Displaying: 71-80 of 766 documents

0.076 sec

71. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Robin Attfield Responsibility for the Global Environment
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
It is argued here that countries have an obligation to enter agreements that would significantly constrain the play of free-market forces in order to tackle the problems of the global environment. On the way, a realist understanding of the global environment is first defended (Section I), as is a strong (as opposed to weak or ultra-strong) understanding of sustainability (Section II). Criticisms are then presented to the project of incorporating the natural environment into the market (Section III). International agreements are shown to be needed to regulate both international and domestic markets if the planetary environment is to be sustained (Section IV).
72. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Peter Dalton Possessiveness and Embodiment: What Thoreau Didn’t Know
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In “Economy,” Henry Thoreau argues against the common view that it is highly worthwhile for a human being to work hard in order to obtain material possessions. Thoreau’s objections are forceful, wide-ranging, and extraordinarily well written. Yet his readers, like almost everyone else, continue to desire, pursue, or acquire more and more material things as well as more and more money, the primary means to such things. Thoreau knew that this was true of the people of his own time, but he didn’t know why. I think I know what Thoreau didn’t know. What Thoreau didn’t know is why material possessions are effective and alluring embodiments of a human being’s worth as a person. This is a particular kind of worth, which I call reputed worth. In the paper I show why reputed worth is so important to people, how material goods embody it, and, unfortunately, why reputed worth is deeply flawed.
73. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Karen Hanson Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice—in Theory
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper explores and criticizes Henry Sidgwick’s conception of the ethical societies he helped found at the end of the nineteenth century. I argue that the societies were not as involved in practical and political problems as one might have expected, and that the theoretical justification offered by Sidgwick -- that the primary obstacles to “right living” lie in our minds and hearts -- is not altogether satisfying. Sidgwick’s nearly exclusive emphasis on the problem of moral knowledge is then contrasted with John Dewey’s attention to moral motivation; and Dewey’s more energetic involvement in current affairs and social issues is set in the context of his distinctive view of the relation between theory and practice. Finally, Sidgwick’s modest hopes for the ethical societies, and the reasons for that modesty, are compared with the confidence that permeated an earlier incarnation of the ethical society, Ben Franklin’s Junto club.
74. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Louis P. Pojman Straw Man or Straw Theory?: A Reply to Albert Mosley
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
I respond to Albert Mosley’s critique that I only attack straw men arguments against affirmative action by showing both that his own argument is a version of one of these “straw men” and that his objections to my arguments can be rebutted.
75. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
John Ladd What’s Group Identity Got to Do with It?: Ethical Issues in Mentoring
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In order to avoid trivializing moral issues concerning mentoring, a specialized “strong” concept of a Mentor is proposed that is based on the original model in Homer’s Odyssey. It is argued that mentorship embodies a highly personal and bonding relationship that comes as a free gift and is based on an affinity of some sort. It is further argued that morally such a relationship may be especially appropriate in a racial setting.
76. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Sherwin Klein An Aristotelian View of Theory and Practice in Business Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper, I argue that an Aristotelian approach to business ethics would place theory and practice in business ethics in proper balance. I attempt to show this in two parts. In part one, I suggest that Aristotle’s balanced view of the relation between theory and practice in political philosophy can be applied to corporate life;Aristotle’s sophisticated ethical and political inquiries should help advocates of corporate culture to construct theories that are theoretically, practically, and ethically sound. In part two, I argue that theory and practice are kept in proper balance in Aristotle’s discussion of phronesis or practical wisdom; therefore, Aristotelian phronesis should help to illuminate morally intelligent business conduct.
77. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Albert Mosley Policies of Straw or Policies of Inclusion?: A Review of Pojman’s “Case against Affirmative Action”
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this article, I review some of the arguments presented by Louis Pojman in “The Case Against Affirmative Action,” and attempt to show that Pojman’s main objections only hold against the strawmen Pojman has erected to represent the case for affirmative action. Affirmative action was designed to correct for state-enforced restrictions against blacks, and has been extended to protect a number of other groups, including women. Its principal justification has been that these groups have in the past been the target of group exclusions that were state sanctioned, and such patterns persist into the present. In this regard, the over-representation of Jews or Asians in academia is little more suspect than the over-representation of blacks in the NBA.
78. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Seumas Miller Collective Responsibility, Armed Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In this paper I explore the notion of collective moral responsibility as it pertains both to nation-states contemplating humanitarian armed intervention in international social conflicts, and as it pertains to social groups perpetrating human rights violations in such conflicts. I take the Rwandan genocide as illustrative of such conflicts and make use of it accordingly. I offer an individualist account of collective moral responsibility, according to which collective moral responsibility is a species of joint responsibility.
79. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Michael Davis Sidgwick’s Impractical Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Oxford inaugurated its new series in practical ethics by reprinting Sidgwick’s century-old Practical Ethics, edited and introduced by Sissela Bok. While this reissue is, in many respects, both appropriate and welcome, it is, in one respect, quite inappropriate. Even a short examination of Sidgwick’s little book shows that Sidgwick did not understand practical ethics as we do: a) because he radically overestimated the importance of a common theoretical starting point; and b) because he radically underestimated the importance of detailed study of particular cases as a replacement for a common theoretical starting point. Philosophers only began to revise their estimates on these matters during the 1960s. When they did, it was not theory that drove them to it but extended experience with medical ethics, an experience no philosopher before then had had. We who do practical ethics are, I think, inclined to overlook the formative power of that experience. Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics seems a good antidote for that.
80. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Sami Pihlström Applied Philosophy: Problems and Applications
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper provides a critical discussion of the concept of applied philosophy. Writers specializing in applied philosophy (e.g., in the various fields of applied ethics) often assume what is here called the traditional concept of applied philosophy, i.e., they think of themselves as applying a “pure” (in itself nonapplied) philosophical theory to some humanly important practical problem area. If understood along these lines, applied philosophy can be taken to be analogous toapplied science. However, this analogy collapses as soon as we realize that the “results” of applied philosophy cannot usually be regarded as instantiations of the von Wrightian technical norm, which can be considered the basic form of the results of applied scientific research. On the other hand, the postmodernist, antiscientific rival of traditional applied philosophy, viz., “media philosophy,” is argued to be little more than a relativist, degraded version of the traditional conception. Finally, it is suggested that the dichotomy between pure and applied philosophy should be abandoned in favor of a pragmatist view, which urges that all significant philosophical problems are always already embedded in human practice.