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61. Chiasmi International: Volume > 15
Eliška Luhanová La non-présence présente: structure de l’experience chez Merleau-Ponty et Patočka
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The present paper is based on an assumption that M. Merleau-Ponty and J. Patočka penetrate by their proper ways into a specific domain constituted by the mutual relations between the me and all the beings which are given to it where a fundamental ontological reciprocity between the me and the world appears. In our first part, we try to ensure an access to this domain by using the phenomenological method, namely, the analysis of experience. We start from the elementary phenomenological fact that what is given in experience transcends its actual empirical donation, then we proceed to determine the content of this transcendence and propose the concept of the transempirical nature of beings: the being transcends every single actual experience, but not every possible experience. On this ground, we try to reconstruct the general ontological basis that leads us inevitably to the limits of phenomenology. Nevertheless, in our second part, we try to demonstrate – in the form of a hypothesis in progress – that we can probably avoid trespassing on the limits of metaphysics if we agree to trespass on the borders between phenomenology and structuralism, in the sense of a structural ontology of possibilities.
62. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Anna Caterina Dalmasso Le médium visible. Interface opaque et immersivité non mimétique
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The relation of reciprocal co-implication that Merleau-Ponty formulates—and on which he insists throughout his work—between sense and the sensible, perception and expression, and then visible and invisible, transforms the way in which one conceives of the medium. Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics reveals an idea of the medium as a support that erases itself in the act of conveying the signification and also shakes the direct correlation between transparency and mimetic simulation.Understood as the sensible thickness of the body opening onto the world, then as depth and écart that catalyzes vision, the medium, then, furnishes one of the definitions of flesh, as the element of auto-mediation: connective tissue or fabric of communication that is at once écart and internal difference. Merleau-Ponty conceives of the medium as both that which renders and that which is rendered visible. It is therefore no longer an intermediary; it ceases to be an invisible mediator and becomes the opaque element that reveals in filigree the movement of gestaltic difference.It is from such a Merleau-Pontian conception of medium that one can begin to elaborate the complex issues posed by mediality in the post-medial age. The idea of a “visible medium” permits us to break with the confl ation of the simulation’s immersive effect and performance, which often informs the rhetoric concerning medias and new technologies, in order rather to think of an “opaque interface” or an “non-mimetic immersivity.” From such a conception of mediality we can equally understand the phenomenon of numerical convergence, not as the accomplishment of the suppression or dematerialization of the medium, as is the case with traditional theories, but as the point of departure for a return to the body as the condition of possibility for every aesthetic experience.
63. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Koji Hirose Instituer le chiasme : à partir du cours sur Hegel de Maurice Merleau-Ponty
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In the 1958-1959 Collège de France course, Merleau-Ponty expounds a detailed commentary on the last paragraphs of the Einleitung from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. We examine in what sense this course has developed the notions that he was in the process of defining, notions such as “chiasm,” “reversibility,” “depth,” and “flesh.”What seems crucial in this course is to clearly define good ambiguity as opposed to bad ambiguity, that is, to the simple mixture of finitude and universality, of interiority and exteriority. It is a question then of revealing, even within Hegelian thought, the operation, although unstable, of good ambiguity and of instituting it beyond the distinction between anthropology and logic without a return to naturalism.It should first be noted that consciousness is for Hegel violence against itself, it gives itself its measure, such that the distinction between measuring and measured is internal to it. By insisting on this “reversibility” of the measuring and the measured, Merleau-Ponty comes to emphasize that the self-relation of consciousness is simultaneously its opening onto a transcendent – an opening whereby it learns something. This leads him to define “the new ontological milieu” which is the depth of the life of consciousness. It is within this depth that the interrogative experience winds on itself.Secondly, if there truly must be a moment where the Hegelian Zweideutigkeit becomes good ambiguity, it will not suffice to explore preobjective depth; it would still be necessary to discern “the hinge” which is “solid, unwavering” and which “remains irremediably hidden.” It is this unwavering hinge that supports phenomena and that, in simultaneously decentering and recentering the fields of appearances, opens a place where one can follow the genesis of sense.Finally, we note that this discovery of the new ontological milieu can be considered as the recovery of the notion of institution that Merleau-Ponty had proposed in 1954-1955: on the one hand, the notion of chiasm invites us to reveal the hinge which at once decenters and recenters the fields of appearances. This hinge is free from the alternative of nature and culture, of subjective and objective spirit; it is the rootedness of our interrogative experience in brute being, which is not object but starts an indefinite search of self. But, on the other hand, the notion of institution, which is essentially descriptive and factual, makes us better feel the weight of the instituted that is also irremediably hidden. It makes us feel the inertia of the instituting event, as well as its fecundity and its cumulativity.
64. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Jacopo Bodini L’insaisissable présence du présent. La précession du présent sur soi-même comme temporalité de notre époque
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Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy seems devoted to a fundamental task, knowing how to grasp what he calls a “mutation within the relations of man and Being.” Such a mutation concerns, in the first instance, Merleau-Ponty’s time, knowing the era in which he lives and writes: it is a mutation that is given in history, and thus generated by historical events. At the same time, this mutation has to do with the very essence of time, as the ontological counterpart of being itself. It is, in this later instance, a mutation of the temporality of being: of an intimate being, the being of self, of the unconscious; but also of a communal and shared being—assumed universal—the being of history.An oblique reflection on a temporality thus conceived emerges in his course notes, “Institution in Personal and Public History.” Temporality, here considered as the transcendental of institution, the condition of its possibility, reveals itself as antichronological and anti-metaphysical: it escapes the linearity of successive presents, the retrograde movement of the real (which has characterized Western philosophy since Plato), the dialectical movement of history according to Hegel.Indirectly, Merleau-Ponty develops a complex temporal figure—from the structural point of view—where “the past […] takes on the outline of a preparation or premeditation of a present that exceeds it in meaning although it recognizes itself in it.” The past is thus not a former present, but—as mythical past—it is simultaneously in the present itself.This revolution of the temporality of being also affects our time. From the ontological discontinuity emphasized by Merleau-Ponty, the mutation within the relations of man and being happening today seems to be characterized by the loss of all dimensions of time: there is only a present, which, nevertheless, is never present. This is true first of all from a personal point of view: desire no longer pursues its fulfillment—although imaginary and impossible—in the mythical horizon of the past, but rather looks for enjoyment, just as impossible and imaginary, in an elusive present that always exceeds us. This desertification of time also reveals itself in history, where, with and after the postmodern, the present seems to stand out as the only possible temporal dimension, depriving history of its sense and its universality.It seems to us that the philosophy of the later Merleau-Ponty prefigures, or, at least, allows us to think, this subsequent mutation. This is a minor figure, but the subject of significant studies, such as that of “precession,” that can help us not only to understand, but also to re-signify, this mythical present and never present that haunts our time.
65. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Takashi Kakuni L’interrogation et L’intuition : Merleau-Ponty et Schelling
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In the 1956-1957 course titled “The Concept of Nature”, Merleau-Ponty takes up Schelling’s thought. In reading Merleau-Ponty’s text on Schelling’s philosophy, we arrive at a point of contact between the philosophy of natural productivity and the philosophy of intellectual or artistic intuition. Merleau-Ponty seems to discover the Schellingian idea of the absolute as an abyss against the Cartesian idea of God as creator. The Merleau-Pontian interpretation of Schelling’s philosophy of nature and art from his course gives us one of the keys to his unfinished ontology, which is that nature and art, physis and logos, are tied up in the perception of the dimension of being given in painting or poetry, as the analysis of painting in Eye and Mind will show us an organon of the ontology of the savage being.
66. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Stefan Kristensen L’inconscient machinique et L’idée d’une ontologie politique de la chair
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The psychoanalyical notion of the unconscious is often considered as being out of reach for phenomenological thinking. When Merleau-Ponty refl ects on it, he takes the unconscious as the realm, in bodily life, that being not yet conscious, is likely to become conscious. He formulates it in his Résumés de cours with the famous sentence “The unconscious is the sensing itself”. Lacan, facing this interpretation, explains that Merleau-Ponty fails to recongnize the essential discontinuity between consciousness and the unconscious. From that criticism, it is possible to follow the reflection of Félix Guattari who develops, both alone and in collaboration with Gilles Deleuze, a conception of the “machinic unconscious”, a notion that can be read as an attempt to articulate the merleau-pontian and the lacanian approaches and to sketch out a theory of the becoming-subject. My aim in this paper, in speaking about “Merleau-Ponty Tomorrow”, consists therefore in appropriating some of his suggestions in this regard and to detect them in an unexpected context (the writing of Guattari), thereby also noting the differences between them. Through this dialogue, I get to a position where it is possible to outline a critique of the contemporary “theory of the self”, which in myview is unaware of the fact that the self is always already caught in power relations. Guattari’s “micropolitics of desire” allows precisely to account for that and thus to develop the phenomenological approach to the self.
67. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Anne Gléonec Gestalt et incorporation cinématographique : un chemin dans l’esthétique merleau-pontienne
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This article aims to delineate a phenomenology of cinema centered on the double incorporation that Merleau-Ponty’s thought allows us to see at work in film. This incorporation is, first, of the elements in each other, and, second and primarily, of beings themselves, making of cinema a new way of symbolizing thinking and the relation to the other. To understand this double incorporation, we take up the question of the Gestalt and its evolution in the work of Merleau-Ponty, since it is through the Gestalt that Merleau-Ponty not only evades the impasses of the theories, subjectivist as well as objectivist, of movement and image, but also succeeds in establishing—by way of a long and precise dialogue with the new natural sciences—an a-subjective phenomenology of the body. Intersubjectivity finally gives way to an “intercorporeity” that would itself be the ground of a redefinition of imagination and its relationship to perception. We thus find the source of a new aesthetics, where cinema reclaims what is proper to it.
68. Chiasmi International: Volume > 16
Guillaume Carron La virtu sans aucune résignation
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In light of the political facts of his time and his own experience, Merleau-Ponty tries, in the preface to Signs, to detect a general structure of history and culture. Concerned with establishing a concrete philosophy, the French philosopher never detached his political reflection from the particularity of circumstances. This article proposes to take up both the spirit and method of Merleau-Ponty. With regard to the spirit, this is a matter of seeing whether the analyses in the preface to Signs still make sense for us today. With regard to method, we try to develop an interpretation anchored in the current experience of French politics. This rootedness in current events is fundamental if we do not want to betray the concern for contingency, the sign of a concrete political approach. We will find that the ethics of engagement defined by Merleau-Ponty in the expression, “virtu without resignation” could also be the response to certain contemporary problems.
69. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Leonard Lawlor Présentation
70. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Mauro Carbone, Federico Leoni, Ted Toadvine Note des Directeurs
71. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Jacques Garelli Florilège de Poèmes Inédits
72. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Dorel Bucur Le Rapport à Autrui Comme Structure (Gestalt)
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À travers une vision gestaltiste, déjà à l’oeuvre dans la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, cet article essaie de montrer que toutes les difficultés propres à l’interprétation de la problématique du rapport à autrui, notamment celle concernant le fait de ne pouvoir jamais avoir un accès complet à autrui, peuvent être surmontées ou, du moins, peuvent être mises en discussion. Toute la question est de savoir si ce rapport est basé sur une constitution mutuelle, une constitution réductible à ceux qui le constituent, moi ou autrui, ou si ce rapport va au-delà, étant plus et autre chose que les sujets qui entrent en relation, puisqu’il est lui-même quelque chose d’irréductible. Ni réductibilité à moi, comme chez Husserl, ni réductibilité à autrui, celui totalement autre, comme chez Levinas, mais une irréductibilité conciliante de ce rapport qui, en tant que forme, dépend des éléments qui le constituent et, néanmoins, est autre chose qu’eux et leur demeure irréductible.Through a Gestaltist vision, already present in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, this article attempts to show that all difficulties inherent in the interpretation of the problems concerning the relationship to the Other, especially the fact that we can never have complete access to the Other, can be overcome, or at least, put into discussion. The most important question is to know whether this relationship is based on a mutual constitution, one that is reducible to its terms, self or Other, or if this relationship goes beyond its subjects and is something irreducible in itself. This relationship is not reducible to the self, as in Husserl’s work, nor is it reducible to the Other, as something completely Other, as in Levinas, but is a relationship of reconciliatory irreducibility which, while entirely dependent on its constitutive elements, is nevertheless something else irreducible to both.Attraverso una visione gestaltista, già all’opera nella filosofi a di Maurice Merleau-Ponty, cercheremo qui di mostrare come tutte le difficoltà tipiche della problematica del rapporto all’altro, specie quella relativa al fatto che non possiamo mai avere un accesso completo all’altro, possano essere superate o almeno rimesse in questione. L’intero problema dipende da un’opzione di fondo: se cioè tale rapporto sia basato su una reciproca costituzione, ovvero su una costituzione riducibile a coloro che lo costituiscono, cioè l’io e l’altro; o se tale rapporto vada al di là, sia qualcosa di più, o di diverso, rispetto ai soggetti che entrano in rapporto, essendo il rapporto stesso qualcosa di irriducibile. Né riducibilità a me, dunque, come in Husserl, né riducibilità all’Altro, come in Levinas, ma conciliante irriducibilità del rapporto in quanto forma, che pur dipendendo dagli elementi che la costituiscono è altro dagli elementi stessi.
73. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Christopher Lapierre Entre Conscience et Inconscient: Une Lecture du Problème de la Passivité Chez Sartre et Merleau-Ponty
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L’objectif de cet article n’est pas d’étudier les relations complexes que les pensées de Sartre et Merleau-Ponty entretiennent avec la psychanalyse – tâche qui exige à elle seule tout un livre –, mais uniquement de montrer que leur traitement respectif de la subjectivité entretient des rapports frontaliers, parfois conflictuels, avec la problématisation psychanalytique de l’inconscient. C’est donc seulement dans la perspective du problème très général de la « conscience fausse » que seront abordés ces emprunts et échanges sinueux. De ce point de vue, il est nécessaire de préciser le sens attribué à la notion de « conscience » par Sartre et par Merleau-Ponty et, conjointement, le statut qu’ils accordent respectivement à l’inconscient. Le dissensus qui sépare les deux auteurs trouve d’abord sa source dans la fonction et les limites qu’ils assignent à la réflexion.The goal of this article is not to discuss the complex relationship between the works of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and psychoanalysis—such a subject would deserve an entire book—but rather to show that their respective treatments of subjectivity are closely related, sometimes conflicting, with the psychoanalytic problematization of the unconscious. It is therefore only in the perspective of the general problem of false consciousness that these references and sinuous exchanges will be presented. From this point of view, it is necessary to pinpoint the meaning attributed to the notion of ‘consciousness’ by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and conjointly, the status they accord respectively to the unconscious. The disparity between these two philosophers originates in the function and limits they assign to reflection.L’obiettivo di questo articolo non è quello di studiare le complesse relazioni che Sartre e Merleau-Ponty intrattengono con la psicoanalisi – cosa che esigerebbe un libro a sé – ma solo di mostrare che il loro modo di trattare il tema della soggettività intrattiene rapporti di frontiera, talvolta conflittuali, con la problematica psicoanalitica dell’inconscio. Affronteremo il movimento sinuoso di questi prestiti e di questi scambi nella sola prospettiva del problema molto generale della “falsa coscienza”. Da questo punto di vista, sarà necessario precisare il senso attribuito da Sartre e da Merleau-Ponty alla nozione di coscienza e, insieme, a quella di inconscio. Mostreremo quindi che il dissidio tra i due autori trova la sua origine anzitutto nella diversa funzione e nei diversi limiti che essi assegnano alla dimensione della riflessione.
74. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Isabelle Letellier Le Réel et la Non-Altérité de L’Autre: Lacan Avec Merleau-Ponty
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La notion lacanienne de Réel semble a priori constituer un point de rupture entre Lacan et Merleau-Ponty. On chercherait en vain l’angoisse traumatique où se noie le sujet en proie au Réel dans les pages où Merleau-Ponty développe sa philosophie de la chair. Pourtant le philosophe y exprime avec acuité l’absence de frontière entre le moi et l’autre. Cette non-altérité de l’autre entre en singulière résonance avec la confusion du moi et de l’autre dans l’expérience du Réel. L’article revient sur ce paradoxe et tente de le déplier pour montrer en quoi l’ontologie de la chair peut éclairer l’expérience du Réel.The Lacanian notion of the Real seems a priori to constitute a point of rupture between Lacan and Merleau-Ponty. We search in vain for the traumatic anxiety where the subject drowns in the grips of the Real in the pages where Merleau-Ponty develops his philosophy of the flesh. Yet, he insightfully explains the absence of a boundary between the self and the other. This non-alterity of the other enters into a deep resonance with the confusion of the self and the other in the experience of the Real. This article focuses on this paradox and attempts to unfold it in order to show what the ontology of the flesh can illuminate in the experience of the Real.La nozione lacaniana di Reale sembra a priori costituire un punto di rottura tra Lacan e Merleau-Ponty. Cercheremmo invano l’angoscia traumatica del soggetto in preda al Reale nelle pagine in cui Merleau-Ponty sviluppa la sua filosofia della carne. Tuttavia il filosofo arriva a esprimere in maniera penetrante l’assenza di frontiere tra l’io e l’altro. E questa non-alterità dell’altro entra in singolare risonanza con la confusione dell’io e dell’altro propria dell’esperienza del Reale. L’articolo affronta questo paradosso e tenta di dispiegarlo per mostrare in che modo l’esperienza della carne può illuminare l’esperienza del Reale.
75. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Gleisson Roberto Schmidt Merleau-Ponty et la Réhabilitation du Naturalisme Freudien
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Dans cet article, on soutient que Merleau-Ponty, à la fin de sa production philosophique, réhabilite ontologiquement le naturalisme caractéristique à la psychanalyse freudienne. Le philosophe identifie, dans le naturalisme articulé par Freud dans sa théorie, une description de la Nature qui, contrairement au subjectivisme philosophique des philosophies de la conscience, et aussi contrairement au mécanisme causal des sciences naturelles modernes, ne favorise pas une « image fantastique de l’homme, de l’esprit et de l’histoire » contraposée à l’inexorable existence d’une Nature en soi. Ainsi, faire une « psychanalyse de la Nature », analyser les motifs de la réévaluation positive de la théorie freudienne dans les textes ultimes de Merleau-Ponty, implique faire ce qui a été l’intention du philosophe tout au long de la critique dirigée à la psychanalyse, c’est-à-dire : extraire de la théorie psychanalytique freudienne des conséquences philosophiques d’un certain ordre (dans ce cas, dans le domaine de l’ontologie), ce que Freud n’a pas été capable de faire – et qui n’était pas non plus son but.In this article we maintain that at the end of his philosophical work, Merleau-Ponty ontologically rehabilitates the naturalism characteristic of Freudian psychoanalysis. In the naturalism articulated by Freud in his theoretical work, Merleau-Ponty identifies a description of Nature that, contrary to the subjectivism of philosophies of consciousness and also contrary to the mechanistic causality of the contemporary natural sciences, does not favor the “fantastic image of man, spirit and history,” counter-posed to the inexorable existence of Nature in itself. Consequently, to do a psychoanalysis of Nature, to analyze the motifs of a positive reevaluation of Freudian theory in Merleau-Ponty’s last works, implies fulfilling the intention he held all through his critique of psychoanalysis. That is to say, it implies extracting from Freudian psychoanalytic theory particular philosophical results (in this case, in the ontological domain), which Freud himself was not able to do—and which was not his aim.In questo articolo sosteniamo che Merleau-Ponty, al termine del suo percorso filosofico, arriva a riabilitare ontologicamente il naturalismo caratteristico della psicoanalisi freudiana. Il filosofo identifica nel naturalismo articolato da Freud una descrizione della Natura che, contrariamente al soggettivismo delle filosofie della coscienza, e, simmetricamente, al meccanicismo delle moderne scienze naturali, cessa di promuovere un’“immagine fantastica dell’uomo, dello spirito e della storia” contrapposta all’esistenza inesorabile di una Natura in sé. Così, svolgere l’idea di una “psicoanalisi della Natura”, e analizzare i motivi della rivalutazione della teoria freudiana negli ultimi testi di Merleau-Ponty, significa prolungare quella che è stata l’intenzione del filosofo lungo l’intero percorso della sua critica alla psicoanalisi: e cioè estrarre dalla teoria psicoanalitica freudiana conseguenze filosofiche appartenenti a un ordine (ontologico) che Freud non ha saputo raggiungere né si è dato il compito di raggiungere.
76. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Guy-Félix Duportail La Sainte Victoire de Cézanne
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L’intérêt et l’originalité de l’humanisme merleau-pontien consiste à mes yeux dans sa mise en lumière du dévoilement de l’origine refoulée de l’homme dans le registre de l’art et de l’expression du corps en général. Merleau-Ponty a su percevoir exemplairement ce mouvement de récursion vers l’inhumain dans l’oeuvre de Cézanne. « Je vous dois la vérité en peinture disait Cézanne ». Cézanne nous donne en effet la vérité de l’hominisation en peinture. Nul mieux que Merleau-Ponty nous permet d’entendre encore aujourd’hui la voix de Cézanne. Il nous permet de fonder sur l’écho de cette voix un nouvel humanisme, un humanisme qui garde en mémoire l’inhumain, qui lève le refoulement mais sans le supprimer, tout comme l’artiste présente l’invisible du visible et tout comme le philosophe décrit la profondeur de l’être. Cet humanisme de la surrection est celui de l’apparition de l’homme à lui-même dans la constellation hasardeuse des signes et dans l’adversité du non-sens (comme refoulement), à égale distance de l’humanisme sans vergogne des aînés de Merleau-Ponty et de l’antihumanisme postmoderne de ses cadets.The interest and originality of Merleau-Ponty’s humanism lie, in my view, in the unveiling of the repressed origin of humanity in the domain of art and the expression of the body more generally. Merleau-Ponty was able to perceive an example of this recursive movement toward the inhuman in Cézanne’s works. “I owe you the truth in painting,” said Cézanne. In effect, Cézanne gives us the truth of humanization in painting. None better than Merleau-Ponty allows us to hear Cézanne’s voice today. Through the echo of this voice, he allows us to found a new humanism, a humanism that bears the memory of the inhuman, that lifts up the repressed but without effacing it, all while presenting us with the invisible in the visible and exposing the profundity of the human being. This humanism of upheaval is that of the appearance of humanity to itself in a hazardous constellation of signs and in the adversity of non-sense (as repression) set in equal distance from the shameless humanism of Merleau-Ponty’s predecessors and the postmodern antihumanism of those who came after him.L’interesse e l’originalità dell’umanismo merleau-pontyano consiste ai nostri occhi nella sua capacità di disvelare l’origine rimossa dell’uomo nella dimensione dell’arte e dell’espressione corporea in generale. Merleau-Ponty ha saputo percepire esemplarmente questo movimento di ritorno e di ricorso all’inumano nell’opera di Cézanne. “Je vous dois la vérité en peinture”, affermava Cézanne. Egli ci restituisce, in pittura, la verità dell’ominazione. Ancor oggi nessuno meglio di Merleau-Ponty ci consente di intendere la voce di Cézanne. Merleau-Ponty ci consente di fondare sull’eco di quella voce un nuovo umanismo, un umanismo che conserva memoria dell’inumano, che innalza il rimosso senza sopprimerlo, proprio come l’artista presenta l’invisibile del visibile, e il filosofo descrive la profondità dell’essere. Quest’umanismo della “surrezione” è l’umanismo dell’apparizione dell’uomo a se stesso nella costellazione aleatoria dei segni e nell’avversità del non-senso come rimosso, un umanismo che si pone a uguale distanza dall’umanismo senza vergogna dei predecessori di Merleau-Ponty e dell’anti-umanismo postmoderno dei suoi successori.
77. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Anna Caterina Dalmasso L’Artiste et L’Adversité: Hasard et Création Chez Merleau-Ponty
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À plusieurs reprises, Merleau-Ponty tisse une correspondance entre art et histoire, entre pratique artistique et action politique : plus précisément il nous invite à former le concept d’histoire sur l’exemple de l’art. À première vue, un tel rapprochement pourrait paraître abstrait, sinon provocateur, l’art étant souvent conçu comme un domaine qui semble avoir peu à faire avec l’espace de l’action. Mais, nous pouvons aujourd’hui comprendre davantage l’intérêt de l’intuition merleau-pontienne, nous, qui faisons l’expérience de la connexion étroite entre l’univers visuel et le milieu politique ou historique, comme des dimensions devenues désormais inséparables. Au fur et à mesure qu’une conception positiviste de l’histoire ou de la politique entendue comme progrès, ou du moins comme projet, échoue sous nos yeux interdits, la question de l’historicité se fait de plus en plus urgente : Merleau-Ponty nous invite à penser l’histoire comme le « lieu de nos interrogations et de nos étonnements », le lieu d’une réponse, voire d’une responsabilité que nos organismes technologiques exigent. C’est à partir de l’expérience de la création artistique et de son rapport constitutif au hasard qu’une pensée de l’historicité peut s’élaborer, là où l’esthétique merleau-pontienne rejoint le mystère d’un sens historique et esquisse implicitement une éthique de la contingence, en ce qu’elle nous appelle à un exercice de la liberté.Throughout his works, Merleau-Ponty has developed the analogy between art and history, between art practice and political action: more precisely he invites us to think about the concept of history on the example of art. At first sight, such an equivalence could seem abstract, if not provocative, insofar as art is still sometimes regarded as a field having little to share with action. But today, experiencing the close connection between the visual and the political environment, we can understand, perhaps better than his contemporaries, what is at stake in Merleau-Ponty’s insight for a new comprehension of history. Whereas a positivist conception of history and politics understood as progress or project seems to be failing before our astonished eyes, the question of historicity becomes more and more urgent: Merleau-Ponty prompts us to think of history as a mysterious junction between facticity and intention, as the beginning of our wonder, as the place of the responsibility that our technological organisms demand. The experience of creation is the figure through which Merleau-Ponty tries to conceive contingency, which is the kernel of the Geneva conference, later called Man and Adversity. So, drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s constant reference to the operation of artistic creation, especially on the reference to El Greco, I aim at examining how a new conception of history can spring by a comprehension of the experience of creation. I will argue that, from the analysis of the relationship between the artist and the sensible, between the artist and her body, Merleau-Ponty comes to outline what I would call an ethics of contingency, insofar as it calls us to the exercise of our freedom.A più riprese Merleau-Ponty tesse una corrispondenza tra arte e storia, tra pratica artistica e azione politica. Più precisamente egli ci invita a plasmare il nostro concetto di storia sull’esempio dell’arte. A prima vista un simile accostamento può apparire come un’astrazione, se non una provocazione, dato che l’arte è spesso pensata come un ambito che poco ha a che fare con lo spazio dell’azione. Ma oggi possiamo meglio comprendere l’interesse di questa intuizione merleau-pontyana, dato che facciamo esperienza quotidiana della stretta connessione tra l’universo visuale e l’ambiente politico e storico, dimensioni divenute ormai inseparabili. Quanto più sfuma sotto i nostri occhi interdetti ogni idea positivistica della storia o della politica come progresso o almeno come progetto, tanto più la questione della storicità si fa urgente. Merleau-Ponty ci invita a pensare la storia come “il luogo delle nostre interrogazioni e dei nostri stupori”, il luogo di una risposta o di una responsabilità che i nostri organismi tecnologici esigono. È proprio a partire dall’esperienza della creazione artistica e dal suo rapporto costitutivo con l’aleatorietà, che un pensiero della storicità può mettersi in cammino, attingendo a quei luoghi in cui l’estetica merleau-pontyana ritrova il mistero di un senso storico e tratteggia implicitamente un’etica della contingenza capace di richiamarci a un esercizio di libertà.
78. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Claire Dodeman « Un Selbst qui est Un Autre »: La Figure D’Ulysse Chez Paul Ricoeur et Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Ontologie du Soi et Phénoménologie De L’Agir
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L’admiration de Paul Ricoeur pour Merleau-Ponty est connue, lui qui entendait donner à la Phénoménologie de la perception sa « contrepartie pratique » avec le premier tome de la Philosophie de la volonté, Le Volontaire et l’involontaire. Il faut d’emblée s’étonner que celui-ci n’ait pas reconnu la teneur pratique de la philosophie de son aîné, dont les diverses analyses au Collège de France, et en particulier l’intérêt marqué de Merleau-Ponty pour la pensée marxiste comme philosophie de l’homme charnel, et le motif naturaliste de l’être agissant et souffrant à partir de 1956, font état. Car c’est bien depuis ce motif que Ricoeur, en 2004, expose le parcours de la reconnaissance : de l’homme agissant et souffrant, à l’homme capable. L’enjeu, nous semble-t-il alors, de ces deux philosophies en leur dimension pratique se résume aisément par les exigences formulées par Paul Ricoeur dans l’ouvrage Soi-même comme un autre, en particulier lorsque celui-ci se donne pour but de « déterminer les traits nouveaux de l’ipséité correspondant à la pratique politique » – détermination du Soi agent qui se dessine, au dire même de l’auteur, à la croisée d’une phénoménologie de l’agir et d’une ontologie du Soi. En effet, comme le souligne Ricoeur, l’effacement paradoxal de la question de l’ipséité dans la philosophie morale kantienne, entre autres, s’explique par l’absence d’une telle théorie de l’action. En bref, le « Je veux » analysé en 1950 par Ricoeur s’ancre dans un « Je peux », qui ne se limite jamais au seul plan spatial chez Merleau-Ponty. Ainsi, à la figure phénoménologique de nos expériences de la passivité correspond la catégorie ontologique de l’altérité, mentionnée par l’expression du Visible et de l’invisible reprise en titre de cet article et dont l’attribution à Ricoeur ne choquerait pas.Paul Ricoeur’s admiration for Merleau-Ponty is well-known given that he presented his “practical counterpart” to the Phenomenology of Perception in the form of his Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary. One is immediately surprised that this is not recognized as the practical content of his predecessor’s philosophy given the diverse analyses at the Collège de France of which, in particular, the marked interest Merleau-Ponty had in Marxist thought as the philosophy of the fleshly human being, as well as the naturalist motif of the active and suffering being beginning in 1956, are part. For, it is due to this motif that Ricoeur, in 2004, presents the trajectory of recognition: from the active and suffering human being to the capable human being. As we see them, the stakes in these two philosophies, as far as their practical dimensions are concerned, are easily summarized by the requirements Paul Ricoeur formulated in his work, Oneself as Another. This is particularly the case given that this text has for its aim, “determining the new traits of individual identity (ipseity) which correspond to practical politics” – the determination of Self as a self-designing agent, which, according to the author, lies at the intersection of a phenomenology of action and an ontology of the Self. In fact, as Ricoeur himself underlines, the paradoxical effacement of the question of ipseity in Kantian moral philosophy, among others, is explained by the absence of just such a theory of action. Briefly, the “I want” analysis by Ricoeur in 1950 is anchored in the “I can,” which is never limited to the single spatial outline we find in Merleau-Ponty. Thus, to the phenomenological figure of our experiences of passivity correspond the ontological category of alterity, as mentioned in the phrase from The Visible and the Invisible taken up in the title of this article and which it would not be shocking to attribute to Ricoeur.È ben nota l’ammirazione di Paul Ricoeur per Merleau-Ponty: col primo tomo della Philosophie de la volonté, intitolato Le Volontaire et l’involontaire, Paul Ricoeur intendeva offrire alla Fenomenologia della percezione una vera e propria “contropartita pratica”. Ma è singolare il fatto che Ricoeur non abbia riconosciuto il risvolto pratico presente nella filosofia del suo predecessore, risvolto ampiamente attestato nei corsi merleau-pontyani al Collège de France e in particolare nelle lezioni che pongono al centro delle loro analisi il pensiero marxista come filosofia dell’uomo carnale e il motivo naturalistico dell’uomo agente e dell’uomo sofferente almeno a partire dal 1956. È proprio prendendo le mosse da questo motivo che Ricoeur nel 2004 espone quanto definisce come il percorso del riconoscimento: dall’uomo agente e dall’uomo sofferente all’uomo “capace”. La posta in gioco, ci sembra, di queste due filosofie, considerate nella loro dimensione pratica, si riassume facilmente nelle esigenze che Ricoeur formula nel suo libro Sé come un altro, in particolare quando si assegna il compito di “determinare i tratti peculiari dell’ipseità corrispondente alla pratica politica” – cioè di determinare i tratti di quel Sé agente che si delinea, a dire dell’autore stesso, al crocevia tra una fenomenologia dell’agire e un’ontologia del Sé. In effetti, come sottolinea Ricoeur, la paradossale cancellazione dell’ipseità operata dalla filosofia morale kantiana si spiega tra l’altro con l’assenza di una adeguata teoria dell’azione. In breve, l’“Io voglio” analizzato da Ricoeur nel 1950 si àncora in un “Io posso” che non si limita mai, in Merleau-Ponty, al solo piano spaziale. Così, alla figura fenomenologica delle nostre esperienze di passività, corrisponde la categoria ontologica dell’alterità, che proprio Il visibile e l’invisibile menziona con l’espressione che noi riprendiamo nel titolo di questo articolo e che ci si aspetterebbe essere anzitutto ricoeuriana.
79. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Michaël Foessel Le Sens et le Sensible: Le Différend Merleau-Ponty/Ricoeur sur L’Autorité de la Perception
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Avec le Volontaire et l’involontaire, « j’envisageais, non sans naïveté, de donner une contrepartie, dans l’ordre pratique, à la Phénoménologie de la perception ». Une confrontation entre la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty et celle de Paul Ricoeur ne peut faire l’économie de cette caractérisation par le second de son entrée dans le travail philosophique. Cette remarque présente toutefois l’avantage de fixer les termes d’une relation marquée par la proximité méthodologique et la distance thématique. La première semble à première vue l’emporter sur la seconde. Le privilège accordé par Ricoeur à « l’ordre pratique » consonne, certes, avec l’image d’un philosophe essentiellement occupé par le phénomène de l’action. Selon ses propres dires, l’anthropologie de « l’homme capable » constitue le fil conducteur à partir duquel il devient possible de reconstituer l’unité de son oeuvre. Il reste que Merleau-Ponty n’est nullement indifférent à l’« ordre pratique » : pour ne rien dire des textes qu’il consacre expressément au politique, il suffit de rappeler que la Phénoménologie de la perception s’achève sur un chapitre consacré à la liberté. Plus profondément, les deux philosophes se retrouveront pour accorder une place centrale à la phénoménologie du « Je peux ». Pour autant, la distance thématique entre les deux auteurs n’est pas sans importance. Il s’agit moins de savoir comment Ricoeur apporte une « contrepartie » à la Phénoménologie de la perception dans l’ordre pratique, que de comprendre pourquoi son oeuvre n’a accordé qu’un intérêt somme toute secondaire à la perception. Le principal accord entre les deux auteurs réside dans le refus de toute « pensée de survol ». Non moins que Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty renonce à « l’idéal d’un spectateur absolu » parce que cet idéal implique nécessairement de transformer la position de l’interprète en principe d’erreur. Il reste que les deux philosophes diffèrent dans la caractérisation de ce point de vue.With The Voluntary and the Involuntary, “I envisaged, not without some naïveté, to give a counterbalance, in practical order, to the Phenomenology of Perception.” A confrontation between the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and that of Paul Ricoeur cannot do without this characterization by Ricoeur in his entrance into philosophical work. All the same, this remark highlights the advantage of fixing the terms of a relation marked by its methodological proximity and its thematic distance. The former, at first glance, seems to trump the latter. The privilege accorded by Ricoeur to the “practical order” resonates, certainly, with a philosophy essentially concerned with the phenomenon of action. According to its own discourse, the anthropology of the “capable human being” constitutes the guiding thread from which it becomes possible to reconstitute the unity of his oeuvre. It is clear that Merleau-Ponty is in no way indifferent to the “practical order.” Without even mentioning the texts he specifically dedicates to the political, it suffices to remember that the Phenomenology of Perception concludes in a chapter devoted to freedom. More profoundly, the two philosophers will come together in according a central place to the phenomenology of the “I can.” For all this, the thematic distance between the two philosophers is not without importance. It concerns less knowing how Ricoeur brings a “counterbalance” to the Phenomenology of Perception in the practical order than to understand why in his work he accorded ultimately only a secondary interest to perception. The principal agreement between the two philosophers resides in their refusal of all “surveying thought.” Not any less than Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty renounces the “ideal of the absolute spectator” because this ideal necessarily implies the transformation of the position of the interpreter into a principle of error. Nevertheless, the two philosophers differ in the characterization of this point of view.Con Le Volontaire et l’involontaire, scrive Ricoeur, “intendevo, non senza ingenuità, offrire una contropartita d’ordine pratico alla Fenomenologia della percezione”. Un confronto tra il pensiero di Maurice Merleau-Ponty e il pensiero di Paul Ricoeur non può evitare di misurarsi col modo in cui Ricoeur caratterizza, nei termini che abbiamo appena richiamato, il proprio esordio di filosofo. L’osservazione ricoeuriana ha il vantaggio di fissare i termini della loro relazione affermandone la prossimità metodologica e la distanza tematica. La prima dimensione sembra a prima vista prevalere sulla seconda. Il privilegio accordato da Ricoeur all’“ordine pratico” risulta certo consonante con l’immagine di un filosofo essenzialmente occupato dal tema dell’azione. A suo dire, l’antropologia dell’“uomo capace” costituisce il filo conduttore intorno a cui ripensare l’unità della sua intera opera. Resta il fatto che Merleau-Ponty non è in alcun modo indifferente