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61. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
José Ruiz Fernández Wittgenstein’s phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s phenomenological relevance
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After interpreting some of the passages in which Wittgenstein refers to phenomenology, this paper tries to clarify why Wittgenstein came to conclude that his work had to be ultimately understood in terms of phenomenology. Secondly, the paper discusses the phenomenological relevance of some of Wittgenstein’s views on language.
62. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Alex Orenstein Ontological Arguments
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There are good reasons for being dissatisfied with standard criticisms of the various arguments, all of which are referred to as being “The Ontological Argument”. While refutation by logical analogy is compelling, it merely teaches us that something is amiss. It does not specify the exact nature of the flaw. The first part of this paper examines and rejects several well-known attempts at refuting and clarifying the argument(s). The second part attempts to provide a principled uniform account of what is wrong by treating the arguments as resting on definitions. Then, by bringing to bear Ajdukiewicz’s exhaustive classification of definitions, we arrive at a unified account of the flaw common to such arguments. In effect we have an explication of the dictum that one cannot define into existence.
63. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Jan A. Kłoczowski Leszek Kołakowski (1927-2009)
64. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Elżbieta Łukasiewicz Husserl’s Lebenswelt and the problem of spatial cognition – in search of universals
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Perception and conceptualization of space are some of the most basic elements of human cognition. It has been long assumed that human spatial thinkingand frames of reference used to grasp and describe the location of an object in relation to other objects are of universal nature and so are projected in naturallanguages in basically the same manner; three principal dimensions in egocentric perceptual space were distinguished: up-down, front-back and left-right, reflecting our biological make-up. If differences in spatial terminology were observed, they were relegated to surface structure phenomena, but were not regarded as differences in perceptual and conceptual representations in the human mind. That belief in the universal perception of spatial relations among humans was ofconsiderable importance for some philosophical theories, also for Husserl’s conception of the Lebenswelt a priori and his defence of the validity of scientificpropositions and of absolute truth. It now appears that the extent of the diversity in spatial thinking has been drastically underestimated (Levinson 2003), but it does not follow that Husserl’s intuitions regarding the existence of universal constituents in incompatible Lebenswelt experiences were necessarily wrong.
65. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Piotr Sikora Ateism, Agnosticism, and Apothatic Theism
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In this paper, I propose a specific version of theism which I would call apophatic theism. In the first part of the paper, I argue that this in the only tenableversion of theism. Due to the fact that it may seem indistinguishable from a very strong form of agnosticism (or atheism understood in the etymological sense of the word: as a-theism where ‘a’ means ‘without’), in the second part of my paper, I try to distinguish apophatic theism from agnosticism (or a-theism), and from so called “Wittgensteinian” view of religion, which also may seem similar to the position I propose.
66. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Stephen Palmquist The Kantian Grounding of Einstein’s Worldview: (I) The Early Influence of Kant’s System of Perspectives
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Recent perspectival interpretations of Kant suggest a way of relating his epistemology to empirical science that makes it plausible to regard Einstein’stheory of relativity as having a Kantian grounding. This first of two articles exploring this topic focuses on how the foregoing hypothesis accounts for variousresonances between Kant’s philosophy and Einstein’s science. The great attention young Einstein paid to Kant in his early intellectual development demonstrates the plausibility of this hypothesis, while certain features of Einstein’s cultural-political context account for his reluctance to acknowledge Kant’s influence, even though contemporary philosophers who regarded themselves as Kantians urged him to do so. The sequel argues that this Kantian grounding probably had a formative influence not only on Einstein’s discovery of the theory of relativity and his view of the nature of science, but also on his quasi-mystical, religious disposition.
67. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Eric Wiland The Limits of Maximization: Actions, Decision Procedures, and Meta-Decision Procedures
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A nagging problem for the consequentialist is the fact that a person who chooses the action-option that seems to her to maximize good consequences all toooften does not produce consequences as good as she would have produced had she thought about her decision in some other fashion. In response, indirect consequentialists typically recommend that one take advantage of whatever benefits the employment of a nonconsequentialist decision procedure may provide. But I argue here that the consequentialist cannot straightforwardly appropriate the decision procedures of those averse to consequentialism. I show that indirect consequentialists treat decision procedures the very same way direct consequentialists treat actions, and thus all of the reasons why direct consequentialists fail to act as well as they can likewise plague the indirect consequentialists’ attempts to decide as well as they can. So despite the wishes of the indirect theorists, consequentialism turns out to be self-defeating after all.
68. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Massimiliano Vignolo Does Deflationism Lead Necessarily to Minimalism about Truth-Aptness?
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I argue that deflationism about truth does not imply minimalism about truthaptness. The condition for truth-aptness can be strengthened and the disquotationalschema restricted without resorting to any inflationary conception of truth-theoretic notions.
69. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Dale Jacquette Liar Paradox and Substitution into Intensional Contexts
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John Barker, in two recent essays, raises a variety of intriguing criticisms to challenge my interpretation of the liar paradox and the type of solution I proposein ‘Denying the Liar’ and ‘Denying the Liar Reaffirmed.’ Barker continues to believe that I have misunderstood the logical structure of the liar sentence and itsexpression, and that as a result my solution misfires. I shall try to show that on the contrary my analysis is correct, and that Barker does not properly grasp what mysolution to the liar paradox involves. Additionally, I argue that Barker makes fundamental errors in the explanation of liar sentence formulations in intensional contexts and in the classical metatheory he invokes to support his criticisms.
70. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Barbro Fröding On the importance of treating oneself well
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This article challenges the common assumption that the character virtues can be divided into two groups, one consisting of other-regarding virtues and oneof self-regarding virtues. On such accounts the other-regarding virtues are often said to focus on advancing the good of others, whereas the self-regarding virtuesprimarily benefit the agent herself. Here, however, it will be shown that virtues like friendship, particular justice, even temper and benevolence—traditionally seen as other-regarding—all contain strong self-regarding aspects. The central claim of the article is that these self-regarding aspects of the other-regarding virtues arenecessary components of complete virtue. Given the scope of these virtues, an agent has to act virtuously in her dealings with herself as well as with others inorder to qualify as fully virtuous. While this account draws on a number of Aristotelian ideas it should be noted that it is not intended as an authoritative, or exegetic, reading of Aristotle.
71. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Jeff Mitscherling Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Distinction between Consciousness and the Real World in Husserl and Ingarden
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While Ingarden makes only infrequent reference to Aristotle, The Philosopher’s presence can be discerned throughout his published works. Perhaps mostsignificantly, when Ingarden returned to work on Controversy over the Existence of the World in 1938, he immersed himself in the study of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and the entire framework of Controversy appears to have been inspired by reflection on central Aristotelian concepts. Ingarden’s understanding of the Aristotelian conception of the relation between form and matter, and indeed the Aristotelian character of Ingarden’s ontology as a whole, stands in sharp contrast not only to Husserl’s transcendental idealism, but also to the materialist orientation of current mainstream research in cognitive science. It is hoped that this brief examination might serve to introduce to this research a realist phenomenological orientation that is capable of embracing and elucidating insights from both materialist and idealist approaches to the study of cognition.
72. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski Composed Objects, Internal Relations, and Purely Intentional Negativity. Ingarden’s Theory of States of Affairs
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Ingarden’s official ontology of states of affairs is by no means reductionist. According to him there are states of affairs, but they are ontologically dependent onother entities. There are certain classical arguments for the introduction of states of affairs as extra entities over and above the nominal objects, that can be labelled “the problem of composition,” “the problem of relation” and “the problem of negation.” To the first two Ingarden proposes rather traditional solutions, while his treatment of negation proves to be original and interesting. Ingarden doesn’t deny the existence of negative states of affairs altogether, but he (i) accepts only a restricted group of them and (ii) ascribes to them an extremely weak mode of being. Negative states of affairs are construed as supervenient entities, and their supervenience-basis involves two factors: on the one hand the appropriate positive states of affairs, and on the other hand certain mental acts of conscious subjects. They enjoy thus a curious “half-subjective” mode of being.
73. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Victor Kocay An Evaluation of Ingardenian Values
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From recent work on Ingarden it is apparent that values are central to his philosophy, even in the context of his realist ontology. In this evaluation of Ingarden’s work we consider his principal philosophical notions (i.e. his realist ontology, his aesthetics, his reflections on language, and his consideration of values) in the light of what Nietzsche referred to in his own philosophy as the “reevaluation” or the “inversion” of all values. It is argued that two of Ingarden’s most fundamental values are the notion of communication and the aesthetic dimension of thought.
74. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Jan Woleński Meaningfulness, Meaninglessness and Language-Hierarchies: Some Lessons from Ingarden’s Criticism of the Verifiability Principle
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Roman Ingarden offered a strong criticism of the verifiability principle in his talk delivered at the 8th International Congress in Prague in 1934. Ingarden argued that this principle either violates itself or smuggles a hidden sense. In this paper I show that Ingarden-like arguments about smuggled (but this pejorative qualification is skipped) meaning apply not only to the criteria of sense, but also to other semantic assertions within language-hierarchies in Tarski’s sense.
75. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Ingvar Johansson Fictions and the Spatiotemporal World—in the Light of Ingarden
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The paper is an attempt to take Ingarden’s unfinished critique of idealism one step further. It puts forward a schematic solution to the external-world realist’sproblem of how to explain the fact that we can identify and re-identify fictions, entities that in one sense do not exist. The solution contains three proposals: to accept, with Husserl and Ingarden, that there are universals with intentionality (Husserl’s “intentional essences”), to accept, contra Husserl and Ingarden, an immanent realism for universals, and to accept Ingarden’s view that there is a mode of being distinct from those put forward in traditional metaphysics, that of purely intentional being. Together, these views imply that all the instances of a specific intentional universal are directed towards the same intentional object; be this object a really existing object or a fiction, a purely intentional being.
76. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Władysław Stróżewski Roman Ingarden: Life and Philosophy
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My paper is devoted to the most important and fundamental issues of Roman Ingarden’s philosophy, including the contention between idealism and realism, the controversy between objectivism and subjectivism in the area of axiology, the problem of validity of cognition, and the structure and role of language. I argue for the claim that Ingarden solved several specific philosophical problems (like, for instance, the issue of causality, theory of systems, etc.) and he also frequently shed new light on various issues that had been discussed throughout the history of philosophy, showing how important and up to date they were. Moreover, it is worthy to say that his philosophy is marked by the precise and subtle character of the analyses and the range of the examined problems. It is the whole in which every specific problem finds a proper place for itself.
77. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Marek Piwowarczyk Endurance and Temporality
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In the article I compare two theories of existence in time: Simons’s conception of continuants and occurrents and Ingarden’s ontology of temporally determined objects (i.e. objects enduring in time, processes and events). They can be regarded as different positions in the controversy over substantialism. The main problem of this controversy can be expressed by the question: what is the primary way of being in time—endurance or perdurance? Ingarden and Simons admit that there exist objects characterized by both ways of being but for Simons, unlike for Ingarden, perdurants are the basic objects which the world is composed of. My aim is not to assess both ontologies but to use the comparison of them as the basis of a reconstruction of the principal problems contained in the controversy over substantialism.
78. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk Roman Ingarden: Forty Years Later
79. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Roberto Poli Spheres of Being and the Network of Ontological Dependencies
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Ontological categories form a network of ties of dependence. In this regard, the richest source of distinctions consists in the medieval discussion on the divisions of being. After a preliminary examination of some of those divisions, the paper pays attention to Roman Ingarden’s criteria for classifying the various types of ontological dependence. The following are the main conclusions that can be drawn from this exercise. Ingarden suggests that (1) the most general principles framing the categories of particulars are based on couples of mutually opposed principles; (2) the most general among these couples of principles appear to be based on three different types of modalities; (3) subsequent couples of opposed principles do not seem to require the introduction of further types of modalities, and (4) the overall typology shows that there are three spheres of being, respectively composed of ideal entities, real entities and intentional entities as contents of psychological acts.
80. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Nancy Billias Ingarden and Badiou: A Meeting at the Crossroads
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In its examination of the intersection of ethics and ontology, Roman Ingarden’s philosophy bears a striking resemblance to the thought of the contemporaryFrench philosopher Alain Badiou. Though no formal influence is claimed, this paper explores several ways in which Badiou’s theory of the event and existential agency is foreshadowed in the writings of Ingarden. In so doing, the author suggests the continued importance of this unjustly neglected philosopher for contemporary thinking on questions of value.