Narrow search


By category:

By publication type:

By language:

By journals:

By document type:


Displaying: 501-520 of 12070 documents

0.112 sec

501. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 5
New Books
502. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 5
Brian Embry Counterfactuals without Possible Worlds? A Difficulty for Fine’s Exact Semantics for Counterfactuals
503. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 5
Shen-yi Liao, Tyler Doggett The Imagination Box
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Imaginative immersion refers to a phenomenon in which one loses oneself in make-believe. Susanna Schellenberg says that the best explanation of imaginative immersion involves a radical revision to cognitive architecture. Instead of there being an attitude of belief and a distinct attitude of imagination, there should only be one attitude that represents a continuum between belief and imagination. We argue otherwise. Although imaginative immersion is a crucial data point for theorizing about the imagination, positing a continuum between belief and imagination is neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining the phenomenon. In addition, arguing against Schellenberg’s account reveals important but underappreciated lessons for theorizing about the imagination and for interpreting boxological representations of the mind.
504. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 6
New Books
505. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 6
Neil Mehta The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
Consider two deeply appealing thoughts: first, that we experience external particulars, and second, that what it’s like to have an experience – the phenomenal character of an experience – is somehow independent of external particulars. The first thought is readily captured by phenomenal particularism, the view that external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. The second thought is readily captured by phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character. Here I show that a novel version of phenomenal generalism can capture both thoughts in a satisfying fashion. Along the way, I reveal severe problems facing phenomenal particularism and also shed light on the mental kinds under which experiences fall.
506. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 6
New Anthologies
507. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 6
Eric Swanson Ordering Supervaluationism, Counterpart Theory, and Ersatz Fundamentality
508. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 7
Lei Zhong Sophisticated Exclusion and Sophisticated Causation
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The Exclusion Argument, which aims to deny the causal efficacy of irreducible mental properties, is probably the most serious threat to non-reductive physicalism. Many non-reductivist responses can only reject simplified versions of the exclusion argument, but fail to refute a sophisticated version. In this paper, I attempt to show that we can block the sophisticated exclusion argument by appeal to a sophisticated understanding of causation, what I call the ‘Dual-condition Conception of Causation’. Specifically, I argue that the dual-condition account of causation motivates an Autonomy approach to solving the exclusion problem (whereas this account of causation challenges the Overdetermination approach). According to the autonomy solution, even if mental properties are unable to cause fundamental physical properties, they can still cause higher-level properties (such as mental, behavioral, and social properties)—if so, human agency would be preserved in the physical world.
509. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 7
New Books: Translations
510. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 7
Darren Bradley A Relevant Alternatives Solution to the Bootstrapping and Self-Knowledge Problems
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
The main argument given for relevant alternatives theories of knowledge has been that they answer scepticism about the external world. I will argue that relevant alternatives also solve two other problems that have been much discussed in recent years, a) the bootstrapping problem and b) the apparent conflict between semantic externalism and armchair self-knowledge. Furthermore, I will argue that scepticism and Mooreanism can be embedded within the relevant alternatives framework.
511. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 7
Jan Almäng Tense as a Feature of Perceptual Content
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
In recent years the idea that perceptual content is tensed in the sense that we can perceive objects as present or as past has come under attack. In this paper the notion of tensed content is to the contrary defended. The paper argues that assuming that something like an intentionalistic theory of perception is correct, it is very reasonable to suppose that perceptual content is tensed, and that a denial of this notion requires a denial of some intuitively very plausible principles. The paper discusses some common objections against the notion of tensed content and concludes that none of them succeeds in showing that perceptual content cannot be tensed.
512. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
Matthew Braham, Martin van Hees The Impossibility of Pure Libertarianism
513. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
Kai Hauser, W. Hugh Woodin Strong Axioms of Infinity and the Debate About Realism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
One of the most distinctive and intriguing developments of modern set theory has been the realization that, despite widely divergent incentives for strengthening the standard axioms, there is essentially only one way of ascending the higher reaches of infinity. To the mathematical realist the unexpected convergence suggests that all these axiomatic extensions describe different aspects of the same underlying reality.
514. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
Fred Rush The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy, 1795–1804 by Dalia Nassar
515. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 8
New Books
516. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Amie L. Thomasson Quizzical Ontology and Easy Ontology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper examines what’s at stake in which form of metaontological deflationism we adopt. Stephen Yablo has argued for a ‘quizzicalist’ approach, holding that many ontological questions are ‘moot’ in the sense that there is simply nothing to settle them. Defenders of the ‘easy approach’ to ontology, by contrast, think not that these questions are unsettled, but that they are very easily settled by trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises—so obviously and easily settled that there is no point debating them. The views may differ in terms of how far the deflation extends—while easy ontology deflates debates about ordinary objects, Yablo doesn’t think his view does. But the crucial underlying difference lies in whether we think there are ontological presuppositions for introducing terminology.
517. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
C. S. I. Jenkins Serious Verbal Disputes: Ontology, Metaontology, and Analyticity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions
This paper builds on some important recent work by Amie Thomasson, wherein she argues that recent disputes about the existence of ordinary objects have arisen due to eliminiativist metaphysicians’ misunderstandings. Some, she argues, are mistaken about how the language of quantification works, while others neglect the existence and significance of certain analytic entailments. Thomasson claims that once these misunderstandings are cleared away, it is trivially easy to answer existence questions about ordinary objects using everyday empirical methods of investigation. She reveals how two conflicting metaontologies can lead to different positions in the first-order debate. In this paper, I bring a third metaontological perspective to the table: one that enables us to maintain that ontological disputes about ordinary objects are not trivially easy to settle, even if we agree with Thomasson that they are merely verbal. These are serious verbal disputes.
518. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Kristie Lyn Miller Defending Substantivism about Disputes in the Metaphysics of Composition
519. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Stephen Yablo Carnap’s Paradox and Easy Ontology
520. The Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 111 > Issue: 9/10
Wolfgang Mann, Achille C. Varzi Foreword