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Displaying: 61-74 of 74 documents

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61. ProtoSociology: Volume > 7
Volker Gardenne Fortschritt zu tieferen Problemen
62. ProtoSociology: Volume > 8/9
Volkmar Taube Exemplifikatorische Darstellung: Zu den Grundlagen einer kognitiven Ästhetik
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After having introduced Goodman’s concept of exemplification I discuss his general argument that exemplification would be the best for comprehensible the expressive phenomena of art. But there will arise problems when making differences between features of works of art which are exemplified and which are not, and when reconstructing the variable forms of autoreflexive expressions. I try to demonstrate that Goodman’s concept of exemplification therefore ist too limited: 1. Goodman doesn’t take into account that the caracteristics of works such as colours, form etc. also can be interpreted as materials of artistic expressions. 2. He doesn’t give any idea to solve the question what would make an exemplification work effectively. Therefore I suggest to reformulate the concept of exemplification.
63. ProtoSociology: Volume > 8/9
Alexander Ulfig Stufen der Rechtfertigung
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For the last 30 years there have been debates in philosophy about the concept of rationality. In anglo-american circles they have been primary characterized as discussions about “justified beliefs.” By contrast, the debate in Germany among discourse-theorists (Habermas, Apel) has been linked to the problem of justification of communicative speech-acts (within the concept of the entire communicative situation). Herbert Schnädelbach has modified the discours-theoretical account. His concept can be regarded along a number of dimensions. He has developed a linguistic analysis of the validity claims made in various speech-act situations (following Paul Taylor). In Schnädelbach’s view, normative characterizations of speech acts can be used descriptively, too. Furthermore, the hierarchy of justifications ends on the level of rational choice.My starting point here is: there is a fundamental distinction between justifications in everyday-life and a theoretical level of justification (discoursive justifications). Thus, I discuss the hierarchy of justifications developed by Schnädelbach.Furthermore, I evaluate Schnädelbach’s concept in a semantic perspective. I will show that Schnädelbach’s pragmatical account requires a semantic analysis. Without recourse to such analysis, we cannot understand the universe of normative language.
64. ProtoSociology: Volume > 8/9
Axel Wüstehube Noch einmal: Rationalität und Normativität
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The ongoing discussion about a notion of pragmatic rationality has evolved in a variety of different approaches, mainly because every author tries to combine his genuine philosophical point of view with the interpretation of “rationality”. Nevertheless there is an agreement of sorts that rationality cannot proceed mereley descriptively but has also normative implications.The paper investigates the proposals of Nicholas Rescher and Herbert Schnädelbach concerning the question of a normativity of rationality. Moreover it deals with the problem of “unity of reason” and its interconnectedness with the inherent normativity of rationality.
65. ProtoSociology: Volume > 8/9
Wolfgang Welsch Vernunft heute
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What type of reason will work under the present conditions? To answer this question a meaningful conception of reason (as distinct from rationality) has to be developed, and is contemporary conditions (due to change in the field of rationality) have to be specified.In part I. of the paper, the radically altered structure of rationality is analysed; it turns out to be characterized by rational disorder. Part II. offers a redefinition of reason; guided by the idea of justice reason operates in transition from one rationality to another. This new kind of reason - "transversal reason " - is further elaborated in part III. It is regarded as a key-element of any type of reason.
66. ProtoSociology: Volume > 8/9
Marcus Birke Externalismus in der Philosophie des Geistes
67. ProtoSociology: Volume > 8/9
Joseph Agassi Die gegenwartige Rolle des Technik- und Wissenschaftshistorikers
68. ProtoSociology: Volume > 2
Karl-Otto Apel Illokutionäre Bedeutung und normative Gültigkeit: Die transzendentalpragmatische Begründung der uneingeschränkten kommunikativen Verständigung
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The paper tries first to show that P. Strawson’s and J. Searle’s proposal of explicating the illocutionary meaning of speech-acts (or corresponding explicit sentences) in terms of the conditions of fulfilment or satisfaction (with regard to the underlying intentional states of mind) is unsatisfactory. It provides no full understanding of the meaning of speech-acts, at least not of non-constative acts, as e.g. orders, requests, demands, confessions, promisses, etc.; for, through its quasi-verificationist horizon, it provides no unterstanding of the illocutionary force in terms of the conditions of accepting the validity-claims that are connected with the performance of the act. Thus far the paper complies with Habermas’ approach. There remains however an ambiguity with regard to the good reasons for accepting a speech-act, since on the level of life-world communication and interaction not only validity-claims and pertinent arguments but also threats and offers are functioning as socially binding illocutionary forces (thus e.g. not only in coercions like "hands up" but in all kinds of negotiations and bargainings). How is it possible to show by a cogent argument that openly strategical acts as offers and threats cannot fulfill the role of providing good reasons for accepting speech-acts in the sense of unrestricted Verständigung (i.e. communicative understanding and coming to agreement) but are parasitic upon non-strategical ways of consensual communication by understanding and accepting validity-claims?The paper argues that this suggestive contention cannot be proved, i.e. grounded by a descriptive analysis of the normal function of communicative actions in the life-world but only - indeed - by transcendental pragmatic reflection on the normative conditions of argumentative discourse which cannot be denied without committing a performative self-contradiction.
