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61. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Theodore R. Vitali Sport Hunting: Moral or Immoral?
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Hunting for sport or pleasure is ethical because (1) it does not violate any animal’s moral rights, (2) it has as its primary object the exercise of human skills, which is a sufficient good to compensate for the evil that results from it, namely, the death of the animal, and (3) it contributes to the ecological system by directly participating in the balancing process of life and death upon which the ecosystem thrives, thus indirectly benefiting the human community. As such, hunting is not only a natural good, but also a moral good.
62. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Annie L. Booth, Harvey L. Jacobs Ties that Bind: Native American Beliefs as a Foundation for Environmental Consciousness
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In this article we examine the specific contributions Native American thought can make to the ongoing search for a Western ecological consciousness. We begin with a review of the influence of Native American beliefs on the different branches of the modem environmental movement and some initial comparisons of Western and Native American ways of seeing. We then review Native American thought on the natural world, highlighting beliefs in the need for reciprocity and balance, the world as a living being, and relationships with animals. We conclude that Native American ideas are important, can prove inspirational in the search for a modem environmental consciousness, and affirm the arguments of both deep ecologists and ecofeminists.
63. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Janna Thompson A Refutation of Environmental Ethics
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An environmental ethic holds that some entities in nature or in natural states of affairs are intrinsically valuable. I argue that proposals for an environmental ethic either fail to satisfy requirements which any ethical system must satisty to be an ethic or they fail to give us reason to suppose that the values they promote are intrinsic values. If my arguments are correct, then environmental ethics is not properly ethics at all.
64. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Arne Naess Man Apart and Deep Ecology: A Reply to Reed
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Peter Reed has defended the basis for an environmental ethic based upon feelings of awe for nature together with an existentialist absolute gulf between humans and nature. In so doing, he has claimed that there are serious difficulties with Ecosophy T and the terms, Self-realization and identification with nature. I distinguish between discussions of ultimate norms and the penultimate deep ecology platform. I also clarify and defend a technical use of identification and attempt to show that awe and identification may be compatible concepts.
65. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Karen J. Warren The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism
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Ecological feminism is the position that there are important connections-historical, symbolic, theoretical-between the domination of women and the domination of nonhuman nature. I argue that because the conceptual connections between the dual dominations of women and nature are located in an oppressive patriarchal conceptual framework characterized by a logic of domination, (1) the logic of traditional feminism requires the expansion of feminism to include ecological feminism and (2) ecological feminism provides a framework for developing a distinctively feminist environmental ethic. I conclude that any feminist theory and any environmental ethic which fails to take seriously the interconnected dominations of women and nature is simply inadequate.
66. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
J. Baird Callicott The Case against Moral Pluralism
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Despite Christopher Stone’s recent argument on behalf of moral pluralism, the principal architects of environmental ethics remain committed to moral monism. Moral pluralism fails to specify what to do when two or more of its theories indicate inconsistent practical imperatives. More deeply, ethical theories are embedded in moral philosophies and moral pluralism requires us to shift between mutually inconsistent metaphysics of morals, most of which are no Ionger tenable in light of postmodern science. A univocal moral philosophy-traceable to David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments, grounded in evolutionary biology by Charles Darwin, and latterly extended to the environment by Aldo Leopold-provides a unified, scientifically supported world view and portrait of human nature in whichmultiple, lexically ordered ethics are generated by multiple human, “mixed,” and “biotic” community memberships.
67. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Bob Pepperman Taylor John Dewey and Environmental Thought
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In response to Chaloupka’s discussion of Dewey’s “social aesthetics,” I argue, first, that Chaloupka has failed to fully appreciate the democratic, political foundation of Dewey’s aesthetic sensibility and, second, that his description of Dewey’s naturalism is ambiguous and misleading. I conclude that Dewey does have things to say to environmental thinkers, but that his views regarding environmental issues are much less unique than Chaloupka suggests. His work stands more as a democratic challenge to environmentalists than as a guide for their thought.
68. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Donald Alexander Bioregionalism: Science or Sensibility?
