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61. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Name Index
62. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Lassaad Elouaer Histoire réelle et spéculation théorique dans la philosophie de Hegel
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Nous proposons dans cette communication d'etudier le rapport entre «le reel empirique» et «la raison theorique» dans le Systeme hegelien. L'objectif est de detacher Tun de l'autre ces deux concepts afin de voir la structure interne de l'esprit qui ne depend pas de la necessite objective du processus empirique dudeveloppement de l'histoire. Dans ce detachement possible, il convient d'interroger la conception hegelienne de la liberte de l'homme dans le monde.
63. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Maria Borges Emotions and Practical Reason in Kant
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In this paper, I shall discuss the relation between practical reason and emotions in Kant. First, I begin by explaining why knowledge of emotions is important for the transcendental project in the moral domain, understood as the claim that reason can determine our actions, in spite of our inclinations. Second, I explain the definition of affects and passions in Kant's philosophy and relate the two to feelings and the faculty of desire. I then question the possibility of controlling emotions, showing that it is, if not an altogether impossible task, at least a difficult one. I show that while affects present a momentary loss of control, they can still coexist with practical reason. Passions, however, may ground principles for actions, and represent a serious danger for rational mastery over inclinations.
64. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Contributors
65. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Simon Lumsden Realism and Idealism in Fichte's theory of Subjectivity
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Kant's account of subjectivity is ambiguous: there is an implicit critique of Descartes in Kaaat, but this is in conflict with more Cartesian aspects of his approach to subjectivity. Fichte develops the critical elements of Kant and turns them against Kant's residual Cartesianism. Fichte, in the various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, is the first to be aware of the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness. In those texts he presents his alternative model for subjectivity by trying to conceive of selfconsciousness such that the self-relation makes no separation between thinker and thought. While Fichte's insight into the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness is generally accepted, his own account of the character of the immediate self-relation, which he presents as the alternative to the reflective model, was never satisfactorily resolved. The exposition of Fichte will examine his theory of subjectivity in relation to the central notion of striving; it will be argued that the notion of a striving subject tries to reconcile the dichotomy of idealism and realism.
66. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Sophie Grapotte La Guerre au Service de la Paix
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Dans cette communication, je me propose de mettre en avant que si la guerre est, il est vrai, le moyen licite qu'utilise les Etats pour acquerir et conserver leur droit ä l'etat de nature, eile est egalement et fondamentalement le ressort du passage de l'etat de nature ä l'etat civique, condition d'une pacification possible. De meme que la propension ä philosopher, ä batailler en faveur de sa philosophie et finalement en se rassemblant dans des camps qui s'opposent ä mener une guerre ouverte, doit etre consideree comme "une des dispositions bienfaisantes et sages de la Nature, par laquelle eile cherche ä ecarter des hommes le grand malheur d'un corps vivant voue ä se corrompre" (AK VIII 414), la guerre est, nous allons le voir, l'un des arrangements preparatoires que prend la Nature pour rendre la paix necessaire et l'un des moyens auquel eile recourt pour contraindre les Etats ä se donner une constitution et ä nouer des relations exterieures legales propres ä conduire ä la paix permanente, bref, une ruse de Tingenieuse et grande ouvriere" pour realiser son but: "faire naitre parmi les hommes, contre leur intention, l'harmonie du sein meme de leurs discordes." (AK VIII 360-361)
67. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Gustavo Sarmiento El método de la metafísica en la Dissertatio de Kant
