Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 71-80 of 497 documents

0.086 sec

71. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Rick Anthony Furtak Estrangement and Moral Agency
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
By taking seriously the state of moral estrangement, we may learn something about the conditions of moral participation. Yet analytic discussions of this topic (for instance, by Hare and Nagel) have frequently been handicapped by an inadequate understanding of the intentionality of emotion. In the work of Albert Camus, we find a superior appreciation of the sense in which the individual’s revolt against prevailing values could be a justified response to objective conditions. Although a sense of the absurd is itself a hindrance to moral agency, it provides us with some insight into our subjective capacity for wholehearted involvement in the world.
72. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Soraj Hongladarom, Michael R. Kelly Time, Technology and Globalization
73. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Sergio Koc-Menard Just War Tradition, Liberalism, and Civil War
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The just war tradition assumes that civil war is a possible site of justice. It has an uneasy relationship with liberalism, because the latter resists the idea that insurgency and counterinsurgency can be justified in moral terms. The paper suggests that, even if this is true, these two schools of thought are closer to each other than often appears to be the case. In particular, the paper argues that insurgency and counterinsurgency can be justified using the liberal assumptions that nonviolent opposition is the proper non-institutional technique to fight oppressive regimes, and that law enforcement is the appropriate response to unjustified rebellions. Given these assumptions, insurgent warfare is limited to circumstances in which, firstly, nonviolent resistance is no longer a reasonable course of action; and secondly, insurgents have the intention to create the political conditions that are needed to make it a coherent option again.Counter insurgent warfare, in turn, is restrained to those situations in which, first, there is a rebellion or revolution even though the use of nonviolent strategies for conflict and change remains a reasonable choice; and second, police agencies lack the resources that arerequired for managing and suppressing rebel activities. Of course, these requirements should be taken as presumptions, and there may be cases when they do not hold.
74. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
John-Michael Kuczynski Two Arguments Against the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
According to one point of view, emotions are recognitions of truths of a certain kind -- most probably valuative truths (truths to the effect that something is good or bad). After giving the standard arguments for this view, and also providing a new argument of my own for it, I set forth two arguments against it. First, this position makes all emotions be epistemically right or wrong. But this view is hard to sustain where certain emotions (especially desire) are concerned. Second, this position is guilty of presupposing what it is meant to explain; for it makes emotions be a pre-requisite for the very value judgments with which emotions are supposed, according to that theory, to be identical.
75. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Paul Newberry The Three Dimensions of Forgiveness
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Recent philosophical literature contains several definitions of ‘forgiveness.’ These fail because the meaning of one part of a complex notion is taken as the meaning of the whole. Ordinary language use indicates three kinds of sufficient conditions for forgiveness where by people canforgive by meeting any one of those conditions.
76. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Sigrid Sterckx A Critique of the Utilitarian Argument for the Patent System
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Attempts to justify the patent system can be based on three grounds: (1) natural rights; (2) distributive justice; and (3) utilitarian (economic) arguments. Each of these arguments is problematic in many ways. The first two are dealt with very briefly. The utilitarian argument is discussed more in depth.
77. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Siegfried Van Duffel How to Study Human Rights and Culture … Without Becoming a Relativist
78. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Noel E. Boulting In Defence of a ‘Three-Tiered Structure’ Within the Interpretative Process
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
An account of what Michael Krausz refers to as “a three tiered structure” within the interpretative process is defended. Starting with the employment of Peircian nomenclature, as employed by Joseph Margolis, artworks and persons - cultural entities - are distinguished from physical entities as tokens of types. But even if culturally emergent entities con be attributed to certain physical atributes in relation to their materiality at the first level of interpretation - the elucidatory - in which such culturally emergent properties are embodied, cultural entities possess certain distinctive Intentional attributes, at a second level of interpretation - thc intentional - not assignable to purely physical properties nor, in the case of artworks such as Van Gogh’s The Potato Eaters, their creator’s intentions. But in order to make sense of Krausz’s notion of “aspectual reverberation” for an individual appreciator, a third level of interpretation is required - the elaborative - in order to make sense of Peirce’s notion not only of the type and token status of a work of art, but its tone, This third elaborative sense of interpretation is then considered in two ways: experientially in terms of what the spectator can bring to an appreciation of an artwork and performatively with respect to an artist’s interpretation of the work in performance, as in dance for example. Possible attacks on this position are then considered.
79. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Philip Benesch Singularism and Multiplism in the Work of Karl Popper
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this article I argue that Karl Popper embraced a muitiplist approach to ethics, politics, history, and cultural practices. Although Popper combined metaphysical realism with a hermeneutic approach that had the potential to support a multiplist philosophy of science, a commitment to verisimilitude and to the identification of universal laws required him to adopt a singularist approach to natural science. I suggest, therefore, that Michael Krausz’ description of Popper as a singularist should be qualified’ that Popper’s philosophy of natural science may be identified with singularism but that recognition should be afforded to his multiplist approach to other fields.
80. Philosophy in the Contemporary World: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Arati Barua Schopenhauer and Krausz on Objects of Interpretation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The paper is intended as a study in the philosophy of interpretation of Michael Krausz in relation to the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. The idea is to throw some new lights on Schopenhauer’s philosophy by critically examining thc works of Schopenhauer in the light of Krausz’s philosophy of interpretation. We shall examine the extent to which Krausz’s philosophy of interpretation could provide a framework of interpretation of the more or less enigmatic parts of constructive realism in Schopenhauer’s The World As Will and Representation and On the Fourfold Root. In particular, I have discussed in my paper the specific problems of (i) bridging the gulf between the object-as-such and the object-of-interpretation in Krausz’s philosophy and (ii) the Will and the Representation in Schopenhauer’s philosophy.