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61. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Mikhail Epstein From the Golden Rule to the Diamond Rule: An Introduction to Stereo Ethics
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Aristotle stated one of the most influential postulates in the history of ethics: virtue is the middle point between two vicious extremes: "…excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue. For men are good in but one way, but bad in many." The paper argues that between two vices there are two virtues that comprise two different moral perspectives as perceived by stereoethics. For example, two virtues can be found between the vices of miserliness and wastefulness: generosity, which is further from miserliness, and thrift, which is further from wastefulness. Just as there are stereo music and stereo cinema, which convey the full volume of sounds and objects, there is stereo ethics, based on the duality of virtues. From the point of view of stereo ethics we can rethink the "golden rule": "Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them." At the basis of both the golden rule and, later, the Kantian categorical imperative, lies the reversibility of moral subjects: you should put yourself in somebody else's place and treat you neighbor as you wish him or her to treat you. Today, however, ithas become obvious that only the ethics of differentiation can save us from relativism, which is a negative reaction against traditional morals with their universal norms. It is precisely this irreducibility of the individual to the general that may become a source of new moral energy. Two questions form a moral criterion: Would you wish to become an object of your own actions? Could anyone but you be the subject of your actions? The best action is that which corresponds to the needs of the largest number and the capacities of the smallest number of people. Act in such a way that you yourself would like to become an object of your actions, but no one else could be their subject. It is moral to do for others that which no one else can do except myself : to be for-others, but not like-others.
62. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Kyung Sig Hwang Modern Society and Moral Education of South Korea: Discussing the Tasks of Justification and Motivation
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Generally speaking, the ethics of Korean society today are going through an unstable stage, in which the traditional ethics of the East are becoming blended with the Western values that were introduced during the modern age. The resulting chaos has become a critical issue for debate, especially after the birth of a new subject, ‘national ethics’ in school education. Yet even nowadays, questions remain regarding whether the two systems of ethics are independent,complementary, or combinable in some way. I’m going to propose a multi-layered structure of moral education; ‘ the three steps of Ethics’ for designing ethical system and moral education of South Korea. First, etiquette education, which is provided in the household prior to self-controlled critical thinking, will be discussed as an infrastructure of moral education. Then, one of the main purposes of schooling, moral thinking education will be described in terms ofdilemma model of organic form. Lastly, a long forgotten side of today’s moral education, the practical implications of ‘virtue education’, will be emphasized because of their cardinal importance to both Eastern and Western traditions.
63. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Hun Chung Can Classical Utilitarianism Participate in Overlapping Consensus? Why Not?: A Reply to Samuel Scheffler
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The main objective of Rawls’ Political Liberalism was to explain how a workable theory of justice can be established and sustained within a society that is marked by reasonable pluralism. In order to meet this end, Rawls introduces the following three concepts: political conception of justice, public reason, andoverlapping consensus. By relying on these three concepts, Rawls presents his two principles of justice as a two stage process. In the first stage, the two principles of justice are presented as a freestanding political conception justified solely by public reason. In the second stage, individuals engage in overlapping consensus which enables them to find additional supporting reasons for the political conception of justice from their own comprehensive doctrine. According to Rawls, even classical utilitarianism can support his two principles of justice by participating in overlapping consensus. However, Samuel Scheffler thinks that this is impossible. Scheffler’s argument relies on the fact that classical utilitarianism is decisively rejected by the initial contracting parties of the original position. Iargue that Scheffler misconceives the main purpose of the original position and that his argument doesn’t show that it is impossible for classical utilitarianism to participate in overlapping consensus.
64. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Lijun Yuan A Balance of Justice and Care: Reading Feminist Ethics
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Since early the 1980s Feminist philosophers started to put up the value of care on agenda in study of ethics, investigating issues of valuing care as a balance of justice. A book came up as The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global in 2006, written by Virginia Held (VH). She called her balancing approach as “fairer caring” and caring justice”. These two terms show the essence of VH’s analysis of notions of care and justice: meshing them together as inseparable but emphasizing care as a wider framework into which justice should be fitted. Hence, care should be the priority in a more comprehensive moral theory, the ethics of care (EC). I will interpret VH’s thoughts and arguments of EC as priority and how justice and care integrated for each other and why EC will work out a better wayregarding many ethical issues. Finally, I will compare VH’s EC with Confucian ethical idea of reciprocity as the golden rule of Confucianism, and evaluate the difference between the two and strengths of each.
65. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Alexander V. Razin The Models of Moral Activity
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By analyzing various models of moral behavior, I wanted to show that humanity does not have any universal moral feeling. The positive and negative emotions I have described appear in concrete situations in various ways. The dominant role goes to negative emotions provoked in response to possible or real violations ofmoral demands. This, by the way, explains the fact that most well-known moral rules have a negative character (don't lie, don't use others solely as a means to your own ends, don't commit adultery, and so on). The positive motivations are mainly represented in situations where shared values influence the process of satisfying highly developed human needs. Traditional approaches to ethics (especially Immanuel Kant's) stressed the separation of moral motives from other socially and naturally caused behavioral stimuli that finally obstruct possibility to explain positive moral motivation. So in order to understand the role of positive motivation in moral we need a new methodology. The basis of this new methodology has to be a complementary principle which allows us to show how differentmotivations can be combined under one nature without mutually suppressing each other.
66. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Susan T. Gardner Moving Beyond Universalizability
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The use of Kant’s universalizability principle as a method of determining the warrantability of an ethical claim has two fundamental flaws. On the one hand, it renders the universalizing moralizer mute in the face of fanaticism, and, on the other, it too easily dissolves into irrational rule worship. In the face of such flaws,many have argued that this “rational” approach to ethics ought to be abandoned in favor of fanning the flames of sentiment. Such a proposal suggests that we have trapped ourselves into a false dilemma. While there is no doubt that the employment of the universalizability principle is more “reflective” than simply following what springs from the heart, nonetheless, it is no where near the pinnacle of rationality to which we can aspire. Ethicists, like their natural and social scientific colleagues, can adopt a form of scientific ethicism that demands that the legitimacy of any ethical claim depends upon the degree to which the reasons that back it are subjected to the formal demands of both local and global sufficiency, and as well, that the legitimacy of the entire procedure survive scrutiny in a public forum of objective inquirers. Paradoxically, since this process is inter- rather than intra-subjective, and since the surviving claims will be maximally unbiased, the widespread adoption of scientific ethicism has the potential to proportionally expand “the circle of we”—which is precisely what critics of rationality, who advocate non-rational sentiment expansion, would have us do.
67. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Byoung Ick Lee A Classification of the Concepts of Subjectivity
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This paper aims at proposing a criterion to analyze the concept of subjectivity by surveying and classifying the theories of some major figures in the history of the western philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Bentham, Kant, and Hegel. As proceeding in this work, I reveal two approaches which confront each other, self-centered viewpoint and system-centered viewpoint, and arrange Descartes, Hobbes, and Bentham into the former, and Aristotle and Kant into the latter. Also, I assign Plato and Hegel to an alternative, say, unified viewpoint. In this project, the subjectivity is defined as the fundamental status of a man. When dealing with it, two kinds of viewpoint present and distinguish themselves from each other by two factors as follows: one is whether or not it allows mediation with others to be involved in the configuration of subjectivity, and the other is whether it is determined by its formal features or by its contents. The self-centered viewpoint gets married with the no allowance of mediation and the contents-determining, and the system-centered one does with the allowance and theformality-determining. And the unified viewpoint is suggested as an overcoming account of those two. The significance of this attempt would be these three: one is that it can provide a clue to create new spectrum through which theories in the history of the philosophy are looked out over. Secondly, it can be groundwork to seek for a source of normative ethics by a way of re-determining personal identity. Finally, criticizing the self-centered viewpoint, a dominant account in present moral discourse, it can propose a footstone for an alternative theory of it.
68. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Kent E. Robson Utilitarianism
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Even for one, individual, singular person, there are potential problelms with Utilitarianism. We must decide whether we go for pleasure, or try to avoid pain. Many other options are available. In addition to maximizing pleasure, we must also think of what the probabilistic likelihood to getting what we want. When weunderstand the problems, we also face the problem of making transitive decisions. Problems with Intransitive decisions take us out of Utilitarian theory. When we add additional people, the problems are still there, but are now elevated. We see there are exact contradictions, and when we add the problems of evaluating,utilitarianism is more difficult than we had expected. Even Jeremy Bentham’s approach leaves us with problems that cut every way in different directions. This is only a start for Utilitarianism.
69. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Nicole Note What Kind of Relation is There between Ethics and the Surpassing?
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This paper describes the relation between the surpassing and ethics. It first describes how we re-think the surpassing. We divide it into a non-reflective and a reflective level. Next we link it to ethics. The point we want to make is that in order for something to be ethical it needs a surpassing element. Yet not all surpassing elements lead to ethics. Therefore, we will first delineate the surpassing.
70. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Guo Yi Human Nature, Mind and Virtue
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The key issue of traditional theories of human nature in China is De or virtue, Yu or desire and their correlation. It leads to two developing currents: one is the old tradition since Xia, Shang and Zhou, the Three Dynasties which take desire as nature, another is the new tradition later Confucius initiated which take virtue as nature. So the understanding of human nature in early China experienced a process from desire to virtue, or from the instinct of human to the essence of human. Prior to Confucius, nature is desire and instinct. In that time, the theories of human nature has two themes, namely to manage nature by virtue and to explain nature by Qi. Since Lao Zi, virtue was taken as the inner essence of human. Later Confucius further to take virtue as nature directly, so completes the fundamental transformation of traditional theory of human nature. This is the source of the idea nature of reason and the origin of the theory nature is good. Zisi advocated “what Heaven has conferred is called the nature” to promote the new tradition, and named desire as “the inner”. The new excavated bamboo book Xing Zi Ming Chu not only developed the idea of “the inner” of Zisi, but also further to restore desire as nature, and constructed a unique system of outer moral apriorism for it. Shortly afterward, Mencius turns this trend and advocates none but the four beginnings is nature, desire only is impartment, therefore he develops the new tradition to extremes. Even though, before the period between Tang and Song dynasties, the mainstream of the theory of human nature in China was the oldtradition, and that the new tradition merely like a flash in the pan. In fact, the dualism of human nature in Song and Ming dynasties carried on the old tradition, and at the same time, succeeded the new tradition, and put them into a unified thought system.
71. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Maria Dimitrova Emmanuel Levinas: Time and Responsibility
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The present paper aims to view three ways of thinking time by Emmanuel Levinas. We distinguish existential, historical, and eschatological time demonstrating how they are connected with his central notion of responsibility toward the Other. The following analysis reorders and interprets what Levinas has said in response of Martin Heidegger’s and Hegel’s position. The text does not make any other claims but aims to offer a possible reading and exegesis of Levinas’s philosophy and open a further discussion on these topics.
72. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Donald C. Hubin The Limits of Consequentialism
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Modern consequentialism is a very broad theory. Consequentialists can invoke a distribution sensitive theory of value to address the issues of distributive justice that bedeviled utilitarianism. They can attach intrinsic moral value to such acts truth-telling and promise-keeping and, so, acknowledge the essential moral significance of such acts in a way that classical utilitarianism could not. It can appear that there are no limits to consequentialism’s ability to respond to the criticisms against utilitarian theories by embracing a sophisticated theory of value. But there are limits. They are imposed by consequentialism’s commitment to ground considerations of rightness solely on considerations of goodness. Some consequentialists have attempted to incorporate elements of guilt and desert into the theory of value. This can be done, consistent with consequentialist scruples, only if these notions can be analyzed without appeal to deontic concepts such as right and wrong. I analyze the problem consequentialists face and suggest a way incorporate notions of guilt and desert in a theory of value without relying in any fundamental way on concepts of right and wrong action.
73. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Sunny Yang Moral Emotions and Thick Ethical Concepts: A Critical Notice of Gibbard’s Non-Reductive Noncognitivism.
