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61. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Simon Lumsden Realism and Idealism in Fichte's theory of Subjectivity
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Kant's account of subjectivity is ambiguous: there is an implicit critique of Descartes in Kaaat, but this is in conflict with more Cartesian aspects of his approach to subjectivity. Fichte develops the critical elements of Kant and turns them against Kant's residual Cartesianism. Fichte, in the various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, is the first to be aware of the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness. In those texts he presents his alternative model for subjectivity by trying to conceive of selfconsciousness such that the self-relation makes no separation between thinker and thought. While Fichte's insight into the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness is generally accepted, his own account of the character of the immediate self-relation, which he presents as the alternative to the reflective model, was never satisfactorily resolved. The exposition of Fichte will examine his theory of subjectivity in relation to the central notion of striving; it will be argued that the notion of a striving subject tries to reconcile the dichotomy of idealism and realism.
62. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Sophie Grapotte La Guerre au Service de la Paix
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Dans cette communication, je me propose de mettre en avant que si la guerre est, il est vrai, le moyen licite qu'utilise les Etats pour acquerir et conserver leur droit ä l'etat de nature, eile est egalement et fondamentalement le ressort du passage de l'etat de nature ä l'etat civique, condition d'une pacification possible. De meme que la propension ä philosopher, ä batailler en faveur de sa philosophie et finalement en se rassemblant dans des camps qui s'opposent ä mener une guerre ouverte, doit etre consideree comme "une des dispositions bienfaisantes et sages de la Nature, par laquelle eile cherche ä ecarter des hommes le grand malheur d'un corps vivant voue ä se corrompre" (AK VIII 414), la guerre est, nous allons le voir, l'un des arrangements preparatoires que prend la Nature pour rendre la paix necessaire et l'un des moyens auquel eile recourt pour contraindre les Etats ä se donner une constitution et ä nouer des relations exterieures legales propres ä conduire ä la paix permanente, bref, une ruse de Tingenieuse et grande ouvriere" pour realiser son but: "faire naitre parmi les hommes, contre leur intention, l'harmonie du sein meme de leurs discordes." (AK VIII 360-361)
63. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Gustavo Sarmiento El método de la metafísica en la Dissertatio de Kant
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En este trabajo examinamos el metodo de la metafisica segün la Disertaciön Inaugural de Kant. Para resolver los problemas de este saber, Kant distingue entre dos componentes del conocimiento humano, una intelectual, que aprehende los objetos como son en si mismos, y otra sensible, que conoce el objeto tal como se nos aparece subjetivamente, cada una con su propio ämbito de validez. Para la metafisica, sostiene Kant, es fundamental mantenerse como conocimiento intelectual puro, lo cual requiere que no sea contaminada por principios y leyes del conocimiento sensible, porque los conocimientos intelectuales no contaminados por el conocimiento sensitivo son verdaderos. Ahora bien, es preciso estar alerta para descubrir los trucos que emplea el conocimiento sensitivo para hacerse pasar por conocimiento intelectual. A fin de poner de relieve estas fuentes de error en la metafisica, Kant emprende la clasificaciön de las falacias de subrepciön por medio de las cuales diversas condiciones sensitivas del conocimiento de los objetos en la experiencia son tomadas como condiciones intelectuales de la posibilidad de los objetos en si mismos. De manera general, Kant piensa que no se debe predicar de los conceptos intelectuales nada que pertenezca a las relaciones de espacio y tiempo. Cuando ello ocurre se trata del conocimiento sensible de un objeto que se subsume bajo el concepto intelectual, pero esto no nos autoriza a pensar que el objeto tal cual es en si mismo este sometido a espacio y tiempo. El anälisis kantiano de las falacias de subrepciön revela asimismo un papel de los conceptos intelectuales en la experiencia, que anticipa -hasta cierto punto- la funciön de la inteligencia en la organizaciön de la experiencia, a traves de ciertos conceptos intelectuales, que en la Critica de la Razön Pura constituirän las categorias del entendimiento, aunque Kant todavia no descubre la division de la facultad superior en entendimiento y razön.
64. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Michael Rahnfeld Carnaps Kontinuum der induktiven Methoden als präzises Beispiel für Nietzsches Doktrin der unbegrenzten Zahl möglicher Interpretationen der Welt
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Der Beitrag zeigt, dass sich Nietzsches erkenntnistheoretische Position als konventionalistisch, pluralistisch, pragmatisch und evolutionär charakterisieren lässt. In diesen wesentlichen Punkten antizipiert sie moderne Ansätze, wie am Beispiel Carnaps Induktiver Logik gezeigt wird. In der sog. CLFunktion beruhen die Behauptungen über L auf s y n t h e t i s c h - a p r i o r i s c h e n Annahmen, die den Uniformitätsgrad des Gegenstandbereiches betreffen. Diese Annahmen lassen sich als konventionelle Festsetzungen deuten, die sich nach den erzielten pragmatischen Erfolgen richten. Es ist naheliegend anzunehmen, dass sich ein adäquates L in der Praxis nach evolutionären Mechanismen herauskristallisiert. Dennoch bleibt stets ein ganzes Kontinuum möglicher konventioneller Bestimmungen von L als rationale Alternative bestehen.
65. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Timothy M. Costelloe "So forward to imagine": Locke and Hume on Primary and Secondary Qualities
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This paper argues that an important feature of Locke's doctrine concerning primary and secondary qualities is also central to Hume's thinking. Section one considers Locke's distinction, presenting it in terms of an "error theory." Locke argues that we attribute secondary qualities to objects and that in so doing give those qualities an ontological status they do not otherwise possess. Locke completes his theory by drawing on the concept of "resemblance" to explain why such mistakes occur in the first place. Section two turns to Hume's philosophy, arguing that, despite his ambiguous comments on Locke and "the modern philosophy," he employs an error theory of the sort developed by Locke. This contention is supported by way of Hume's treatment of beauty as a secondary quality or sentiment which arises in an individual who judges an object beautiful. The paper concludes by emphasizing that, for Hume, this philosophical explanation of beauty stands in contrast to the error committed in common life where, as in Locke's account, people make the mistake of taking beauty to be in the object itself.
66. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Andrew Payne Emerson on Socrates and the Tyranny of the Majority
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Emerson's Representative Men reveals his awareness of the dangers of the tyranny of the majority and his admiration for figures of great genius. These trends of thought, which led Emerson's contemporaries Carlyle and Nietzsche to reject democracy, are combined in Emerson with support for democracy. To understand and justify Emerson's combination of fear of the tyranny of the majority, admiration for genius, and support for democracy, it is helpful to examine his portrait of Socrates in Representative Men. Emerson's Socrates is a figure of genius who, by his ironic profession of ignorance and demonstration of moral truths, is capable of freeing the citizen of a democracy from the tyranny of the majority.
67. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Alexandrine Schniewind Ethics in Late Antiquity: Away from Worldly Solicitations, towards Social Concern
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Taking off from the observation that scholars have for too long maintained that late ancient philosophy has no ethical theory, the purpose of this paper is toshow that there is. indeed an ethics in late antiquity, and even that it is rich and consistent. I make a distinction between an ethical theory (about e.g. happiness and virtue) and its practical foundation in the philosophical curriculum of Neoplatonic schools. I focus on the curriculum, showing that the pedagogical focus of late ancient ethics is twofold: it aims to make people turn away from worldly ties, but nevertheless always retains social concern as a main preoccupation. To this end two different kinds of ethical tasks can be distinguished: (a) the purification of the soul who is starting her philosophical journey and (b) the generous testimony of the soul who has already experienced purification. The Platonic call for divinization of the soul [Theaetetus 176b) turns out to bear interesting parallels with late ancient ethics and, what is more, to provide its general framework.
68. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Marina Bykova The Philosophy of Subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel
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In the modern Continental tradition the word "subjectivity" is used to denote all that refers to a subject, its psychological-physical integrity represented by its mind, all that determines the unique mentality, mental state, and reactions of this subject. Subjectivity in this perspective has become on the Continent the central principle of philosophy.Modern Continental philosophy not only maintains the value of the subject and awakens an interest in genuine subjectivity. It evolves from the subject and subjective self-consciousness as Jundamento inconcusso. Thus modern Continental philosophy should be understood and discussed as a philosophy of subjectivity. This paper deals, on the one hand, with the philosophical-historical reconstruction of modern philosophy of subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel, and, on the other hand, with an analysis and evaluation of Hegel's systematic approach to subjectivity in terms of philosophical tradition, especially from the viewpoint of the realization of the idealistic program of selfconsciousness represented by German idealists.Focusing on the major lines of development of the theory of subjectivity in Continental philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, 1(1) discuss the quandaries of early modern philosophers concerning subject and subjectivity and their attempts to resolve these quandaries by developing the fundamentally new (in contrast to previous tradition) understanding of subjectivity; (2) show that the issue of subjectivity was the basic topic of transcendental idealism; and (3) introduce Hegel's approach to subjectivity and briefly define its novel character.
69. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Marcia Homiak The Continuous Activity of Ordinary Life
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Aristotle is right to argue that the best life is a life of unimpeded activity, but I believe he went wrong in thinking that ordinary human life is, or must be, far removed from the best life. To establish this claim, I offer a historical explanation of what unimpeded activity involves. I use the class of art patrons in Renaissance Florence to show how mathematical skills acquired in everyday life can be applied to widely differing tasks. As patrons extend their mathematical skills, their activities become more self-realizing and hence more continuous in Aristotle's sense. I argue that the activities of the Florentine patron class, to be sustained over time, require many of Aristotle's virtues. Examples like this show, I argue, that reasonably unimpeded activity is an important human good and that it is genuinely desirable to, and within the grasp of, ordinary people, even those who initially claim no interest in virtue.
70. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Daniel Graham The Sun's Light in Early Greek Thought
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In the sixth century BCE Ionian philosophers explained the sun as a mass of fire, sometimes as floating like a leaf or a cloud above the earth. It was thought to be fueled by moist vapors from the earth. In the f i f t h century philosophers typically envisaged the sun as a red-hot stone or a molten mass carried around by the force of a cosmic vortex. The decisive shift in explanations seems to result from the cosmology of Parmenides, who recognized that the moon received its light from the sun, and hence inferred that the heavenly bodies were spherical solid bodies. The new theory required a new account of how the sun came to be hot. The sun was said to be heated either by being in a fiery region or by friction. The discovery of a large meteorite seemed to confirm the fifth-century theory.
71. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Richard Fincham Hölderlin and Novalis: Reappropriating the Reflection Model of Self-Consciousness
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This paper draws upon my research into the posthumously published fragmentary remains of Hölderlin and Novalis's philosophical reflections to describe how their explanations of the possibility of self-consciousness are far more convincing than those provided by their philosophical contemporaries, and still have much to contribute to contemporary debates concerning the nature of 'consciousness' and 'selfhood.' The paper begins by sketching the background to their accounts of self-consciousness, that is, Fichte's critique of Kant's 'reflection model' of self-consciousness and the subsequent critique of Fichte's 'solution' to this problem by more orthodox Kantians (such as F. I . Niethammer). I shall then present an account of how Hölderlin and Novalis may be said to enact a 'synthesis' of the opposed Kantian and Fichtean positions, to formulate an account of self-consciousness that on one hand acknowledges the power of—in Henrich's words—Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht into the inadequacy of the Kantian 'reflection model,' whilst, on the other hand, re-appropriating such a 'reflection model.' They thus argue that I am only aware of myself as T by means of a reflective act (in which I in some sense become my own intentional object), whilst at the same time arguing that such awareness nevertheless involves a non-reflective 'dimension.' For Hölderlin and Novalis, therefore, consciousness is always intentionally directed, and yet in being intentionally directed, it is also non-reflectively related to itself or "self-luminous" sea conception of consciousness which has similarities with Sartre's conception of the 'pre-reflective cogito.'
72. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
AÏm Deüelle Lüski Thought from the Middle: The Method of Deleuzian Metaphysics
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My lecture is concerned with a presentation of the method of Deleuzian thought, which - I would like to contend - well represent the change that has taken place in postmodernist thought. Deleuze is unique in calling himself a "classical metaphysicist," i.e. a restorer of classical thought, albeit via the screen - thought which has managed to survive and overcome the obstacle of modernity. The Deleuzian unification of pre-modern thought and modernist critique with Nietzsche's theory of eternal repetition gives rise to a method, whose utter meaning is an attempt to provide thinkers with sharp tools for successfully opposing later capitalism and globalization, something that stands at the very heart of Deleuzian metaphysics. This opposition, which in effect is also a new doctrine of moral aesthetics, lies at the core of this present lecture. I would like to present the special combative nature of Deleuzian thought, and through him to present a different radical angle of the post-modern paradigm.
73. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Altaf Hossain Gadamer's Hermeneutics: Some Critical Comments
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Hermeneutics, in its phenomenological mode, has become one of the dominating issues in contemporary philosophical discours. Hans-Georg Gadamer, the leading exponent of phenomenological hermeneutics, develops his theory in his monumental work Truth and Method1, by regarding hermeneutics as an exploration of both the archaeology of human understanding and constitutive role of language in experience. In this paper, we have presented a brief exposition of Gadamer's views, giving an emphasis on how human understanding of objects inevitably mingles with its traditions or prejudices. Following Gadamer, we also have offered a systematic account of the role of language upon our overall understanding and building of an impersonal criterion of the truth and meaning of experiences. And finally we have critically examined Habermas* critique of Gadamer's failure to see language as a camouflage of domination of stronger experiences and the fact that the history of understanding is systematically distorted by this domination.
74. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Antonio Gallardo Cervantes Nacimiento del sujeto en filosofõa de Emmanuel Levinas
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Levinas pretende liberarse de la esclavitud del subjetivismo moderno. En realidad, de lo que se trata es de salir del ser por una nueva via. Estamos ante una Filosofia de la Liberaciön.
75. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Linda Fisher The Challenges of Diversity
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The issues of difference, diversity, otherness, and the possibility of community have emerged as leading philosophical and socio-political questions in recent times. An increasing theoretical emphasis on issues of difference and alterity, with a corresponding convergence of topics like globalization, have brought into renewed focus not only the question of otherness, but more fundamentally, the question of how the encounter with the Other is to take place. My paper examines the treatment of issues of difference and otherness within a perspective of philosophical hermeneutics. In recent writings, Gadamer has suggested that the principles of his philosophical hermeneutics can prove beneficial in reflections on contemporary social problems of diversity and cultural difference. In examining these claims, I question whether Gadamer acknowledges sufficiently the challenges and resistance of otherness. At the same time, I also question the claims of some theorists who maintain that it is never possible to bridge difference and otherness. In the end I suggest that while the resistance of difference might be underestimated, there are nevertheless promising approaches for thinking difference and diversity to be found in a hermeneutical perspective.
76. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Wanda Torres Gregory "Unintelligibility in Heidegger"
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In his Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65), Heidegger claims: "Making itself intelligible is the suicide of philosophy" (435). He defines intelligibility in terms of the modern metaphysical forms of thinking and speaking about beings as objects of representation. Moreover, intelligibility involves a uniform accessibility for the inauthentic. anybody of an age marked by thoughtlessness. Thus, Heidegger upholds and tries to adhere to a principle of unintelligibility for the thinkers in the crossing from the first beginning to the other beginning of philosophy. Thinkers in the crossing are essentially ambiguous and indefinite in their attempt to move through and away metaphysical thinking toward a be-ing-historical thinking. Their only option is to say the metaphysical language of beings as language of be-ing, and this involves a transformation of language and thinking through a "turning around" of the meaning of metaphysical words. Unintelligibility is an essential feature of this transformed and transformative effort to carry out the ultimate task of "the bringing back of beings from the truth of be-ing" (11). If philosophy makes itself intelligible, then it fails to accomplish its mission in the age of the abandonment of be-ing by beings. Unintelligibility in Heidegger, as he defines it and as it occurs in his own writing, suggests the concomitant demand on us, the philosophers of today, to make the effort to interpret the language of beings as language of be-ing.
77. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Alain Beaulieu La grammaire de la renaissance spinoziste: puissance, multitude et démocratie non-représentative
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Depuis le milieu des annees 1960, les etudes spinozistes ont pris un nouvel essor sous l'impulsion du courant marxiste qui a vu dans le programme de liberation des collectivites pense par Spinoza le projet politique le plus apte ä assurer une reponse ä la crise de legitimite du marxisme. Dans la foulee de certaines intuitions de Althusser, et ä la lumiere de la conceptualite spinoziste, plusieurs penseurs (notamment Deleuze, Negri, Macherey, Matheron et Virno) ont ainsi propose un nouveau modele d'organisation de la vie en commun. Ces acteurs de la renaissance spinoziste redigent, en quelque sorte, le chapitre conclusif de la derniere ceuvre de Spinoza (i.e. le Tratte politique reste inacheve) en definissant les nouvelles conditions de la democratic ä l'heure de la deterritorialisation generalisee marquee par l'abolition des frontieres nationales (economie mondiale, reseaux informatiques, etc.). Ce contexte offre l'occasion de repenser la politique en radicalisant les propos de Spinoza et en faisant jouer les notions de "puissance" et de "multitude" non seulement contre les concepts de "pouvoir" et de "peuple" qui en sont venus ä dominer le champ de la reflexion en philosophic politique, mais egalement contre les philosophies de l'histoire fondees sur la dialectique et la teleologie. Apres avoir decrit brievement quelques-uns des principaux enjeux de la politique spinoziste et avoir presente les nouveaux ennemis du spinozisme (neo-liberalisme et marxisme ideologique), nous ferons une genealogie de la refondation neo-spinozienne de Marx (Althusser, Deleuze, Negri) avant de repondre ä la question "Que faire?". II s'agira alors de determiner le role de l'Etat et de situer cette pensee politique par rapport ä l'utopie revolutionnaire. Ce parcours contribuera ä mieux definir les fondements et les implications de la democratic non-representative qui est au cceur des revendications de la renaissance spinoziste.
78. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Jesús Adrián Escudero Heidegger und die Genealogie der Seinsfrage
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The present text shows the hidden root of the question of being in Heidegger's Early Writings. His first logic and epistemological investigations in a neokantian atmosphere moves to ontological interests: he gives up the notion of transcendental subject, and asks for the historical and temporal background of live. In this sense, the young Heidegger gives his work a new direction by searching for the hermeneutical pressupositions that allows philosophy to formulate again the question of being from a radical point of view.
79. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Walter B. Gulick A Brief Brief for Philosopher Kings and Queens
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In what manner can philosophy best face world problems? I argue that philosophy's most important contribution to problem solving is not analysis and clarification but synoptic in nature. Relying upon the power of reflection and the scope of imagination as linked to a patient attempt to understand many disciplines, the philosopher ideally seeks to comprehend problems in their many-dimensioned complexity. The disciplines of ecology, evolution, and ethics are especially fruitful in guiding the philosopher seeking to assess the relative worth of things in their emergent inter-relationships. - In the body of the paper I attempt an outline of the outstanding human caused harms, injustices, and instabilities resulting in pain and suffering today. World philosophy today seems sufficiently pluralistic, comprehensive and free of unduly constraining orthodoxies that it can again play a significant role not only in conceptualizing problems but in articulating solutions. Broad visions comparable to Plato's as set forth in the Republic can again be ventured. We need to seek out ways to place into power a council of international philosopher kings and queens offering effective solutions beyond the dictates of partisanship and ideology. I conclude by suggesting five principles that international philosopher kings and queens might be expected to rely upon to bring about a more just global society.
80. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 11
Sandor Kariko Georg Lukács's Labour-Conception
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The studying of Marx, said Gyorgy Lukäcs at the beginning of the 1920s, does not mean the uncriticised recognition of the results of his researches, nor the <faith> set in well-defined theses, the interpretation of a <sacred> book. One has to become absorbed in the ceuvre of Marx, so that then, as a second step, one can commence the systematic elaboration of the problems of our age. It is unjust that in western philosophies, especially in the Anglo-Saxon concerning literature the name of the old-age Lukäcs does not appear, or is present as that of some Stalinist inquisitor, the indisputable pillar of Marxism and the Bolshevik movement. Yet his late piece of labour, his vast ontology experiment convincingly shows how one can penetrate the original texts of Marx and at the same time preserve one's conceptual souvereignity, sense of reality, and one's capacity, at least in a latent way, to judge or surpass the thoughts of one's master. This study aims to interpret the problem of Lukäcs's relation to Marx through the analysis of the labour concept of Lukäcs, and would like to prove that the rereading of Lukäcs (and Marx) can serve with surprises, new meanings and morals even today.