictions. Some problems regarding its interpretation are the problem of the nature of the Sāṃkhya dualism and the problem of the connection or relationship of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The Sāṃkhya system clings to spiritualistic pluralism and dualistic realism, but its very logic indeed impels it to embrace idealistic monism or absolutism.
92. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Lionel Marti L’Enuma elish – une oeuvre dont la pérennité et le propos ont marqué les esprits: (réponse a N. Ziegler)
93. Chôra: Volume > 13 > Issue: Supplement
Alain Le Boulluec La monarchia dans les Homélies clémentines et l’origine du Mauvais
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
As the most rigorous upholder of monotheism, the pseudo‑Clementine homilist is at strife with the Marcionite dualism. More precisely, he comes up against the Apelles’ doctrine, which is all the more dangerous as it establishes the unicity of God and reduces the demiurge of the world and author of the Law to a created power. The theory of the «false pericopes» of the Scriptures is specially directed against Apelles, in order to protect the identity between the supreme God and the Creator of the world. It seems that the conjectures about the origin of the Evil One, which attempt to avoid a new form of dualism, are also directed towards the refutation of Apelles : to the obedient demiurgical angel is opposed the providential function of the Evil One, who has to put the human beings’ piety to trial ; and against Apelles who maintains the severance between corporeal reality and God’ being, the homilist makes use of the audacious theory of the mixing of the elements to settle both the connaturality of the Evil One and of the body of God and the blamelessness of God with reference to the will of the Tempter, which is contingent.
94. Chôra: Volume > 14
Anca Vasiliu Note liminaire
95. Chôra: Volume > 14
Marilena Vlad Présentation du dossier
96. Chôra: Volume > 14
Francis Lacroix Logismos et dianoia chez Plotin
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The use of the terms λογισμός and διάνοια in the writings of Plotinus has already been discussed by H. J. Blumenthal in his book entitled Plotinus’ Psychology (1977). Blumenthal here defended the thesis that the terms were used as synonyms in the Enneads. Indeed, though some passages seem to indicate a difference between λογισμός and διάνοια, in the majority of cases Plotinus nonetheless seems to use these words interchangeably. We propose to analyze in detail the terms λογισμός and διάνοια by referring, inter alia, to Treatise 49 [V 3], 2‑3, where the terms seem indeed to be used synonymously, as well as other treatises such as Treatise 28 [IV 4], where Plotinus seems to give each word a different sense. Other scholars, namely E. K. Emilsson, think that we can establish a clear distinction between logismos and dianoia, by a thorough study of the World‑Soul, which has the dianoia, but not the logismos. After a review of Emilsson’s thesis, we will finally propose that Plotinus employs the word διάνοια when he refers to the soul’s capacity to store data for judgement, while he employs the term λογισμός to describe the process of judging this content, which may be distinguished from other processes.
97. Chôra: Volume > 14
Anca Vasiliu Penser l’Un ou la limite de la médiation selon Plotin
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Trying to reconstruct the specific definition of the noetic act from some excerpts of the fifth and seventh Treatises (Enneads, V, 9 and 4), one manages to circumscribe the operations by which Plotinus establishes in the context the unity between the intellect, the act of thinking, some form of «prime intelligibility» and the other, multiple, intelligibilities. Plotinus is striving to avoid several pitfalls in order not to endanger the unity of the noetic hypostasis and consequently to imperil the only possible way of thinking the One. At least four ways of bypassing possible impediments detectable in the context mentioned can be summarised : (i) averting the idea that the noetic act can be identified to the form and can thus be defined as «the thinking of forms» ; (ii) establishing that the precession of being as an «object of thought» is an a posteriori act of thought, and not the actual and necessary preeminence of the being on the noetic act ; (iii) debunking any temptation of considering thought as a mediation between the first and the second hypostasis ; and finally (iv) avoiding a definition of the noetic act through a sine qua non recourse to power, by establishing a specific statutary order of the noûs according to which the act and the power determine, or not, the possibility of intellection. An analysis of the texts will bring us to reconsider the so‑called theory of the two complementary acts and its Aristotelian origins, and also to recall the debates around Plotinus’ «idealism», demonstrating the appositeness and the specificities of that conception.
98. Chôra: Volume > 14
Alain Lernould La διάνοια chez Proclus: pensée et discursivité
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
According to the well known Platonic distinction of different types of knowing, discursive thought (διάνοια) is second to intellect (νοῦς), and above opinion (δόξα). Intellection intelligizes the entire intelligible cosmos, all at once (ἀθρόως), in an undivided manner. Discursive thought, involving temporal thinking, articulates into plurality the indivisible character of the intellectual life. I argue in this paper that Proclus does not reduce discursive thought to discursivity. Discursive thought is thought, i.e. intellection (διά‑νοια) before being discursive (διά‑νοια), intellection of Psychic Forms, and intellection in the manner of the soul.
99. Chôra: Volume > 14
Carolle Metry-Tresson Comment l’âme peut saisir l’un: l’anagogie damascienne comme transgression de l’apophasis
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
For Damascius, the last great Neoplatonist of late Antiquity, the answer to the question “how to go beyond the plurality of human thought for the purpose of really attaining the one ?” is not to be found on the side of the via negativa – which is the dynamics of a rejection of plurality –, but in a positive, unifying and integrative dialectic by which the plurality of the soul is not denied any more, but gathered, contracted and simplified in an undifferentiated unity for the purpose of really attaining the one. Setting himself apart from his predecessors due to a new conception of the ‘one’ understood as ‘all(ness)’, Damascius aims to deconstruct, and then abandon, the via apophatica, for it becomes in his eyes an illusory, unsuitable and counterproductive way in the vertiginous ascent of the soul towards its origin. Indeed, a number of passages of his masterpiece, De Principiis, reveal his radically critical decision to reject the immoderate use of negative discourse to express the one, as well as the cathartic status and the anagogical purpose generally allowed to apophatism. It is stated here that ‘negation’ is only the reflection of our own cognitive powerlessness, a dangerous illegitimate (‘bastard’) reasoning, or simply an artifice of language, even if authorized in certain circumstances. Is the one not beyond any discourse, distinction and exclusion ? Making obsolete any triumphalism of hyperapophatism, judged as unacceptable and contradictory, Damascius offers the human soul the promise of an authentic, as well as lucid anagogy towards the principle.
100. Chôra: Volume > 14
David Vachon Contemplation et théurgie: les facultés de l’âme au·dela de la pensée discursive chez Proclus
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this article, we want to analyse the principal characteristics of three faculties of the soul in Proclus’ work : discursive thinking, contemplation and theurgic practice. We will then establish links between these faculties and the process of purification, divided into philosophical, dialectic and telestic types. We will then analyse these types of purification in relation with three metaphors exploited by Proclus : the naked soul, the flower of the intellect, and silence. The goal of this article consists in proving that dianoia (discursive thinking), even if it has to be overcome by other faculties (contemplation and theurgic practice), still operates implicitly in the process of assimilation to the One. In other words, contemplation and theurgic practice are not a substitute for rational thinking, but rather its ultimate achievement.