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61. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Josef Smolka Caramuelův List Markovi Marci Ještě Jednou: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
62. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD Reálné Potence: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
63. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Ludmila Dostálová Organon V. S Podtitulem ? Kolik Práce Za Nás Mohou Udělat Počítače ? Pořádaný 28.–31. Srpna 2006 V Olomouci: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
64. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Petr Dvořák 400. Výročí Jana Caramuela Z Lobkovic Oznámení O Konání Konference: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
65. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Daniel Heider Zpráva o filosoficko-teologické sekci konference Jezuité v českých zemích Bohemia Jesuitica 1556–2006: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
66. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Petr Dvořák Zpráva z konference o analogii ve filosofii a teologii: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
67. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Kamila Pacovská Kritika metaetiky v díle P. Footové a dalších „deskriptivistů“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article aims to present one of the most decisive criticisms of metaethics which resulted in the restoration of substantive ethics in Great Britain in the late fifties. Philippa Foot attacks the basic metaethical presupposition that evaluative meaning is logically independent of descriptive meaning. She concentrates on the semantics of the word “good”. The second, most extensive part of my article summarizes her argumentation for the thesis that evaluative meaning of the latter word can imply some description of the object evaluated. This result can be linked with the rejection of formalistic methods in ethics.
68. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Petr Dvořák Univerzální preskriptivismus R. M. Hara: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article is a critical systematic presentation of R. M. Hare's ethical concepts and doctrine as outlined in his books The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963). The theory merits attention for many reasons, yet it appears to suffer from some weaknesses; the chief among them being the lack of explanation for the source of binding force of moral principles.
69. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Marek Otisk Significatio a Appellatio v sémantice Anselma z Canterbury: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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This paper is consecrated to the problems of the semantics in the Anselm’s philosophy of language – one of the most important parts of his philosophical inquiry. The main care is focused to the analysis of terms veritas and rectitudo, mainly because of significatio and the semantics – e.g. significatio with respect to names (proper and common; infinite, privative and empty). Special passage refers to denominative names, because in their case Anselm of Canterbury makes differences between significatio ( per se, per aliud and ut unum) and appellatio in his semantic analysis.
70. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Stanislav Sousedík František Mayronis o pomyslných jsoucnech: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
71. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Quodlibeti quaestiones Vi. et Vii (De entibus rationis): A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
72. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
David Svoboda Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
73. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
David Peroutka OCD Znovu o abstraktních pojmech: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
74. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Paul E. Oppenheimer, Edward N. Zalta O logice ontologického důkazu: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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In this paper, the authors show that there is a reading of St. Anselm’s ontological argument in Proslogium II that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This reading takes Anselm’s use of the definite description “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” seriously. Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified sentence “there is an x such that…” does not imply “x exists”. Then, using an ordinary logic of descriptions and a connected greater-than relation, God’s existence logically follows from the claims: (a) there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable, and (b) if x does not exist, something greater than x can be conceived. To deny the conclusion, one must deny one of the premises. However, the argument involves no modal inferences and, interestingly, Descartes’ ontological argument can be derived from it.
75. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD Suárezova nauka o receptivních potencích a její ohlas u R. Arriagy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse).
76. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Anselmův ontologický důkaz očima teorie abstraktních objektů: Úvodní poznámka
77. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Machula Les quatre causes de l’être selon la philosophie premiére d’Aristote: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
78. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
David Peroutka OCD K Novákově odpovědi: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
79. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík Základní fenomény lidského bytí očima filosofie. Témata týkající se života každého člověka.: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
80. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Lukáš Novák Problém abstraktních pojmů: Odpověď Davidu Peroutkovi