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51. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Joona Taipale The Anachronous Other: Empathy and Transference in Early Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis
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This article discusses our experience of other people from both phenomenological and psychoanalytic perspectives. Drawing on Husserl and Freud, I will distinguish between different temporal modes of the other: while Husserl carefully examines the ways in which others are constituted as synchronous (present) or as asynchronous (past), Freud underlines that others may also appear in a temporally displaced, anachronous manner, whereby one’s experience of some past other dominates in the experience of the present other. Freud discusses this third kind of relationship to the other under the rubric “transference”. The main objective of this article is to argue that the Freudian concept of transference is a structural element in our experience of others, and that, in this respect, the psychoanalytic concept of transference should be seen as complementing the phenomenological account of empathy and interpersonal understanding.
52. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran The Emotions in Early Phenomenology
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This paper off ers an overview of certain key features of the accounts of emotion defended by the early phenomenologists. After briefly presenting the movement of early phenomenology and describing its historical context, I shall elaborate the main claims about the emotions defended by this group, articulating them through the following five topics: 1) the stratification of emotional life; 2) the qualitative aspect of emotional experience; 3) the foundation of the emotions in cognitive acts; 4) the intentionality of feeling and the emotions; and 5) their moral dimension. Th e paper finishes with some concluding remarks about the significance of the early phenomenological discussion of the emotions for the debate on this topic in contemporary analytical philosophy.
53. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Kristjan Laasik Wilhelm Schapp on Seeing Distant Things
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In 1909, Wilhelm Schapp, a student of Edmund Husserl’s at Göttingen, defended his doctoral thesis, Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. In this text, Schapp argues that color presents things to the sense of sight by contributing a certain order, or form, that manifests itself in the orderly, predictable variation of perspectives, in the course of experience. He also argues that we do not visually perceive certain distant things, like a house far down in the valley, due to a lack of such color order. While accepting, with qualifications, Schapp’s claim concerning the need for a color order, I will argue that we can visually perceive distant things. I will also argue that Schapp’s discussion of distant things is, nevertheless, of current interest, viz., by comparison of his views with Alva Noë’s recent arguments to the effect that we do not visually perceive distant objects.
54. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Mariano Crespo Moritz Geiger on the Consciousness of Feelings
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Moritz Geiger was one of the most significant members of the early phase of the phenomenological movement. His work on the consciousness of feelings constitutes an example of careful phenomenological analysis. The central question Geiger raised is this: how are feelings given to consciousness when they are “fully lived” (vollerlebt)? As I seek to prove, the principal result of his analysis is to point out a way of being oriented towards feelings without objectifying them. Geiger’s analysis of the consciousness of feelings is a masterpiece of phenomenological precision. It is reasonable to think that it influenced the way Husserl conceived of something so decisive as emotive intentionality.
55. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Bernardo Ainbinder From Neo-Kantianism to Phenomenology. Emil Lask’s Revision of Transcendental Philosophy: Objectivism, Reduction, Motivation
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Recently, Emil Lask’s work has been the object of renewed interest. As it has been noted, Lask’s work is much closer to phenomenology than that of his fellow Neo-Kantians. Many recent contributions to current discussions on this topic have compared his account of logic to Husserl’s. Less attention has been paid to Lask’s original metaphilosophical insights. In this paper, I explore Lask’s conception of transcendental philosophy to show how it led him to a phenomenological conversion. Lask found in Husserl’s Logical Investigations the possibility of grounding transcendental philosophy in purely objective terms, thus avoiding any risk of psychologism. But he also concluded that the tools found in Logical Investigations needed to be complemented by a method which would inquire back fr om the constituted to the constituting (anticipating Husserlian reduction) and a way of grounding such a methodological move in experience itself (anticipating Husserlian motivation). Lask then provided a model for reduction and motivation without bringing a transcendental ego into the picture.
56. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Timothy Martell Cassirer and Husserl on the Phenomenology of Perception
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This paper creates a dialogue between Ernst Cassirer, one of the last prominent representatives of Neo-Kantian thought, and Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. In Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer criticizes Husserl’s distinction between hylē and morphē. His criticism is based in part on the work of several figures belonging to the early phase of the phenomenological movement, including Wilhelm Schapp. By developing Cassirer’s criticism and considering the responses that Husserl could have offered, the dialogue helps to clarify the complex relationship between Cassirer’s philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology. It also reveals some of the ways in which early phenomenology influenced other philosophical movements. But dialogue between Cassirer and Husserl is of more than historical interest. I argue that Husserl would not have had an adequate response to Cassirer’s objections. Cassirer’s criticism of Husserl thus remains relevant for present day research in phenomenology.
57. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Matthew Schunke Revealing Givenness: The Problem of Non-Intuited Phenomena in Jean-Luc Marion’s Phenomenology
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This article questions Jean-Luc Marion’s move away from intuition and shows how it risks the promise of his account of religion by returning to metaphysics and speculation. My aim is not to ask whether Marion’s phenomenology can adequately account for religious phenomena, but to ask whether Marion’s account of revelation meets his own phenomenological principle — that one must rely on the phenomenon to establish the limits of phenomenology — which he establishes to guard against metaphysics and speculation. To this end, I demonstrate how Marion drifts from his phenomenological principle when he claims that revelation is a phenomenon given without intuition. This drift leads to criticisms that he is leading phenomenology toward speculative philosophy and sneaking revelation in through the back door. I then show the detrimental consequences for both his phenomenological and theological projects and how he could better achieve the goals of both projects by maintaining the role of intuition.
58. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Garrett Zantow Bredeson Sebastian Luft (ed.), The Neo-Kantian Reader
59. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Mădălina Diaconu Richard Shusterman, Körper-Bewusstsein. Für eine Philosophie der Somästhetik
60. Studia Phaenomenologica: Volume > 15
Tibor Földes Alessandro Salice (ed.), Intentionality: Historical and Systematic Perspectives