69. ProtoSociology: Volume > 2
Georg Meggle, Maria Ulkan Grices Doppelfehler: Ein Nachtrag zum Griceschen Grundmodell
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This paper takes up again Grice’s Basic Model (GBM) for analysing communicative acts. We draw attention to a ’new’ fault in GBM, i.e. a fault not yet noticed in the literature: Grice’s deflniens for CA (= communicative attempt) is not only too weak (as it is not satisfying the reflexivity-condition according to which any CA implies the speaker’s intention of CA’s being understood by the hearer); it is also too strong - and just for the same reason.
70. ProtoSociology: Volume > 2
Gerhard Preyer Sprachpragmatik
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The domain of pragmatics is to arrange in the architectonic of competences. Competences are to discriminate on the base of distinction between rule-following behaviour and action-rules. This can be understood as a critic of L. Wittgensteins conception of following a rule. The Frankfurter version of speechacttheory has argued - following partial K Bühler - that three fundamental properties (functions) of language can be identified: the representation of state of affaires, the generation of interpersonal relationship and the expression of intentional make happen someone (Erlebnisse). Further dimensions and explications for concerning this properties shall be elaborated. Steps to constructive pragmatics can be gone.
71. ProtoSociology: Volume > 2
Volkmar Taube Bildliche Sprechakte
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How operates communication with pictures? S. Kjörup has elaborated - follow up the analysis of pictorial symbolization in N. Goodman’s "languages of art" - a speechacttheory of picturing The problem of this approach is that Kjörup has no answer of pictorial fiction.
72. ProtoSociology: Volume > 2
Alexander Ulfig Was sind reflexive Sprechhandlungen? Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von Reflexion und Sprache
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The relationship between reflection and language has become of main interest, not only in the area of philosophy. How is reflection by means of language on language possible?Firstly I want to discuss the possibility of linguistic reflexivity within the late philosophy of L. Wittgenstein.The next step will be a critical analysis of G. Frey's "linguistic theory of reflection". This will be followed by an outline of the importance of reflection in context of the speechacttheory (J.L. Austin, J.R. Searle).Finally I will analyse the problems around linguistic reflexivity within a discourse theoretical framework (J. Habermas, K-O. Apel).It will be questioned if the "discourse" would have to be understood as the linguistic equivalent to "reflection" . Then I will be looking at the relationship between discourse and metacommunication. The analysis will end in the attempt of a typology of discoursive-reflexive predicats.
73. ProtoSociology: Volume > 2
Peter Rothermel Semantische Implikaturen
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Semantic implicatures are features for understanding the use of sentences. The status of this implementations of meaning is a quasi-logical relation as a "weak implication". They are determinated through types of lexical units and expressions in grammatical positions. But both are only necessary conditions for semantic implicatures. Further assumption for meaningful use of sentences are presupposed e.g. existence presuppositions, evidences, customs etc. So, the delimination to pragmatic (presuppositions) is indicated.
74. ProtoSociology: Volume > 2
Joachim Labude Formalisierungsversuch der Sprechakttheorie
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In their book 'Foundation of illocutionary logic' the authors attempt to formalize the theory of speech acts. In set theoretical terms they describe their basic notions of illocutionary forces and points, define new ’illocutionary' symbols and operations and formulate some axioms and postulates, which should explicitly describe their theory, but their creativity of introducing new functional symbols and connectives conjoint with an unsystematic representation opposes this purpose.