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61. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Scott R. Stroud Śankara and the Challenges of Interpretation: Advaita Vedanta and the Ethical Dilemnnas of the Bhagavad Gita
62. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Panos Eliopoulos The Irrational Self in the Fathers of the PHILOKAUA and in the Zen Buddhist Tradition
63. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Song-Chong Lee Hinduism and Neo-Confucianism on the Ideal Self
64. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Fabio Gironi Śūnyatā and the Zeroing of Being: A reworking of ennpty concepts
65. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Nancy Snow Classical Indian Philosophy of Induction: The Nyāya Viewpoint
66. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 16
Gordon Haist Classical Indian Philosophy of Induction: The Nyāya Viewpoint
67. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Payal Doctor Meaning and Metaphor in the Early Nyāya School
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In the Nyāya school of Classical Indian Philosophy, the concept of word meaning is described in detail; however, the theory of metaphor seems to clash with the theory of word meaning. This paper explores the theory of meaning in the early Nyāya theory and whether metaphor is compatible with it. The Nyāya theory of meaning is a 'basis for application' (pravrttinimitta) model: words pick out references because of the conventions and practices of use. Yet, these words can come to refer to something completely different by pushing off its conventional usage and taking on a metaphorical meaning. If the referent is determined on the basis of the properties it possesses, how it is possible that only some properties are applied to a referent in metaphorical cases when, conventionally, a referent must possess all of the properties before the word is applied to it? This paper will investigate three main questions: 1) what is the nature of a referent according to the Nyāya?; 2) what is the mechanism for metaphorical transfer that allow some properties to transfer and not others?; and 3) what are the philosophical implications of the Naiyāyikas understanding of meaning?
68. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Theodore L. Kneupper J. Krishnamurti's Critique of Religion
69. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Barbara A. Amodio Opening the Temple in the Human Body: The Tantra, Mantra and Yantra of Chakras, Kundalini and Open Parasols
70. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Linda K. Mackey Gandhi, Socrates and Satyagraha
71. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Kisor K. Chakrabarti AAtmatattvaviveka (Analysis of the Nature of the Self) An Annotated Translation: Examination of the Argument from the Effect as Destruction of the Cause
72. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Don Habibi Amartya Sen's Defense of Strong Human Rights
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This essay presents a critical analysis of Sen's theory of human rights. I pay particular attention to his attack on Jeremy Bentham's denunciation of natural rights and the charge that preexisting universal rights are without foundation. I begin by providing some context for understanding Sen's approach to the debate about human rights. I then present a brief overview of rights theory and define the important terms, and also present Bentham's understanding of the 'foundational problem' and why he regards it as a dangerous problem. I offer a short overview of the human rights movement that covers its progress since Bentham's time. I then present a critique of Sen's defense of human rights and conclude that Sen's efforts to invalidate Bentham do not succeed. Bentham's contribution to the debate over human rights remains relevant.
73. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
David W. Long Philosophical Sketches: Prolegomena to any Future Study of Consciousness
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This cross-disciplinary, cross-cultural paper explores and critiques scientific, philosophical, and psychological concepts of consciousness. It embodies many of the ideas I presented at the First International Conference for the Study of Consciousness Within Science in 1990, a gathering of physicists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, all of whom were trying to come to grips with both the experience and the idea of consciousness in their work.
74. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 17
Chandana Chakrabarti Socio-Religious Essays in Advaita Vedanta
75. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
James A. Dunson III The Accidental Optimist: Arthur Schopenhauer, The Veil of Maya, and Moral Philosophy as a Way of Life
76. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti, Stephen H. Phillips Counterinference
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Counterinference is one of five kinds of pseudo-prover (similar to fallacy in Western logic) recognized in the Nyaaya school. Typically in counterinference while one side seeks to prove the thesis that a probandum belongs to an inferential subject because an inferential mark pervaded by the probandum belongs to that subject, an opponent challenges that by arguing that the probandum does not belong to the inferential subject because another inferential mark pervaded by absence (negation) of the probandum belongs to that subject. A common example is: sound is eternal, since it is audible and audibility is pervaded by eternality (i.e. all that is audible is eternal, like sound-ness, the common property of all sound particulars); but sound is non-eternal, since it is originated (by clapping hands, etc.) and all that is originated is non-eternal, like a pot, etc. Critics from other philosophical schools have objected that counterinference is not an additional kind of pseudo-prover. Since it is impossible for an inferential subject both to have and not to have a probandum, either at least one of the inferential marks does not belong to the inferential subject (the fallacy of being unestablished) or at least one of the inferential marks lacks pervasion (the fallacy of deviation) and, accordingly, counterinference should be subsumed under those fallacies. Nyaaya philosophers have responded by pointing out that the formal structure of counterinference is different from that of the other fallacies: in counterinference we have two different inferential marks but not in the other candidates. The epistemic result of counterinference is also different from that of the other fallacies mentioned, it is argued further. Moreover, it is contended (against a Nyaaya faction) that the epistemic result is not doubt as specifically understood in Nyaaya but desire to know the truth about the chosen inferential mark and the probandum. Accordingly, counterinference may be explained as that which provides the ground for inquiring what is the truth about the original inferential mark and its probandum due to presentation of an inferential assimilation (paraamarsha) that contradicts the original inferential assimilation. The discussion yields also a broader normative principle that contradiction or counterproof provides the epistemic ground for further inquiry even if there is proof. The selection is from the Tattva-cintaa-maNi, the canonical Navya-Nyaaya work of GaMgesha (14th century CE?). The selection is from a large work and presupposes some things explained elsewhere in the text. Further, though written with great precision the work paradoxically belongs to the old Indian philosophical oral tradition in which a beginner is expected to read it with the help of additional information supplied by an expert. Hence paying close attention to what is implied in the context and supplementing certain ideas is necessary for interpretation and understanding.
77. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
L. Brooke Schueneman Tragedy and Reconciliation in the RaamaayaNa
78. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
J. Randall Groves The Aryan Hypothesis and Indian Identity: A Case Study in the Postmodern Pathology of National Identity
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In this paper I trace various uses of the Aryan hypothesis by different groups of Indian and non-Indian scholars of Indian history in order to show how this hypothesis has taken several forms as it was put to use in the construction of Indian identity. These constructions of Indian identity will show that India is suffering a pathology of identity in response to the modern and postmodern stresses it is undergoing. India is not alone in its present postmodern pathology. We see the same phenomenon in various parts of the world with the conservative and religious revivals in the Islamic world, Israel and the United States.
79. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
Ilana Maymind A Comparative Case Study: Memory, Law and Morality
80. Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion: Volume > 18
Michael Yudanin Merciless Justice: The Dialectic of the Universal and the Particular in Kantian Ethics, Competitive Games, and Bhagavad Gîtâ
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Morality is traditionally understood as comprised of two components: justice and mercy. The first component, justice, the universal component of the form, is frequently seen as foundational for any moral system . which poses a challenge of explaining the second component, mercy, the particular component of content. Kantian ethics provides an example of this approach. After formulating his universalist theory of ethics in the Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals and further developing it in the Critique of practical reason, he attempts to use it in order to establish the morality of mercy in the Metaphysics of morals. Yet can universal morality of justice necessitate particular ethics of mercy? Using the example of competitive games, the relations between the ethics of justice and that of mercy are demonstrated, and it is shown that the former does not lead to the latter. Moreover, the universality of the rules of moral behavior can serve as a form for blatant brutality. Analyzing the characteristics of particular morality, we can conclude that physical humanity of the moral object, perceived as such by the subject, is a required condition for mercy. Removal of object.s humanity is a necessary step toward an ethical system that allows cruelty . a system that can still be based on universal moral rules. Bhagavad Gîtâ, on the other hand, can be seen as an example of combining nî?kâmakarma, the formal, universal ethics of desireless action, with a variety of particular motivations originating in the nature and social context of the moral agent.