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En este trabajo examinamos el metodo de la metafisica segün la Disertaciön Inaugural de Kant. Para resolver los problemas de este saber, Kant distingue entre dos componentes del conocimiento humano, una intelectual, que aprehende los objetos como son en si mismos, y otra sensible, que conoce el objeto tal como se nos aparece subjetivamente, cada una con su propio ämbito de validez. Para la metafisica, sostiene Kant, es fundamental mantenerse como conocimiento intelectual puro, lo cual requiere que no sea contaminada por principios y leyes del conocimiento sensible, porque los conocimientos intelectuales no contaminados por el conocimiento sensitivo son verdaderos. Ahora bien, es preciso estar alerta para descubrir los trucos que emplea el conocimiento sensitivo para hacerse pasar por conocimiento intelectual. A fin de poner de relieve estas fuentes de error en la metafisica, Kant emprende la clasificaciön de las falacias de subrepciön por medio de las cuales diversas condiciones sensitivas del conocimiento de los objetos en la experiencia son tomadas como condiciones intelectuales de la posibilidad de los objetos en si mismos. De manera general, Kant piensa que no se debe predicar de los conceptos intelectuales nada que pertenezca a las relaciones de espacio y tiempo. Cuando ello ocurre se trata del conocimiento sensible de un objeto que se subsume bajo el concepto intelectual, pero esto no nos autoriza a pensar que el objeto tal cual es en si mismo este sometido a espacio y tiempo. El anälisis kantiano de las falacias de subrepciön revela asimismo un papel de los conceptos intelectuales en la experiencia, que anticipa -hasta cierto punto- la funciön de la inteligencia en la organizaciön de la experiencia, a traves de ciertos conceptos intelectuales, que en la Critica de la Razön Pura constituirän las categorias del entendimiento, aunque Kant todavia no descubre la division de la facultad superior en entendimiento y razön.
68. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Michael Rahnfeld Carnaps Kontinuum der induktiven Methoden als präzises Beispiel für Nietzsches Doktrin der unbegrenzten Zahl möglicher Interpretationen der Welt
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Der Beitrag zeigt, dass sich Nietzsches erkenntnistheoretische Position als konventionalistisch, pluralistisch, pragmatisch und evolutionär charakterisieren lässt. In diesen wesentlichen Punkten antizipiert sie moderne Ansätze, wie am Beispiel Carnaps Induktiver Logik gezeigt wird. In der sog. CLFunktion beruhen die Behauptungen über L auf s y n t h e t i s c h - a p r i o r i s c h e n Annahmen, die den Uniformitätsgrad des Gegenstandbereiches betreffen. Diese Annahmen lassen sich als konventionelle Festsetzungen deuten, die sich nach den erzielten pragmatischen Erfolgen richten. Es ist naheliegend anzunehmen, dass sich ein adäquates L in der Praxis nach evolutionären Mechanismen herauskristallisiert. Dennoch bleibt stets ein ganzes Kontinuum möglicher konventioneller Bestimmungen von L als rationale Alternative bestehen.
69. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Timothy M. Costelloe "So forward to imagine": Locke and Hume on Primary and Secondary Qualities
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This paper argues that an important feature of Locke's doctrine concerning primary and secondary qualities is also central to Hume's thinking. Section one considers Locke's distinction, presenting it in terms of an "error theory." Locke argues that we attribute secondary qualities to objects and that in so doing give those qualities an ontological status they do not otherwise possess. Locke completes his theory by drawing on the concept of "resemblance" to explain why such mistakes occur in the first place. Section two turns to Hume's philosophy, arguing that, despite his ambiguous comments on Locke and "the modern philosophy," he employs an error theory of the sort developed by Locke. This contention is supported by way of Hume's treatment of beauty as a secondary quality or sentiment which arises in an individual who judges an object beautiful. The paper concludes by emphasizing that, for Hume, this philosophical explanation of beauty stands in contrast to the error committed in common life where, as in Locke's account, people make the mistake of taking beauty to be in the object itself.
70. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 10
Andrew Payne Emerson on Socrates and the Tyranny of the Majority
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Emerson's Representative Men reveals his awareness of the dangers of the tyranny of the majority and his admiration for figures of great genius. These trends of thought, which led Emerson's contemporaries Carlyle and Nietzsche to reject democracy, are combined in Emerson with support for democracy. To understand and justify Emerson's combination of fear of the tyranny of the majority, admiration for genius, and support for democracy, it is helpful to examine his portrait of Socrates in Representative Men. Emerson's Socrates is a figure of genius who, by his ironic profession of ignorance and demonstration of moral truths, is capable of freeing the citizen of a democracy from the tyranny of the majority.