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The current interest in bioregionalism, stimulated in part by Kirkpatrick Sale’s Dwellers in the Land, shows that people are looking for a form of political praxis which addresses the importance of region. In this paper, I argue that much of the bioregional literature written to date mystifies the concept of region, discounting the role of subjectivity and culture in shaping regional boundaries and veers toward asimplistic view of “nature knows best.” Bioregionalism can be rehabilitated, provided we treat it not as a “revealed wisdom” for the reconstruction of human society, but as a sensibility and environmental ethic that can infuse our work even as we make use of the functional regionalisms that increasingly shape people’s consciousness. I conclude by citing Lewis Mumford’s concept of a region as capturing the dialectical interplay of natural and cultural elements.
69. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
David M. Johns The Relevance of Deep Ecology to the Third World: Some Preliminary Comments
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Although Ramachandra Guha has demonstrated the importance of cross-cultural dialogue on environmental issues and has much to tell us about the problems of wildemess preservation in the Third World, I argue that Guha is partly wrong in claiming that deep ecology equates environmental protection with wilderness protection and simply wrong in calling wilderness protection untenable or incorrect as aglobal strategy for environmental protection. Moreover, I argue that the deep ecology distinction between anthropocentrism and biocentrism is useful in dealing with the two major problems which Guha identifies as undermining the health of the planetoverconsumption and militarism. Although it is true that preservation of wildemess will not be successful unless human social dynamics are taken into consideration, nevertheless, a biocentrism which integrates critical social theory can provide the basis for an ethic that undercuts the environmental degradation from overconsumption and militarism more effectively than a human-centered system.
70. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
John S. Dryzek Green Reason: Communicative Ethics for the Biosphere
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Exclusively instrumental notions of rationality not only reinforce attitudes conducive to the destruction of the natural world, but also undermine attempts to construct environmental ethics that involve more harmonious relationships between humans and nature. Deep ecologists and other ecological critics of instrumental rationality generally prefer some kind of spiritual orientation to nature. In this paper I argue against both instrumental rationalists and ecological spiritualists in favor of a communicative rationality which encompasses the natural world. I draw upon both critical theory and recent scientific intimations of agency in nature.
71. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Thomas W. Simon Varieties of Ecological Dialectics
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A hierarchical ordering of approaches afflicts environmental thinking. An ethics of individualism unjustly overrides social/political philosophy in environmental debates. Dialectics helps correct this imbalance. In dialectical fashion, a synthesis emerges between conflicting approaches to dialectics and to nature from: Marxism (Levins and Lewontin), anarchism (Bookchin), and Native Americanism (Black Elk). Conflicting (according to Marxists) and cooperative (according to anarchists) forces both operate in nature. Ethics (anarchist), political theory (Marxist), and spirituality (Native American) constitute the interconnected interpretative domains of a dialectically informed ecophilosophy. In a world painted too often in blacks and whites, ecological dialectics colors the picture a more realistic gray.
72. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Alan Wittbecker Metaphysical Implications from Physics and Ecology
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I contrast metaphysical implications from physics and ecology and compare them through two concepts, the field, primary in physics and borrowed by ecology, and wholeness, postulated in ecology and borrowed by physics. I argue that several implications from physics are unacceptably reductive or erroneous and identify an old and a new ecology. Metaphysical implications from the old ecology are quite different from the new ecology, as weIl as from quantum or Newtonian physics.
73. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Murray Bookchin Recovering Evolution: A Reply to Eckersley and Fox
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Robyn Eckersley claims erroneously that I believe humanity is currently equipped to take over the “helm” of natural evolution. In addition, she provides a misleading treatment of my discussion of the relationship of first nature (biological evolution) and second nature (social evolution). I argue that her positivistic methodology is inappropriate in dealing with my processual approach and that her Manichaean contrast between biocentrism and anthropocentrism virtually excludes any human intervention in the natural world. With regard to Warwick Fox’s treatment of my writings, I argue that he deals with my views on society’s relationship to nature in a simplistic, narrowly deterministic, and ahistorical manner. I fault both of my deep ecology critics for little or no knowledge of my writings. I conclude with an outline of a dialectical naturalism that treats nature as an evolutionary process-not simply as a scenic view-and places human and sodal evolution in a graded relationship with natural evolution. I emphasize that society and humanity can no longer be separated from natural evolution and that the kind of society we achieve will either foster the development of first nature or damage the planet beyond repair.
74. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Eugene C. Hargrove, J. Baird Callicott Leopold’s Means and Ends in Wild Life Management
75. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
John Lemons, Donald A. Brown, Gary E. Varner Congress, Consistency, and Environmental Law
76. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
AIdo Leopold Means and Ends in Wild Life Management
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[Although research in wildlife management is repeating the history of agriculture, unlike agricultural research, which employs scientific means for economic ends, the ends of wildlife research are judged in terms of aesthetic satisfactions as governed by “good taste.” Wild animals and plants are economically valuable only in the sense that human performers and works of art are: the means are of the brain, but the ends are of the heart. Wildlife management has forged ahead of agriculture in recognizing the invisible interdependencies in the biotic community. Moreover, it has admitted its inability to replace natural equilibria and its unwillingness to do so even if it could. Because many animals do not exhibit their natural behavior under laboratory conditions, researchers are dependent on observation in the wild. The difficulties involved in isolating variables are especially clear in the study of the natural cycle. It is a problem which seems to defy the experimental method.]
77. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Michael Martin Ecosabotage and Civil Disobedience
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I define ecosabotage and relate this definition to several well-known analyses of civil disobedience. I show that ecosabotage cannot be reduced to a form of civil disobedience unless the definition of civil disobedience is expanded. I suggest that ecosabotage and civil disobedience are special cases of the more general concept of conscientious wrongdoing. Although ecosabotage cannot be considered a form of civil disobedience on the basis of the standard analysis of this concept, the civil disobedience literature can provide important insights into the justification of ecosabotage. First, traditional appeals to a higher law in justifying ecosabotage are no more successful than they are in justifying civil disobedience. Second, utilitarian justifications of ecosabotage are promising. At present there is no apriori reason tosuppose that some acts of ecosabotage could not be justified on utilitarian grounds, although such ecosaboteurs as Dave Foreman have not provided a full justification of its use in concrete cases.
78. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Kelly Parker The Values of a Habitat
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Recent severe environmental crises have brought us to recognize the need for a broad reevaluation of the relation of humans to their environments. I suggest that we consider the human-nature relation from two overlapping perspectives, each informed by the pragmatic philosophy of expeIience. The first is an anthropology, according to which humans are viewed as being radically continuous with their environments. The second is a comprehensive ecology, according to which both “natural” and “nonnatural” environments are studied as artificial habitats of the human organism (i.e., as artifacts). The pragmatic approach has two features which make it promising as a way to ground environmental thinking. First, it allows us to avoid a human-nature dichotomy and the many problems which that dichotomy has traditionally engendered . Second, it ties environmental questions to a common cultural experience and a philosophical position from which environmentalists can effectively engage mainstreameducational and political discussions.
79. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 12 > Issue: 4
Robert W. Gardiner Between Two Worlds: Humans in Nature and Culture
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In this essay, I set forth a view of humans as creatures living at once in two worlds: the world of nature and the world of culture. I explore some of the tensions and paradoxes entailed by this position, as weIl as the implications for ethics, both interhuman and environmental. I also critique the distortions entailed by ethical stances which draw too heavily on one polarity or the other without taking sufficient account of the discontinuities between them.
80. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
R. P. Peerenboom Beyond Naturalism: A Reconstruction of Daoist Environmental Ethics
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In this paper I challenge the traditional reading of Daoism as naturalism and the interpretation of wu wei as “acting naturally.” I argue that such an interpretation is problematic and unhelpful to the would-be Daoist environmental ethicist. I then lay the groundwork for a philosophically viable environmental ethic by elucidating the pragmatic aspects of Daoist thought. While Daoism so interpreted is no panacea for all of our environmental ills, it does provide a methodology that may prove effective in alleviating some of our discomfort.