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My aim in this paper is to illuminate the limitations of adopting thick ethical concepts to support the rationality of moral emotion. To this end, I shall first of all concentrate on whether emotions, especially moral emotions are thick concepts and can be analysed into both evaluative and descriptive components. Secondly,I shall examine Gibbard’s thesis that to judge an act wrong is to think guilt and anger warranted. I then raise the following question. If we identify moral considerations with anger in particular, it overly emphasizes one seemingly arbitrary emotion. In other words, I doubt whether ‘other’s anger’ can be the general concept corresponding to thick concepts such as courage or generosity. My doubt about the objectivity of Gibbard’s moral emotion depends on Bernard Williams’doubt about ethical objectivity in terms of a critical notice of the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts. Finally, I shall pose a challenge to the distinction between thick and thin ethical concepts on the ground that it is not in fact a clear one. I shall argue that it is impossible clearly to classify various ethical concepts either as thick or thin. This is because, I shall argue, as Scheffler points out, “any division of ethical concepts into the two categories of the thick and the thin is itself a considerable oversimplication.” Indeed, I shall argue, our ethical vocabulary is tragically rich with an irreconcilable plurality of values. If my analysis is right, I argue Gibbard’s attempt to appeal to thick concepts to explain the rationality of moral emotion is open to question.
74. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Heiner F. Klemme Hume’s Law reconsidered
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In this talk, Hume’s distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in the Treatise of Human Nature will be discussed. It will be argued that Hume accuses previous moral philosophers neither of committing a logical error in their reasoning, nor of falling short of a possible deduction of an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ because of false assumptions. Rather, Hume argues that these philosophers have an incorrect notion of reason: By means of reason, we do not discover eternal moral truths, and also, reason does not motivate us. According to Hume, reason reveals only causal relations that exist between external facts and our emotions, which are facts as well. The ‘ought’ is located just in our emotions and not in the things which evoke the moral emotions inside us.
75. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Kyungsuk Choi “Bioethics” as a New Challenge to Philosophy
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The advance of medical and biological science and technology has presented us with new ethical and legal issues. Is embryonic stem cell research morally justified and legally allowed? What moral status do embryos have? Who can be a morally appropriate user of In Vitro fertilization? Who can use donated sperm and/or egg? What is the scope of reproductive liberty?” What is the meaning of a family and that of reproduction? How far does our genetic intervention go?”Scientists, lawyers, and laymen are waiting for clear answers from philosophers. Unfortunately, philosophers have not seemed to give satisfactory answers to them. We may have various reasons. One of main reasons, however, seems to me that the above philosophical questions have not been the main research topics for philosophers since philosophy gave up metaphysical and/or religious questions. Thus, I argue that biomedical ethical issues urge philosophers tochange the philosopher’s attitude of doing philosophy. Those issues make them consider and rethink our fundamental concepts of life, death, family, and values pursued by human beings. In addition, it is easy to find conflicting ethical and philosophical answers to the above questions. Thus, it is very hard to reach consensus on the above ethical issues. This makes philosophers consider how we make a group decision over ethical issues showing conflicting but reasonable ethical answers in a plural society. This requires philosophers, especially scholars of ethics, develop a new ethics and its relevant concepts. This ethics must be able to work in a plural society where reasonable comprehensive belief systems coexist. In these respects, I argue that bioethics has to struggle with a newchallenge to philosophy.
76. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Kenneth Shockley The Agent Relativity of Directed Reasons
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Directed reasons are reasons that rely for their normative significance on the authority one individual has with respect to another. Acts such as promising seem to generate such reasons. These reasons seem paradigmatically agent relative: they do not hold for all agents. This paper provides a defense of the claim that theform of agent relativism seemingly required by directed reasons is innocuous, and poses no general problem for a practice dependent account of directed reasons, and, therefore, for consequentialism. While the position I present does not constitute a complete teleological account of value, it points toward a way of integrating directed reasons into a practice-based account of value. The position presented also remains consistent with the so called Compelling Idea that often motivates consequentialism: it is always permissible for an agent to do what will lead to the outcome that is best.
77. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Lambert Nieme Par-delà Kant et Hans Jonas: L’Éthique de la Visibilité dans l’Invisible
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L’existant humain est par essence un être-au-monde. Cette dimension ontologique (pré)suppose une réalité ontique, à savoir la nature comme espace de visibilité de notre existence. Cependant, le pouvoir technologique défigure cette nature et se retourne contre l’homme au point que même l’éthique traditionnelle devient inopérante face aux défis de ce pouvoir. C’est à juste titre que Hans Jonas soutient que la réflexion éthique doit cesser de s’occuper uniquement de l’action humaine en rapport avec les hommes entre eux pour s’intéresser à l’homme comme une force agissante au sein de la nature. Ainsi, contrairement à Kant, Jonas pose les effets de l’acte comme condition de sa moralité. Et pourtant, il nous semble que la disposition intérieure du sujet agissant, la volonté bonne,n’est pas non plus à négliger. D’où la pertinence de l’impératif de l’éthique de la visibilité dans l’invisible qui réconcilie les deux positions : Agis de telle sorte que ton acte, sous-tendu par une intention pure, produise des effets compatibles avec la permanence d’une vie authentiquement humaine sur terre en assurant ainsi ta visibilité dans l’invisible. L’inflexion de cet impératif dans la praxis quotidienne passe par l’éducation ; laquelle doit s’organiser autour de trois principes cardinaux, à savoir : le principe de préséance de la vie, le principe d’interaction des générations et le principe de discontinuité des antivaleurs.
78. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Mohsen Javadi Moral Epistemology in Islamic Theology
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In this paper I will discuss the main approaches of moral epistemology in the major sects of Islamic theology; the Mu’tazilah and Shi‘ite, who formulated rationalistic ethical system between the eighth and tenth centuries, and the Ash‘arites, who developed a voluntaristic system of morality. At first the answer of Mu’tazila and Shi‘ite to the main question of moral epistemology namely the justification of moral beliefs will be discussed and compared with the intuitionism of Western ethics. Secondly the voluntarism of Ash‘arite concerning the moral knowledge will be discussed and rejected.
79. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Joon Ho Kang Utilitarianism: A Standard of Rightness or a Decision Procedure
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Exploiting the apparent paradox that utility maximization will not be achieved by adopting the strategy of maximizing utility, Indirect Utilitarianism denies that the right decision which maximizes the probable good can always be identified by the direct application of the criterion of rightness. In this view, generally speaking, Utility is characterized as providing merely a standard of evaluation or an “esoteric” criterion of right conduct, and not a substantive decision procedure in practical situations. This characterization of utilitarianism as an esoteric morality may have certain advantages for avoiding central objections to utilitarianism that arise when the Principle of Utility becomes a decision procedure which governs the moral deliberation of most people, i.e., when it becomes an “exoteric” morality. If a utilitarian takes seriously the “publicity condition” or being the “public moral basis of society” which Rawls has held to be a conceptual condition for a plausiblemoral theory, however, the indirect view of utilitarianism may not be seen as so attractive to the utilitarian. For the damage to utilitarianism as a whole inflicted by giving up on being a public moral basis of society, from a strategic point of view, may be greater than the protection the indirect view has hopefully promised.
80. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Xinyan Jiang Moral Perception and Its Evaluative Dimension
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Moral Perception is the moral agent’s perception of the morally significant situation. In recent decades, the question about the role of moral perception in the moral life has drawn more and more attention in contemporary ethical theories. It has been widely acknowledged that the virtuous person perceives a given morally significant situation differently from others. But, current discussions of moral perception have been focused on the cognitive function of moral perception i.e., moral perception's making a certain feature of a given situation salient for the agent, but there is not much that has been said about the evaluative nature of moral perception, i.e., moral perception's offering the agent a certain evaluation of the saliently perceived feature of a given situation. This paper is intended to show that moral perception has both cognitive and evaluative dimensions. More specifically, it argues that moral perception is not only a matter of saliently seeing certain features of a morally significant situation but also a matter of evaluating these features. It is such an integration of cognitive and evaluative dimensions of moral perception that provides with the agent motivational power and makes her action possible.