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61. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Roger Paden Defining Philosophical Counseling
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According to Kuhn a new scientific discipline comes into existence when a group of scientists adopt a common paradigm within which to conduct research. The adoption of this paradigm senes to focus the attention of the group’s members on a common explanatory task-at-hand and leads them to adopt similar methods and aims, thus making possible the standard puzzle solving activities that allow normal science to advance rapidly. However, Kuhn argues, in pre-paradigm periods and during revolutionary phases, scientists do not engage in such singleminded, puzzle-solving behavior, as the paradigm itself is put into question. Instead, during these periods, they become at least partially self-reflective in that they become interested in understanding the nature of their discipline and its relationships to other disciplines. In this paper, I argue that Philosophical Counseling is in a pre-paradigm period and is in need of a paradigm centered definition if it is to develop an identity and advance rapidly. In an Aristotelian mood, I seek this definition though an examination of the related fiends of psychotherapy and pastoral counseling.
62. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
William Sweet Human Rights and Cultural Diversity
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In this paper, I discuss some challenges to the discourse of universal human rights made by those who insist that the existence of pluralism and cultural diversity count against it. I focus on arguments made in a recent article by Vinay Lal but also address several other criticisms of universal human rights-arguments hinted at, but not elaborated, by Lal. I maintain that these challenges frequently fail to distinguish the discourse of human rights from its adoption by certain states to advance foreign policy objectives, and suggest that, even when these criticisms appear plausible, closer inspection reveals that they are either inconsistent or simply do not succeed. I conclude that the notion of universal human rights still has an important place in a culturally diverse and pluralist world.
63. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Paul M. Hughes Exploitation, Autonomy, and the Case for Organ Sales
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A recent argument in favor of a free market in human organs claims that such a market enhances personal autonomy. I argue here that such a market would, on the contrary, actually compromise the autonomy of those most likely to sell their organs, namely, the least well off members of society. A Marxian-inspired notion of exploitation is deployed to show how, and in what sense, this is the case.
64. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
David E. W. Fenner Animal Rights and the Problem of Proximity
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This paper argues that due to considerations of proximity of particular humans to particular (nonhuman) animals, and to the impact this proximity has on the obligations felt by those humans to those animals, an animal rights strategy as a means of specifying what obligations humans really do have toward animals cannot be successful. The good news, however; is that it is out of these proximity relations that we can begin to understand just what obligations humans properly do have toward animals.
65. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Shlomit C. Schuster On Philosophical Self-diagnosis and Self-help: A Clarification of the Non-clinical Practice of Philosophical Counseling
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In this paper I describe and analyze the need for an alternative, non-clinical approach to counseling, i.e., philosophical counseling. Throughout the first part of this paper. I aim to prove pragmatically the truth or validity of this new non-clinical approach to counseling by describing its effectiveness in a case-study. In the second part, I suggest that many philosophers have made use of philosophical self-diagnosis and self-help to improve their own well-being, although for their private practice of philosophy they did not use the words I have chosen here. I exemplify this by analyzing the representative life narrative of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as a case study.
66. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Gary J. Foulk, M. Jan Keffer, Harry L. Keffer The Perception of Ethical Dilemmas in Clinical Practice: Empirical Diagnosis and Philosophical Therapy
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The empirical diagnosis presented in this paper is based on interviews with nurse practitioners and physicians designed to elicit their perceptions of the nature and role of ethical dilemmas in clinical practice. Having selected five of these perceptions or views which were common and significant. the philosophical therapy offered consists in, first, a general discussion of ethical dilemmas, and second, a critical analysis of each of the five views with the aim of pointing out confusions and errors, the recognition of which can be of applied and practical help in the clinical setting.
67. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Warren Shibles Philosophical Counseling, Philosophical Education and Emotion
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The recent literature, conference and internet discussions about philosophical counseling (PC) show that it is in a state of confusion as to its definition, area of expertise and purpose. The present paper analyzes these definitions showing their limitations as well as their strong points. A proposal for a more adequate definition is then given which recommends changing the name of “Philosophical Counseling” to “Philosophy Educator and Advisor.” It is also shown that humanism contains many of the elements of the definitions of PC. An analysis of emotion, and specifically anger, is then given to show its implications for PC and to exemplify the definition of PC here proposed.
68. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Louis P. Pojman The Case Against Affirmative Action
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Affirmative Action is becoming the most controversial social issue of our day. In this essay I examine nine arguments on the moral status of Affirmative Action. I distinguish between weak Affirmative Action, which seeks to provide fair opportunity to all citizens from strong Affirmative Action, which enjoins preferential treatment to groups who have been underrepresented in social positions. I conclude that while weak Affirmative Action is morally required, strong Affirmative Action is morally wrong.
69. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Daniel A. Dombrowski Rawls and Animals
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In “Rawls and Animals” I try to do two things. First, I try to bring together for the first time Rawls’ thoughts on animals in “A Theory of Justice” as well as the often contradictory secondary literature on this topic. And second, I examine for the first time Rawls’ treatment of animals in his recent work “Political Liberalism.”
70. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Michael S. Pritchard Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics: From Practice to Theory
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In contrast to The Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics counsels not trying to “get to the bottom of things” in our efforts to reach “some results of value for practical guidance and life.” For Sidgwick, both practical and theoretical ethics should start from the Morality of Common Sense. Although he retained his utilitarian outlook in Practical Ethics, this paper suggests that the Morality of Common Sense has the resources to hold its own against utilitarian revision.
71. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Robin Attfield Responsibility for the Global Environment
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It is argued here that countries have an obligation to enter agreements that would significantly constrain the play of free-market forces in order to tackle the problems of the global environment. On the way, a realist understanding of the global environment is first defended (Section I), as is a strong (as opposed to weak or ultra-strong) understanding of sustainability (Section II). Criticisms are then presented to the project of incorporating the natural environment into the market (Section III). International agreements are shown to be needed to regulate both international and domestic markets if the planetary environment is to be sustained (Section IV).
72. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Peter Dalton Possessiveness and Embodiment: What Thoreau Didn’t Know
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In “Economy,” Henry Thoreau argues against the common view that it is highly worthwhile for a human being to work hard in order to obtain material possessions. Thoreau’s objections are forceful, wide-ranging, and extraordinarily well written. Yet his readers, like almost everyone else, continue to desire, pursue, or acquire more and more material things as well as more and more money, the primary means to such things. Thoreau knew that this was true of the people of his own time, but he didn’t know why. I think I know what Thoreau didn’t know. What Thoreau didn’t know is why material possessions are effective and alluring embodiments of a human being’s worth as a person. This is a particular kind of worth, which I call reputed worth. In the paper I show why reputed worth is so important to people, how material goods embody it, and, unfortunately, why reputed worth is deeply flawed.
73. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Karen Hanson Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice—in Theory
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This paper explores and criticizes Henry Sidgwick’s conception of the ethical societies he helped found at the end of the nineteenth century. I argue that the societies were not as involved in practical and political problems as one might have expected, and that the theoretical justification offered by Sidgwick -- that the primary obstacles to “right living” lie in our minds and hearts -- is not altogether satisfying. Sidgwick’s nearly exclusive emphasis on the problem of moral knowledge is then contrasted with John Dewey’s attention to moral motivation; and Dewey’s more energetic involvement in current affairs and social issues is set in the context of his distinctive view of the relation between theory and practice. Finally, Sidgwick’s modest hopes for the ethical societies, and the reasons for that modesty, are compared with the confidence that permeated an earlier incarnation of the ethical society, Ben Franklin’s Junto club.
74. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Louis P. Pojman Straw Man or Straw Theory?: A Reply to Albert Mosley
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I respond to Albert Mosley’s critique that I only attack straw men arguments against affirmative action by showing both that his own argument is a version of one of these “straw men” and that his objections to my arguments can be rebutted.
75. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
John Ladd What’s Group Identity Got to Do with It?: Ethical Issues in Mentoring
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In order to avoid trivializing moral issues concerning mentoring, a specialized “strong” concept of a Mentor is proposed that is based on the original model in Homer’s Odyssey. It is argued that mentorship embodies a highly personal and bonding relationship that comes as a free gift and is based on an affinity of some sort. It is further argued that morally such a relationship may be especially appropriate in a racial setting.
76. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Sherwin Klein An Aristotelian View of Theory and Practice in Business Ethics
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In this paper, I argue that an Aristotelian approach to business ethics would place theory and practice in business ethics in proper balance. I attempt to show this in two parts. In part one, I suggest that Aristotle’s balanced view of the relation between theory and practice in political philosophy can be applied to corporate life;Aristotle’s sophisticated ethical and political inquiries should help advocates of corporate culture to construct theories that are theoretically, practically, and ethically sound. In part two, I argue that theory and practice are kept in proper balance in Aristotle’s discussion of phronesis or practical wisdom; therefore, Aristotelian phronesis should help to illuminate morally intelligent business conduct.
77. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Albert Mosley Policies of Straw or Policies of Inclusion?: A Review of Pojman’s “Case against Affirmative Action”
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In this article, I review some of the arguments presented by Louis Pojman in “The Case Against Affirmative Action,” and attempt to show that Pojman’s main objections only hold against the strawmen Pojman has erected to represent the case for affirmative action. Affirmative action was designed to correct for state-enforced restrictions against blacks, and has been extended to protect a number of other groups, including women. Its principal justification has been that these groups have in the past been the target of group exclusions that were state sanctioned, and such patterns persist into the present. In this regard, the over-representation of Jews or Asians in academia is little more suspect than the over-representation of blacks in the NBA.
78. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Seumas Miller Collective Responsibility, Armed Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide
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In this paper I explore the notion of collective moral responsibility as it pertains both to nation-states contemplating humanitarian armed intervention in international social conflicts, and as it pertains to social groups perpetrating human rights violations in such conflicts. I take the Rwandan genocide as illustrative of such conflicts and make use of it accordingly. I offer an individualist account of collective moral responsibility, according to which collective moral responsibility is a species of joint responsibility.
79. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Michael Davis Sidgwick’s Impractical Ethics
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Oxford inaugurated its new series in practical ethics by reprinting Sidgwick’s century-old Practical Ethics, edited and introduced by Sissela Bok. While this reissue is, in many respects, both appropriate and welcome, it is, in one respect, quite inappropriate. Even a short examination of Sidgwick’s little book shows that Sidgwick did not understand practical ethics as we do: a) because he radically overestimated the importance of a common theoretical starting point; and b) because he radically underestimated the importance of detailed study of particular cases as a replacement for a common theoretical starting point. Philosophers only began to revise their estimates on these matters during the 1960s. When they did, it was not theory that drove them to it but extended experience with medical ethics, an experience no philosopher before then had had. We who do practical ethics are, I think, inclined to overlook the formative power of that experience. Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics seems a good antidote for that.
80. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Sami Pihlström Applied Philosophy: Problems and Applications
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This paper provides a critical discussion of the concept of applied philosophy. Writers specializing in applied philosophy (e.g., in the various fields of applied ethics) often assume what is here called the traditional concept of applied philosophy, i.e., they think of themselves as applying a “pure” (in itself nonapplied) philosophical theory to some humanly important practical problem area. If understood along these lines, applied philosophy can be taken to be analogous toapplied science. However, this analogy collapses as soon as we realize that the “results” of applied philosophy cannot usually be regarded as instantiations of the von Wrightian technical norm, which can be considered the basic form of the results of applied scientific research. On the other hand, the postmodernist, antiscientific rival of traditional applied philosophy, viz., “media philosophy,” is argued to be little more than a relativist, degraded version of the traditional conception. Finally, it is suggested that the dichotomy between pure and applied philosophy should be abandoned in favor of a pragmatist view, which urges that all significant philosophical problems are always already embedded in human practice.