all’“ordine pratico”: per tacere dei testi espressamente incentrati sulla questione del politico, potremmo ricordare che Fenomenologia della percezione si conclude con un capitolo dedicato alla libertà. Più in profondità, i due pensatori si ritrovano ad accordare un funzione decisiva alla fenomenologia dell’“Io posso”. D’altra parte, neppure la distanza tematica tra i due autori va sottovalutata. Non si tratta tanto di capire in che modo Ricoeur arrivi a proporre una “contropartita pratica” alla Fenomenologia della percezione, ma in che modo Ricoeur arrivi ad accordare un interesse tutto sommato secondario alla percezione. Il principale motivo di accordo tra i due autori risiede nel rifiuto di ogni “pensiero di sorvolo”. Non meno di Ricoeur, Merleau-Ponty rinuncia “all’ideale di uno spettatore assoluto”, nella misura in cui questo ideale porterebbe inevitabilmente a trasformare la posizione dell’interprete in un principio di errore. Ma anche sul modo di intendere questo punto di due filosofi prendono strade differenti.
80. Chiasmi International: Volume > 17
Jean-Philippe Pierron La Prose du Monde ou le Monde Comme un Texte?: Ricoeur, Lecteur de Merleau-Ponty
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty et Paul Ricoeur pensent tous deux l’inscription du corps dans la chair du monde, mais ne tirent pas les mêmes conséquences de ce point de départ anthropologique. Le premier creusera toujours plus profond la signification et la portée de toute inscription charnelle en développant une ontologie du sensible, une esthétique de cet entrelacs qui lie l’homme et le monde. Ricoeur, à la différence de son ainé, médiatisera de plus en plus cette inscription dans une herméneutique des identités individuelles et culturelles reconnaissant l’importance structurante des institutions, accentuant la dimension éthique. Entre une quête de l’originaire qui veut retrouver l’expérience d’un être sauvage et une philosophie pour laquelle la vérité est révélation, pour un sujet, d’un sens profond que nous livre une herméneutique de la récollection du sens, quelles affinités et quels motifs de divergence alors ? Le point de rupture, s’il en est un, entre les deux philosophes ne tient-il pas à ce que Ricoeur, fidèle à la tradition réflexive, maintient l’idée d’une personne, au moins capable d’une reprise de l’expérience du monde, là où Merleau-Ponty a cherché à s’en affranchir ? Faut-il opposer une philosophie de la chair et de la « vision » à une philosophie du texte et de la narration jusque dans leurs conséquences pratiques ?If Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur both think the inscription of the body in the “flesh” of the world, they differ as regards the consequences they draw from this anthropological starting point. Merleau-Ponty delves ever deeper into the meaning and scope of this carnal inscription, developing an ontology of the sensible, an aesthetic of the intertwining of human and world. Ricoeur, by contrast, explores the implications of this inscription for a hermeneutics of individual and cultural identities which recognizes the structuring importance of institutions, emphasizing the ethical dimension. But what affinities and what divergences are there between a quest for the originary that wishes to recover the experience of wild being and a philosophy for which truth is revelation, for a subject, of a profound meaning yielded to us by a hermeneutic of the recollection of meaning? Does the point of rupture between the two philosophers, if there is one, lie in the fact that Ricoeur, in faithfulness to the reflexive tradition, maintains the idea of a person capable at least of appropriating the experience of the world, while Merleau-Ponty relinquishes it? Is it necessary to oppose a philosophy of the flesh and of “vision” to a philosophy of the text and of narration even in their practical consequences?Maurice Merleau-Ponty e Paul Ricoeur pensano entrambi l’iscrizione del corpo nella carne del mondo, ma non ricavano le stesse conclusioni da questa comune premessa antropologica. Il primo andrà scavando sempre più a fondo il significato e la portata di ogni iscrizione carnale sviluppando un’ontologia del sensibile, un’estetica dell’intreccio che lega l’uomo e il mondo. Ricoeur medierà sempre più quell’iscrizione andando verso un’ermeneutica delle identità individuali e culturali, riconoscendo l’importanza strutturante delle istituzioni e accentuando il rilievo della dimensione etica. Quali affinità e quali divergenze sussistono allora tra una ricerca dell’originario che mira a ritrovare l’esperienza dell’essere selvaggio e una filosofia che pensa la verità come rivelazione al soggetto di un senso profondo che ci viene restituito dal movimento di un’ermeneutica che ne raccoglie pazientememnte le tracce? Il punto di rottura tra le due prospettive non ha forse a che vedere col fatto che Ricoeur resta fedele alla tradizione della riflessione, conserva l’idea che la persona sia capace di una ripresa dell’esperienza del mondo, mentre Merleau-Ponty cerca di affrancarsene? Dobbiamo allora opporre una filosofia della carne e della “visione” a una filosofia del testo e della narrazione fin nelle loro conseguenze d’ordine pratico?