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61. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 5 > Issue: Part 2
Mark A. Hector, Judith E. Hector Walt Whitman, Nursing, and Phenomenology
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Each age has its sick and wounded and those who provide them nursing care. This paper links together “The Wound Dresser,” a poem by the Civil War nurse Walt Whitman, a musical composition by John Adams that is based on the poem, and a book on nursing research and practice. The poem, the musical composition, and the book are described and related from the perspective of phenomenology.
62. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
Panos Theodorou Heidegger’s Search for a Phenomenological Fundamental Ontology in his 1919 WS, vis-a-vis the Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Values
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It has already been remarked that Heidegger’s early Kriegsnotsemester of 1919 plays an important role in the development of his project toward a phenomenological Fundamental Ontology, which would elucidate the meaning of “Being as such.” However, both the reason why this happens and why it eventually fails appear to have been poorly understood. In this paper, I initially present the meaning of Heidegger’s effort, in that ‘semester,’ to build philosophy as a genuinely “primordial science.” Then, I explain the sense in which the neo-Kantian philosophy of values became a crucial constituent of his inspiration. In this direction, Heidegger’s thought experiment with the “African aboriginal” is examined and placed at the right position within his overall search for the “primal some thing” qua critical “formal indication” in the search and phenomenologization of “Being as such.” Finally, I present three serious difficulties that make this early attempt by Heidegger phenomenologically flawed and probably lead him to the new orientations of Being and Time.
63. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
Dean Komel On European Dialogue
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The question of the contemporaneity of Europe appears in the context of dialogue on the common European future, which, on the one hand is an achievement of the encounter of diverse cultural languages and, on the other, dictated through reflection on what is re-establishing the Europe of today as a world view. Views on “opening the future” and “enabling development” cannot be mutually harmonized, since there is a lack of experience of contemporaneity in the jointing of horizons. From this experience also comes the common interest in European dialogue. The diversity of European languages does not prove to be an obstacle to re-establishing this dialogue, but its vital condition. It is, namely, the historically mediated possibility that brings the essential diff erence into the uniform process of the expansion of power without difference.
64. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
Nicoleta Szabo The Dark Face of Praxis and Enlarged Pragmatism: Alfred Schütz and Wong Kar-wai
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The problem of the action’s meaning for the agent that executes it constitutes a complicated matter in terms of a phenomenology of action. Our task in this paper is to analyze the acts of consciousness that contribute to the constitution of this meaning, underlying two shortcomings with which Alfred Schütz struggled: the teleocratic character of the action’s project and, respectively, the “radical or vulgar” pragmatism, which represents the ordinary frame of reference for a pragmatic theory of action. The solutions proposed by Schütz—the “praxial” aspect of the ongoing deed, the importance of imposed relevances and a different understanding of pragmatism—will be scrutinized using a short case study occasioned by some interesting remarks of the film director Wong Kar-wai regarding his way of making films without a proper project.
65. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
Pedro M. S. Alves Image-Consciousness and Fantasy: The ego of observation and the ego of reverie
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In this paper I intend to understand from a phenomenological point of view the relationship between figurative consciousness and other non-original presentations, such as expectations, remembrances or fantasies. My analysis is focused on the difference between figurative consciousness, on the one hand, and a modality of fantasy that I call “reverie” (or daydream consciousness), on the other hand. I stress that figurative consciousness implies a pure observational ego, whereas reverie is a free construction of the ego’s own personal story. The freedom of reverie has, nevertheless, some important constraints. I emphasize the constraints that come from the passive and affective life of the ego. Finally, I propose new criteria for the phenomenological differentiation between several kinds of acts of non-original presentations (Vergegenwärtigungen).
66. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
Iris Aravot On the In-Between of Architectural Design
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The paper suggests that architectural-making, a process of research in practice, and itself bridging between the space of experience and the horizon of expectations, corresponds to phenomenology as a method of inquiry. This includes architectural phases parallel to epoché, phenomenological reduction, free variations, transcendental intuition of the essence, and description. The paper describes the in-between, its two edges, experience and expectations, and their mutual influences through the process of architectural making. Examples from the design studio and professional literature illustrate the argumentation. The in-between is presented as structured, notably having a depth—the ineffable origin of creativity. In conclusion, the paper suggests that the edges and the in-between are temporary configurations in a flux, wherein the architect makes use of his / her most inner resources, as a contribution to the meta mor phosis and revitalization of his / her culture.
67. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
Dmitri Ginev On the critique of ethnomethodology from the viewpoint of hermeneutic phenomenology
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Ethnomethodological studies of science proved to be a particular stage in the development of ethnomethodology. In the same vein, hermeneutics of scientific research belongs to the scope of contemporary hermeneutic phenomenology. The present paper tries to reveal deficiencies in the ethnomethodological description of everyday practices taking place in the “life-worlds” of scientific communities. On the author’s main claim, these deficiencies can be overcome by both revising and supplementing the ethnomethodological description. The outcome of this revision/supplementation is a sort of “double hermeneutics”—interpretative studies of science’s interpretative practices.
68. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
Andrea Altobrando Subjectivity, Nature and Freedom: An itinerary through Husserl’s philosophy
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In this paper I try to understand the relationship between nature and subjectivity from a phenomenological (mainly Husserlian) perspective and to bring into focus the consequences of this relationship to the problem of human freedom. Husserl did not deeply explore the concept of freedom in almost any of his works and manuscripts, i.e. he never really gave a definition and a thorough analysis of freedom. Nevertheless it is quite clear that freedom plays a peculiar role in many strategic points of his philosophy. We can say even more: the entire phenomenological enterprise is funded on freedom, since the so called “phenomenological reduction” is, according to Husserl himself, the result of an absolutely free act. But if freedom is necessary in order to have a genuine philosophical and phenomenological enquiry, shouldn’t this “condition of possibility” be queried and eventually elucidated? Or is freedom something which remains outside the boundaries of phenomenological investigation? I think that by following Husserl’s inquiries into the different levels of constitution of subjectivity it is possible to produce evidence in support of the claim that freedom is an apodictic fact, but a fact which, if correctly understood, has conditions as well as consequences which should not be neglected if we don’t want to miss freedom itself in our “human existence”.
69. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
Agustín Serrano de Haro Is Pain an Intentional Experience?
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My paper focuses on the main categories that phenomenology has employed to describe physical pain. I try to show that the early assumption of Stumpf`s concept of “affective sensations” (Gefühlempfindungen) faced strong descriptive difficulties, that seem to point to a sort of noematic character of pain: pain in its bodily location is the pole of a central attention, or at least of a conscious co-attention. But at the same time it is impossible to avoid the evidence that pain consciousness is not a perceptive grasp of one’s body, but a feeling of instantaneous or continuous hurting. The provisional thesis may be that the three main categories of Husserlian analysis of intentionality: hyletic layer, noetic intention, and noematic kern are needed in the basic description of pain experience, but they are required without any internal division—and this is the very core of the problem.
70. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
Daniel Marcelle The Great Gurwitsch-Follesdal Debate concerning the Noema: The Connection of the Conceptual to the Perceptual
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The Noema has enjoyed a tremendous debate in the history of phenomenology from the time of the 1960s to the present. The poles of this debate generally are Aron Gurwitsch and his “perceptual noema,” on the one side, and Dagfinn Follesdal’s noema as a sense, on the other. While Gurwitsch and Follesdal never directly debated, named, or impugned one another, these activities were eagerly taken care of by many others taking one side or another. First, I explore this debate and then in the end show that Gurwitsch’s position has been rendered into a kind of straw man. I then show how Gurwitsch’s understanding of the noema meets several of Follesdal’s challenging theses. Thus, I make a defense of Gurwitsch by show ing that his noema is very robust because not only is the perceptual noema amenable to gestalt organization, but that it is also conceptualizable. I finish by exploring these dimensions and describing the manner and importance of the conceptualization of the perceptual noema.
71. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 3
Introduction
72. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Zheng Yujian Re-enchantment of Nature: McDowell and Merleau-Ponty on Perception
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McDowell’s Mind and World bears unique importance in terms of re-focusing the contemporary empiricist problematics on a Kantian style inquiry: how can unconceptualized sense data, thus inhabiting the space of causes, become a resident of the space of reasons? By abandoning a common presupposition underlying the two dichotomous yet oscillating positions (the Myth of Given vs. a Davidsonian coherentism), the conceptual content becomes boundless. This “boundless” implies that nature is not beyond or alien to human conceptuality or rationality, or that our experiential engagement with natural objects is permeated with normative spontaneity, the same faculty for our presumed freedom. That is a main aspect of re-enchanting nature in McDowell.Merleau-Ponty opposes the disenchanting, reductive empiricism in his well-known Phenomenology of Perception. Perception never occurs in the vacuum of pre-existing meanings. Human beings are “condemned to meaning”: we have no choice but to acknowledge the genetic dependency of our full-fledged rational accomplishments on a pre-rational or pre-objective realm. This realm is not content-bleak or rationally empty but rather has its own lived-through “logic,” which is displayable to the appropriate perceptual stance.In this paper I’ll try to put McDowell and Merleau-Ponty in comparative focus so that weakness or limitation in each, while attempting to re-enchant nature from the vantage point of perception, can be seen in a more illuminative way. An evolutionary dimension, as well as a retrospective perspective, of the implicit meaning in human/animal perception will be revealed in my critical comparison. One upshot of my critique is the following positive thesis: the intentionality of man is the epistemologically legislative condition for nature to be possessed of rational relations (Darwinian reasons), while Mother Nature is the ontologically enabling condition for man to become intentional interpreter (meaning-endower). This deep-seated interdependence between man and nature with regard to reason relations, when well cashed out, will be the ultimate ground for justifying what I call the retrospective enchantment of nature.
73. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Notes on Contributors
74. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Shin Ho-Jae Sensation in Husserl’s Static Phenomenology: Apprehension-Content Scheme and Representation
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This paper will address the concept of sensation in Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Ideas I. In Husserl’s early static phenomenology, sensation was suggested as non-intentional experience, thereby, it has the status of real moment in consciousness, and it plays a role of material for the constitution of object, and also it functions as the representative content of the intentional object. These determinations of sensation converge on the apprehension-content scheme. Especially, this paper will try to reveal the essential structure of the objectifying act in Husserl’s static phenomenology, by systematically clarifying the relation between the scheme in Fifth Logical Investigations (LI5) and the representation through fullness in Sixth Logical Investigations (LI6). This paper will examine this problem with regard to two aspects. One is about what status the sensation occupies within consciousness, and the other is about what role the sensation plays in the constitution of object. In conclusion, the fullness in LI6 is none other than the hyle in LI5. What matters in LI5 is the structure of constitution, in which the apprehension has animating effects on the sensation. On the other hand, what is concerned in LI6 is the structure of fulfillment, by which consciousness achieves to obtain the recognition of an object in such a way that the intended object is represented actually by the act of intuition with sensation. After all, in Husserl’s static phenomenology, sensation is not only the material or hyle for the constitution, but also the content of representation.
75. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Lubica Učník Human Existence: Patočka’s Appropriation of Arendt
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In order to show a different understanding of what it means to be human, in this paper, I will present Jan Patočka’s discussion of human existence. For Patočka, human existence is essentially historical and situational. His reflections proceed from Martin Heidegger’s explanation of the structure of human existence in Sein und Zeit, which Heidegger calls Da-Sein. According to Patočka, Heidegger’s exposition is predicated on a negative human relation to the world; we are originally inauthentic. Yet he forgets to take into account that Da-Sein is a doublet: animal rationale. Patočka appropriates Arendt’s phenomenological account of the human condition in order to critique Heidegger’s account of Da-sein in Being and Time to develop his own understanding of human existence.
76. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Cheung Ching-yuen From Phenomenology of Man to Philosophical Anthropology: Max Scheler’s Turn and its Significance
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Max Scheler (1874-1928) is one of the most original and influential figures in phenomenology. He is also known as the father of modern philosophical anthropology. Scheler’s project is not to develop a strict science or to explore the meaning of being, but to question the fundamental question: what is man, and what is man’s place in nature? In this paper, I shall discuss Scheler’s turn from phenomenology of man to philosophical anthropology, and evaluate the significance of this turn.
77. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Fang Xianghong Europäische Philosophie im zeitgenössischen Festland China
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In contemporary Chinese Mainland emerge a great number of scholars, which specialize in European philosophy, so that nearly all of the European philosophers and philosophical schools are researched. They have translated philosophical works, publicized investigational papers and books and corrected the misunderstandings between these two heterogeneous cultures. The Impact from philosophical ideas goes even beyond the academic circle and extends to the social fields, forming various “fevers”. This article will not only introduce the concerning important figures and events, but also attempt to shed light on a tendency, that is, on an ever deepening dialog between Chinese and western thoughts.
78. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Jung Tae-Chang Husserl’s Criticism of Representationalism in Logical Investigations
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The aim of this paper is to understand Husserl’s criticism of representationalism, especially of Brentano’s. In this investigation, the exact point of Husserl’s criticism of Brentano’s “intentional inexistence” and its meaning about Husserl’s intentionality will be examined.
79. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Kanda Daisuke Language and Inducement
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Our present day experience is becoming increasingly intercultural. In encountering different cultures, we notice mostly the differences in language. The question here comes into focus: How we can give an account of the intercultural experience of language? This paper will inquire as to where we must pay attention in order to deal properly with language in the intercultural experience on the basis of Husserl’s texts. For that purpose, it is necessary to focus on the concept of motivation. Husserl considers motivation as the demand to complement our experiences at each moment. I will call this demand “inducement” and try to make clear the relationship between language and inducement.
80. Phenomenology 2010: Volume > 1
Yu Chung-Chi Introduction to Volume 1